House Committee Would Tie All Pakistan Aid to Security Conditions. (A Terrible Idea.)
7/20/11
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Last week, I asked whether a long-term U.S. development strategy in Pakistan could survive the especially stormy episode in the security relationship whipped up since the killing of Osama bin Laden. This week brought signs that, sadly, point to no.
Today, the House Foreign Affairs Committee is debating a bill that (among other things) would for the first time tie all economic assistance to Pakistan to conditions unrelated to development or democracy. Under the House bill, if the Obama administration cannot certify that Pakistan’s military is preventing the Taliban and associated groups (including the controversial Haqqani network) from operating inside Pakistan, all aid—security-related and economic—would be cut off.
My last post already covered why this is absolutely counterproductive. In brief, I cannot imagine a scenario in which tying economic assistance to U.S. short-term security goals will help to achieve those goals. The notion that a relatively small amount of civilian aid will change the strategic calculus of the Pakistani military is simply ludicrous. Meanwhile, attempting to use civilian aid as security leverage would upset the fragile two-track strategy that has guided U.S. strategy in Pakistan for the past several years.
American leaders from President Obama and Senator Richard Lugar down the line have told the Pakistani people that the United States has an enduring interest in their long-term success. Given the United States’ fickle history, convincing anyone in Pakistan that there is any seriousness behind that statement has been understandably difficult to say the least. For sure, the development program could be more effective than it has been, and U.S. staff in Islamabad could do much better at communicating their plans and activities. However, the fundamental foreign policy structure is correct: a steady, long-term development strategy that includes both aid and non-aid tools, separated from the constantly changing short-term security relationship.
Earlier drafts of this legislation left this structure intact. They placed new conditions to the economic aid to Pakistan—but they were conditions that were aimed at making the troubled development program more focused and effective on its own objectives. The conditions (still present in the current draft) would for example, require the administration to define measurable indicators of progress for the civilian program, describe how it’s sharing information on aid spending in Pakistan online (something they’ve promised to do better for over a year), and discuss how trade and other policies could be used to spur private sector growth and job creation in Pakistan. To those of us who want to see an effective U.S. development strategy in Pakistan, these were positive steps.
Just this week, though, something changed. The committee majority added six words of legalese – “the certification required under section 203(c)”—that entirely erase the separation between long-term development aid and short-term security leverage. (Section 203(c) contains all the conditions placed on security-related aid. This is what the relevant sections of Kerry-Lugar-Berman look like as amended.) On first read, I didn’t even notice that little clause. Based on my earlier reading, I was all set to endorse the HFAC draft as a coolheaded, sensible piece of legislation. But that clause changed a sensible piece of legislation into one that will create more problems than it will solve.
In 2009, when the Kerry-Lugar-Berman aid package originally passed, there were protests in Pakistan over false rumors that the economic aid in the bill came with onerous strings attached, conditions that would undercut Pakistani sovereignty. If the current House draft were to become law, this time around, those rumors would be firmly based in fact.
The only saving grace is that this piece of legislation is extremely unlikely to be enacted. After all, no State Department authorization bill has become law in six years. The real action will likely be in the relevant Appropriations subcommittee, which will consider its own bill next week. We can only hope the appropriators will maintain their support for a long-term development program, more or less shielded from the ups and down of a short-term security relationship. (Given the choice, I personally would be OK with a smaller aid program if it meant the Pakistan development strategy could focus on development.) Here again, however, things do not look hopeful.
Last Friday, Nancy Birdsall, Milan Vaishnav and I went to the Pentagon to present our work on U.S. development strategy in Pakistan to a room of military officers and others whose chief focus is eliminating threats to U.S. national security. While the session was not-for-attribution, it was clear that this military audience grasped the importance of a long-term development strategy in Pakistan to the success of their own mission. Absent a stable, functional state in Pakistan, the United States will be worrying about this country once again in 10 or 20 years. Congress can send an unambiguous message about Pakistan’s cooperation on security issues without making the long-term development mission collateral damage.
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