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# Notes

## Chapter One

1. *Foreign aid* for the purposes of this book is defined as the transfer of economic resources (loans, grants, or in-kind transfers like food) on concessional terms (with a minimum of 25 percent grant element current value) from one government to another government, international organization, or nongovernmental entity, one purpose of which is to better the human condition in the recipient country. This definition is very close to the one used by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, except it does not set a minimum per capita income level for countries receiving foreign aid. Thus, in my definition, aid to Israel and other middle-income countries is included as foreign aid.

2. *Development* is a concept with many meanings—usually sustained economic growth and poverty reduction—but it can also include democratization, social inclusion, strengthening public institutions and capacity, and the opportunity to realize one’s full capabilities.

3. See U.S. National Security Strategy, 2002 and 2006 ([www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/](http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/) and [www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/](http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/)).

4. Other potential public instruments for promoting development abroad include trade policies (trade preferences for exports of developing countries to U.S. markets), policies affecting U.S. foreign investment, and, in recent decades, immigration policies. While there have been some trade policies shaped to further prosperity in poor countries (African Growth and Opportunity Act), these have tended to be limited since trade policy is strongly tied to domestic political interests within the United States.

5. The data on U.S. foreign aid in this study are taken from USAID’s website, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook) (<http://quesdb.cdie.org/gbk/index.html>). These data cover grants (net obligations) and loans (net authorizations). Where these data are not available, appropriations and disbursement data are

used. The data cover multilateral and bilateral economic aid from all U.S. government agencies. The data are on a U.S. fiscal year basis.

6. The United States is still the largest donor in absolute terms.

7. I am using the term *purposes* here to mean major, discrete objectives of foreign aid that are ends in themselves. These include promoting U.S. diplomatic goals, furthering development, which is both an end in itself and a means to achieve U.S. diplomatic goals, addressing global issues, providing humanitarian relief, supporting economic and political transitions in former socialist countries, promoting democracy (both as an end and a means), preventing and mitigating conflict, strengthening fragile states, and furthering commercial interests. Many of these overlap in the types of activities they involve. Some, such as strengthening fragile states, are as yet limited since we have much to learn about such states and how to influence them. Promotion of commercial interests abroad is not a major driver of U.S. aid.

8. I am not taking sides here in the sterile debate between Jeffrey Sachs and Bill Easterly that, on the one hand, more aid is imperative (a “big push” approach to tackling world poverty) and, on the other, aid has been largely ineffective and should be sharply reduced or eliminated. It is clear that aid is not the solution to all development problems; it can even at times make them worse. Nor is it the case that most aid has clearly failed to realize its development goals. Aid effectiveness depends on who gets it and how it is used and implemented. Greatly increased aid provided to the wrong government or recipient organization (that is, one that lacks the capacity or probity to use it well) is a waste, or worse. And aid can create perverse as well as beneficial incentives if provided in sufficient quantity, another qualifying element in the aid effectiveness debate. But there are many activities important to growth and poverty reduction that can usefully be funded by considerably more aid, as they have been in the past. Thus, if there is a hidden assumption in this book, it is that more aid, wisely used, can be better.

## Chapter Two

1. “Near abroad” refers to those countries bordering Russia that had been part of the former Soviet Union and in which Moscow continues to take a special interest.

2. There was an effort by some in government and the scholarly and policy communities to frame environmental and international health issues as security threats to the United States. See, for example, Thomas Homer-Dixon, *Environment, Scarcity and Violence* (Princeton University Press, 2001); see also endnote 19 below. But this view never proved convincing enough to catch on. The tactic reflects a view that if a policy goal can be justified in security terms, it is likely to be much more compelling politically in the U.S. system.

3. U.S. government spending is typically divided into discretionary and mandated categories. The level of the latter type of expenditures, like Social Security, agricultural subsidies, or Medicaid, is required by law. The former expenditures are the choice of the executive branch and Congress. In 2006 roughly one-third of the federal budget was discretionary. Foreign aid represented 4 percent of discretionary spending with defense and domestic expenditures making up the remaining 96 percent. See Congressional Budget Office data ([www.cbo.gov/budget/data/historical.xls](http://www.cbo.gov/budget/data/historical.xls)).

4. A recent trip report by staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee observed, “USAID may be viewed as the neglected stepchild in DC but in the field it is clear that USAID plays either the designated hitter or the indispensable utility infielder for almost all foreign assistance launched from post.” See *Embassies Grapple to Guide Foreign Aid*, report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 2007, p. 2.

5. Actually, raiding the aid budget was my informal job description as a deputy assistant secretary of state for Africa, and I was not alone.

6. The trend toward fragmentation was also driven by globalization and the realization that it was difficult to deal with environmental, health, or energy issues at home without addressing those same issues abroad. Secretaries in most federal departments preferred to control their own monies rather than place them in USAID or have to request expenditures abroad from USAID. Criticisms of USAID in Washington made these decisions easier, and neither OMB nor the White House resisted them (nor were they necessarily aware at the leadership level of their existence).

7. Relatively little has been written about the IDCA effort. For a brief history, see Vernon Ruttan, *United States Development Assistance Policy* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 119–20. This book is the best history of U.S. aid.

8. Perhaps the most influential statement of this concept of how and why policies suddenly change is by John Kingdon in his book *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies* (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1995). Arguably another policy window opened on aid in the years following 9/11 during which the Bush administration could get most of what it wanted out of Congress. But it did not have an overall concept of what it wanted to do with U.S. aid at that time. The window appears now to be closed.

9. I am not aware of any published records of this; but I was USAID deputy administrator at the time, and since it was my idea and I pushed it with the vice president and his study group, I must serve as the primary source for this fact.

10. One small change was that USAID returned to the earlier practice of sending its budget to OMB through the secretary of state. But it also continued to send it directly to OMB as well.

11. He did win in another area: two other agencies, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the U.S. Information Agency, were both folded into the Department of State.

12. Development Assistance Committee, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, *The United States*, Paris, 2006 ([www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/57/37885999.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/57/37885999.pdf)).

13. Personal correspondence with Patrick Cronin, who was with USAID in the early years of the Bush administration.

14. See “MCA Monitor Analysis” on the Center for Global Development website for history and commentary on the MCC and MCA ([www.cgdev.org/content/publications/?type=63](http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/?type=63)). See also Steve Radelet, “The Millennium Challenge Account in Africa: Promises vs. Progress,” testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, June 28, 2007; Sarah Lucas, “Lessons from Seven Countries: Reflections on the Millennium Challenge Account,” April 2007. Both of these documents are available on the Center for Global Development website ([www.cgdev.org](http://www.cgdev.org)). See also David Gootnick, “Millennium Challenge Corporation: Progress and Challenges with Compacts in Africa,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, June 28, 2007 ([www.gao.gov/new.items/d05625t.pdf](http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05625t.pdf)).

15. Data come from the MCC website, “Countries” ([www.mcc.gov/countries/index.php](http://www.mcc.gov/countries/index.php)).

16. Senate Report 110–128, *Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2008* ([http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/R?cp110:FLD010:@1\(sr128\)](http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/R?cp110:FLD010:@1(sr128)), June 2007). Only eleven compacts had been signed at the time of publication of this report. Several more were added in 2007. While there are differences among the experts on the MCC on how spending should be regarded (for example, commitments versus disbursements), it is hard to argue against the implicit assumption on the part of Congress that it is disbursements that count—action rather than intention—and that these have not only been slow by any measure but have been well below planned levels in MCC compacts. It is widely expected that disbursements will pick up as the MCC gains more experience, as needed institutions are put in place in recipient countries, and as expenditures commence. But only time will tell.

17. As a number of experts on PEPFAR have pointed out to me, this last announcing of doubling funding to \$30 billion over five years was less than it seemed since Congress was already appropriating \$6 billion per year for the program, which if continued over five years would amount to more than \$30 billion. For policy analysis of PEPFAR’s activities, see the Center for Global Development, *HIV/AIDS Monitor* ([www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/\\_active/hivmonitor](http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/hivmonitor)) and PEPFAR Watch ([www.pepfarwatch.org/](http://www.pepfarwatch.org/)).

18. Center for Strategic and International Studies, “PEPFAR Reauthorization: Looking Forward,” transcript of discussion, p. 13 ([www.kaisernetwork.org/health\\_cast/hcast\\_index.cfm?display=detail&hc=2145](http://www.kaisernetwork.org/health_cast/hcast_index.cfm?display=detail&hc=2145)).

19. For an excellent analysis of the politics of PEPFAR, see John W. Dietrich, “The Politics of PEPFAR: The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief,” *Ethics*

*and International Affairs* 21, no. 3 (Fall 2007): 277–92 ([www.cceia.org/resources/journal/21\\_3/essay/001.html](http://www.cceia.org/resources/journal/21_3/essay/001.html)).

20. Randall Tobias, “The New Approach to U.S. Foreign Assistance,” remarks at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Gala, Washington, D.C., November 17, 2006 ([www.state.gov/f/releases/remarks2006/78284.htm](http://www.state.gov/f/releases/remarks2006/78284.htm)).

21. The F framework was somewhat different from the USAID framework, but the approach of classifying countries according to their economic conditions and shaping aid to address those conditions was the same. The white paper can be found at USAID’s website ([www.usaid.gov/policy/pdabz3221.pdf](http://www.usaid.gov/policy/pdabz3221.pdf)).

22. Department of State, “Framework for U.S. Foreign Assistance” ([www.state.gov/f/c23053.htm](http://www.state.gov/f/c23053.htm)).

23. Tobias reportedly indicated this intention in an e-mail to USAID staff toward the end of his tenure.

24. “To reduce widespread poverty” was added to this statement later as a result of pressure from the NGO community who regarded its absence as a sign that the administration had downgraded this element in aid giving.

25. In the view of a number of political scientists, at least. This author is among the skeptics of this theory because of definitional and data problems. But whether right or wrong, it was a useful theory for U.S. presidents to justify their policies promoting democracy abroad in terms of U.S. security interests as well as values.

26. See, for example, the statement of Senator Patrick Leahy at the hearing of the Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs of the Senate Appropriations Committee on the FY 2008 USAID Budget Request and Foreign Aid Reform, March 28, 2007.

27. According to Laura Wilson, a senior staffer in F, the first of these decisions made by Tobias was not intended to decrease aid for development but shift development assistance into ESF to achieve greater flexibility and impact since ESF monies, some of which were also used to further development, are less circumscribed by congressional earmarks and directives. But those concerned about the shift pointed out that a future director of U.S. foreign assistance or the secretary of state may allocate ESF primarily for security purposes (which was the original intent for ESF monies), leaving aid for development purposes significantly diminished. Rightly or wrongly, the possible future impact and symbolism of this shift heightened fears that development was being downgraded in the F process. The decision on increasing State’s operating expenses was not made by Tobias or his staff. While the reduction in USAID’s operating expenses was a decision made by Tobias and provoked criticisms within USAID and Congress, the growing number of critics of the F process saw these decisions together as indications of the downgrading of the role of USAID and development in favor of State Department and the diplomatic uses of aid.

28. Remarks at Society for International Development annual dinner, June 6, 2007.

29. Michael Phillips, “Big Aid Agency Group Splits with Bush,” *Wall Street Journal* (online), “Washington Wire,” May 11, 2007.

30. Glenn Kessler, “Hill, Aid Groups: One Opaque System Replaced Another,” *Washington Post*, July 22, 2007, p. A4.

31. These documents have been regarded as sensitive and so not available to the public, or scholars, for perusal.

32. Staff working with Tobias describe some sixty meetings with congressional staff and members, with a considerable amount of exchange of views and changes in reform plans. Given the criticisms from Representatives Lantos and Lowey and Senators Leahy and Menendez, it is clear that something went wrong in the communication with Congress—it seems unlikely that the public criticisms of Tobias and the reforms were simply partisan sniping.

33. Senator Robert Menendez, “Opening Statement,” hearing on confirmation of Henrietta Fore as USAID administrator and director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, June 12, 2007, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (<http://menendez.senate.gov/newsroom/record.cfm?id=276585>).

34. Tobias and his staff were already in the process of analyzing and adjusting the processes they put into place when he departed USAID. See the “After Action Report,” May 2007 ([www.state.gov/f/releases/factsheets2007/84579.htm](http://www.state.gov/f/releases/factsheets2007/84579.htm)).

35. OECD, *The United States: Development Assistance Committee* (Paris, 2006).

36. Defense Department Directive 3000.05, p. 2, November 28, 2005 ([www.dtic.mil/WHIS/directives/corres/htm/300005.htm](http://www.dtic.mil/WHIS/directives/corres/htm/300005.htm)).

37. Quadrennial Defense Review for 2006–09, p. 75 ([www.defenselink.mil/gdr/](http://www.defenselink.mil/gdr/)).

38. There were some problems in the implementation of these new authorities at first though coordination between DoD and other agencies improved in 2007. For an account of this and other issues involving the use of economic assistance by the Department of Defense, see the excellent report by J. Stephen Morrison and Kathleen Hicks (project directors) from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, *Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance*, December 2007 ([www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071211\\_integratinglowres.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071211_integratinglowres.pdf)).

39. For details on the DoD budget for the global war on terror, see Gordon Adams, “Budgeting for Iraq and the GWOT,” testimony before Committee on the Budget of the United States Senate, February 6, 2007 (<http://budget.senate.gov/republican/hearingarchive/testimonies/2007/2007-02-06Adams.pdf>).

40. Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, “The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DoD’s Expanding Role,” Working Paper 131 (Washington: Center for Global Development, November 2007), p. 6 ([www.cgdev.org/content/general/detail/14815](http://www.cgdev.org/content/general/detail/14815)). This is another excellent account of DoD’s growing role in development and the issues it raises. According to this essay, while the PRTs have been praised in some quarters, others have raised questions about the degree of interagency collaboration they represent and their effectiveness.

41. See [www.c6f.navy.mil/APS/](http://www.c6f.navy.mil/APS/).

42. Lauren Ploch, “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (Washington: Library of Congress, July 2007), p. 2 ([www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34003.pdf](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34003.pdf)).

43. Stephanie Hanson, “The Pentagon’s New Africa Command” (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, May 3, 2007), p. 2 ([www.cfr.org/publication/13255/](http://www.cfr.org/publication/13255/)).

44. See Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, “Landon Lecture,” Kansas State University, November 26, 2007 ([www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199](http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199)).

45. See S/CRS website at [www.state.gov/s/crs/](http://www.state.gov/s/crs/).

46. Mark Hanin, “Civilian Reserve Corps,” Non-Military Capacity Project Background Paper, Bipartisan Policy Center, August 2007, photocopy, p. 3.

47. See, for example, John De Pauw and George Luz, eds., *Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action* (New York: Praeger 1991).

48. Quoted from a former U.S. Army captain who had served in Iraq in Corine Hegland, “National Security—Why Civilians Instead of Soldiers?” *National Journal*, April 28, 2007, p. 3.

## Chapter Three

1. Growth and poverty reduction are, of course, tied together. Sustained growth usually reduces poverty, and the more equitable incomes are at the beginning of a growth phase, the faster poverty is reduced. Actions to reduce poverty directly through expanding education, health services, credit available to the poor, and other activities touching the poor directly can also promote growth. Indeed, the basic services that benefit the poor are the foundations of long-term growth. But the emphases on growth and poverty reduction are different, often reflecting quite different views of what it takes to produce broad-based economic progress, and the constituents of these two approaches have tended to be different.

2. Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion* (Oxford University Press, 2007).

3. For a review of the literature on the impact of aid on growth, see Michael Clemens, Steve Radelet and Rakhin Bhavnani, “Counting Chickens when they Hatch: The Short Term Impact of Aid on Growth,” Working Paper 44 (Washington: Center for Global Development, 2004). See also Carl-Johan Dalgaard and Henrik Hansen, “On Aid, Growth and Good Policies,” *Journal of Development Studies* 37, no. 6 (2001): 17–41.

4. For some early evidence of an “MCC effect,” see Doug Johnson and Tristan Azjone, “Can Foreign Aid Create an Incentive for Good Governance? Evidence from the Millennium Challenge Corporation,” April 11, 2006, Harvard

University ([http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=896293](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=896293)). There are numerous anecdotes of the “MCC effect,” but this appears to be the only systematic study of that effect. Further studies will be necessary to demonstrate that effect convincingly.

5. Raj Atluru, partner, Draper, Fisher, Jervetson (venture capitalist firm), personal communication; James W. Fox, *The Venture Capital Mirage*, USAID Program and Operations Assessment Report No. 17, August 1996, p. 4, [www.usaid.gov/pubs/usaid\\_eval/pdf\\_docs/pnaby220](http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/usaid_eval/pdf_docs/pnaby220).

6. Operations Evaluation Department (OED), “Evaluation Results,” *Annual Review of Development Effectiveness* (ARDE), vol. 2 (Washington: World Bank, 1995), p. 41. OED is now called the Independent Evaluation Group within the World Bank.

7. U.K. Department for International Development, “Project Completion Reports: A Review of Findings from Projects Approved between 1986 and 1999,” EV637, UK Government, London, 2001, p. 16.

8. OED, ARDE, 2001, p. 62.

9. A “big push” argument today for large amounts of aid to overcome the obstacles to development can be found in Jeffrey Sachs, *The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time* (New York: Penguin, 2005).

10. For an overview of this research, see Clemens, Radelet, and Bhavnani, “Counting Chickens.”

11. See [www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf).

12. USAID, “Fragile States Strategy,” January 2005 ([www.usaid.gov/policy/2005\\_fragile\\_states\\_strategy.pdf](http://www.usaid.gov/policy/2005_fragile_states_strategy.pdf)).

13. Diana Cammack, Dinah McLeod, and Alina Rocha Menocal, with Karin Christiansen, *Donors and the “Fragile States” Agenda: A Survey of Current Thinking and Practice* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2006), p. ix ([www.odi.org.uk/events/horizons\\_nov06/15Dec/JICA\\_percent20Report.pdf](http://www.odi.org.uk/events/horizons_nov06/15Dec/JICA_percent20Report.pdf)). In the view of some, the political and civil rights expected of fully operative states and a measure of legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens are also part of the functionality of states. See Robert Rotberg, *When States Fail* (Princeton University Press, 2004).

14. See, for example, Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security, *On the Brink: Weak States and U.S. National Security* (Washington: Center for Global Development, 2004).

15. This effort has produced a considerable amount of data and several major reports. See Daniel C. Esty and others, “The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for U.S. Foreign Policy Planning,” in *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems*, edited by John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr, chapter 3 (Boulder, Colo.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); Daniel C. Esty and others, *Working Papers: State Failure Task Force Report*, Phase 1 report (McLean, Va.: Science Applications International Corporation, November

30, 1995); Daniel C. Esty and others, *State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings* (McLean, Va.: Science Applications International Corporation, July 31, 1998). Also published as State Failure Task Force, “State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings,” in *Environmental Change and Security Project Report*, Phase 2 report (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center, Summer 1999); Jack A. Goldstone and others, in consultation with Matthew Christenson and others, *State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings* (McLean, Va.: Science Applications International Corporation, September 30, 2000); Robert H. Bates and others, *Political Instability Task Force Report: Phase IV Findings* (McLean, Va.: Science Applications International Corporation, 2003).

16. Global Development Alliance, *The Development Frontier*, USAID, September 2007, p. 1 ([www.usaid.gov/our\\_work/global\\_partnerships/gda/newsletter/sept07.pdf](http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_partnerships/gda/newsletter/sept07.pdf)).

## Chapter Four

1. See the Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of Government, *Report to Congress*, vol. I (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. 32 and 34.

2. See, for example, Luther Gulick, “Notes on the Theory of Organization,” in *Classics of Public Administration*, edited by Jay Shafritz, Albert Hyde, and Sandra Parkes (Belmont, Calif.: Thompson Wadsworth, 2004), pp. 90–104.

3. For a discussion of theories of public management, see Harold Seidman and Robert Gilmour, *Politics, Position and Power* (Oxford University Press, 1986). The authors observe that some organizations—for example, the Heritage Foundation—have advocated duplication for the competition it can generate. But, they conclude, “It is easy to pick out the flaws in the concepts of unity of command, straight lines of authority and accountability and organization by major purpose; it is far more difficult to develop acceptable alternatives” (p. 3).

4. Former U.S. ambassador to Egypt Edward Walker remarked, “Aid offers an easy way out for Egypt to avoid reform. They use the money to support antiquated programs and to resist reforms” (Charles Levinson, “\$50 billion Later: Taking Stock of U.S. Aid to Egypt,” *Christian Science Monitor*, April 12, 2004 [[www.csmonitor.com/2004/0412/p07s01-wome.html](http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0412/p07s01-wome.html)]). See also Robert Zimmerman, *Dollars, Diplomacy and Dependency: Dilemmas of U.S. Economic Aid* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1993) for an exposition of this view.

5. By unifying all its major development programs and policy and implementation responsibilities into one agency, the British government has, in the view of many, created the most coherent development aid organization among all major aid donors.

6. This is the story of the Ministry of Development in Germany, originally set up in 1961 with almost no visibility or even responsibility over German aid. Over the decades, with a succession of effective ministers, it has gained control over most of German aid and is a prominent and visible element in the German government and the prominent player in German aid policies. See Carol Lancaster, *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics* (University of Chicago Press, 2006).

7. The majority of the members of the HELP Commission, whose report, *Beyond Assistance*, was recently published, supported the creation of an International Affairs Department with four subcabinet agencies reporting to the secretary: one for trade and development, one for humanitarian affairs, one for political and security issues, and one for public diplomacy. The department would have regional platforms staffed by officers of each of the four agencies. This model is based on the organization of DoD. The question is where would control over the budgets, personnel, and policies of the four subcabinet-level agencies rest and how consistent is the rest of the model with the requirements of managing U.S. relations with foreign countries (which are much more the key focal point of U.S. foreign policy than regions as in DoD) to achieve multiple goals. Nevertheless, it is an intriguing model and worth considering in more detail. But a radical restructuring of U.S. foreign affairs agencies is well beyond the scope of this book.

8. See Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, *Greater than the Sum of Its Parts? Assessing “Whole of Government” Approaches to Fragile States* (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007). Patrick and Brown do not find many cases of effective “whole of government” coordinating mechanisms for addressing fragile states.

9. I wish to thank Gordon Adams from American University for bringing the NTCT to my attention.

10. See the NCTC website, [www.nctc.gov/about\\_us/what\\_we\\_do.html](http://www.nctc.gov/about_us/what_we_do.html).

11. See the DoD website, [www.defenselink.mil/qdr/](http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/).

12. Terry Moe, “The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure,” in *Can the Government Govern?* edited by John Chubb and Paul Peterson (Brookings, 1989), p. 268.

13. John P. Kotter, *Leading Change* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), pp. 21–22. This list comprises the titles of the chapters in his book.

14. One expert on change in the public sector argues on the basis of a major case study that resistance to change is not automatic or necessarily crippling. A shared sense of the need for change, and effective communication by and trust in those leading change, can be effective in smoothing shifts in policies, programs, and organization. See Steven Kelman, *Unleashing Change: A Study of Organizational Renewal in Government* (Brookings, 2005).

15. Randall Tobias, *Put the Moose on the Table: Lessons in Leadership from a CEO’s Journey through Business and Life* (Indiana University Press, 2003), pp. 246–53. The intriguing question, which only Tobias can answer, is why did his

approach to change management in the F process differ so much from the guidelines he suggests in his own book on the subject?

16. In the past, the tight relationships between U.S. government agencies, their congressional committee members and staffs, and private interests were called “iron triangles.” See Hugh Hecl, “Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment,” in *The New American Political System*, edited by Anthony King (Washington: American Enterprise Institute Press, 1978), pp. 87–124. This term has morphed into “networks” as the ties between these political actors have loosened. But no one argues these networks are not still present and highly influential, especially when change is in the air.

17. Tobias, *Put the Moose on the Table*, p. 251. The mystery remains why Tobias did not follow his own excellent advice.

## Chapter Five

1. Combining hard and soft power is increasingly called *smart power*. See, for example, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Commission on Smart Power ([www.csis.org/smartpower/](http://www.csis.org/smartpower/)).

2. The extent of these changes is a work for lawyers. In the judgment of experts on aid legislation, this approach would at least be less complicated than the efforts to reorganize the intelligence community during the Bush administration. (Personal correspondence, June 11–12, 2007, with Robert Lester, former USAID lawyer and drafter of aid legislation.)