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*National Politics
and Global Choices*

Human progress is neither automatic nor inevitable. We are now faced with the fact that tomorrow is today. We are confronted with the fierce urgency of now. In this unfolding conundrum of life and history, there is such a thing as being too late. Procrastination is still the thief of time. Life often leaves us standing bare, naked and dejected with a lost opportunity. The “tide in the affairs of men” does not remain at the flood; it ebbs. We may cry out desperately for time to pause in her passage, but time is deaf to every plea and rushes on. Over the bleached bones and jumbled residues of numerous civilizations are written the pathetic words: Too late.

MARTIN LUTHER KING JR.

Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community? 1967

During the days Martin Luther King spoke the words above, American society faced the challenge of integrating African Americans into the mainstream of American life. Serious socioeconomic problems still affect the African American community, but America succeeded to a great extent in meeting the challenge—an African American is about to succeed another as secretary of state of the United States. Had America not taken up the challenge, it is likely that it would have been greatly weakened by internal strife. Today the challenge is better global governance.

The global order that will emerge in the world of the 21st century—the nature of the United Nations, the rules or lack of them governing intervention, the future of our environment, the evolution of international financial institutions, and the World Trade Organization—will be decided on by national policymakers, acting first and foremost as politicians mindful of the expectations of their electorates. That is still a fact of life and will remain so for a long time. Even in the European Union, which has traveled much further than others toward supranational decision making—politics remains a very local affair.

How, then, could national politics interact with global trends in a way

that promotes acceptance of the reforms proposed throughout this book? The proposals are concrete and go beyond generalities, although it is their fundamental nature rather than their exact form that matters. The United Nations Security Council could consist of 16 rather than 14 members and include Brazil and Nigeria or South Africa as permanent members. There could be five rather than four variables determining voting strengths, with the fifth being contributions to a standing UN peacekeeping force in addition to general military capability. What is essential is to go beyond just adding new members to the Security Council and build a voting system that reflects the world at the beginning of the 21st century and is legitimately perceived as such. No matter how one gets there, only a change that sweeping will stop the political paralysis that so often constrains the United Nations in the face of pressing challenges.

The security challenges are immediate. Environmental challenges are longer term but just as real. Neglect of global warming over the next two decades could create huge social and economic costs later in this century. Much of the environmental problems are distributional: we have or will have enough knowledge and technology to deal with most resource shortages and can even improve the quality of the environment, but we have to agree on the policies to achieve specific objectives and compromise on the sharing of the costs and benefits.

What I have referred to throughout this book as “better” globalization also depends on a truly development-oriented round of trade talks to unleash new dynamics of growth and start encompassing services, an area with huge potential for large global efficiency gains. This implies winning the battle for the hearts and minds of people the world over on trade issues by clarifying what is at stake and covering the costs of short-term adjustment. Only then can the long-term benefits be realized.

Chapter 5 proposed a Stability and Growth Facility under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), although a strengthened World Bank might be even better suited to manage such a facility, with the IMF working in cooperation by focusing on surveillance and acute crisis management. Whatever shape and under whoever’s umbrella the facility functions, what is essential is to recognize that a significant number of emerging-market economies desperately need to escape the debt trap that has constrained their development for so many years, both due to their own past imprudence and because capital markets have exacerbated volatility and surges in the cost of carrying debt.

The obstacles confronting the world’s poorest countries are so daunting

that a gradual approach to solving them simply will not work. Only a concerted “big push” strategy, as described in chapter 6, will enable these nations to become part of a growing world economy. Meeting or even getting close to the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals requires a substantial increase in resources targeted to development. Some version of a small international development tax in the form of a surcharge on profits or an environmental tax could provide some of the additional resources required both to keep the cost of borrowing from the Stability and Growth Facility close to the LIBOR rate, and to finance the “big push” strategy to help the poorest of the poor with only concessional resources.

The “frontloading” of development assistance required for the “big push” strategy would clearly benefit from the idea put forward by Gordon Brown, British chancellor of the Exchequer, to authorize borrowing guaranteed by future aid allocations in rich country budgets, which would increase the resources that can be quickly deployed in support of more rapid and equitable development. Regular development-oriented allocations of special drawing rights (SDRs), as proposed by financier Georges Soros and others, represent another potential approach to raising resources.

These are all important details—and in global affairs as much as anywhere, one must remember that sometimes the devil can be in the detail. But the foundation upon which those details can be negotiated must be an unwavering willingness to reform the international system in such a way that (i) the security sphere is governed by international rules based on explicit consent and measured by methods that are inclusive and reflect democratic values, and (ii) economic globalization is embedded in institutions and policies that stabilize market forces, foster greater equity and fairness, and incorporate the poor, the disadvantaged, and the excluded into the global development process.

More effective, functional, and representative governance of the international system is critically important to the reform process. A renewed United Nations with top governance councils that are both effective in action and perceived as legitimate the world over must provide the integrating framework, but without adding on layers of bureaucracy that slow the ability of individual agencies to act decisively on a day-to-day basis. Table 9.1 compares the framework of governance—voting strengths—on the current UN Security Council with what would be the voting strengths on a renewed UN Security Council and a new UN Economic and Social Security Council as proposed in chapters 3 and 4.

Table 9.1 *Current UN Security Council versus proposed UN system voting strengths*

<i>Current Arrangements UN Security Council</i>	<i>Voting strength under renewed UN system</i>		
	<i>Permanent members (6 seats)</i>	<i>Transition UN Security Council</i>	<i>UN Economic and Social Security Council</i>
<i>Permanent five with veto power</i>			
United Kingdom	European Union	27.43	25.74
France			
United States	United States	22.91	17.78
	Japan	9.83	12.76
China	China	8.76	8.75
	India	4.65	6.28
Russian Federation	Russian Federation	3.44	1.53
<i>Regional allocation (10 seats)</i>			
Asia (2)	<i>Constituencies (8 seats)</i> Other Asia (2)	8.10	9.87
Latin America, Caribbean, and Canada (2)	Latin America, Caribbean, and Canada (2)	6.67	8.47
	Arab League (1)	3.07	3.96
Africa (3)	Africa (2)	2.86	2.62
Western Europe and Other (2)			
Eastern Europe (1)	Other Europe (1)	2.29	2.24

Two key determining factors of the likelihood and the speed with which fundamental reform in the international system will take place in the years ahead are the direction taken by the United States following the November 2004 elections and the debate unfolding in Europe over the new constitution that must be ratified by referendum or parliamentary vote. The sections that follow examine how the choices that the United States and Europe make might interact with the behavior of other major regional players and with global political dynamics.

The Choice for the United States

The Iraq war and the events surrounding it have unleashed a strong, often passionate debate on global governance and national sovereignty in the

United States, a debate that one wishes could have taken place in the early 1990s when the Cold War ended.

As to what is at stake when the United States is involved, Zbigniew Brzezinski (2004, vii) might have put it best: "American power and American social dynamics, working together, could promote the gradual emergence of a global community of shared interest. Misused and in collision, they could push the world into chaos while leaving America beleaguered."

In an October 2003 lecture delivered at Chatham House in London, Brookings Institution president Strobe Talbott presented the key question as "whether the US recommits itself to the utility of collaborative institutions and consensual arrangements—not just as a participant, but as a leader."

Will the United States try to dominate the world relying primarily on unrivaled military might, and regard global institutions as potentially useful but nonessential tools to supplement its power as a nation-state? Or will Americans try to lead the world into building a 21st century order where nation-states will abide by rules under a reformed international system that reflects the current realities of relative power and democratic values?

US policy over the past decade has not been encouraging for those who hope that America will opt for leadership rather than domination. As discussed in chapter 3, the United States has tended to oppose proposals that imply some degree of shared sovereignty, whether it has been the Kyoto Protocol, the International Court of Justice, the Treaty to Ban Landmines, or the necessity to wait for UN Security Council authorization before invading Iraq.

Sometimes the United States has tried to justify its unwillingness to use the international cooperative framework by arguing that the existing system is ineffective. It is true, for example, that the intervention in Kosovo—which most would agree was desirable and successful—had to be carried out without UN Security Council authorization because a single veto would have stopped it. It could also be argued, although with less evidence and conviction, that any intervention in Iraq, regardless of the degree of international support, would have been blocked by one veto or another. That is precisely why comprehensive reform of the UN Security Council is so necessary—to prevent gridlock and facilitate a functional decision-making structure. A simple enlargement of the Security Council preserving current veto rights would not be sufficient—no UN-backed intervention in Kosovo would have been feasible even if Germany, Japan,

India, and some other nations had been permanent members. For the UN Security Council to truly become a useful tool of international governance, the most critical reform must be to restrict the ability of countries to use veto power, and to adopt a voting system that allows for strong and worldwide supermajorities to use the UN to act in a timely and decisive manner.

But instead of actively seeking reasonable reform, US policies over the past decade have been directed toward downplaying the potential role of international institutions and instead emphasizing reliance on sheer US power. For example, in her oft-quoted article "Promoting the National Interest," Condoleezza Rice (2000) argued against "the appeal . . . to notions of international law and norms, and the belief that the support of many states—or even better of institutions like the United Nations—is essential to the legitimate exercise of power." One might agree with her if the exercise of power is truly self-defense, or to prevent massive loss of life in ethnic cleansing or genocide. But who has the legitimacy to judge in a particular situation?

Despite the unprecedented military might of the United States, there is growing evidence that unilateralism is not working. The most telling paradox is that at a time when US military capability is unrivaled, Americans feel less safe than they have felt in decades. This domestic insecurity has become so strong that it is creating a new and difficult-to-manage trade-off between homeland security and civil rights.

It will become increasingly apparent that economic realities also will constrain unilateralism. Material progress has continued in the United States, but serious problems are looming ahead. The budget surpluses of the late 1990s have turned into record budget deficits, with the large financial burden the United States is shouldering for military operations in Iraq and elsewhere bearing some of the responsibility. The dollar has lost about 20 percent of its value with respect to other major currencies, and yet the trade and current account deficits are widening, signaling the danger of further declines in the value of the US currency. A steeply declining currency has never been a sign of particularly good economic health or national power. The military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq seem bogged down, despite huge financial expenditures, and there is serious concern that the United States might be overstretched. The emergence of a military challenge elsewhere (North Korea, for instance) would force the United States to take drastic measures to mobilize the human and financial resources necessary to meet such a threat. Further increases in

military expenditures would add to the already worrisome fiscal situation. Arguably, all this does not amount to an increase in the security and well being of the United States.

Perhaps even more important than the issues enumerated above is that US policies have earned resentment throughout the world that can only be compared to sentiments that prevailed during the Vietnam War. Various polls conducted in 2003 and 2004 show an almost universal lack of support for US policies, with disapproval ratings often reaching beyond 60 or even 70 percent, even in countries traditionally friendly to the United States.¹ This situation cannot long endure for two fundamental and related reasons, one practical and the other ideological.

The practical reason is based on economic and financial matters, as the United States will have an ongoing need for peacekeeping operations in various parts of the world, not least in Afghanistan and Iraq. If and when a peace accord can finally be reached between Israelis and Palestinians, more peacekeepers will be needed to enforce and secure the agreement. What will happen in the broader Gulf area is anybody's guess, and further needs could well arise in places not easy to predict—peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention in Africa, and potential trouble spots in Central Asia, and perhaps even in parts of Latin America.

Some of these problem areas may be used by terror networks as bases and pose direct challenges to the physical or economic security of the United States. A Report of the Commission on Weak States and US National Security (2004) states, "The inability of many poor countries to effectively control and manage their territories makes them particularly susceptible to incursions by terrorist groups, illicit trafficking, crime, and the spread of disease. . . . Illicit transnational networks, particularly terrorist and criminal groups, exploit weak states for the porous borders and minimal law enforcement that allow the easy movement of money, people, drugs, and weapons. Somalia, for example, suffered the near-total disappearance of centralized authority after the failed UN and US intervention in 1992–93. Al-Qaeda moved in, using the country as a safe haven through the 1990s and as a staging ground and escape route for attacks in Kenya as recently as 2002."

1. The Pew Global Attitudes Project (2004) regularly reports on polls conducted worldwide. In the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, the respective percentages of respondents rating the United States favorably dropped from 75, 63, and 61 percent in the summer of 2002 to 58, 37, and 38 percent in the spring of 2004.

US political leaders will have difficulty asking taxpayers to carry most of the financial burdens of containing violence in the world all by themselves. The danger is that a vicious cycle will develop in which the more the United States attempts to intervene in various spots unilaterally, the greater the resistance to these interventions will become, the more the United States will feel threatened, and the more it will feel it has to intervene. Such a cycle would generate ever-increasing financial costs, weaken the US economy, lower the value of the dollar, and make it more expensive for the United States to have a global reach.

What Americans (and the world) now need and expect are results—a concrete return on the hundreds of billions of dollars spent and the thousands of lives lost or forever impaired: in the security domain alone, a secure new Afghanistan that no longer harbors terrorists, an Iraq that can function as a peaceful, independent state, a price of oil that does not go through the roof because of worries of what will happen in the major oil fields of the Gulf, a significant reduction in the threat of terror at home, a peaceful resolution of the Korean nuclear issues, prevention of genocidal mass killings in Africa, and effective control of the spread of weapons of mass destruction worldwide. Moreover, these “results” should be achieved while the United States is reducing its budget deficit and restoring fiscal balance!

It must be added that security does not just, or even primarily, depend on military operations or peacekeeping. Talbott (2001, 75–76) writes, “We must distinguish between, on the one hand, the assassins and those who mastermind and abet their operations and, on the other hand, their constituencies—those millions who feel so victimized by the modern world that they want us to be victims, too. . . . In the budget crunch ahead, there will be a temptation to squeeze down the very programs that will allow us to move from reactive, defensive warfare against the terrorists to a proactive, prolonged offensive against the ugly, intractable realities that terrorists exploit and from which they derive popular support, foot soldiers, and political cover.”

In a medium-term perspective, the fight against global poverty and the effort to make globalization into a more equitable process is inseparable from the effort to achieve more physical security. The results Americans are looking for across the world ultimately depend less on military might or peacekeeping operations than on worldwide success in preventing state failure, promoting inclusive growth, and improving social conditions from which terror often emerges.

Such results are not forthcoming, however, without much greater international cohesion and cooperation, and without the willingness of many other countries to share the financial burden of the many interrelated tasks on which such cooperation depends. The US public is increasingly aware of the constraints of unilateralism and increasingly impatient for the results that, to date, have yet to arrive. Perhaps as the stalemate progresses, Americans will become more receptive to an honest message that explains why sharing the burden in terms of resources also requires a willingness to share decision-making power and responsibilities.

In his now famous commencement address at American University in 1963, quoted in chapter 2 this book, US president John F. Kennedy said that “world peace, like community peace, does not require that each man love his neighbor—it requires only that they live together in mutual tolerance, submitting their disputes to a just and peaceful settlement.” Flash to some four decades later, and while the American public will want guarantees that the US homeland is secure, it is also likely to understand that true international cooperation, including submission by all to international law as formulated by a legitimate and realistic process, will actually enhance that security at lower cost to the US taxpayer. The message should be clearly and carefully articulated that the Cold War is over, and for the first time in history, nations and citizens the world over actually share a considerable common ideological ground. The overwhelming majority of people in the world have no basic antagonism to the social-liberal synthesis—the social model combining competitive markets, a caring and enabling state, and liberal democracy—so there is no fundamental or insuperable obstacle to greater international cooperation. For the first time in history, agreement to submit to international rules and law is possible.

However, the process of transforming international cooperation into a functional policy must be based to some degree on sharing sovereignty. The 1990s showed that it is not enough to overcome the deep ideological divisions of the Cold War; it is also necessary to accept and elaborate ways to reach decisions that require compromise. International decision making, always difficult under even the best of circumstances, is often virtually impossible if some form of super-majority voting is not an accepted part of the system. In a new world order, this means that at times the United States will be overruled by a supermajority. The US superpower will have to accept this reality if it wants international burden sharing and cooperation to work. Like other nations, the United States can ask for

special safeguards to be built into the system. It can certainly ask that the system recognize US strength and influence, but it cannot ask to be the sole, unconstrained decision maker and at the same time expect the world to share the burden of carrying out these decisions.

The second, more ideological, reason why it is reasonable to believe that the United States would ultimately embrace a more multilateral approach within a reformed international order is that the United States itself is becoming much more global in the sense of being even more diverse and pluralistic than it already was. As Kagan (2004, 151) explains, American nationalism has never been “rooted in blood and soil, but rather is a universalist ideology that binds Americans together.” Ever since the war of independence, Americans have thought of themselves as a vanguard of mankind willing to defend and fight for freedom throughout the world. As Kagan again reminds us, Benjamin Franklin declared at the time of the Revolutionary War, “We fight not just for ourselves but for all mankind.” Similar messages abound in speeches by Woodrow Wilson, Harry Truman, John F. Kennedy, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan. American patriotism is not based on race, religion, or even language. It actually comes closer to Habermas’ “constitutional patriotism” referred to in chapter 8. It is very hard for ethnic or religious nationalism to accept sharing of sovereignty with “others.” It should be easier for Americans, who arguably are an aggregation of the world’s diversity.

In 2010, about 40 million Americans of a population of 300 million will speak Spanish as their primary language, with strong attachments to Latin America. Close to another 35 million will be African Americans, whose living links to Africa may not be strong, but who have an emotional attachment to their roots and origin. Perhaps 20 million Americans will have strong attachments to Asia, and millions more American communities have substantial emotional links to virtually every part of the world.

In the economic domain, the share of foreign trade in US GDP has almost doubled over the last four decades, and US corporations produce an increasing share of output not only in Europe but also all over the world.

Taken together, all of these diverse factors will facilitate and necessitate US engagement in the world and make it easier for Americans to embrace multilateralism. With trade and travel has come an increase in globalization of the US lifestyle and culture. While global attention often focused on the export of American pop culture to the rest of the world, Americans themselves increasingly embrace elements of foreign cultures as well,

ranging from sushi bars to hummus. A return by America to old-style isolationism, with which it at times flirted in the past, seems unlikely.

Globalization requires America to remain open to and engaged with the world, so it is likely that the combination of cultural-ideological factors and the practical need to share the burden of maintaining security with others will eventually lead the United States to choose leadership rather than unilateral domination.

The Choice for Europe

Europe also faces critical choices in the years ahead. Europe does not have the military power or the global political-military reach to even try to dominate the world. The European Union does not yet even have a common foreign and security policy. Europe may advance and develop its capabilities, but even if progress were much more rapid than expected, it would not rival the United States militarily for decades to come. Moreover, Europe's demography is different from that of the United States. The current EU-25 countries have a slowly declining population, as opposed to population growth of close to 1 percent in the United States.

On the other hand, Europe, as is often said, has tremendous "soft power," which is the ideological power that comes from setting an example that others want to emulate, from having taken steps to abolish war between nations that fought each other for centuries, and from showing how supranational governance mechanisms can work. The problem is that, just when the world most needs European engagement and leadership to help build the global governance architecture of the 21st century, weaknesses in many European economies, combined with complications inherent in enlarging the European Union, have turned much of the European policy debate inward. The preceding chapter contrasted three competing visions of Europe's future, and the debate over them will be particularly intense in 2005–06, when European parliaments and electorates will have to vote on the draft constitution. The outcome is uncertain and a real danger exists that the electorates in some countries will reject the draft constitution, prompting serious governance problems inside the EU. Even if such a constitutional crisis were to occur, the union is very unlikely to unravel—European institutions would try to continue functioning according to current rules, however inadequate they have become for the much larger post-2004 European Union. But such developments would definitely make it more difficult for Europe to play a strong and constructive global role.

In the coming years, Europeans will have to decide on the different visions of the future elaborated upon in chapter 8 of this book. The vision of the superstate Europeans will not be successful because it is based on a totally unrealistic historical analogy. Europe cannot become a new 19th century, super nation-state where the identities of the French, the Germans, the Italians, the Poles, the British, etc. all merge into some type of a new euronationalism based on religion and culture. Such euronationalism simply does not exist, and the chances of it emerging are declining, not increasing. By force of demography, Europe like the United States is becoming more diverse: close to 16 million Muslims live in the 25 European Union nations, and immigration to the continent from all over the world will continue. Because of geography and existing family networks, many of the newcomers will be from the southern Mediterranean. Moreover, the union's enlargement to the east has increased other forms of diversity, brought new languages into the union, and increased links to the great Slav-Orthodox region. To turn these challenges into strength, Europe does need a renewed sense of mission instead of old-style nationalism, be it at a continental scale.

If the more extreme sovereignists are able to capitalize on dissatisfaction with recent European economic performance and anti-immigration fears, they may be able to channel local and national reflexes against globalization into an "anti-Europe" vote, which would arrest the progress Europe has made for decades toward greater cohesion and workable sovereignty-sharing mechanisms. That would leave Europe as a large common market, with some countries also sharing a currency, and perhaps a tendency for some countries to try to form islands of enhanced cooperation, although this would be difficult without a common framework. Without some of the institutional changes foreseen in the draft constitution—such as a stronger and longer-term council presidency, a relatively powerful EU foreign minister, a more sensible rule of qualified majority decision making, and a stronger and more streamlined commission more directly accountable to the EU Parliament—Europe and its expanded union would have less cohesion and decision-making capability than it had when it was a union of 15 countries. Europe's progress toward a flexible, multilevel, and postmodern form of supranational governance would be stalled. The European Union would not cease to function altogether, but it would be weaker than in the preceding two decades. The danger of gridlock would increase both on internal European issues and on global issues. It would be unlikely, for example, that such a Europe could agree to joint representation in the renewed UN Security

Council and the new UN Economic and Social Security Council proposed in chapter 3 of this book. It would be impossible for such a Europe to develop a strong and independent military capability.

For all these reasons, the United States would not be able to find in Europe the strong and capable partner willing and able to share the burdens of global governance and policymaking with which a United States more inclined toward multilateralism would want to work—a weak and indecisive Europe would not be helpful to US multilateralists. On the other hand, the frustrations that would be linked to continued European weakness and inability to act could exacerbate anti-American feelings among Europeans, leading to less cooperation and perhaps low-level confrontation.

If Europeans embrace the third vision appropriate to meet the challenges of the 21st century, they will approve a European Constitution or something close to it. Europe would reorganize itself so that governance of a union of 28-plus countries could actually function. An increasing number of policy decisions at the European Union level would be taken by the qualified majority foreseen in the constitution. Europe would move toward much stronger cohesion in overall fiscal and macroeconomic policies and a more coordinated foreign and defense policy. At the same time, regional and local power could be strengthened on matters where there is really no need for interference or centralist directives from Brussels. This increased cohesion would not be based on 19th century nationalism attempting to define itself as an antagonist of the United States, or “against” the Muslim world or China, but rather as an effort to give public policy the power and instruments with which to address economic and social problems whose solutions lay in the supranational domain. This could be seen as a vanguard effort to build the global governance needed in the 21st century. Talk about Europe as a “Christian fortress” would cease and give way to the celebration of European diversity and tolerance and to the recognition that the continent will be multiethnic and multireligious. There would be increasing emphasis on Europe’s global responsibilities. This Europe not only of nations but also of people could be more cohesive precisely because it accepts diversity and turns it into strength.

In a strategy paper presented at the June 2003 European Summit in Athens, Javier Solana called on Europe to assume its global responsibilities and help strengthen multilateralism by accepting certain sacrifices leading to a more equitable distribution of power in the international

system and a more effective European capability to act. Specifically, he urged the individual European nations to speak with one coordinated voice in such global entities as the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, and the World Trade Organization. By working together, the European nations could play a critical role in building stronger bridges of cooperation to other parts of the world.

Assuming Europeans accept the 21st century vision for their future, European borders would probably expand slowly beyond Romania and Bulgaria (2007) and Croatia and Turkey (2010 and 2014) to include the western Balkans (2015–2017?) and then perhaps the Ukraine, depending both on progress made by the new internal European governance mechanisms and on what happens in the neighboring countries. Such a Europe would also develop advanced forms of cooperation with the southern Mediterranean countries, building on the strong common cultural heritage of the three great monotheistic religions and the Greek-Roman-Arab-Jewish contributions to science and European thought, as well as the huge potential of a Euro-Mediterranean economic cooperation zone as a source of growth and shared prosperity. Such a Europe would continue to be an example for other parts of the world, and would be a strong, credible, and attractive partner to a United States that seeks support for building the governance mechanisms to achieve more secure and equitable globalization. The European Union would also need to develop a close special relationship with the Russian Federation. Such a Europe also would have a sense of purpose that would marginalize the kind of knee-jerk anti-Muslim, anti-American, or anti-immigrant feeling that is prevalent today. Clearly, the 21st century vision is one of a Europe that would be better not only for Europeans, but also for the United States, the Middle East, and the entire world.

The United States, Europe, and the World

The animosity that has emerged over Iraq between old and close allies has focused much attention on the future of transatlantic relations and the need to repair the damage already inflicted. But analyses of the situation diverge considerably. Robert Kagan (2004) writes, “It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world. On the all-important question of power—the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of power—American and European perspectives are diverging.”

Zbigniew Brzezinski (2004, 222), on the other hand, argues that the principal divergence of opinion is within the United States itself between those who want to exercise power to dominate—the majority, according to Kagan, which Brzezinski would dispute—and internationalists who want to lead not by the sheer use of power, but by dwelling on common interests and values. Brzezinski also emphasizes the crucial importance of US-European cooperation: “A genuine US-EU transatlantic alliance, based on a shared global perspective, must be derived from a similarly shared understanding of the nature of our era, of the central threat the world faces, and of the role and mission of the West as a whole.”

Having watched the situation evolve in Iraq and the direction of the debate over it in the United States, Kagan, in the afterword he wrote for the second 2004 edition of his book, ends up proposing a renewed US-European alliance centered on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a way to solve the transatlantic divide and exercise worldwide power more effectively.

“To address today’s global threats Americans will need the legitimacy that Europe can provide,” Kagan (2004, 158) writes, but “right now many Europeans are betting that the risks from the axis of evil, from terrorism and tyrants, will never be as great as the risk of an American Leviathan unbound.”

The first half of 2004 saw renewed emphasis on both sides of the Atlantic on the crucial role of transatlantic cooperation. It became clear to many that the United States and Europe can achieve far more working together than acting alone, with recognition even by the US administration that unilateralism was not delivering results. The danger now is of an unrealistic new expectation that the combination of US and European power can achieve what US power alone could not, when in fact a far more constructive approach would be to examine dynamic and effective ways to build global governance.

An underlying theme of this book is that the victory of liberal democratic values over the totalitarianism that threatened the world in the 20th century has essentially rendered old-style power politics unworkable. It is not possible to have a basic belief in the equal value of human beings and at the same time behave as if this belief is relevant only inside certain national borders or transatlantic regions. In the 21st century, there can be no effective power without legitimacy; in turn, globalization is ensuring that there can be no legitimacy without recognizing the inherently equal value of human beings across the globe. Together, the United States and

the European Union account for about 55 percent of world GDP and two-thirds of global military capability. Together, they are also a formidable source of ideas, art, culture, and science. But they can no longer be omnipotent. Their populations together represent less than 14 percent of the world population today and will account for no more than about 10 percent by 2020. This in itself should be sufficient to disqualify any argument that Europeans and Americans can simply rule the world. Legitimacy requires that it is the United Nations, not NATO, which must provide the framework for world security.² The same sense of legitimacy requires that international economic institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and WTO be part of an architecture of global governance that takes into account the resources of the wealthy while providing sufficient weight and decision-making power as well to the large populations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The developing countries and their people must perceive international economic institutions as also their own.

The leadership of the United States and Europe is needed to build global governance, and no one is questioning that they will have a determining weight for years to come in any institutional structure that can and will function at the global level. Their joint weight should not be interpreted as total power, however. Moreover, the rules determining voting strengths should foresee periodic revision of the weights as the underlying indicators change with time. The Russian Federation remains a crucial player, and its inclusion in the building of a structure of peace must go beyond ceremonial invitations to G-7 meetings. In particular, Russia should not feel threatened by NATO. China and India are emerging as nations with the size and strategic importance that must be fully recognized in the international system. Incorporating them appropriately into the international architecture would help head off an antagonistic relationship to the West that might sow the seeds for potentially devastating future conflicts.

As made painfully clear by current events, including the Middle East and the Arab world in the structure of global governance is particularly urgent, although this will be much more difficult than including China and India because of the lack of cohesion in the Arab world itself. Still, no effort should be spared to encourage progress toward such cooperation

2. This does not preclude the possibility for NATO to act as an instrument of the UN Security Council, using its capacity for multilateral military action with the endorsement of an explicit Security Council resolution.

and to build the economic, cultural, and religious bridges that would allow the Middle East to become part of progressive globalization. Latin America also must be a strong participant in the new global institutional architecture and, particularly in the economic domain, must receive the support that will allow its nations to reduce excessive debt and start growing more rapidly than in the recent past.

Finally, Africa remains at the heart of the challenge of overcoming exclusion and building a process of all-inclusive globalization. It is a continent that still bears the scars of a history inflicted on it by others for centuries. The possibility of Africa as a peaceful and growing region will only happen if the world community is willing to finance a new and major “big push” that substantially increases investment in the continent over a sustained period of time. Africans will have to be able to work with donors in a framework that is legitimate and combines effective conditionality with local leadership and peer review. Moreover, the United Nations, in cooperation with the African Union, will have to intervene much more quickly and decisively whenever local or national governance breaks down and millions of lives are threatened.

Legitimacy also requires that governments that want to have a say in the international system themselves be able to claim domestic legitimacy. Over the past two decades, democracy and human rights have progressed in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and many parts of Asia and Africa. As argued in chapter 3 when discussing new arrangements for the UN Security Council, it is reasonable to expect and to encourage positive interaction between the global spread of democratic institutions within nation-states and the willingness of the most powerful countries to accept greater power sharing in the international system. The spread of democracy around the world is making global governance more legitimate and acceptable. Conversely, insisting on democratic standards appears more justified if the international system itself becomes more democratic.

Humanity has technological resources and know-how today that are developing with a speed that surpasses the most fantastic dreams. Together with very visible forms of diversity, there is also, more than ever before in history, a greater sense of a shared globe and shared values. Translating the tremendous potential for a safer and better world into reality will require forging a strong alliance between global civil society and progressive national politics that can articulate real choices, explain real costs and benefits attached to global options, and outline the institutional reforms necessary to break out of old straight jackets. What must

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be overcome is not just the always conservative power of privilege and entrenched positions, but also the old habits of thought and the analytical frameworks that no longer fit our reality. The greatest threat we face is our own fears. Divided we will not be able to overcome these fears. Together, enjoying our diversity and sharing our humanity, we can build the global institutions and global governance appropriate to the new world of the 21st century.