Worldwide Governance Indicators vs. 'Afro-Pessimism':

Lessons from an empirical perspective on governance in Africa countries

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www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance

www.govindicators.org

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<u>Issues: Empirics inform on Fallacies vs. Realities?</u>

Moving Away from Fallacies:

- <u>Unmeasurability</u> of Governance & only rely on objective or 'official' data
- <u>'Afro-pessimism'</u> lack of governance changes, and poor perfomers, or
- 'Irrational Exuberance' by focusing on growth in very recent short term, declaring victory prematurely
- <u>Generalizations</u> about the whole African continent excessive averaging
- Governance a <u>'Luxury Good'</u>


Towards a new Reality:

- Governance is measured
- <u>'Governance Matters'</u> for development
- Understanding the <u>variety</u> <u>and contrasts</u> across countries in the continent
- Learning from good performers: some leaders, countries, and institutions showing 'the art of the possible'
- Private Sector

 Role of the 'Demand Side' of Governance, & of the International Community


 & Private Sector

The 'Long View'- Sobering but some hope... While Africa Stagnated, East Asia Soared GDP per capita: Africa & East Asia, 1960-2006/7




⁻⁻ Chart depicts income per capita in 2000 constant terms. In 1960, actual per capita income of East Asia region was \$141, while Sub-Saharan Africa average was \$432; in 1974 it was \$202 and \$595, respectively, in 1994 it was \$677 and \$486, and in 2006 it was \$1473 for East Asia and \$583 for Africa. -- Source: WDI, Low-income economies are those in which 2006 GNI per capita was \$905 or less (53 countries of which 33 from Sub-Saharan Africa).

WHILE ON AVERAGE DISAPPOINTING, AFRICA'S FIVE FASTEST GROWING ECONOMIES STACK UP WELL WITH ASIA...




Source: WDI, 1960-2005

Macroeconomic Management has improved Inflation Rates, 2000-06 (in %)



Growth has recently picked up in a number of countries in Africa, yet very diverse



Source: Africa's Silk Road (2007). Authors calculations based on 2007 ADI Report.

Governance in Africa: work in progress

- Governance defined and measured
- The WGI, margins of error, and caution
- Africa's governance performance: diversity in levels and in trends – variance galore
- Complementing aggregate WGI with other data sources
- Some preliminary implications

What Is Governance?: the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes:

- The process by which governments are selected and replaced:
 - 1. Voice and Accountability
 - 2. Political Stability & No Violence/Terrorism
- Capacity of state to formulate and carry out good policies and deliver services
 - 3. Government Effectiveness
 - 4. Regulatory Quality
- Respect of citizens and state for rules of the game
 - 5. Rule of Law
 - 6. Control of Corruption

Worldwide Governance Indicators

- Data on six dimensions of governance covering 212 countries over 1996-2006
- Based on hundreds of underlying indicators taken from 33 different data sources
- Aggregate and individual indicators available interactively at <u>www.govindicators.org</u>, largest governance database
- Full transparency on degree of imprecision: taking margins of error seriously
- Unobserved Component Model (UMC) used to aggregate individual sources

Why Measure Governance?

- Governance matters for:
 - Development outcomes
 - Effectiveness of foreign aid
- WGI are not a "scorecard" or a "horserace"
 - entry point for serious empirical analysis
- Data on governance empowers reformers and advocates for change
 - enables evidence-based policymaking

Whose Views Do the WGI Reflect?

- WGI capture views of tens of thousands of stakeholders worldwide
 - household and firm survey respondents sharing their successful and failed interactions with governments
 - experts in NGOs, private and public sectors sharing their international perspective on governance successes and failures
- WGI do not reflect views of World Bank
 - almost all data sources from outside WB
 - WB allocation of IDA resources based on CPIA

Sources of Governance Data

- <u>Cross-Country Surveys of Firms:</u> Global Competitiveness Survey, World Competitiveness Yearbook, BEEPS
- <u>Cross-Country Surveys of Individuals:</u> Gallup World Poll, Global Corruption Barometer, Latinobarometro, Afrobarometer
- Expert Assessments from Commercial Risk Rating
 <u>Agencies:</u> Global Insight, Political Risk Services, BERI,
 Economist Intelligence Unit, Merchant International
 Group, IJET Travel Consultancy, Asia Risk Consultancy
- <u>Expert Assessments from NGOs, Think Tanks:</u> Reporters Without Borders, Heritage Foundation, Freedom House, Bertelsmann Foundation, Amnesty International, IREX, Global Integrity, Binghamton University, International Budget Project
- Expert Assessments from Governments, Multilaterals:
 World Bank CPIA, EBRD, AFDB, ADB, State Department,
 OECD, IFAD

Why Aggregate Indicators?

Basic Premise: individual data sources provide a noisy "signal" of broader concept of governance, e.g.:

- trust in police → RULE OF LAW
- freedom of press → VOICE & ACCOUNTABILITY
- bureaucratic quality → GOV'T EFFECTIVENESS


Benefits of Aggregation

- aggregate indicators are more informative about broad concepts of governance – simple intuition of averaging
- less likely to generate extreme outliers
- generate explicit margins of error for country scores

Three Principles for Using Governance Indicators


- 1. All indicators have measurement error
 - rely on variety of data sources
 - reduce noise by aggregation
- 2. There are no silver bullets
 - subjective/perceptions vs. objective/statutory
 - aggregate vs. individual indicators
 - regular cross-national monitoring/research vs. detailed country diagnostics/country policy advice
 - complements vs. substitutes
- 3. Links from policy actions to outcomes are complex
 - "actionable" versus "action-worthy" indicators

4 Governance Indicators, 2006, Some Regions




Source for data: 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006', by D. Kaufmann, A.Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, June 2007 - www.govindicators.org.

Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa – Resource-Rich vs. Non Resource Rich Countries, 2006




Source for data: 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006', by D. Kaufmann, A.Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, June 2007 - www.govindicators.org. Oil Řich countries included Gabon, Congo, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, Angola and Equatorial Guinea

Control of Corruption, African countries, 2006



Source for data: 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006', by Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, June 2007 ,www.govindicators.org. Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red: country is in the bottom 10th percentile rank ('governance crisis'); Light Red: between 10th and 25th percentile rank; Orange: between 25th and 50th percentile rank; Yellow, between 50th and 75th; Light Green between 75th and 90th percentile rank; and Dark Green: between 90th and 100th percentile (exemplary governance). Estimates subject to margins of error.


Control of Corruption, 2006: Africa Map



Source for data: : 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006', D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, July 2007

(http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/); Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red, bottom 10th percentile rank; Light Red between 10th and 25th; Orange, between 25th and 50th; Yellow, between 50th and 75th; Light Green between 75th and 90th; Dark Green above 90th.


Government Effectiveness, 2006: Africa Map



Source for data: : 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006', D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, July 2007


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Government Effectiveness, 2006: Selected Countries



Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2007: Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006

Over-time Changes in WGI's Voice & Accountability, selected African Countries, 1998-06




Source for data: 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006', by D. Kaufmann, A.Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, June 2007 - www.govindicators.org. Dark and light Green reflect significant improvement at 90 and 75% confidence level, respectively, and likewise regarding light and dark Red for deteriorations. By contrast, changes in Yellow (only selected countries shown) are not highly significant statistically (once margin of error taken into account).

Governance Indicators for Ghana, 1998-2006

GHANA






Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2007: Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006

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Governance Indicators for Mozambique, 1998-2006




Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2007: Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006

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
Governance Indicators for Liberia, 1998-2006

Comparison between 2006, 2002, 1998 (top-bottom order)




Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2007: Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006

Governance Indicators for Mali, 1998-2006



Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2007: Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006

Governance Indicators for Zimbabwe, 1998-2006




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
Governance and Development

- Is governance "better than expected" given low income levels in Africa?
 - 2/3 of countries in Africa fall "above the line" in a scatterplot of governance against per capita income ——doing relatively ok on governance?
- This scatterplot interpretation (implicitly) assumes a strong positive effect of income on governance
 - but actually most if not all of the causation is in the other direction – better governance raises per capita income
 - Weak rationale for "income discount" for governance challenges in poor countries

Rule of Law and Per Capita Income




Higher Income Does Not Cause Better Governance




Governance Matters: The 300% 'Dividend'

- Large Development Dividend of Good Governance: a one-standard-deviation improvement in governance (say, corruption control) raise incomes per capita in a country by about 300% in long-run
- But is such a <u>decline in corruption</u>
 unrealistically large?: NO -- One S.D. is the <u>difference from</u>: Somalia → Togo or Guinea-Bissau → Namibia or Rwanda → Botswana or Portugal → Netherlands or Sweden
- The impact is <u>from governance to incomes</u>, and not viceversa -- higher incomes alone will not automatically do

Governance Matters -- The 'Development Dividend' Isolating Causality: From governance to income




Even in the Shorter Term African countries can benefit from improvements in Governance? Changes in Control of Corruption & Income per capita growth, 1998-06



Source for data: 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006', by D. Kaufmann, A.Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, June 2007 - www.govindicators.org, and World Bank database. The Africa sample excludes 7 oil-rich countries: the correlation is somewhat lower when included.


Complementing WGI & Learning from Disaggregated Data Firms Speak: Top Constraints to Business, *EOS 2006*

% firms reporting constraint among top 3:




Source: EOS 2006. The question posed to the firm was: Select among the above 14 constraints the five most problematic factors for doing business in your ountry. Note that the overall EOS sample covers 125 countries, and in some regions –particularly in the Middle East, Africa and the FSU, many countries are not surveyed. Thus, regional averages need to be interpreted with caution, since typically countries not surveyed tend to rate lower in governance than those surveyed.

Unbundling Different Manifestations of Bribery, EOS 2006



Source: EOS firm survey, WEF2006. Questions: In your industry, how commonly firms make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with permits / utilities / taxation / awarding of public contracts / judiciary? (common...never occurs). How commonly do firms like yours make undocumented extra payments to lower level public servants / high ranking politicians, political parties, and senior public servants to secure business?

Responsibility of the Private Sector & Multinationals on Anti-Corruption



Source: EOS2006. Questions: When firms **like yours** do business with the government, how much of the contract value must they offer in additional payments to secure the contract?". Y-axis shows percentage of firms who admitted paying bribes. Last bar excludes small with less than 50 employees.


Complementing WGI: Country-specific, in-depth Governance & Anti-Corruption diagnostic surveys

- A demand-driven, participatory action-oriented process to improve governance
- Key features:
 - Three surveys: households, firms, and public officials
 - Questions focus both on experience and perceptions
 - Questions are tested and adapted to local realities
 - Rigorous technical requirements in implementation
 - Local institution implements, with advise from outside
- Outcomes: enhanced local capacity, baseline governance data, and action plan for policy reform
- In Africa, examples of such diagnostics in Ghana, Zambia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Madagascar, Guinea, Nigeria, Malawi, Benin, and Burundi.

The power of diagnostic data and key dimensions for analysis

- 1. Participatory and Transparency Tool, for all stakeholders within the country to be involved
- 2. 'Unpackage' corruption administrative, state capture, bidding, theft of public resources, purchase of licenses
- 3. Identify weak and strong institutions
- 4. Assess the costs of corruption on different stakeholders
- 5. Identify key determinants of good governance
- 6. Input to develop concrete policy recommendations

Corruption acts as regressive tax-- small firms pay more in bribes. Diagnostic Results from Guinea & Ghana (% of gross monthly revenue paid in bribes, reported by firms)



Governance Indicators, by agency

(based on responses of public officials from 20 agencies, Guinea 2004)

	Audit Mechanisms	Enforcement of Rules	Quality of Rules	Politicization	Resources	Transparency	Citizen Voice	Wage Satisfaction	Service	State Capture	Overall Corruption
Mnistère de la justice	හ	51	55	44	37	47	72	19	67	44	39
Mnistère de la Sécurité	62	50	57	44	38	47	74	18	69	38	35
Mnistère de l'Administration et de la Décentralisation	61	53	54	42	39	49	7 5	29	70	45	45
Mnistère des Finances	7 6	72	60	40	43	5 8	80	28	67	51	30
Mnistère de l'Enseignement Supérieurs et Recherche	62	50	56	44	35	46	74	20	69	47	42
Scientifique	02	30	30	44	33	40	/4	20	09	4/	42
Mnistère de l'Urbanisme et Habitat		76		42	33		64	7 5	3 8	5	
Mnistère de la Santé Publique	70	ങ	57	43	35	60	70	30	58	40	44
Service Communal		62	51	34	40	52	64	13	49	49	
Service Sous Préfectoral	58	43	55	45	32	43	72	13	64	52	37
Mnistère de la Communication		52	61	44	38	46	7 5	42	65	69	
Mnistère de la Jeunesse et Sports	60	52	5 6	42	42	53	7 3	11	71	52	42
Ligue Islamique Nationale	62	60	59	41	41	49	7 5	28	64	43	33
Mnistère de l'Agriculture	61	58	57	42	38	45	77	30	65	36	36
Mnistère de l'enseignement Pré Universitaire	67	69	57	41	50	50	72	42	7 6	45	31
Mnistère de la Fonction Publique		44	60	45	44	44	71	25	5 6	10	
Organisation Non Gouvernementale (ONG)		59	53	41	48	44	82	8	7 0	54	
Entreprise Moro – Finance					32		7 3	8	80	13	
Mnistère de l'Energie, Mnes et Environnement		70		49	5 5		52	25	74		
Whole Country	62	50	57	45	34	46	7 5	20	68	42	37

The indicators above take values between 0-100. To interpret them please keep in mind that:

- -The higher the value of the governance indicator the better the quality of that dimension .
- -The higher the value of the corruption index, the more severe the problem.


Concluding: Some Issues for Debate

- Governance Matters, and so does Measuring it
- Learning from considerable Country and Institutional Variation *in Africa & other regions*
- Candid & Realistic Role of Donors, Private Sector & Multinationals
- Away from focus on symptoms and on superficial reforms by 'fiat'
- Towards deeper Incentive-driven reforms
- Back to basics?: Contestable Politics, Competition, Transparency, 'Voice' & Free Press; Judiciary Reforms

Concretely: 10 Transparency Reform Components

- 1. Public <u>Disclosure of Assets & Incomes</u> of Candidates, Public Officials, Politicians, Legislators & dependents
- 2. Public <u>Disclosure of Political Campaign</u> contributions by individuals and firms, and of campaign expenditures
- 3. Public Disclosure of Parliamentary Votes, w/out exceptions
- 4. Effective Implementation of <u>Conflict of Interest Laws</u>, separating business, politics, legislation, & government
- 5. Publicly <u>blacklisting firms bribing</u> in public procurement
- 6. Effective Implementation of <u>Freedom of Information Law</u>, with easy access to all to government information
- 7. Fiscal/Financial transparency: EITI, budgets, ROSCs
- 8. E*procurement: transparency (web) and competition
- 9. Media Freedoms & Media Development
- 10. Country Diagnostic (& Scorecard) on Governance & A-C

Press Freedom (FRH) in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1995 vs. 2006



Source: 2006 Freedom House. Y axis measures percentage of countries in the region with free press (rating of 30 or below) partly free (ratings between 30 and 60) and not free (rating above 60). In 1995 there were 45 countries divided into red (21), yellow (20) and green (4). In 2006 there were 47 countries divided into red (21), yellow (19) and green (7).


FH Formal Democracies & Press Freedom, Africa, 2006

	'Free Press'	'Partly Free'	'Not Free'
'Democ racies'	MALI, GHANA, MAURITIUS, SOUTH AFRICA, CAPE VERDE, SAO TOME & PRINCIPE, BENIN, NAMIBIA	BOTSWANA, KENYA MOZAMBIQUE LESOTHO SENEGAL COMOROS GUINEA-BISSAU MADAGASCAR MALAWI SIERRA LEONE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC NIGER SEYCHELLES	BURUNDI, LIBERIA, ZAMBIA
'Non- Democr acies'		BURKINA FASO, CONGO, TANZANIA, UGANDA, MAURITANIA, NIGERIA	ANGOLA, GUINEA CAMEROON, IVORY COAST, GABON, DJIBOUTI, CHAD, TOGO, SWAZILAND, ETHIOPIA,GAMBIA, Congo DR, SUDAN, RWANDA, SOMALIA, EQUATORIAL GUINEA, ZIMBABWE, ERITREA

Source: Freedom House (FH) 2007 - Press categories based on press freedom ratings: 0-30=free; 31-60=partly free; 61-100=not free.

Power of Data, Transparency and Citizen Oversight Tracking Education spending in Uganda

equiv. US\$ per student



Source: Uganda Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys

Nothing very new...

'If it cannot be measured, it cannot be controlled'

Lord Kelvin

'Not everything that counts, can be counted, and not everything that can be counted, counts'

Einstein

Data for Analysis and Informing Policy Advice, Not for Precise Rankings

Any data on Governance, Institutions, and Investment Climate are subject to a margin of error. They are not intended for precise country rankings, but to highlight relative strengths and weaknesses and draw analytical and policy lessons. The data and indicators do not necessarily reflect official views on rankings by the World Bank or its Board of Directors. Errors are responsibility of the main authors. This presentation draws from collaboration and inputs from Massimo Mastruzzi as well as from staff from the Africa region.

For access to the data and to bibliographical references, visit www.govindicators.org