3 *A Renewed United Nations*

Excellencies, we have come to a fork in the road. This may be a moment no less decisive than 1945 itself, when the United Nations was founded.

At that time, a group of far-sighted leaders, led and inspired by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, were determined to make the second half of the twentieth century different from the first half. They saw the human race had only one world to live in, and that unless it managed its affairs prudently, all human beings may perish.

So they drew up rules to govern international behavior, and founded a network of institutions, with the United Nations at its center, in which the peoples of the world could work together for the common good.

Now we must decide whether it is possible to continue on the basis agreed then, or whether radical changes are needed.

And we must not shy away from questions about the adequacy, and effectiveness, of the rules and instruments at our disposal.

Among those instruments, none is more important than the Security Council itself.

The United Nations is by no means a perfect instrument, but it is a precious one. I urge you to seek agreement on ways of improving it.

SECRETARY-GENERAL KOFI ANNAN
Inaugural speech to the UN General Assembly, September 2003

The United Nations came into existence at the end of World War II because serious and coordinated thought had been given, with top-level political support, to a new design of the international system. Unfortunately, nothing similar happened at the end of the Cold War. A number of high-level commissions, committees, and conferences issued reports or proposals for reform around the time of the 50th anniversary of the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions, which happened to come about a few years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Regarding the UN, these included the Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance (1991), US Commission on Improving the Effectiveness of the

United Nations (1993), Canadian Committee for the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations (1994), Commission on Global Governance (1995), Independent Working Group on the Future of the UN System (1995), and the Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force (1996).[1]

However, none of these initiatives reflected a systematic and holistic effort to update the entire international architecture that involved rethinking how to combine the political and economic spheres—this despite the fact that the end of the Cold War was probably as dramatic an event as the defeat of the Axis powers. The Asian financial crisis in 1997 prompted considerable discussion about a new global financial architecture that led to such innovations as the Financial Stability Forum (FSF)[2] and encouraged closer cooperation in the financial sector between the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. But these changes were modest and not at all linked to the UN system, and so the world entered the 21st century with an international institutional architecture in large part inherited from the immediate post–World War II era, rather than one reflecting the needs and challenges of the new century.

The 21st century did not start peacefully—the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001 signaled that the end of the East/West divide might not necessarily bring the worldwide peace and security for which so many had long hoped. Less than two years after September 11 came the war in Iraq and its aftermath, accompanied by worldwide debate on the necessity, desirability, and legitimacy of such an intervention. These events have moved the question of global governance and international legitimacy to the center of political debate throughout the world. Again, there has been an outpouring of papers on global governance and initiatives ranging from the UN Secretary General's High Level Panel on Global Security Threats and Reform of the International System, to the World Commission on the Social Dimensions of Globalization (2004), and the independent Task Force on Global Public Goods led by

1. For the UN, see also Boutros-Ghali (1992), Childers and Urquhart (1994), and South Centre (1996). Spencer (2004) has compiled a comprehensive annotated bibliography of the scholarship on UN reform at www.global-challenges.org/index.html. Regarding Bretton Woods reform, see for example Kenen (1994), Bretton Woods Commission (1994), and Haq, Jolly and Streeten (1995).

2. The FSF was established in 1999 to promote international information exchange and cooperation in financial supervision and surveillance by bringing together senior representatives from national financial authorities, international financial institutions, international regulatory and supervisory agencies, committees of central bank experts, and the European Central Bank.

former Mexican president Ernesto Zedillo and Tidjane Thiam of the Ivory Coast.[3]

Yet, the international system basically continues on a business-as-usual basis, with bureaucracies pursuing their day-to-day work and protecting their privileges. There are periodic calls for change, but they do not translate into plans for action. Even the dramatic world events since 2001—which signaled more clearly than ever that the time has come to comprehensively rethink the international system—have yet to prompt significant reform.

Global Democracy and Nation-States

At a time when democracy has triumphed as the model for human political organization, it is clear that legitimacy must be part of what defines the international system. Legitimacy in our time requires a certain degree of global democracy, but at the same time realistic global governance cannot ignore existing power in economic and military relationships. Any blueprint that ignores the resources controlled by the various actors and their relative weights in the world will lead nowhere. The reform agenda, therefore, must try to balance three divergent requirements:

- more global democracy that in some fundamental sense recognizes the equal value of all human beings,
- the ability to work with existing nation-states that have legal status as sovereigns and remain fundamental units of the international system, and
- the need to take into account the divergent economic and military capabilities of these nation-states.

When trying to reconcile the fundamental value of human equality with ongoing recognition of the sovereignty of individual states and the fact that they remain the building blocks of the international system, it must be remembered that even in the context of such countries as the United States, Germany, or India and regional groupings such as the European Union, democratic legitimacy is compatible with various forms of federal structures and upper chambers that do not simply reflect the "one person, one vote" principle. What may be more difficult to accept

3. The author is a member of the task force, which is supported by several governments, led by France and Sweden.

in terms of basic legitimacy is a partial "weighting" of countries by economic and military size.[4] Nonetheless, such classification is essential for a workable system. The objective is not a world government, but rather global governance that promotes participation, uses the principle of subsidiarity, acknowledges diversity and respects the sovereignty of even the smallest states, provides global public goods, solves international problems, and reflects the basic values of human equality and dignity.

The "realists" in the international relations field tend to downplay the importance or even relevance of legitimacy as a useful concept when analyzing global issues. But their description of the international system overemphasizes the dichotomy between politics "within" states and politics "between" states. Keohane and Nye (2001, 2) describe the realist view as follows:

> It makes no more sense to ask whether an interstate organization is democratic than to ask if a broom has a nice personality. One should ask merely if the instrument works well. One might ask about the personality of the janitor handling the broom, and one might ask about democratic procedures in the states using the interstate institution. In this realist view, world politics is inherently undemocratic and there is little point in lamenting the obvious.

As Keohane and Nye point out, this "realist" distinction is overdone. While the world today is far from an ideal global political community and no true global democracy as defined in national-level terms is likely anytime soon, elements of such a global community do in fact exist, encouraged by the information revolution, increasingly integrated world markets, global nongovernmental organizations, and fundamental values with a strong worldwide following. As a result of this emerging community of values, states that do not internally function as democracies suffer from diminished legitimacy in the international arena, particularly if and when they try to weigh in on decisions affecting the international system as a whole. While such nations are still recognized as sovereign actors,

4. Some might argue that an important rationale for effective international institutions is to reduce the need for military power, and that military capability as a weighting factor into a voting scheme could create a perverse incentive for nations to increase military spending. However, creating effective global governance must take into account the realities of the balance of power and the enduring importance of the ability to project military power. What can be hoped for is that military power should be recognized as only one among several factors that should determine the relative weight of nations, and that it should be used to protect human security rather than in pursuit of dominance.

their influence suffers from their lack of internal democracy. Increasingly, public opinion expects that to be legitimate, principals in the international system should have a functioning democracy at home.

Another aspect of the emerging community of values that has been greatly nurtured by the practice of democracy at the national level is the intrinsic equal value of human beings wherever they are and whatever they look like. In the 21st century, the legitimacy of global governance mechanisms must somehow relate to and encompass this fundamental value. People cannot be intrinsically equal inside a given nation-state and unequal across borders. Such a dichotomy, when pushed too far, offends widely shared ethical principles. It follows that global institutions cannot just derive their legitimacy and accountability from the extent to which they "are faithful agents of democratic principals" (Keohane and Nye 2001, 2). When these institutions aggregate the will of the principals involved—that is, the nation-states—the result must be perceived as fair and acceptable to people all across the globe. At the same time, the result must also be workable in a world where nation-states retain considerable power and support from their populations. A successful recipe ultimately requires a good dose of global democratic legitimacy, a sufficient degree of realism, and the greatest possible amount of efficacy.

The Global Networks and Transnational Clubs

Some argue that in lieu of a new and overarching international governance architecture, the emerging multitude of issue-oriented networks, nongovernmental organizations, and what are sometimes called "special transnational clubs" represent a sufficient response to the challenge of global governance.[5] Prompted by a range of international issues and challenges, many international networks have formed to address a variety of specific issues such as landmines, the environment, debt relief, and infrastructure development. Reinicke (2000) calls these different policy-based groups and entities "trisectoral networks."

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) has brought together governments, civil society, and international institutions including the United Nations. Thanks to efforts by the ICBL, which was honored with a Nobel Prize, 120 states signed the Ottawa Treaty in 1997

5. Reinicke (2000), Keohane and Nye (2001), and Rischard (2002) stress the growing role of networks for global governance without arguing that they constitute a sufficient response to the governance challenge.

banning the use of landmines. Other examples abound of successful efforts by such trisectoral networks, including what was perhaps one of the most significant recent achievements regarding the environment—the signing of the Montreal Protocol to control the production of substances that are depleting the ozone layer. This initiative involved the cooperation of governments, international institutions, industry, representative organizations, and civil society.

As an advocate for canceling debt for very poor countries, the NGO Jubilee 2000 has formed an effective coalition with several governments willing to take radical steps on debt issues. Transparency International has raised the profile of efforts to fight corruption worldwide by quantifying the problem and ranking countries according to a "corruption index." Other important efforts include everything from the World Commission on Dams, a multi-actor initiative that encourages socially responsible construction, to the Roll Back Malaria Partnership and the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers.[6]

"Clubs" are usually more official forms of international policy networks. A few examples are the Basle Club of Central Bankers, the Group of Seven (G-7) Finance Ministers, the Paris Club (a group of official creditors), and such groupings as the G-20, the G-77, the G-24, and the Nonaligned Movement in the United Nations, assembling various countries around specific agendas. Where NGO networks usually raise awareness of problems and advocate solutions, the clubs negotiate deals or lend their authority to the design of procedures such as accounting standards or banking supervision guidelines. The "Evian Approach" recently adapted by the Paris Club provides more flexibility in debt restructuring. Clubs often work well because they are self-selected and bring together members who want to cooperate. Their disadvantage, of course, is that because they are not inclusive, those that are excluded do not necessarily consider the decisions reached to be legitimate or binding.

Among these clubs, the G-7, consisting of the United States, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy, has a very special and powerful role. The role has become recognized over the last two decades, although it is resented by those who are excluded.

Networks and clubs clearly will continue to make major contributions

6. For more detail on trisectoral networks, see *Global Public Policy Project* available at www.gppi.net.

to international governance and problem solving in the years ahead—trisectoral networks, in particular, strengthen the influence of civil society on national and international decisions and often mobilize knowledge and skills more effectively than bureaucratic public organizations (Rischard 2002; Reinicke 2000). By themselves, however, these entities cannot solve more complex problems that involve long-term issues of national sovereignty or the need to legitimize important systemic decisions. No network or special club can ensure successful trade negotiations, enhance the legitimacy of the IMF, or head off a conflict or war. In order to be effective in solving some of the issue-specific problems mentioned above, networks and clubs must be embedded into an overall governance structure that is accepted as legitimate. Civil society is important and helpful in bringing attention to problems and mobilizing support and participation. Many of the actions required, however, remain in the public domain, and the role and power of nongovernmental organizations is not sufficiently comprehensive or even legitimate to substitute for real reform. Self-selected clubs can play a useful and often leading role, but almost by definition they lack legitimacy. The proposals outlined in the section that follows address the need for broader reforms directed at the overall structure within which the various elements of global governance operate, be they international organizations, special clubs or groupings of countries, or global issue networks.

An Overarching Role for the United Nations

A reformed United Nations should provide the unifying framework for global governance in both the political and economic spheres. No other overarching setting exists that is based on the reality of nation-states, but which also has accumulated the necessary experience and global legitimacy.

The importance of the United Nations was in evidence during the period leading up to the Iraq crisis and, even more so, in the period after the war. Despite all the UN's shortcomings, including serious management failures common to most large bureaucracies, and the enduring reality of politics based on military power, all actors in the Iraq drama had to take it into account. In the end, the United States acted without a clear Security Council resolution authorizing intervention, but not without first trying to secure such a resolution and not without paying a heavy political price for proceeding without UN endorsement. Public opinion across

the world made the presence or absence of a Security Council resolution a litmus test for legitimacy.[7]

The UN concept has global legitimacy not only in a narrow legal sense but also in terms of the perception of a vast majority of humanity. The overall design proposed below is based, therefore, on a strong integrating role for a reformed United Nations at the top of the international system. As mentioned above, the secretary-general of the United Nations did appoint a high-level panel of eminent and experienced experts to work on UN reform and, in particular, reform of the UN Security Council. This work is under way and will no doubt come up with very important recommendations some time in late 2004. The Zedillo-Thiam–led Task Force on Global Public Goods is also looking at "security" as a global public good and will have its own proposals in early 2005. The proposals presented in this book express a long-term vision. They may have the advantage of not being constrained by the need to reach a compromise between alternative views, some reflecting national policies. They may appear as less realistic in the sense of not being so constrained. They are not supposed to be just dreams, however. They are a result of weighing the political constraints as I have experienced them personally and they also reflect many discussions, particularly with friends and colleagues involved in progressive politics across the world. I do hope that some elements of what is proposed here will turn out not to be too far removed from what emerges from the work of the formally appointed task forces. I also trust that the debate will continue for a while beyond the time the task forces make their official recommendations and before political leaders will finally take the radical steps that are needed for real reform. Moreover, reform will only be possible if global progressive forces mobilize behind a set of concrete proposals that go beyond generalities and if global civil society puts real pressure on the formal political processes to encourage far-sighted thinking and political courage.

The proposals have at their core two high-level UN governance councils—a renewed Security Council and a proposed new Economic and Social Security Council—that together would provide strategic direction and broad governance to the entire international system. They would most definitely not attempt to be a world government, but would try to

7. To cite just one example, the Spanish government elected in 2004 took the decision to withdraw its troops from Iraq unless the UN took overall charge. The government of the United Kingdom felt it important enough to try, however unsuccessfully, to obtain a new UN resolution that would have led Spain to stay.

reflect the global community of nations and people, serve as a source of international legality and legitimacy, and secure global participation.

The two councils would attempt to set global priorities and would make certain key decisions such as authorizing cross-border interventions, choosing the top managers of international agencies, and encouraging efficient use of resources for promoting such global "goods" as peace and financial stability and avoiding such global "bads" as armed conflict, environmental degradation, and disease. The entire world should be involved in these decisions, and all countries should be entitled to some representation. The key problem, of course, is how to organize this representation without making decisive collective action impossible.

The renovated UN Security Council would mediate in political disputes between states, fight terrorism in all its forms, promote collective security and peace, and uphold human rights and the rights of minorities. The council would set global policy on these issues and have the means to enforce it. The new UN Economic and Social Security Council, constituted at a much higher level than the current Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which is not much more than a debating forum, would oversee global governance in the economic and social spheres, including the environment, by serving as a coordinating and legitimizing structure for all the UN specialized agencies dealing with economic, social, and environmental matters, as well as the WTO and the Bretton Woods institutions.[8] The strengths and operational autonomy of individual agencies would be maintained, but the UN Economic and Social Security Council would provide an overall framework of legitimacy and efficiency.

The remainder of this chapter focuses on the UN Security Council, while the proposed UN Economic and Social Security Council will be discussed in the context of the chapters that follow on the Bretton Woods institutions, particularly in chapter 4. Chapter 7, which examines how the WTO could be reformed and strengthened as part of the overall international architecture, also discusses a possible oversight and coordinating role for a UN Economic and Social Security Council as regards trade, labor, and other issues. The proposals here in no way advocate absorption of the Bretton Woods institutions or the WTO into the UN administration. To be effective, these institutions should preserve their operational autonomy and continue to build on the independent professionalism

8. Environmental protection should be one of the key objectives of the new UN Economic and Social Security Council. One could name it Economic, Social and Environmental Security Council.

accumulated over decades. It is only their high-level governance that would become part of overall UN governance, thus benefiting from the legitimacy of a renewed United Nations.

Why propose two councils rather than just one to oversee both the political and security sphere and the economic and social sphere? The reason is because the relative importance or the most desirable "weights" of different nations or grouping of nations at the top level governance of the international system may not be the same for the different spheres. For both operational reasons (the ability to act) and because of the realities of power, military capability must be a determining factor in governance of the security domain. The situation is somewhat different, however, when it comes to economic and social matters. It would be perfectly appropriate for the weights in the top-level economic and social governance council to reflect strongly the effort of a country or a group of countries ready to spend large amounts of resources on funding global public goods. Population also should carry a larger weight in the economic and social sphere than in the security sphere.

Rather than complicating matters, differences in the relative power of countries in the different spheres could well make compromise easier. Realistically, Brazil or India, for example, might have significantly larger weights on the Economic and Social Security Council than on the Security Council.[9] In addition, at any one time, a larger number of countries could have actual seats on one of the two councils without unduly increasing the council's size. Finally, the experience and competence required in the two spheres are different, and the representatives serving on one council might well have different backgrounds than those serving on the other. For all these reasons, it may be preferable to have two councils rather than a single one that attempts to integrate across all issues. The areas of competence of each council must be clearly defined, but this need not preclude close and structured cooperation between the two. The councils could meet jointly on a periodic basis to address crosscutting areas of concern.[10] Provided the areas of competence are clearly delineated, jurisdictional disputes should be unlikely, but a dispute resolution procedure may nevertheless have to be built into the system. In the event of disagreement, the

9. See appendix B, table 1, for the country and constituency voting strengths on the proposed UN Economic and Social Security Council.

10. Alternatively, there could be two subcommittees within a council. The question would remain, however, as to whether to assign different voting weights to countries based on the subcommittee on which they serve and vote.

two councils would meet jointly, and the dispute could be resolved by a simple majority of the weighted votes of all members present from both councils. Finally, it may be important to note that a UN Economic and Social Security Council could be created as a new structure, without immediately having to implement radical change in the existing Security Council. The economic and social sphere could "lead" the security sphere.

Current Security Council

The United Nations was not the first attempt to establish a world organization responsible for international peace. The devastating effects of the First World War united internationalists such as US president Woodrow Wilson and others to propose the creation of a League of Nations to prevent future wars. The league proved to be an unsuccessful attempt to secure world peace, having failed after a decade in existence to stop the aggression of the 1930s and the world's slide into devastating war.[11]

During the Second World War, US president Franklin Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston Churchill met to draft a charter formalizing US material support for Britain. This document, called the Atlantic Charter, was to become a blueprint for the postwar period.

The initial draft included a statement that proposed the establishment of an "effective international organization," which was later revised to a "wider and permanent system of general security." The Atlantic Charter was signed on August, 14, 1941. The charter announced that the signatories sought no aggrandizement and recognized the right of all peoples to choose their own form of government and to approve any territorial changes that might affect them. It also guaranteed all nations the right to trade and to navigate anywhere in the world and called for international cooperation to promote improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security so that "all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want."

Soon after, the United States would enter the war after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. On the first day of 1942, representatives of 26 Allied nations fighting against the Axis Powers met in Washington, D.C., to pledge their support for the Atlantic Charter

11. The league was mainly a creation of President Wilson's ideals (his famous 14 points), but Wilson's aggressive support for the league backfired in the United States. The Republicans successfully weakened Wilson when he used the league as a major issue in his democratic congressional campaign.

by signing the "Declaration by United Nations." This was the first time the term "United Nations," which was suggested by Roosevelt, was officially used.

Diplomatic interaction between the British, Soviets, and Americans, as well as US Senate approval of the initiative, opened the way to draft the constitutive texts of this new world organization. In August 1944, the United States invited the Soviets, British, and later the Chinese to Dumbarton Oaks in Washington for conversations. While there was overall agreement on the responsibilities of the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Secretariat, veto powers in the Security Council remained to be settled after Dumbarton Oaks. The Soviets insisted on having veto power for any type of resolution. The United States wanted permanent council members to be able to veto enforcement actions, but argued that a party to a dispute should not to be able to vote on the recommendations. The veto issue was settled at the Yalta Conference in 1945, when Roosevelt, Churchill, and Joseph Stalin agreed that the permanent five members (their nations plus France and China) could veto Security Council actions, but a party to a dispute could not block discussion of an issue or attempts at peaceful settlement. The veto power of the Permanent Five was already controversial in 1945—Australia, among others, wanted to prevent use of the veto to block attempts at peaceful settlement. Stalin was determined to prevent any dilution of the veto power, and his opposition finally led the nonpermanent states to relent. After solving the veto and General Assembly membership issues,[12] the American, British, and Soviet leaders called for a United Nations Conference to be held in April 1945 in San Francisco. Two months after the conference, the UN charter was approved.

The UN charter is based on the principle of sovereign equality of members. At Dumbarton Oaks, it was agreed that all "peace-loving" states would be eligible for membership.[13] Sovereign equality meant that what mattered was the legal status of statehood regardless of size, wealth, or military power. This fundamental principle was to become the "one state, one vote" principle of the General Assembly.

12. The Soviets initially insisted on having 15 votes in the General Assembly, one for each Soviet republic. After President Roosevelt's counterproposal of 48 votes for each US state, the Soviets settled for three votes for Russia, Byelorussia, and the Ukraine.

13. The former Axis powers and their allies initially were denied membership, an exclusion that continued until Italy and Spain were admitted in 1955, Japan in 1956, and East and West Germany in 1973.

The General Assembly has important functions such as admitting states to UN membership, electing nonpermanent members to the Security Council and members to ECOSOC and the Trusteeship Council, appointing judges to the International Court of Justice jointly with the Security Council, and appointing the secretary-general, although the council itself must nominate the candidate. Despite these important functions, the huge disparities in the power of the 191 UN member states (as of 2002) means, and has always meant, that the General Assembly is an international body where weaker states can debate international affairs in an important official forum without having any real decision-making power.

The real power at the United Nations thus rests with the Security Council, which is responsible for maintaining international peace and security and has the authority to act on behalf of all UN members. Chapter VI of the UN charter specifies the Security Council's powers to seek a peaceful settlement of disputes and provides a wide range of techniques for investigating disputes and helping to achieve a resolution without the use of force. Chapter VII specifies the Security Council's authority to identify aggressors and to commit all UN members to take enforcement measures such as invoking economic sanctions or providing military forces for joint action. In addition, the Security Council recommends the admission of new member states, advises the General Assembly on the appointment of the secretary-general, and together with the assembly elects the judges of the International Court of Justice.

In addition to its Permanent Five members, the council has 10 nonpermanent members elected by the General Assembly for two-year, nonrenewable terms, with only five new members elected each year. No country can serve successive terms as a nonpermanent member. At least four nonpermanent members must vote for a resolution to pass, a provision that allows seven nonpermanent members to block a resolution agreed to by all of the Permanent Five—something that has never happened in the history of the United Nations.

The nonpermanent membership of the Security Council was extended from six to its present 10 in 1965. Also in 1965, the General Assembly adopted a resolution allocating five seats to Africa and Asia, two to Latin America, two to Western Europe and other areas, and one to Eastern Europe. The council's presidency rotates monthly among its members.

The post–World War II division of the world into two antagonistic alliances meant that any one member of either side with veto power was

easily able to bloc any attempt to obtain a binding Security Council resolution. This essentially made it impossible for the council to become the effective instrument of global governance and international legality that it was designed to be by the founding fathers.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the political dynamics determining Security Council behavior changed significantly, and hope emerged that with the Cold War veto standoff finally gone the council might function as originally envisioned. Since the end of the Cold War, the Security Council has indeed dealt with any number of conflicts. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the Security Council issued a dozen resolutions condemning the invasion and calling for international assistance to Kuwait. UN Resolution 678 authorized member states cooperating with Kuwait to use "all necessary means" to restore peace in the area. The passing of this resolution followed major US diplomatic efforts to convince the Soviets to approve the resolution. The UN-sponsored military coalition led by the United States forced an end to the Iraqi occupation and restored Kuwaiti sovereignty. The US-led coalition did not invade Iraq, staying within the limits set by the UN resolution, which did not include support for an occupation of Iraq. The first Gulf War thus seemed to signal that the Security Council might be able to deal with major threats to world peace. Unfortunately, events in the Balkans quickly changed that perception.

The Security Council became involved in the Yugoslav conflict as heavy fighting broke out in 1991 after Slovenia and Croatia declared independence from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was dominated by Serbia. The council first deferred negotiation of the ceasefire to European initiatives in line with Chapter VIII of the UN charter, which stipulates that regional organizations can resolve local disputes. But European Union diplomacy had little success. As the fighting escalated, the Security Council authorized the creation of the UN Protection Force for Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), which initially was deployed in Croatia. Heavy fighting shifted to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and as signs of "ethnic cleansing" became more evident, UNPROFOR coordinated efforts to deliver humanitarian aid to civilians who increasingly had become targets in the conflict. The main problem facing UNPROFOR was its limited mandate, which did not authorize the use of force to stop ethnic cleansing. In fact, the presence of UNPROFOR forces without proper mandate may even have exacerbated the conflict. The Security Council could have taken more decisive action had it not been for the Russian veto threat

blocking any resolution suggesting more forceful action. Learning from that experience, the United States did not wait for another deadlock at the Security Council during the Kosovo crisis and intervened without Security Council authorization, no doubt preventing massacres that might have cost tens of thousands of innocent lives, but also undermining the legal basis for the intervention. NATO also conducted air operations without Security Council authorization, although subsequent council resolutions on Kosovo *de facto* legitimized the operation *ex post.*

The threat to disable the Security Council through recourse to the veto since the end of the Cold War has not always come from the Russian Federation. The United States put the council in a difficult position by asking that immunity be granted for its soldiers from the International Criminal Court (ICC). The United States convinced the Security Council to unanimously adopt a resolution granting a 12–month immunity from the ICC to all UN peacekeeping personnel from states that are not parties to the Rome Statute.[14] In 2003, the United States pushed through another resolution extending immunity one more year by simply threatening to draw back all its forces from UN peacekeeping operations. Many nations perceived this episode as one in which the Security Council was held hostage by the United States.

The Security Council's post–Cold War problems were most clearly illustrated by the Iraq crisis of 2002–03. The United States initially seemed to have hesitated as to whether to seek a Security Council resolution at all. To some degree this was due to the fear that at least one of the Permanent Five members would exercise its veto. In the end, and with strong encouragement from British prime minister Tony Blair, the United States did try to obtain a resolution clearly authorizing the use of force, but in February 2003, Jacques Chirac announced that France would veto such a resolution as long as the UN arms inspectors had not finished their job. In the meantime, nonpermanent members, including small countries such as Cameroon and medium-sized nations such as Chile, faced intense diplomatic pressure from both the United States and France, with the latter leading the anti-intervention coalition. The fact that one country could veto the resolution, and that the United States quite clearly announced that it would act as it saw fit no matter what happened at the Security Council, underlined the reality that the UN arrangements were—and

14. The Rome Statute, which is the treaty that established the International Criminal Court, gives the ICC jurisdiction over three main classes of offenses: genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.

remain—insufficient for encouraging and facilitating an effective role of the Security Council, despite the fact that the bipolar world of the Cold War has disappeared.

Reforming the Security Council

In his speech inaugurating the UN General Assembly in 2003, Secretary-General Kofi Annan recognized all that has been achieved under the UN's longstanding structure, but also acknowledged that "we must decide whether it is possible to continue on [this] basis . . . or whether radical changes are needed. . . . And we must not shy away from questions about the adequacy, and effectiveness, of the rules and instruments at our disposal. Among those instruments, none is more important than the Security Council."

For the Security Council to impart new strength and effectiveness to global governance in the political and security sphere, radical reform is needed so that council decisions be perceived to be much more legitimate than they are today, thereby commanding greater support from public opinion worldwide as well as from the community of nation-states.

Numerous global governance reform proposals have been put forth for the United Nations, but until recently the discussion concerning Security Council reform has focused on increasing the number of countries or phasing out the Permanent Five veto.[15] Larger and important countries such as India, Italy, Germany, Japan, and Brazil come to mind when one thinks about enlargement of the UN Security Council. Nigeria and South Africa are obvious sub-Saharan Africa candidates. But, then, what about Mexico as another very important Latin American country, and Egypt, a historical leader among Arab countries, or Pakistan, which claims a seat

15. A notable exception is Schwartzberg (2003), who proposed a weighted voting scheme for the General Assembly (and possibly for the Security Council) in order to reform the existing "unrealistic" one nation, one vote system and end the council veto. Schwartzberg (2004) elaborates on his earlier proposal, with greater emphasis on the Security Council. While Schwartzberg's approach is somewhat similar to that proposed in this chapter, the factors determining the weighting are different and lead to different voting strengths. Falk and Strauss (2001) have proposed a world parliament made of civil society, which in the future may be associated with the UN General Assembly. Kennedy and Russet (1995) proposed an increase in the number of both permanent and rotating members of the Security Council and a restriction of the veto to questions of war and peace, as the founders intended. For a detailed list of major proposals, see the Global Policy Forum website at www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/debateindex.htm.

in the council as a leading "Islamic" nation, particularly if India obtains a permanent seat? While simply adding new members may be a solution that follows the path of least resistance—the old members stay and some new ones are happy to gain seats—it is unlikely to solve the fundamental problems of the Security Council. A larger and more unwieldy Security Council is unlikely to solve the underlying problem of legitimacy. Indeed, if new permanent members were given veto power, the chances of paralysis would increase further, while if they were added without veto power, a new council may be perceived as less legitimate than the old one: there would be countries of roughly equal importance as permanent members, with some having the veto power, while others would not.

Reform thus should be based on moving toward a system of weighted votes and universal participation that involves all countries, but under which the weights in the voting scheme also reflect the actual size, ability to act, and importance of the participating nation-states. Instead of individual veto rights, supermajorities would be required for the most important decisions. For cross-border military interventions, for example, the supermajority required could be four-fifths of the weighted votes. For other matters that require a majority for a binding decision, that proportion might be three-fifths.

Using these criteria, the 2003 invasion of Iraq would have required a four-fifths majority decision, while a decision on the continued application or termination of sanctions would have required a three-fifths majority. Use of military force in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan would all have required four-fifths majorities.

In short, the ways in which the Security Council could promote peaceful means to resolve a dispute would all require three-fifths majorities. For example, appointing a UN mediator to negotiate a peaceful ending of a conflict would require three-fifths of the weighted votes, as would recommendations of new states for UN membership as well as the resolution that recognized the Iraqi Governing Council.

Currently, both military action and economic sanctions are classified under Chapter VII of the UN charter, whereas other dispute settlement techniques come under Chapter VI. One could identify decisions requiring a four-fifths majority as those coming under Chapter VII, and decisions requiring three-fifths majorities as those coming under Chapter VI. It would probably be better, however, to require a larger supermajority for actual military intervention than that required for the application of economic sanctions as suggested above.

Reform efforts should not be deterred simply because it is probably not possible to find a perfect weighting scheme for Security Council votes that all members would accept as optimal. The same could be said for any voting scheme or electoral law at a national or regional level. There are no perfect or ideal schemes, but rather schemes that are accepted and considered legitimate by large majorities of participants—which is precisely what should be the goal at the global level.

The proposal described below is based on a long-run, "steady-state" vision of the Security Council, although the exact voting strengths are based on recent data and would change over time. Transition formulas most certainly would be required—and might actually be desirable—to get the Security Council from where it is today to where it should be in the long run. Moreover, any reasonable proposal must include adjustment mechanisms that allow a given structure to evolve over time. Perhaps the most serious weakness built into the United Nations at the time of its creation was institutionalizing "ownership" of the veto power in a way that reflects the world of 1945, without any practical provision for change.

What is proposed below is a long-term vision toward which the system should progress. However difficult it may appear to realize this vision, not achieving fundamental progress toward much greater legitimacy will lead to huge problems. It is also important to add that it is informed citizens of all countries that should make the decisions on reform, not just bureaucracies that may want to perpetuate existing arrangements which provide bureaucratic advantages to a few without really being in either the national or global interest.

Under the reform arrangement, each country would be weighted by four factors reflecting relative importance in the international system: population, GDP, financial contributions to funding global goods, and military capability. The latter could ideally evolve into a proxy for potential contribution to peacekeeping. The weights would have to ascribe relative importance to these four factors. As an illustration, the weighted vote of India, W_{INDIA}, would be as follows:

$$W_{INDIA} = a_1 (P_i) + a_2 (GDP_i) + a_3 (B_i) + a_4 (M_i)$$

Here, a_1 to a_4 are agreed weights identical for all countries and adding to one; P_i is the share of India's population in the world total; GDP_i is the share of Indian GDP in the world total; B_i is the share India contributes to the global public goods budget; and M_i is India's share of global military capability. The population share is relatively straightforward to

compute, although a decision would have to be taken whether residents or nationals are to enter the formula, but the other three factors involve more difficult measurement decisions.[16]

Taking for the moment nominal GDP at constant 1995 US dollars, contributions to the UN budget as a proxy for contributions to the funding of global public goods, and military spending in nominal dollars as a proxy for military capacity, and setting $a_1 = a_2 = a_3 = a_4$, India's weighted vote (W_{INDIA}) would be $W_{INDIA} = 5.162$ percent.

The voting powers that result from such a scheme must have two essential characteristics: they must appear reasonable and appeal to the public demand for legitimacy, and they must be acceptable to the nation-states that would have to agree to the reform. The process of moving toward such a reform would involve global interaction between civil society, political parties, and opinion leaders, as well as negotiations between sovereign states.

After agreement is reached on the weighting scheme and measurement issues, the question would remain as to how to organize participation on the Security Council, given that participation of all states in General Assembly style meetings would be impractical. For Security Council meetings to operate effectively and allow for discussion and debate, membership should consist of a manageable number of countries representing, at any one time, the world community. The practice of having some members as permanent and others as rotating members has advantages and could be combined with the reformed voting system. One possible compromise arrangement would have the United States, the European Union, Russia, China, India, and Japan as permanent members. Other countries

16. Any quantitative measure used in the calculation of such a weighting scheme will be somewhat controversial. For GDP, one has to decide whether to use purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted GDP or nominal GDP. A more serious problem is military capability. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 use military expenditures as a rough measure of military capability, but a more sophisticated index of military power could be calculated by combining military spending and capitalization (a measure of spending on equipment) that reflects military power with spending on military forces capable of peacekeeping operations. Ideally, this measure over time should come to reflect the potential to contribute to peacekeeping operations—for example, the military component of the Commitment to Development Index compiled by the Center for Global Development/Foreign Policy measures the contributions of 21 wealthy countries to peacekeeping and forcible humanitarian intervention missions endorsed by international bodies. But the weights must also reflect the balance of power in the international system. In sum, careful analysis would be needed in order to establish weights that address a wide range of concerns from moral dilemmas to a realistic reflection of the power balance.

would be members of constituencies, i.e., groups of countries that would elect one or more representatives. The constituency categories would have representatives for Other Europe, Other Asia, Africa, the Arab League, and Latin America, the Caribbean, and Canada. Each of these constituencies could have up to three elected seats on the Security Council, depending on the total weight and the number of countries the constituency represents. Occupation of these seats would rotate every two years, not unlike the current practice. What would be different, however, is that each member of the Security Council so elected would "own" a share of the weighted regional vote determined by the votes received during the biannual elections in that constituency.

Table 3.1 describes a possible grouping of countries in the world by regional constituencies and the weight each country and constituency would carry in the total, using the weights and principles discussed above. The computation of the weights should be taken as broadly illustrative rather than a precise prescription. More detailed empirical work would be needed to establish precise prescriptive weights. The weights should be updated every five years to take into account changes in the underlying variables such as population and GDP. Appendix A presents a comprehensive list by country and constituency of all UN members' weights under Security Council arrangement proposed here, and weights computed based on recent data. It is important to always remember that these weights will change over time.

Table 3.1 shows that the United States and the European Union, because of their overall weight, would each have *de facto* veto power for decisions requiring a four-fifths majority. In other words, the Security Council could not sanction a cross-border military intervention if either the United States or the European Union did not agree. However, neither could individually block a decision requiring a three-fifths majority, although together they could.

Other members would have to combine to reach the blocking majority on decisions requiring a four-fifths majority. For example, even together, Russia and China could not have blocked Security Council clearance for intervention in Kosovo. They would have needed votes from other constituencies to reach a 20 percent share of the vote.[17] The developing

17. Kagan (2004, chapter 8) examines how Security Council action was blocked on Kosovo and compares European attitudes to US action without council authorization in Kosovo to the debate on US intervention in Iraq, again without council authorization.

Table 3.1 *Permanent and constituency member voting strengths on proposed UN Security Council*

	Factors determining voting strength (% of total)[a]				*Result*
Countries	*Contribution to global public goods budget*	*Population*	*GDP*	*Military capacity*	*Weighted vote*
Permanent members (6 seats)					
EU and official candidates (28)[b]	0.37	0.09	0.31	0.27	26.0
United States	0.22	0.05	0.27	0.40	23.2
Japan	0.19	0.02	0.17	0.05	10.9
China	0.02	0.21	0.03	0.04	7.5
India	0.004	0.17	0.01	0.02	5.2
Russian Federation	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	1.6
Constituencies (8 seats)					
Other Asia (40)	0.05	0.18	0.07	0.06	9.0
Latin America, Caribbean, and Canada (35)	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.04	7.4
Arab League (21)	0.02	0.05	0.01	0.06	3.4
Africa (43)	0.005	0.10	0.01	0.01	3.2
Other Europe (19)	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.03	2.5

a. The actual weighted vote would be revisited every five years to reflect underlying changes in the determining factors.

b. Numbers in parentheses are the number of countries represented in that constituency.

Notes and sources: Contribution to global public goods budget is the member contribution to the UN regular budget for 2004. Population is that of member states in 2001, from the World Bank, *World Development Indicators,* and the CIA Factbook. GDP is that of 2001 in constant 1995 US dollars, from the World Bank, *World Development Indicators.* Military capability is based on military expenditure in 2001 in constant 1998 US dollars, from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

countries as a group would have more than the 20 percent needed to veto decisions that require a fourth-fifths majority.

The weights in table 3.1 should not be considered only from the point of view of which action could be blocked by 20 percent of the votes. Even though the United States and European Union could individually block a decision requiring a four-fifths majority and together block a decision requiring a three-fifths majority, they could not force either type of decision without securing some form of support from elsewhere in the world.

Consider the case of the Balkan wars of the 1990s. Economic measures to be enforced by the Security Council could have been determined by a positive vote from the United States, the European Union, and Japan (23.2 + 26.0 + 10.9 = 60.1 percent). For military intervention, however, 19.9 more percentage points would have been required. These could have come, for example, from such constituency representatives as Other Asia, Latin America, and the Arab League.

Permanent Members

Although the proposed Security Council would have a mixture of permanent members and nonpermanent members representing multicountry constituencies, the actual distinction between the types of members would not be as sharp as it is today. The arrangement proposed here would assign one seat to Other Europe, two seats to Other Asia, two seats to Latin America and the Caribbean and Canada, two seats to Africa, and one seat to the Arab League. Adding these eight seats to six permanent seats would lead to a Security Council of 14 members—a manageable size that would allow for real discussion and productive meetings. Being a permanent member would of course still be desirable, but it would be less advantageous than it is now because permanent members would no longer have a right to veto just by virtue of their permanence. Some nonpermanent members representing their constituencies would have voting powers close to or even exceeding that of some of the permanent members.

In terms of permanent seats, the proposal here, because it is long term in nature, unites the 25 European Union members as of May 2004 with the three official candidate countries (Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey) expected to become members in the near future.[18] The European Union would need an internal mechanism to determine how the EU representative would vote on the UN Security Council—one possibility would be to use the qualified majority voting (QMV) formula that is foreseen in the draft EU constitution for a range of issues, and which requires 65 percent of the EU population and 55 percent of the member states for approval of measures. The draft constitution does not, however, include foreign and security policy decisions as those to be agreed on by the QMV, retaining instead unanimity in the foreign policy and security areas. For the Security Council reform proposed here to be workable, the EU would

18. Alternatively, the three candidate countries could be included in Other Europe.

have to agree to use the QMV formula in the context of Security Council votes, otherwise a single member could force the union to abstain within the reformed Security Council, which would be absurd. If the European Union could not agree on at least some form of QMV for purposes of Security Council decisions, EU representation could be rearranged in a way similar to the other multicountry constituencies. However, employing the QMV model for Security Council votes would not imply the complete unification of EU countries' foreign and security policies. EU members could continue to manage their bilateral relations and defense policies individually. The only requirement would be a binding mechanism to determine a common vote on the Security Council. Some European Union countries appear already to support a limited move toward joint decision making in global governance. The Social Democrats essentially agreed in their pan-European platforms to such unification of EU representation in global institutions, and many members of the right-of-center European Popular Party share this view. There is also strong support for such "unification" of EU representation in global institutions among citizens in many EU countries.

The proposal would mean that France and the United Kingdom would lose their individual veto powers, whereas Germany would not gain that power. In terms of what might be called the "global democracy" aspect of legitimacy, it is quite clear that none of these three countries should have an individual veto power, since each has less than 1.5 percent of the world population. Their individual economic and military weights also are insufficient to justify an individual veto right.

As part of the European Union, however, it would seem entirely reasonable for them to share in the EU's veto right over decisions requiring a four-fifths majority. The EU would have to acquire legal personality as foreseen in its proposed constitution, not just in the context of the United Nations. That having been resolved, the role of Europe in a reformed United Nations would reflect the current European reality, as opposed to that of 1945.[19] It would also, incidentally, allow for a significant economy of resources for EU countries—a positive development that, unfortunately, might well face purely bureaucratic resistance.

19. Some claim it is unrealistic to ask France and the United Kingdom to give up their veto, even as part of a medium-term vision. And yet, if one were to ask any reasonable panel of experts or well-informed citizens whether the UK and France are likely to retain their vetoes, say in 2020, the answer would be no. Somehow we have to get from today to 2020!

The United States, with more than 23 percent of the overall vote under the proposed arrangement, could by itself block all decisions requiring a four-fifths majority. Given US economic and military might, any global governance system in the political and security sphere that does not give this power to the United States would be unworkable and have no chance of being accepted. In addition, the US population is much larger than that of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom combined, and is close to twice that of Japan or Russia. Thus the proposed reform would be entirely compatible with US concerns while also enabling the United States to be a global leader in an international system with greater legitimacy and that allows for real participation and common decision making. The United States would be the only individual nation-state with a veto on decisions requiring a four-fifths majority, and the US vote would be roughly equal in weight to the vote of the European Union, despite the fact that the EU population is much larger and overall European Union GDP exceeds that of the United States, because the proposal takes military capability into account.

Russia would remain a permanent member, to some degree because of its remaining military strength. It is also likely that if there is indeed continued socioeconomic stabilization, GDP will likely increase rapidly given Russia's size and natural resources—assuming the country remains socially and economically stable—increasing Russia's weight in the system. Russia does not have grounds to insist on retaining its individual veto power, however, which is a remnant of conditions in what is now a distant past. If Russia itself were to continue to have a blocking majority, legitimacy would require the same for, at the very least, China, India, Japan, and Brazil, complicating the working of the reformed council and multiplying the chances for the kind of stalemates so damaging to the UN system in the past.

Russia's voting weight in the total would likely benefit from a more comprehensive definition and measurement of military capability than the preliminary one used here, which is simply based on military expenditures. This requires a more detailed and careful quantitative analysis that is beyond the scope of this book.

China, India, and Japan are, by order of magnitude, larger players in the international system than any other individual country with the exception of the United States. Thus, they should be permanent members under the reform arrangements. However, because the proposed system would

essentially rely on qualified majority voting, these countries individually would not have veto power over decisions requiring either four-fifths or three-fifths majorities. However, China's and India's respective weights would increase over time, and having India and Japan permanently join the Security Council would remedy today's unreasonable status quo and greatly enhance the council's legitimacy worldwide.

Another country with a major individual role in the international system is Brazil, which conceivably could be included as a permanent member. However, Brazil's individual weight, 2.17, is much smaller than the weights of what would be the two new permanent council members, Japan and India. Instead, Brazil would play a leading role in the Latin American constituency, as explained below.

Constituencies and Nonpermanent Members

In addition to the six permanent members discussed above, the new Security Council would have eight nonpermanent members representing various, essentially regional, constituencies. Other Europe would have one seat, Other Asia two, Latin America and the Caribbean and Canada two, the Arab League one, and Africa two. The computed weights, not the number of seats, would determine voting power—in other words, under the proposed arrangement it is the weights that are more fundamental to the nature of governance than the number of seats.

Nonetheless, the number of seats would also have some importance, since, irrespective of their voting power, countries would want to participate in Security Council meetings. Take, for example, Other Asia, including such countries as Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as small states like Vanuatu and Brunei. These countries would form a regional constituency and elect two representatives every two years to sit on the Security Council. These two nonpermanent members would each own a share of the regional vote, which could be determined by the amount of support they obtained during constituency elections. Let us assume, as an example, that Thailand, Indonesia, and New Zealand put forward their candidatures for nonpermanent seats for a given two-year period. Let us further assume that in the ensuing constituency election, Thailand gets 30, Indonesia 50, and New Zealand 20 percent of the weighted votes. As a result, Indonesia and Thailand would become nonpermanent members for the next two years.

To how much of the regional vote should they be entitled? The most reasonable of various formulas that might be considered would be one where Indonesia gets 62.5 percent of the regional weighted vote, and Thailand 37.5 percent, reflecting their relative success in the constituency vote, with the votes that went to New Zealand distributed proportionally to that success. This is a formula often used in national elections when there are threshold levels that parties must reach to enter parliaments. The votes that went to parties that did not reach these thresholds get distributed to those parties that made it past the post. In principle, each constituency could decide what rules it would want to use, including whether or not countries could be reelected for more than one term, or particular rotation arrangements. The details matter less than respect for the overarching principles as well as for giving some allowance for rules and arrangements that best suit the specific circumstances of particular constituencies.

The result of the proposed arrangement would be a Security Council with six permanent and eight nonpermanent members, but one where all countries of the world would be represented. The council would meet at the head of state or government level at least once a year, perhaps during the September meetings of the United Nations in New York.[20] The other meetings would continue to be held in New York with the participation of the "permanent representatives" (ambassadors) to the UN. It may be desirable, however, to introduce specific internationally accepted criteria for membership on the UN Security Council in terms of career experiences, seniority, etc. The total number of 14 members would allow for efficient and productive meetings. The UN Security Council would have wide-ranging powers to set up particular subcommittees, to open certain meetings to civil society and the press, to hold entirely closed meetings, and to raise funds for security-related purposes.

A new UN Security Council along the lines proposed above would represent a quantum leap in terms of the council's legitimacy worldwide and would open the way for a more powerful global governance mechanism in the security and political sphere. Growing to some degree out of existing arrangements, the proposed scheme would preserve a certain amount of continuity, yet reflect the world of the 21st century and the challenges faced today rather than those faced almost 60 years ago in what was a very different world.

20. Note that there is no such meeting for the current UN Security Council.

Weighting Quality of Democracy

Some object to a strengthened role for the United Nations because of the uneven quality of the democracy that is practiced by member countries. In fact, while liberal democracy based on free and competitive elections has spread worldwide in unprecedented fashion over the last few decades, many countries still cannot be said to practice democracy in a manner accepted by most nations in today's world. Robert Kagan has argued that NATO would be a better instrument than the UN for collective action because NATO is an alliance of liberal democracies without undemocratic members ("A Tougher War for the US Is One of Legitimacy," *The New York Times,* January 24, 2004).

There is no doubt that the international system should evolve in a direction where the quality of domestic democracy becomes very important in determining a sovereign country's legitimacy as an international actor. However, the weight of history has to be overcome before a simple link between domestic democracy and international legitimacy can be firmly and simply established. First is the lingering memory of colonialism, when advanced democracies subjugated other countries and peoples and totally ignored the democratic aspirations of the conquered populations. Second, even as colonialism came to a close, the advanced democracies continued not only to condone but also sometimes to actively support undemocratic regimes across the world. Salvador Allende was the democratically elected president of Chile when he was assassinated in a CIA-backed coup in 1973—a particularly blatant example, but by no means the only one. So it seems premature today for the leading nations of the world to require flawless internal democracy from countries where not so long ago they themselves had undermined democratic development. With time, the situation may change, particularly if the advanced democracies consistently withdraw support from undemocratic regimes and work for more democracy within the international system as such. It is inconsistent, after all, to stress the liberal-democratic principle of equality and freedom and at the same time narrowly defend realistic-nationalistic principles in international affairs. Liberal democracy implies a system of values that extends beyond one's borders, and only consistent practice of these principles in international affairs will allow for the emergence of an ideological and historical basis upon which to hold every country strictly to democratic standards before allowing it to participate in international decision making. In the long run, those standards could

become an important factor in determining a sovereign country's weight in international decision making. But this is likely to be a gradual process during which time a strongly shared set of international values, applied consistently and transparently, gradually replace the memories of colonialism and the Cold War.

Appendix A, table 2, outlines a variant of the proposed weighting system for the new Security Council that would employ the Freedom House Index to measure domestic freedoms as one of the weighting factors.[21] An alternative approach would be to move toward a system which sets certain basic democratic standards that would have to be met in order for a country to qualify for membership in international institutions, not unlike what the European Union requires of countries that want to join the union.

Transition Phase

The reforms necessary to put in place a reasonable and balanced alternative to the current but outdated UN Security Council arrangement would require a transition phase during which the existing Permanent Five nations would retain some of their special status, perhaps in the form of greater voting weight than the formula that represents the ultimate reform objective. Current permanent council members could, for example, retain their individual veto power for a period of years while the new system would be phased in. The existing veto power could remain "superimposed" on the new weighted voting scheme for a number of years, perhaps a decade. The existing Permanent Five might also agree to restrict the use of their vetoes to a narrower range of decisions. Reform may in fact be easier to achieve if the old Permanent Five have a strong say in exactly how the weights proposed above would be computed. In addition, it might be reasonable for each of those nations to get an upfront 2 percentage point allocation in voting strength—in addition to the weight derived from the four-factor formula—for a longer transition period of, say, 20 years. In other words, the whole world, including the current

21. Appendix A, table 2, focuses on the political rights element of the Freedom House Index, which measures countries using a scale from 1 to 7 (the higher the number, the more antidemocratic the regime). According to the index, the advanced Western democracies and Japan get a 1, China a 7, India a 2, and Russia a 5. For the appendix, the scale was linearly transformed to a 1.5–0.5 point scale (half being worst), and the existing weighted votes were multiplied by the transformed Freedom House Index. Later these weights were scaled so that the total of all countries' weights would add up to 100 percent. Table 2 in the appendix was prepared following a suggestion of Francis Fukuyama.

Table 3.2 *Permanent and constituency member voting strengths in transition phase of proposed UN Security Council*

	Factors determining transition period voting strength[a] *(% of total)*				*Result*
Countries	*Contribution to global public goods budget*	*Population*	*GDP*	*Military capacity*	*Weighted vote*
Permanent members (6 seats)					
EU and official candidates (28)[b]	0.37	0.09	0.31	0.27	27.4
United States	0.22	0.05	0.27	0.40	22.9
Japan	0.19	0.02	0.17	0.05	9.8
China	0.02	0.21	0.03	0.04	8.8
India	0.004	0.17	0.01	0.02	4.6
Russian Federation	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	3.4
Constituencies (8 seats)					
Other Asia (40)	0.05	0.18	0.07	0.06	8.1
Latin America, Caribbean, and Canada (35)	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.04	6.7
Arab League (21)	0.02	0.05	0.01	0.06	3.1
Africa (43)	0.005	0.10	0.01	0.01	2.9
Other Europe (19)	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.03	2.3

a. The actual weighted vote would be revisited every five years to reflect underlying changes in the determining factors.

b. Numbers in parentheses are the number of countries represented in that constituency.

Notes and sources: Contribution to global public goods budget is the member contribution to the UN regular budget for 2004. Population is that of member states in 2001, from the World Bank, *World Development Indicators,* and the CIA Factbook. GDP is in constant 1995 US dollars, from the World Bank, *World Development Indicators*. Military capability is based on military expenditure in constant 1998 US dollars, from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Permanent Five, would share 90 percent of the total votes according to the proposed formula, and the Permanent Five would get an additional equal allocation of the remaining 10 percent in recognition of their previous status. Table 3.2 shows what Security Council voting strength would look like at the beginning of the 20-year transition period.[22]

22. See appendix A, table 3, for country-by-country voting strengths on the proposed Security Council at the beginning of the 20-year transition period.

As discussed earlier, the EU countries would have to resolve among themselves how to organize their shared Security Council vote both in the transition phase and in the longer term. The transition arrangement would be particularly important for the Russian Federation, where current GDP may be unnaturally low because of the country's difficult transition from communism. Since the voting weights in the base formula would be revised every five years to reflect changes in the four factors determining voting weight, it is likely that the Russian Federation would increase its basic weight over the 20-year transition period. That transition thus would recognize Russia's special circumstances and work toward an equitable outcome for that nation.

The type of UN reform discussed in this chapter will be difficult to achieve politically even with a transition phase. The governance of reform must be accompanied by serious internal management reforms. Maintaining the current status quo will also be very difficult, however, because it is blatantly unfair and does not work. For all those who do believe that very worrisome security problems are awaiting the world as a whole, reform is in fact unavoidable. The world must face up to the need for a serious reform of global security arrangements. The proposals outlined above reflect arrangements that could work and may become acceptable, given some transition measures. No doubt other, somewhat different proposals could also constitute substantial progress. What is certain is that the Permanent Five cannot simply pretend that the veto they gave themselves will be accepted forever in its current form. One cannot set up an organization or a structure of governance at some point in history and expect that it remain unchanged forever. Insisting on the status quo is equivalent to undermining the United Nations as an instrument of global governance and peace. The security of all, including the security of Permanent Five citizens, depends on a strong and legitimate UN Security Council, able to enforce international law and champion the peaceful resolution of disputes. The concluding chapter of this book attempts to outline the political dynamics that could lead to UN reform of the type presented above.