



CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT

Presents

***USAID-DoD Cooperation and Implications for
Development***

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Steve Radelet: Good afternoon I'm Steve Radelet, senior fellow at the Center for Global Development, welcome to all of you. It's great to see such a nice turnout today. We're really excited to have this event today to talk about the increasing web between USAID, Department of Defense, between our defense prong of our foreign policy and our development prong and of course our diplomatic prong as part of this story as well. As you all know one of the most striking trends in foreign assistance over the last few years is the growing role of the Department of Defense. It now accounts for over 20 percent of US foreign assistance. Foreign aid spending not counting military aid of what is classically known as ODA development assistance; more than 20 percent is now carried out by the Department of Defense. It's also – DoD has also expanded its role in training and equipping foreign military forces in fragile states around the world. This has raised a number of questions. Will this subordinate the development to defense? Will this subordinate long term priorities to shorter term security issues, or will it bring new capabilities to the floor and allow a greater integration between the many facets of our foreign policy, or is this a strategic decision that the government has made to move more towards DoD's role or is it the result of other problems in terms of our organizational structure, legislative mandates that essentially lead to no other choice but for DoD to take up this role.

So we're going to try to tackle some of these issues. They are part of a much bigger debate going on in Washington these days. Part of several bigger debates about the role – about the direction of US foreign policy in general and the broader roles of defense, diplomacy and development. Part of that is a debate going on about modernization of US foreign assistance and there is a big debate that many of you are familiar with and aware of about whether there should be a significant restructuring and reform of our foreign assistance looking at the legislation that undergirds our development policies – our foreign aid policies, our foreign aid policies, organizational structures, our strategy, and our objectives for foreign aid. So this debate that we've got here is part of a much bigger debate that goes at the heart of what we're trying to achieve with our foreign policy and how we can best bring our instruments to bear.

We're very pleased to have a great panel today. What we're going to do is start with our first key speaker Bill Anderson. We're very pleased to have Bill join us today. Where he is USAID senior development advisor at the US European Command at Stuttgart where among other things they are the hub for coordinating all US military involvement in Africa among other regions, which is Bill's area of specialization. He has a long and distinguished career at USAID with many postings throughout Africa. He is going to kick off our event today with the presentation talking about his experiences absolutely at the heart of trying to work our development policy and our defense policies together.

After Bill's presentation we have several panelists where we will engage in a bit of a round table discussion. I'll introduce those panelists after Bill's talk and then we'll save a lot of time to open it up for Q&A for our audience today. So please join me in welcoming Bill Anderson to the podium.

Bill Anderson: Thanks very much Steve. I'm really happy to be here and I want to give some thanks to the Center for Global Development for organizing this. To Sheila Herrling as well as Steve, Amy Crone, Heather Haines, they sort of helped me get prepared for this from Stuttgart. I'm also very happy to see such a large crowd here from USAID, from the NGO community, think tank community, international partners and of course we have a very good panel.

One of the cross cultural adjustments that I had to make in going to work at EUCOM and with DoD was going through the looking glass into the world of PowerPoint. So I'm going to inflict on you a few PowerPoint slides, I hope you'll forgive me as I do that. But that's one of the many adjustments I made and hopefully I can make the technology work here. So I promised Sheila Herrling that I was going to hold what I said for 20 minutes so I'm going to do a quick sort of introduction. Much of the introduction you probably don't need and try to spend as much time on for issues. Sort of why USAID-DoD collaboration, risks and challenges in the collaboration, what have we at USAID accomplished from our point of view over the last couple years since I've been there, and where do we go from here.

And for starters let me just mention that for most of my AID career, my contacts with DoD colleagues in the field in particular were mainly on the softball field and other social occasions, but that began to change for me in 1992, 1993 when I spent a year at the industrial college of the Armed Forces which is a companion institution to the National War college. And that sort of opened my eyes to the full range of national security issues in our inter-agency partners. And then my subsequent assignments in Tanzania and Eritrea where I was there for the outbreak of the border war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and worked a subsequent year on emergency assistance on the hundreds of thousands of war displaced. And my final assignment in USAID as director of the office of east and south Asia at a time when Indonesia and East Timor conflicts were occurring. And not only that every country I worked with, there were 18 at the time, had some sort of conflict or crisis issue. Now this was before 9/11, before Iraq and Afghanistan, but conflict and crisis were very much a part of what we had to cope with.

Just for those of you who don't know me this is just a quick sketch. The main point I want to make here is that I'm a field person. I spent two-thirds of my AID career in long term assignments in the field. The other point I want to mention is that when I was young and naive I went to work on the hill and I worked for a former chairman of the Foreign Aid Appropriations Subcommittee who's now immortalized in the film Charlie Wilson's War. Although I'll have to say Clarence Long, Dr. Long, the person I knew and who I worked with for six years is not the person I read about in the book. Although I recommend the book to you - it's quite an interesting book.

So for the last two years I've been working as the USAID development advisor at EUCOM. I play many roles as shown here but primarily my job for USAID to EUCOM is to make clear to DoD what resources, what assets, particularly field assets, what capabilities USAID brings to the table in areas of interest to DoD. Then I have a reverse role which of course is to make the similar things clear - that is what DoD's capabilities and resources are of use to USAID, particularly field missions.

I want to make one point of clarification just so you know where I'm coming from. My comments are focused on my experiences at EUCOM, the US European Command. And until AFRICOM was created last fall, the majority of my time was spent on Africa, because most of Africa was under the responsibility, for DoD purposes, of the European Command and we'll take a look at that quickly. And because the focus of the European Command Deputy Commander General Kip Ward, was on Africa. And as you know now General Ward is the commander of AFRICOM.

Okay as most of you probably know DoD divides the world into five regional commands. This division of the world there is no relationship on how the State Department divides the world, how USAID divides the world, how other agencies divide the world and people talk about that question. With AFRICOM the number will rise to six divide commands. This is a picture of EUCOM when I arrived. That is the EUCOM area of responsibility or AOR. And on October 1, AFRICOM assumes responsibility under the DoD unified command structure for all of the African continent except for Egypt including Madagascar and the Island Nations to the east of the continent. If you take a look at a close to final, I'm not sure this is the current statement of AFRICOM's mission, you will see that the statement is focused on the security sector on military to military cooperation and on supporting US foreign policy and we'll come back to this point later. And for those of you that don't know much about USAID, most of you I'm sure you do, we're divided into regional bureaus - now five regional bureaus with the division of the Asian east bureau into a bureau of middle east and a bureau for Asia, and technical bureaus. And

I come from this office here under the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, Humanitarian Assistance, so Office of Military Affairs is a new bureau and then the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance is the part of AID that most – that if DoD knows something about USAID they usually know about OFDA, Office of Disaster Assistance and I'm sure my colleagues there are working pretty hard on the situation in Myanmar as we speak.

Okay for Europe, Asia, and Africa, which are the areas that I've been focusing on more or less, what USAID brings to the table more or less are 35 regional USAID missions, 23 in Africa, they're colored red those countries that have USAID offices, 12 in Europe and Eurasia, and four regional missions, three in Africa and one in Europe and Eurasia. Each of which has substantial capabilities for planning resources for development assistance, outreach to host governments, NGO community, international community, and so on.

Okay let's move now to talk a bit about the rationale for USAID-DoD collaboration at the level of national strategy and also at the field level. Since the Marshall plan US government leaders have linked our national security and national interests to foreign assistance. And these quotes from Secretary of State George Marshall, President Kennedy, and a recent statement from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates make that point. USAID and DoD both share similar types of strategic guidance. Both beginning with a national security strategy and descending to country level plans, both budget plans and strategic plans. We and many of our multinational partners are talking more and more about a quote "whole of government approach", in areas like security sector reform, crisis response and other areas. Moving from the idea of visibility that is the idea of knowing what each other is doing but not having much more relationship than that, to more higher levels or more closer levels of coordination and even joint planning.

Now, what are DoD's contributions to USAID's work? In the field a major contribution that DoD and organizations like AFRICOM and EUCOM can make to our work, USAID's work, is in improving security and safety of local population. USAID can't make much of a difference in people's lives if we don't have a stable environment in which to work, particularly for the long term work, and if we don't have secure environments to work in. If DoD builds professional militaries who are regarded as protectors by the local population, who respect human rights, who can deploy regional peace keeping forces, all of that helps make USAID much more effective in improving people's lives. That also benefits the work of international donors and NGOs who are working in the same area.

Now one other point that I want to mention is this last point about the need for 3D. You know we use this short hand defense, development, diplomacy 3D joint budget testimony before OMB in the hill because DoD can be a very powerful ally for USAID and this is an example. In the final stages of the FY09 budget negotiations the current chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, sent a strong letter to OMB Director Jim Nussle, in support of full funding in the FY09 foreign assistance request, that is those – what the agencies were requesting that OMB sent to the hill, and particularly in support of the substantial increase in the USAID staff. In that letter he cited the importance of USAID operations and adequate USAID staffing for national security. Was that letter the determining factor in 92 million dollars being included in the FY09 budget request for three hundred new USAID Foreign Service officers, probably not? Was it important, was it an important factor? Absolutely, because it showed the value with which DoD viewed USAID's role in the areas that related to DoD's work.

Let's talk a little about risks and challenges. I won't talk about all of these. There's the perception – the concern about the perception that host countries, other donors or NGOs may regard our foreign assistance as becoming militarized. The NGO community has raised a number of concerns, problems, safety issues and we have a member on the panel who I am sure will talk on those points. There's the possibility of congressional blow back and congressional concerns and we are lucky to have a member of the panel who can probably mention that or answer questions on that. Most of these concerns in my judgment can be managed by robust engagement with DoD by USAID at the COCOM and the field level. But robust engagement means having a strong presence in the combat command as well as in the country teams and it means identifying and raising the issues that we see with DoD operations early on in the planning process, so that we can negotiate, raise these issues, and work these things out. That obviously means that rebuilding USAID's capability is key to having a relationship more of equals in this sense.

There are also a number of challenges and what are those. I'll just talk about two. First one is who does USAID work with in the field day to day with DoD? There are several types of DoD officers in a country team, Defense attaché for example; there are offices of defense cooperation. It's that second group of people, the people who work on security cooperation, that are the obvious partners of AID, the people for us to talk about. In Europe and Eurasia and every country where we have a USAID mission there is an office of defense cooperation and more and more they work very closely with our USAID staff and work on joint projects together that are complimentary to each other. In Africa the situation is much different. There are only 12 offices of defense cooperation in the 53 countries of Africa, and of those 12 only 9 of those are in countries where we have

USAID missions. And as you remember the numbers I mentioned earlier we have 23 USAID missions in Africa.

The other challenge that I'll sort of mention is not only do we hope to be able to have the funding from Congress in the FY09 budget to hire three hundred new USAID foreign service officers, we are moving to hire over two hundred and fifty, I believe the number is, this year. That means hundreds of new USAID foreign service officers who need to be brought up to speed on how to work with DoD. But they also have to be trained on all these other things, USAID systems, all the other capabilities that they're going to need to be successful in AID. So that's another challenge.

Let me say a little bit about what happened over the last two years. In general I would say we could see progress – a good deal of progress in our understanding of and collaboration with each other in several areas and I'll just mention two of these. We can come back to any of this stuff in Q's and A's.

On the training we made a good deal of progress in the area of training particularly related to our respective roles in disaster assistance. OFDA or Office of Support for Disaster Assistance, has a very effective two day course called the joint humanitarian cooperation course. OFDA delivers this course every year and every combat command. In my first year there at EUCOM we did a course for 25 people. Last year we did three sessions for 110 people. Now of course just putting people through training doesn't solve all the issues but that's a start. Now what we need to do is develop a course, what we call a USAID 101 course where we train DoD staff at the combat and commands and other parts of DoD on who we are, what we do, how we do it, and what we bring to the table and vice versa. And that will help substantially in helping us work together.

The other point I'll mention is that at EUCOM's initiative we organized a fourth point there, we organized a humanitarian assistance partnership conference in June of last year to which we brought over a hundred DoD and USAID field staff and EUCOM staff to talk about humanitarian assistance, just humanitarian assistance. Now that term illustrates one of the challenges of working together. That term means two different things to DoD and USAID. To USAID humanitarian assistance means disaster response. To DoD humanitarian assistance means small scale projects and education help, water sanitation and so on. So we had to get over that little hump before we got to other issues, but we had a very fruitful series of discussions. In fact one of the people on the panel was at that conference, and we raised a number of issues that had come up in certain countries. We also raised and discovered a number of activities going on

– cooperative activities that nobody knew about in Stuttgart or in the EUCOM headquarters. So it was very illuminating.

Now just a couple of personal milestones. Drinking from the fire hose is sort of an interesting metaphor that's actually fairly apt for the steep learning curve of the interagency person in at who goes into a DoD environment. But actually folks from DoD who come to a joint command like the European Command, from a carrier, from air force installations, from an army base, say the same thing about their experience because it's so different for them as well. Obviously for inner agency it's even more different. Traveling with the boss is a long story about how I got on the plane with General Ward for a couple of trips, but that particular event where I went to five countries in seven days and met a number of people and you could wonder what could you accomplish. But it enabled me to have a number of insights about this question of who USAID works with in the field for DoD and also how USAID could create events for senior EUCOM officials who are traveling. Such as an introductory round table to the NGO or donor community in that particular country, that would give DoD officials a much clearer idea of the development side of the context in that country.

In working with EUCOM and AFRICOM and DoD as a whole we need to remember that our world of development, emergency assistance, and reconstruction is a crazy world for DoD staff who aren't accustomed to the raucous donor NGO community that we deal with in the field, in addition to all the complex host country relationships and varied cultures.

Okay where do we go from here, how do we move forward in building appropriate, effective complementary relationships between USAID and DoD? I'll mention quickly sort of three general points.

First the regional commands, the combat commands need to link into USAID planning systems at an earlier stage and vice versa. Because the issue is how do we plan how our respective cooperation strategies and programs relate to each other and compliment each other and then also identify the issues that we need to resolve with those plans. We have a long way to go on this. We haven't made much progress on this.

Second it's clear the DoD and the combat commands understand and value what USAID and foreign assistance – other foreign assistance agencies and programs do and the role of our assistance in preventing conflicts and crises. In this area that I'm talking about, geographic area, please remember I'm not talking about the CENTCOM; I'm not talking about Iraq and Afghanistan. In the EUCOM, AFRICOM area our financial resources for foreign assistance are 10-30 times DoD resources in this area. So the foreign assistance program is the behemoth as far as

the level of financial resources. The same is not true of the human capital however.

Third point is, to get USAID and DoD field staff working together at a planning and implementation level we need stronger messages from the heads of agencies, from assistant secretaries, AID assistant administrators, commanders of combat command, for field staff to reallocate some of their spare time to understand their colleagues. It really takes a lot of time. It's very difficult to understand different agencies, how they work, how their planning works, how we can link up together. And it's also true that there are not many personnel incentives to do this right now. In fact in AID our respective personnel and promotions systems do not reward in any significant way interagency work in general. So that's a problem.

In moving forward we need to take advantage of some key areas where EUCOM and AFRICOM clearly compliment each other. I've already talked a little bit about the security development nexus because that refers to this work with the security sector so that we have a stable and secure environment. There are a number of security cooperation programs. There are really over 20 different security cooperation programs that have some relationship to what USAID does and we're laying out the role of AID and DoD. In some cases it's fairly easy and in some cases it's complicated.

And the last point I want to make is that – the bottom point here. USAID has a network of relationships with host country institutions, with NGOs, with governors that are extremely valuable to DoD in any area they work in where we're already working in. For example; USAID knows anybody and everybody who's active in health in countries where we have substantial health programs. We know everybody in the host government. We know every donor that's working in this. We know every NGO that's working in this area and we know what the relationships are and who's doing what. And that's something that DoD should take advantage of more.

At a more concrete level there are a number of specific actions that EUCOM and USAID could take to move our collaboration to a higher level. Most of these are simple actions; it's pretty obvious. But the accumulative effect could be quite – could be great. And I'll just mention a couple of these.

If we had comparable – if we had lists of priority countries that we could compare, we have a list of the foreign assistance priorities in Africa because that's in the budget. If DoD has a similar, and they do have a similar list of priority countries, you would think all we'd do is sort of take a look at those, maybe consider picking those countries where we both

have priorities and working at a higher level or a more intensive level in a couple of those countries.

The second point is for DoD to consider, or make a major criterion of their placement of new office of defense cooperation to put in countries in Africa where we have USAID missions. So we had people to work with day to day in the field.

And the last point I would just reiterate again is the importance of having basic training, whether it's traditional classroom, or web based, or on CD's that make clear for – to DoD staff what USAID does, USAID 101, and similar with DoD.

Okay let me finish up. On a personal note, this is one of the best USAID jobs I've ever had, and for a number of reasons that I've listed there. The good point was that from the moment I arrived, although I did have to try to figure out a sea of new acronyms - that's just sort of one of the things that comes up. From the moment I arrived I was asked to participate in all sorts of things from high level meetings to low level meetings, to participation on a whole set of issues. Not necessarily areas that AID is involved in. There was some security issues that took a little while to get resolved. To get into some of the high meetings I had to have a high level of security clearance, took six weeks. I had to be escorted to the bathroom for six weeks because I was on a – you know those kinds of things. But in general it was obvious that people wanted my time. On the other hand, I didn't have time to do everything people wanted me to do. I had to make choices and I wondered from time to time whether I was making the wisest choices and getting the most bang for the buck at least for my agency, out of the time I was spending. The other sort of down side is that EUCOM, just like other bureaucracies, has pretty strong stove pipes. And that meant that the work I did at one part of EUCOM didn't necessarily move across to other parts of EUCOM. And the folks at EUCOM jokingly referred to the stove pipes as cylinders of excellence.

[Laughter]

So let me just conclude with three final points. Based on my experience at EUCOM in Africa, I see the growing USAID, DoD collaboration relationship as a glass half full with much potential to apply our comparative advantages, our respective comparative advantages to a greater result for international security and development. Having said that, this collaboration should be seen in a broader context and Steve already referred to the bigger picture.

First, for building a bigger picture, for building more effective US government interagency relationships in foreign affairs and national

security. What authorities, what institutions, what processes do we need to change or create to enable our agencies, our principle agencies to work together better. And second, continuing – the second part of this bigger picture is continuing foreign assistance reform and particularly building of USAID and other foreign assistance institutions. The third point is that I would argue that we need more intellectual capital and more resources, more priority placed on building better approaches, models, processes, institutions for conflict and crisis prevention verses conflict and crisis response, at both the US government interagency and at the more complicated multi-national levels.

For me that's the critical challenge that faces us. Those are some – that's some contact information and I just want to note that I'll be replaced in July by Mr. Fernando Cossich who will replace me. So thank you for your attention. *[Applause]*

Steve Radelet: All right, well thank you very much Bill. That's a great start to the conversation. What we want to do now is just have a little – some round table discussion here on some of the key points that Bill has raised and then we'll turn to you all for some question and answers. But let me first introduce the rest of our panel. Chuck Kosak is the acting deputy assistant secretary of defense for partnership strategy at DoD. Chuck, as I look at his bio, I'm not quite sure whether he's a defense specialist or a development specialist and the fact is that he's both. He speaks both Swahili and French, he's a peace core volunteer in DROC, in Democratic Republic of Congo, he worked for the International Rescue Committee in Bosnia and now works at DoD. So it's a great mix to bring to the discussion. If you look at – at Chuck's bio that you've got in front of you, you'll see that DoD managed to pull off having him join the Senior Executive Service in June 2008, which is either a typo or it's an example of the remarkable efforts of DoD to get things done, not only on time, but actually in advance in future tense. So we're very glad to have Chuck with us today.

Connie Veillette to his left is the senior republican staffer at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. She previously worked as a specialist in foreign assistance at the Congressional Research Service. She wrote a terrific report for CRS, which I hope you picked up. There's copies of it outside on foreign aide reform issues and policy options for Congress. It's a great report that gives a nice overview of some of the key issues that we're wrestling with and we look forward to her views on how congress is looking at and engaged in these issues.

And on my far left, your right, Linda Poteat is the director of disaster responses at InterAction. She brings to the table over 10 years of experience in many tough places around the world where she has

specialized in civil military operations. Our NGOs, particularly lots of the humanitarian organizations that are part of InterAction's membership are often ones that are caught right in the middle of this development security nexus and we're delighted that she can join us today.

Let me start actually with Chuck. We heard Bill mention it, we've heard lots of people say it that there's a concern that the increasing role of DoD, the people should be concerned of the increased militarization of development and the bigger role the DoD is – is playing. Are they right? Should they be concerned? Is this a problem?

Chuck Kosak: Well I guess I have to emphatically say no. It's understandable, I think when I – when we talk about for example, Bill's experience at EUCOM, there was a joint interagency advisory group created, which I thought at the time - I was serving as a political advisor at Fifth core in Heidelberg, Germany, that's the United States Army in Europe and – and at the time I thought it was very innovative. And I think it is very innovative. When we talk about change management, we talked about this a little bit at lunch. It's controversial.

We have Title 10 and Title 22. We have our authorities, we have our missions, we have our mandates, we have our resources, we have our rice bowls, but I think the one thing that everyone agrees about is that in particularly in the wake of September 11, we're faced with new threats asymmetric threats, sufficiently complex and complicated threats that no single agency has the capacity or even potentially the authority to deal with these threats singularly or effectively. And so there's no question we need to work better together. We need to collaborate in a preventative sense.

And so when I think of the – the joint interagency advisory group at EUCOM and I think of the evolutionary process, the development of Africa command, the thing I would stress here is that we are evolving in such a way that we're looking at ways to better collaborate our efforts and to focus more on preventing as opposed to reacting to situations. Because the reality is that Americans expect us to do better. The American taxpayer expects us to do better. And that means preventing grave threats to this country. It means working and building partnerships abroad in such a way – because we don't have all the resources that would be required, because we're not ubiquitous and cannot be everywhere in the world that we work with key allies and like minded allies to build capacities in a preventative sense to deal with these threats before they gather greatly and do harm in regions where we have very important interests and here at home.

But I understand some of these concerns. I think – I think that some people have been convinced that – and you know it's good to have a congressional representative here. We don't have the legal authority to become the lead in foreign policy, it's illegal. The Secretary of State is in fact, the President's advisor on foreign policy, she is the leader, she will remain the leader.

The State Department has a very specific mandate and authority and with respect to development space and humanitarian space. I understand there are a lot of valid concerns out there. But what I think what we're trying to do is not so much blend authorities, because that's not our goal and it's certainly not something we're able to do, but instead blend expertise, blend comparative advantages at the strategic operational tactical levels in such a way that we can plan better that we can work better together.

And as I was sort of saying during lunch, the fact of the matter is that State will stay in the lead in those areas where it belongs in the lead. Where it has the legal authorities and the advisory capacities. It certainly has the comparative advantages. I don't mean to sound like David Ricardo up here, but DoD doesn't want to –

Steve Radelet: It's okay, comparative advantage is a good thing.

Chuck Kosak: - delve into areas where it lacks the expertise, authorities, resources, etcetera, but it's in this difficult position where it's having to do things in some spheres of operation where we're dealing with complex contingencies that need to be done – need to be done simply because if they're not done there are disastrous implications. And so of late, the Secretary of Defense in numerous speeches whether at K State or CSIS and certainly in a historic moment before the House Appropriations – the House – the HASC, Appropriation Subcommittee a couple of weeks ago, the Secretary of State for the first time in the HASC history testified before Congress, before Chairman Skelton and the HASC and they had very similar views on very important issues, maybe the issues we're discussing today.

And – and again as I said the effort is to look for ways to build models and methods of doing things that we collaborate better, but as appropriate with State in the lead in those areas AID in the lead in those areas where it has the mandate and expertise. So the as appropriate is the critical point to stress here.

Steve Radelet: Good, Linda. Let me get your views on that. Is this a – a great example of – of interagency cooperation where we're bringing together the different agencies in a more unified foreign – foreign policy approach with some warts and some bumps along the way? Or are there serious

risks that this could undermine one of our objectives in development in the long run and – and more militarized foreign assistance? How do you see it?

Linda Poteat: Are you talking about AFRICOM specifically or just in conversations in general?

Steve Radelet: You can use that as an example, but more the growing role of DoD in foreign aid.

Linda Poteat: Okay. Well, I think we certainly have some particular views about where we think DoD has a comparative advantage and where we don't think that they have a comparative advantage. I think most of us agree that it's extremely important for all of the – all of the stakeholders to be talking to one another. It's really important for us to insure that USAID and State Department are somewhat on the same page and that they're also talking to their colleagues at DoD.

There's ways of doing it and ways of doing it. I think when AFRICOM was initially rolled out in the first press releases and the first few meetings when they were talking about having the 50% civilian presence in the combatant command I think that struck many of us as a bit odd, simply because DoD is a much bigger animal than either State Department or USAID and it didn't see that that balance was really gonna work. And many of us also kind of didn't – if we were actually going to do that 50%, it meant that almost all of the African expertise in the US government would move to Stuttgart and that really wasn't something that we were hoping for.

But I think that the structure that they have at the moment is actually working quite well I think. One of the things that I wanted to say as well is when USAID first announced the Office of Military Affairs; I think many of us had a bit of a knee jerk reaction to that. It didn't seem like it made a great deal of sense to us and we were like, what is it gonna do? But I think one of the things that it's done that has been extremely helpful for us is placing the senior development advisors in the combatant commands, because now, I think many of the NGOs feel like they do have a voice and an advocate who's there sort of helping the military to figure out what – what's appropriate, what's not appropriate, how do we do these sort of things. How do you convene stakeholders? What kind of language do you use to speak with them?

And on a personal level, I found it quite helpful to have Bill in his position and many other colleagues in positions that they're in at CJTF HOA and the various other SOUTHCOM and places like that. And so having – having someone – a senior advisor who's been in the field who can

explain from a perspective, from a historical and institutional memory perspective how USAID works, it's extremely helpful. And I work more with our senior development advisor than I do with the political advisors in the combatant commands, but I think they play that similar role. Their role has been well established for quite some time.

At the same time I think – I think the Iraq Afghanistan paradigm has colored how everybody looks at the military and how the military works in the field. And –

Steve Radelet: What do you mean?

Linda Poteat: And – in that as – there was an extreme imbalance in the reconstruction activity because there simply weren't the civilian bodies to send out there at the time and still aren't. And so the military, because they're very task oriented and they fill the gap, because that's what they're supposed to do and they do it with enthusiasm, have taken on that role. And I think there aren't a lot of people who would say, well that shouldn't have happened at all, because there could have been a huge vacuum there. But I think our preference would have been that we had a stronger State Department and USAID and other civilian agency presence able to step in and assist. And so I think that – that kind of lense is sort of being now focused on Africa to a certain extent, where as Bill explained USAID has been present for a very long time, State Department as well. And where most African government officials and frankly military officials know USAID and what they do and I think are very comfortable with their role. And are sort of – and so there have been some questions initially in the beginning of the role out of AFRICOM as to what role was and why was the military talking about doing humanitarian and development assistance.

Steve Radelet: Right. Connie, how do you see this up on the hill? How is it seen up there? Is there congressional blowback, is there agreement on this, is there – how – how's it look from up on the hill?

Connie Veillette: Okay. I would say that in Congress, there's recognition that DoD has a role to play in foreign assistance. Particularly in conflict situations and the delivery of humanitarian assistance and in situations where there needs to be some speed in the response, there needs to be greater flexibility.

And I think there's also recognition on the hill and a growing recognition at that, that the DoD's increased role has come about because we've short changed the civilian side of things in both resources and personnel.

Having said that, though, there is still congressional concern and this concern extends beyond the boundaries of committee jurisdictions. So for

example, you have members of the Armed Services Committee that believe that our military is being stretched too thin by having to take on some of these responsibilities. It's not surprising that members of the Foreign Affairs Committees on both the House and the Senate feel that there may be a blurring of line here or even that this may be a case of mission creep. There's concern, too about coordination issues. And the whole of government approach. It's more than just how do we effectively coordinate among DoD and USAID and State Department, but you know there's 30 – about 30 other government agencies out there that are providing some type of foreign assistance and so how do we provide that type of interagency coordination and cooperation.

I think what Bill describes is something that's happening on the ground and it looks good and maybe it is a model for how programs are planned and implemented or how projects are planned and implemented, but I tend to want to step back at a little bit higher level and talk about it from a policy point of view and how can we get that type of coordination.

Steve Radelet: There's a couple comments here, that Connie just said that part of the reason for this is that we've – may have short changed our civilian side over the years and Linda said that – mentioned that in Iraq part of the reason here was essentially filling a vacuum, that we didn't have the civilian capacity so DoD stepped in.

Chuck, is this a strategic choice? Or to what extent is this the result of weaknesses in the civilian capacity either funding or people on the ground or legislative mandates for the other organizations that as a result of these other weaknesses, DoD has stepped in – into the void and perhaps a less than suboptimal way under different arrangements? Or is this the right strategic choice? What do you think and then I'm gonna turn to Bill and ask your comment.

Chuck Kosak: Well, you know I think – I think actually it's a combination of both. Interestingly, just by way of my own experience on the ground, I can't really talk to Iraq that much or a little bit on Afghanistan. But really as the head of office of the International Rescue Committee, in Bosnia – and I talked a little bit about this at lunch, there's no doubt that at that time, the military had an approach, which was look we're – we break things and we kill people. We do what we're told, we're bringing peace to Bosnia, we're going to canton the weapons.

We have a very very limited military mission. It's Annex 1A under the Dayton Peace Agreement. And we had a heck of a time and this is after I finished my NGO experience. I ended up back in the Pentagon doing mostly humanitarian affairs and later NATO. But because of the civilian, whether the High Commission under the UN or European Union structure

or the various other civil agencies operating in Bosnia dealing with the very contentious belligerency. We created key supporting tasks for the military to increasingly play a role in supporting civilian agencies to help them succeed and to move progress in a – at a faster pace.

So I think that the military responded to, though, that in doctrine as well. They started to take a look at how they trained. They started to take a look and there was some grousing I remember at the time. There were the hardcore war fighters who said, “Wait a minute, I joined the military to do the military things that everybody knows and expects.” And suddenly we found ourselves in situations with very very ruthless provocateurs, if you will, who were seeking to provoke the US military, the implementation force, later the SFOR to doing things and over reacting in such a way that it could provoke unrest in Bosnia. And so they found themselves getting engaged in policing duties and that kind of thing. Using tear gas and doing other things in places like Brcko.

So I think it’s been an evolutionary thing with the realization that if we don’t get involved in some of these areas, we’re staying here forever. Because we’re not getting to a sustainable – you can’t have military progress in terms of cantoning weaponry and stopping the fighting, simply because there’s a void of fighting. Unless you have development, you have humanitarian response and you have all these different areas where there is progress and people begin to rebuild their lives in a meaningful and sustainable way.

Sometimes we’re just – we’re Americans, we’re too impatient. We expect change to happen overnight, but I will say that at this point, there’s no question that at a strategic level, I think that during the secretary’s testimony before the House Armed Services Committee with Secretary Rice, he did talk about USAID during Vietnam. He talked about the 16,000 or so folks in AID and he talked about like today it’s about 2,000. So we are talking about a virtual gutting of civilian capacities in different ways. And he has said to Secretary Rice, “We understand that the strategic operational and tactical level that we need to help you.” And as Bill alluded to during his presentation, we need to help build the civilian capacities and budgets and work as best we can towards this end if we’re to have success.

It also gets to the very nature of what we’re dealing with globally. Whether you’re talking about Islamic extremists and the Tran Sahara or other parts of the world, you know **** said, “You really can’t solve political problems through military means alone.” And there are numerous other eminent military experts and philosophers who also point this out. And I think everyone accepts that fact, that if we’re truly to succeed at stemming extremity around the world, the reality is you need to

deal with the developmental needs, the educational needs, the human security aspects. And that doesn't mean within the strictly military context.

Steve Radelet: Right. Let me ask you just to follow it up, to be a little more specific, if we did build up the capacity, USAID or wherever it might be. What are the things that DoD has moved into that are – that they're doing now that they wouldn't do in an ideal world where those capacities existed. You mentioned Secretary Gates' speech and I sense as I read that fabulous speech, the K State speech, which everyone should read if they haven't, the speech given in Kansas State in late November.

A little bit of frustration in the sense of DoD doing things that they shouldn't normally – that they wouldn't ideally be doing if those capacities existed in the other – in the other institutions, so what is it that DoD is doing now that they wouldn't do if the civilian capacities were there otherwise?

Chuck Kosak: Well, I think maybe a good example that I could provide that kind of depicts the imbalance or the bifurcation of the budgetary process here in town is where you have nascent threats in – and I'll use as an example the Tran Sahara area. You have some of these movements that initially are strictly domestic, but then they begin to morph into more of a regional construct. The group, the Salafist group for preaching and combat for example, was kind of regionally focused and focused at destabilizing several countries in the Tran Sahara region.

But then it begins – we've seen it morph into a more global threat and an affiliation with Al Qaeda. This isn't to say that it's making this transition easily and it's operational in the context of being able to attack the United States or to attack – it's mostly stayed in the regional area. But the – what you want to do is involve yourself in a program where you deal, I guess on a the military side, with improving security capacity, working with those militaries in that region to ensure that they're professionalized, working with them to reform, to ensure that they're doing the right things with human rights and that sort of thing, but building security capacities appropriately.

But on the other side the thing that's interesting about the Tran Sahara counter terrorism program is that there's a whole civilian dimension and that is to deal with the development of madrassas, educational problems, the – the methods that some of these extremists use to spread extremity to – to sow the seeds of instability. And that falls really under the rubric more of development and humanitarian response in building people's lives in a meaningful way so they don't resort to some of the – the demagoguery, if you will.

So that's the kind of thing where you would see a recession of certainly DoD being too involved on the military side, promoting those capacities and you – and you have more of a shift towards the smart power, if you will and the use of civilian capacities there.

Right now I can just simply say with this specific program, most of the money is on the military side and we're doing a lot of joint combined exchange training through special operators and that kind of thing. So we're doing the military side, but the funding on the civilian side is not materialized. So it hasn't developed in the way that it was originally envisioned.

Steve Radelet: Bill, you said you saw the the situation, glass half full. I read that as sort of related to the question I just raised. To what extent is this a good thing of trying to strengthen our overall foreign policy initiatives? To what extent is this not – to what extent is this less than ideal, because it's a reflection of weak civilian capacities in other agencies or legislative mandates?

Bill Anderson: Okay. I guess I go back to this – first to this great speech by Secretary of Defense Gates in which he makes clear that we all share a collective guilt since the end of the cold war for gutting the civilian agencies. And the interesting thing about the way he makes that argument is that in political terms, he says this is a bipartisan screw up and therefore we have to solve this in a bipartisan way. At least that's the lesson I draw from that.

One of the first prior – that's not a quote, that's not a quote. One of the first priorities must be, for me to restore the balance between DoD and civilian agencies like USAID. We have to restore this human capital. The strategic choice that you speak of is actually making the best of a bad situation. And the problem – however, the problems in conflict and crisis situations and weak and fragile states, I think it – that it has become clear to us are such that many hands are necessary to contribute to these solutions. Both from the interagency perspective in a single government like the US and the multinational one.

The other thing, though that's interesting, and I think we're beginning to do this, so we can learn a great deal from our friends, particularly the UK, United Kingdom, which has created since 1991, a variety of interagency funding pools and capabilities to deal with conflict and crisis issues and conflict crisis response. And they've had a lot of experience doing this and there are a lot of lessons to be learned from that.

Steve Radelet: Connie, from the hill's perspective, if there are – the civilian capacity has been gutted, there's less than an ideal situation, does this – how does this feed into the broader debates about foreign assistance reform or reforming State Department, strengthening our – our civilian capacity? Is it – is it seen as the bipartisan screw up over the last 15 years and therefore needs some serious fixing at that nuts and bolts level to get the balance right? Or how does it feed into that broader debate?

Connie Veillette: I don't want to attribute screw ups to anything that Congress does.

[Laughter]

Steve Radelet: It wouldn't be fair.

Connie Veillette: So let's just say that things happened.

[Laughter]

Bill Anderson: We'll quote you on that.

Connie Veillette: Okay. If I can first respond to the question that you asked Charles - about it's if civilian capacity was restored, what would DoD not do? And I want to talk about that because Congress generally supported the expansion of some authority, some DoD authority, specifically 1206 and 1207, the train and equip stuff. On the basis that these were temporary authorities, because we needed to respond quickly to some critical situations that we were in, but DoD now is asking that those authorities be made permanent and global. And I think that that changes the debate in a significant way, because it all – it's almost saying that okay we give up, we're never gonna get civilian capacity back to what it's supposed to be. And then the question also is, well then what distinguishes a train and equip program done outside of a major conflict area to the FMF program?

And to me that's a basic question and it speaks to what is the role of DoD verses the role of our civilian agencies. It's no longer just about capacity, it's about mission.

Chuck Kosak: Can I just respond to that?

Steve Radelet: Yeah why don't you respond quickly.

Chuck Kosak: I think that's a really good point to bring up. It's interesting, I – one of the things, when we talk about budgetary processes or their imbalances, but it's also the speed with which we're able to respond to these asymmetric threats. And one of the ways that I'm able to differentiate when I'm up on the hill briefing staffers, FMF is a country

focus program. It's not a regionally focused program. And one of the good things about 1206 is that it is a project specific program and so consequently sometimes you have countries that are facing threat, a government has acknowledged that there is a threat and they're not necessarily figuring prominently in the FMF country specific outlay.

And the other thing is that the FMF program has a hand crank that takes a certain amount of time to be able to get different types of assistance to a country and so we are able, for example, in situations like Lebanon, we're able to be able to respond more quickly to a threat that the Lebanese armed forces, for example, improving their mobility by getting spare parts to them very quickly as opposed to saying, we hear your problem, we understand, we're with you, but we're going to think about you and put you into the FMF process and hopefully you'll get some assistance in a few years.

So, that's one way of differentiating but the other thing I would say that one of the things that I like about 1206 which I think has been very important is, we're working extremely well with the State Department and part of what we're discussing here today is improving interagency collaboration and cooperation and one thing I can say is we work with our counterparts on a daily basis and very, very effectively. We have meetings at State, meetings at DoD, any specific proposal requires the approval of both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense and this has brought about an excellent cultural cooperation in a sense and we're responding to urgent and emergent threats as we see them arising with our partners. But, one of the key points here is that building partnership capacity is one of the most critical means by which we're able to address threats again United States and our partners abroad.

Steve Radelet: Connie, that second question on how this feeds into the broader debate about reforming foreign assistance more broadly if there are the weaknesses in civilian capacity how to overcome this problem and then I want to ask Linda the same question.

Connie Veillette: There's definitely momentum out there, both off the hill and on the hill to try to tackle some of these reform issues. I think that members now are trying to get a handle on how far reaching that needs to be. Whether we're looking at the entire national security apparatus or whether we're looking at just trying to get some better coordination between our civilian foreign affairs agencies and DoD. And part of the problem is that there are these puzzle pieces and I'm very glad that Bill had that graphic in his PowerPoint. Each committee on the hill is in charge of its own piece of the puzzle but we're not really putting them all together and so this may be a matter that Congress has to ask itself. Is Congress currently organized in the correct fashion to provide oversight of an interagency process?

Steve Radelet: And, is that partly a reflection of the many different agencies involved? It seems to me that's on both sides. That's an executive organization issue and a Congressional organizational issue.

Connie Veillette: Yes, absolutely. This goes beyond having the foreign affairs committees and having armed services committees because we have so many other agencies that are involved in it. Whose fitting all the pieces together as far as a Congressional oversight perspective with the role of the Department of Labor and Health and Human Services and Education and the list just goes on and on. And if Congress is pushing for whole of government approach, then I'm just suggesting that Congress may need to actually look at itself as well.

Steve Radelet: Linda, how do you see this? How it fits into the broader issues of foreign assistance reform to the extent that some of the shift is the result of weaknesses in civilian capacity, how this helps to move that debate forward?

Linda Poteat: You know, I think we all recognize that foreign assistance reform has been kind of painful and difficult. I think for those of us who have worked in the field, it would be really helpful for us if the embassy folks and the USAID folks were like talking to one another, generally talking from the same pages. Because that's not always the case. I mean, I've worked in countries where they were actually working at cross purposes from one another which wasn't really helpful for the implementing partners.

But, I do think Connie's made a really good point too in that the US government needs to look at its strategy from an eagle's eye perspective because going back to Chuck's example of the trends to health, clearly the US government has identified, you know, terrorism issues in this part of the world and is sending a certain amount of resources there. However, both Niger and Chad are not USAID presence countries and there is no one from USAID in Chad to help guide, perhaps, the US military and what's appropriate for them to do and what's not appropriate. There's no one to be an advocate for the NGOs who are kind of confused as the military folks kind of wander around in their normal areas of operation. And so, it seems odd to us that the US government doesn't have a unified strategy for these particular issues and I think that we would welcome that.

Steve Radelet: It seems odd to a lot of people.

Linda Poteat: Yeah. So, some clarity on that would be really good and it seems like people who aren't working as a team and I think a more effective use of our taxpayer dollars and it would make a lot more sense to the people at

the field level, the folks in Mali, Niger and Chad if there seems to be some sort of common strategy there as well.

Steve Radelet: Let me turn to Bill on that same question and then I'm going to the audience for some Q & A. So, get ready with your questions. But question to you from your perspective on the ground, what does this say about the priorities for reorganizing the civilian capacities, reorganizing foreign aid, modernizing foreign aid diplomacy, to make this balance work better?

Bill Anderson: Sort of like a broken record, I really think that the key thing is to establish sufficient capability in the foreign assistance agencies so that they can cope with this more complex environment. I really think that's the main thing.

Steve Radelet: Great, alright, let's turn to you guys, to you folks for questions for the panel. Raise your hand and we'll come around with the microphone. Please identify yourself with your name and organizational affiliation. Please no speeches or long comments, just make a direct question. If you want to direct it to specific person, great, but we've got a lot of people here so, make it short to the point. We'll take two or three questions, turn back to the panel and then go back to you.

Lane Vanderslice: Lane Vanderslice, World Hunger Education Service. I've been paying attention to these things for about 60 years. It going to have to be a little bit of a speech.

Steve Radelet: Make it quick.

Lane Vanderslice: There's been a consistent threat of fall in US international relations beginning with Vietnam when we took the colonialism as a communism threat and we've done this in Latin America, we've had a lot of AID presence at the end of the war in Latin America. This is going through a number of different integrations. So, I can give you some more integrations. So, the question is it seems to me like the United States is actually incapable of following anything else but an extremely self interested policy which and so, my question is, it seems to me in some sense I think what we're doing is rearranging. It's been a very good rearrangement, I've learned a lot from, the panel is rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic, my bigger question is, how are we going to actually achieve development in the developing world?

Steve Radelet: Good, just rearranging chairs. Yes sir, back in the back there.

*Peter ****:* Thank you. Peter ****, State Department, Africa Bureau. I was just wondering if anyone on the panel could answer this question, it's sort

of a hypothetical question, how much of this problem is defined by our problems in the Middle East and our problems in Iraq and Afghanistan to a certain extent. Most problems go away but a lot of the problems with, eventually when they go away, the problems with the State Department staffing, with budget, with AID can be possibly resolved in a more rational fashion because a lot of the resources are being sucked off as from DoD so with the State Department and with AID. It can't be helped but how do you view the end state? Thank you.

Steve Radelet: Good. Should those problems go away, we should all be so lucky. But, yes, go ahead. But still, how they affect, even, your question still holds even in the presence of those problems continuing, how it affects programs in the rest of the world. Yes sir?

Walker Hardy: Walker Hardy from the National Defense University. My question concerns basically I think the biggest concern here is how the US ends up being viewed? So, the big part is diplomacy and what we see is generally in the media and in the pictures coming from Web sites and so forth is a standard USAID, the packages and everything is packed up in big boxes saying USAID all over it. Whereas, the Army and especially the civil affairs units which have grown recently, expanded, those civil affairs units also often wear civilian clothes, do not wear army fatigues, and do projects with money kind of support local governments but are kind of behind the scenes and I wonder in that case, when USAID and the Army and the civil affairs are working together, you're kind of going at it from different ways and I think that should be a major concern in defining whether the civil affairs units and so forth are explained more what they're doing rather than being behind the scenes like many special forces units do.

Steve Radelet: Great, thank you. Bill, let me ask you that first question. Is this rearranging the deck chairs or is there something more fundamental afoot or at least the opportunity for something more fundamental?

Bill Anderson: Well, I see the glass half full. I think it is somewhat more than rearranging the deck chairs although Secretary Gates, he's painted a pretty negative picture in regard to the loss of capability that we inflicted on ourselves. But no, I think it is possible for us to approach the world at a positive and constructive way that both meets our security national interest and serves broader values that we told there.

Steve Radelet: Thanks. My own two cents on that is that so far it's mostly rearranging the deck chairs but I think there's an opportunity over the next year, 18 months to do something much more fundamental and I think that's what Secretary Gates was talking about. Whether we seize that opportunity remains to be seen. But, we have, that's right, there may be and some view that this is the best opportunity, it doesn't mean we're

going to do it because of the discussions going on about foreign policy because of the Secretary's speech, because of the upcoming presidential election, that there's the opportunity whether we take it or not, is the question. But, Chuck it looks like you want to jump in on that.

Chuck Kosak: You know, there is something that we've supported, the Locker initiative which is, I'm not submitting to you that it's going to be a rabbit being pulled out of the hat on this one but we, you know, do we need a national security act of 1947? I mean, do we need to change things in such a way that the interagency just structurally is changed. I mean, I think we're moving in the direction of trying to figure that out. Mr. Locker was responsible for Goldwater-Nickels and we had obviously quite a bit of time to adjust to that. That structural change was needed and we did it and that's made things better and internal to DoD certainly and I think there's goodness in that.

The other thing I would simply say is that there are other interesting things happening and I bring up Africa Command, again not to, I want to issue the caveat that we're not talking about a panacea here. Everyone knows that change management is very controversial, very difficult. It involves resources and rice bowls and all kinds of things but the goodness I see in Africa Command is that we have gone from a Napoleonic J code structure in a command and you can imagine that culturally this was an extremely difficult thing for us in the traditional military sense to wrap our arms around but there is a Deputy to the Commander for civil military affairs and that United States Ambassador and underneath her, her name is Mary Yates. She is an Africanist with lots of experience. We have a development advisor, we have additional ID people that Bill has alluded to and we have gotten an excellent response interagency partners, commerce, agriculture, who want to participate, who want to have people in the Command.

I'm not saying that this is going to solve the excellent point that Connie's bringing up about collaboration and coordination and that kind of thing but we look at as being improving DoD's ability to look at events in Africa in a preventive sense. To look at problems before they become crises and crises before they become catastrophes instead of responding to fire after its well into major damage. You know, looking at things with our interagency partners, using their expertise and working with folks back here in Washington to be a little bit more forward leaning and preventive. So, that's an example where we've made some structural changes in a command and as part of that, you will have General Ward coming back to brief Congress. And I'm sure he will be pleading with Congress to increase civilian resources as it relates to his area of operations and the efficacy of the programs that he's involved in.

Steve Radelet: Let me skip to the third question, we'll come back to the second question about the Middle East in a minute, how much of this is a Middle East problem. But, the third question, how is the US viewed, how is this viewed around the world and if I can turn to Linda to respond to that question.

Linda Veillette: This is the distinguishing between USAID and how the CA teams are doing their work? Ok. So, first of all, just to let everyone know, I think many people in the audience know but USAID isn't just about delivering packages and it's not just the USAID staff but there are implementers in the field who are often either the contractors or nongovernmental organizations who live in the communities who have established relationships of trust with the communities and who have been working there for a quite some time. Just a reminder, not everyone may be aware of this but in fact, civil affairs officers aren't supposed to be doing that kind of work outside their uniform unless it's a case of force protection. The Department of Defense signed off on guidelines on this kind of behavior back in July of 2007 and so you might refer your friends to those guidelines or digital publication 3-08 on that issue. Sorry to quote chapter and verse but I know it by heart I'm afraid.

I think from our perspective, from the NGO perspective I think most of the people that we meet in a lot of these developing countries are more comfortable with meeting as my boss likes to say an American in a baseball cap as opposed to an American in a helmet and I think the Peace Corps has done a really interesting job of diplomacy in a lot of the places that we work. A lot of places that I've been, even in extremely difficult conditions and conflict areas, people say, oh yeah, you're an American, we had a Peace Corps volunteer in my village and I don't know Chuck, they might have been talking about you because I was in the Congo but very rarely did I meet anyone who said, yeah, I met a really cool military guy. It's mostly just because of the way that they tend to work. They don't tend to spend a lot of time in the community, that's not their job, they're going in and leaving again. And I think many of them would like to do that in order to get to know their communities better, but it's not really part of their role.

Steve Radelet: Do you worry much about this issue that when civilian personnel are seen working side by side, quite literally with military that it could undermine the role of the effectiveness of the civilian capacity because of suspicion because of how people are viewed?

Linda Poteat: I think it depends, you have to really look at the context and from our perspective, from the humanitarian NGOs, it's really much more of a security issue and how we are associated and it's not just with the US military, it's with UN Peacekeeping Force, it's with the British military,

the Belgian military or the Australian military depending on where you're deployed. And so, when you're in a situation where the military, wherever it is, is viewed in any way as not being neutral, and they usually aren't, you as a humanitarian because you want access to all of your beneficiary populations have to remove yourself from that situation and I think most of the folks, the military folks on the ground kind of understand that point. I've kind of like to leave to some of our USAID colleagues to talk about whether or not their sort of appearance on this stage in a developing country alongside their DoD colleagues would have an impact on the effectiveness of their work.

Steve Radelet: Connie, the second question that was asked was about to what extent this is driven by the Middle East problem and that might be overshadowing everything else. How do you see that? Is this really just driven by concerns in the Middle East or is there more to it? What happens if that problem if gets resolved, does that carry over to other areas?

Connie Veillette: I think that the post 9-11 environment and what and our activities in Iraq and Afghanistan and Middle East peace or lack thereof have all had an unintended consequence to demonstrate vividly that our civilian agencies are lacking and provide some of the motivation to build them up. But, let's fantasize that all those issues go away, we're still facing a huge number of transnational and crosscutting issues. We've got health issues, significant health issues, poverty, we have food security issues, climate change, energy security. Those are all issues that argue that we still need to increase civilian capacity even if these other issues get removed.

Steve Radelet: I spent about half my time working in Liberia and the whole issue of the importance of security and stability for development has become absolutely central to thinking and people weren't thinking that way 20 years ago. But they're certainly understanding that now so I think it might have, it started with Middle East but a lot of these issues are carrying over to recognizing that these challenges are playing out in other places around the world. Let me turn back to the audience over on this side and get a couple more questions.

John Sewell: I'm John Sewell from the Woodrow Wilson Center. I'd like to make a speech but Steve would cut me off and I don't want to have.

Steve Radelet: I would never do that.

John Sewell: First, just on your last remark Steve, I think that people have been worried about security development nexus for at least 20 years now and there's been a lot of experience which isn't necessarily being applied. You know, listening to his debate, particularly in the context of Africa and

AFRICOM and if I suddenly appeared in this debate knowing nothing about the politics of the US establishment, I'd say well, it's probably a good idea, there should be a leading State Department official in charge of Africa with a military advisor. And he or she should, the military advisor, should intervene when military force is needed; training people, peacekeeping operations, whatever it is. But the African countries where it is not needed, a military presence and military tools are particularly useful. Health is, education is, economic advice is and Steve's doing Liberia and so on and so forth. It seems to me we've got the optic reversed at least in the African context and probably in Latin America and we should, if you're doing major reform, the development diplomacy defense nexus skews the argument because there are lots of other US interests that aren't going to be met by a relationship with the Defense Department.

Steve Radelet: Thank you John.

Jose Goncalves: Jose Goncalves from Nathan Associates, an economic research and development firm in the area. Looking at the 3Ds that we talked about and the little D perhaps development is the smallest of the three. We've heard hear about the interagency collaboration and how wonderful and supportive that should be. But, looking at the context of development, not the relief or reconstruction, I'd like to hear what the panel thinks in terms of who's leading in this dance? You know, which of the 3 D's is actually leading the dance when it comes to development? Thank you.

Steve Radelet: Ok, someone leading the dance or is it just a big mosh pit maybe? That's not exactly a dance but you get what I'm trying to say.

Joel Fyke: Joel Fyke from the Washington Office on Latin America. This question is I guess mostly directed at Chuck but it would be interesting to hear maybe Connie's views on it as well. How do you answer concerns that as expertise and capacity is built within DoD to respond to some of these more traditionally foreign assistance development needs that on down the road if we begin to look at strengthening some of the agencies that have been gutted as we mentioned that these capabilities would then be shifted somehow back to civilian agencies looking very specifically as was already mentioned at 1206 being made permanent and then increased? I mean if you are looking at, you can do 1206 and quickly or you can do FMF and have it maybe in a couple of years. I mean, which country would want to even go the FMF route if 1206 larger and more available? As an example

Steve Radelet: Chuck, you want to start with that?

Chuck Kosak: Yeah, I think you raise a very good point. I guess at this point in time when we talk about building capacity within a command, we're talking about detail ease, we're not talking about DoD people or increasing these capacities. But AID representatives and other interagency representatives so naturally they fall under the rubric of their agencies and so they're there to add value to the mission out there and there's a cultural loyalty I guess that's built within the command to work on specific plans and responding to certain situations and that kind of thing. But, yeah, I think right now what we're dealing with and I refer back to the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense's testimony before the HASC.

You know, we're talking about civilian support to military missions or in lieu of military missions. In other words, Connie brought up the point that we're overstretched right now. We're all over the world in many different places with military men and women facing numerous tours in some of these places and the problem is, we're not involved in places where the answers are so easy that we're going to be out of there with in 3 to 5 years or what have you. The problems are so chronic and complex that we're looking at ways right now to try to deal with what we're dealing with and try to ease as best we can with the strain on the American war fighter abroad and the deployments.

So, I think when we look at 1207 for example, that's an example of a stability oriented authority, not counter terrorism oriented, and what we're trying to do is increase the expeditionary capacity within the civilian agencies as well. SCRS, the goal is to have civilian expertise to be able to deploy to these theaters or in advance of, in lieu of US troops to help alleviate some of the stress. And so in terms of these things evolving to permanency, I think that it's as we begin to promote and build the civilian capacities and maybe some of these authorities that have been developed will adjust as appropriate but right now we're faced with a huge imbalance that we have to contend with.

Steve Radelet: Thank you. Bill, who's leading this dance? Is anybody leading this dance? Is there a strategy behind this where someone's actually got an idea where this is going or this a mosh pit, a toga party, whatever, where everybody's out? Is it - more bad analogies - is it more just vacuums that are out there that are short term opportunities that are being filled there without someone actually leading?

Bill Anderson: We're talking about long term development right? I think that was the question, right? Ok, on the long term development, we now have in the US government a number of institutions that have major roles to play in development and not only in USAID, but the Millennium Challenge Corporation, PEPFAR, the HIV/AIDs Initiative and other institutions as some people say, the recent health commissions, thirty US government

agencies that are involved with foreign assistance. And so there are some dominant ones but the picture's gotten much more complicated in this administration with to be sure a substantial increase in funding for foreign assistance. Substantial, doubling, tripling.

Steve Radelet: You mentioned your big concern was developing these civilian capacities, if we did that, with that same organizational structure, are we going to be successful or do we need to build up the civilian capacity but then do some reorganization to make things more efficient?

Bill Anderson: My personal opinion, I stress that, my personal opinion, is that we need a more rational organization of foreign assistance structures.

Connie Veillette: That's really a hot potato I think for a hill person to answer because we really have not gotten into those issues yet and I think it's something that the Foreign Relations Committee is very interested in looking into. I can give you my personal opinion is that you're going to need both. You need to strengthen civilian capacity and that that needs to happen regardless of what other kind of reorganization that you would pursue. That having a reorganization or restructuring without building civilian capacity is not going to get you anywhere, you need to do both simultaneously.

Steve Radelet: And can I throw another hot potato at you and civilian capacity reorganization, is there need for legislative change?

Connie Veillette: That's really hot.

Steve Radelet: Well, you answered the last one so well.

Connie Veillette: Yeah, it's really been tough to get foreign assistance reauthorization through. We may have a golden moment with the start of the new administration, if a new administration puts it at the top of their foreign policy priorities to do something like that. I still think it's going to be tough and I think it's going to be particularly tough to get a clean foreign assistance authorization because members of Congress, they like to express themselves with regard to what they think needs to be done and I would even at some point, not in this venue, argue that they have the right to do that. And then the question is well, do you limit yourself to a foreign assistance, a new foreign assistance act or a cleaned up act or do you go for the whole enchilada and look at a national security act that really does try to bring in these 3 D's and integrate it all together. And that's even a bigger job to tackle.

Steve Radelet: Thank you. Yes sir? Over here and then over here.

David Hirschmann: My name's David Hirschmann, I'm the Director of International Development Program at American University and I'm not going to make a speech, because it is too nuanced. What I want to say is I understand the connection between security and development, I understand the need for interagency cooperation. To be brief, this relationship is fundamentally flawed and we need to go back to that development in the end it is not about US security. Development is about uplifting people in the third world. I know the connections and you can throw them all back at me and you do have the advantage of being nuanced from the top, we don't. These are not only different purposes but we have different cultures. The military, as you said, breaks things and kills people and then puts them together again. Development, if it's working, should build institutions not buildings. There are a number of other cultural differences. Development respects complexity. The military simplifies complexity. Development has to go slowly. The military has to move quickly. There's nothing wrong with the military, these are just two totally different things and I didn't hear you talk about approaches and values and cultures, and organizations and different missions and I'd like to hear you talk about that a little bit more.

Steve Radelet: Thank you, there's a question over here on my right.

Paula Feeney: Paula Feeney, Emerging Market Groups. My question is for Bill Anderson. Bill in your introductory remarks that set the stage for us this afternoon, you mentioned that there were over 20 security cooperation programs and I noted HA/DR, SSR, DDR. Give us a couple sentences on those security cooperation programs so that we can get some sense of really the types of cooperation that you are viewing or enhancing on the ground. Thank you, a little bit of meat on the bones.

Steve Radelet: Thank you Paula and then we'll take one more over here. Larry Knowles sort of on the right side there. My right.

Larry Knowles: Larry Knowles with Hewlett Foundation. Steve you already kind of stole part of the question I was going to throw at Connie about legislation but I'll have...

Steve Radelet: I'm flattered that we think alike Larry.

Larry Knowles: I wonder. I'll come at a little different way. Everybody talks about resources and capacity need to be strengthened here but I've been intrigued by a lot of discussion on authorities. The first part of the question I'm wondering, I guess this is for Chuck and maybe Bill as well. How much of the new authorities 1206 and several others have come up because you need to be more nimble. You can't live under the morass of the foreign systems legislation to respond to the needs out there. If that has

been and it sounds like specially you're comparison between the FMF and 1206 and that has been the case at least some circumstances. That is that's the case, and these were temporary fixes, why hasn't there been an accompanying aggressive approach by the administration to fix the problem in the foreign systems legislation so that you could return and do things just as nimbly there and do it on a permanent long-term basis. And finally if that's still the case, can that be sort of a box that you can use to move forward a modern, foreign aid modernization? Is that another element in that for maybe convincing Congress to take up legislation.

Steve Radelet: Thank you, Larry. Let's start, Linda if I can ask you to take the first questions from David at AU. There are two goals that are always brought out about foreign assistance; development and US national security, sometimes framed in different words. Are those fundamentally incompatible? I think is basically David's question that we really can't bring those together, that this is fundamentally flawed. The development is not about security. What do you think?

Linda Poteat: I'm not sure that they're fundamentally incompatible but I think we look at different end states. I think the military's end state is much closer than development's end state. And he's absolutely right, the way that you do development is, it's very different. Development, most of the work we do, and even about humanitarian assistance is more about the how of what you do than the what of what you do. It's working with communities, or working with local governments or working with ministries in order to address the needs that they have prioritized in whatever way that we can do it. The military doesn't function that way. They're not built too. But that doesn't mean that, I think most everyone would like to have a stable and secure world so that children can go to school and everyone can get appropriate healthcare. We, I think we might define these things differently. The US military of course, is going to look at it from a US perspective. Many of us who do humanitarian and development work are looking at it very much from the perspective of the beneficiaries who we serve. There are fundamentally different perspectives in play but that doesn't mean we can't sit down and talk about where there might be intersections or where there's clearly not an intersection where folks need to sort of stand aside from one another.

Steve Radelet: Chuck, are they fundamentally flawed? Is the idea...?

Chuck Kosak: Well, you know I think the gentlemen; Linda just raised a very important point. I can tell that when I was in Bosnia and I was driving around in my white vehicle and blue helmet under UN auspices for the International Rescue Committee, when the implementation force came in, just a huge cultural difference. My goal as Linda pointed out was to maintain my independence, it was critical to the effectiveness of my

programs. My impartiality, because there were so many ethnicities and different issues that I wanted to be able to reach all of the vulnerable populaces and there were many among each of the ethnicities despite whatever labels we put to each and so these things were very important to me.

At the same time, I've got to admit, one of the proudest days of my life was when the implementation force came in. I mean, I'm not trying to be unduly critical here, but many of the folks in Bosnia was referring to the UN as the United Nishta, Nishta meaning nothing in Serbo-Croat and I'm not saying anything derogatory about the UN, I'm just saying that at the time we were not really solving the problem in Bosnia. And the implementation force came in, the bad guys sat down very quickly and for me I felt like I was setting up a lot of collective centers and I was taking care of newly minted widows and orphans and I was bringing my hygienic supplies around and, but I felt like I was applying band aids to wounds that would never heal.

So, for me it was the importance of the military coming in and doing what they did was there and having said that we had kind of a tough time getting along there's no doubt. I knew all the Mayors and I knew the good guys and the bad guys and I knew and had a really good understanding having been on the ground for a couple of years. The military came in as though they understood everything and we and the old folks were either force multipliers or not or didn't know how to relate to us in cultural sense.

You're right, culturally very different. But I learned that there are some symbiotic things. I learned that the military leadership was critical. I learned that when the military supported me whether it was the Danes or others who were on the ground. Some of the civilian leaders who would not have listened to me did. I learned that the logistics capacity was huge and that helped me get my stuff all around. I learned the communications capacity was great. There were areas where I was interested as appropriate, keeping a safe distance in terms of my association with the military but none the less working with them in a pragmatic sense. We were getting folks back into places where the military had to do area security, the police had to do the close security, the development agencies had to be there to create sustainable jobs and create a sustainable existence for people moving back to areas that have been destroyed. The humanitarian agencies and NGOs had to be there to take care of immediate needs so we had to work together and you'll find often that among the various cultures and various agencies and NGOs operating on the ground the closer you are to the problem the more you have an impetus to solve it and the greater flexibility in terms of dealing with these sorts of things.

Linda mentioned the responsibilities with respect to the military 2000.5 different things. The guidelines I think are important. We will come down and talk with combatant commands if we hear that rules are being broken. Part of the reason for assigning these guidelines was to help us understand each other better and work more effectively. We need to work through these things but I don't think we're necessarily working across purposes, I think it's a question of being creative. Creating neutral spaces where we can talk to each other whether as I've tried to develop a civil military forum where NGOs feel comfortable coming to a neutral space and being able to talk on equal footing with the military about what the military's right and what it's doing wrong, what the priorities should be and shouldn't be. And so try to work together in such a way that there's, we're building better understanding and mutual respect for the missions, the different missions that we have, and a better understanding of how to work better together and synchronize what we're doing in a way that benefits. You know I couldn't have assisted my beneficiaries as an NGO leader in Bosnia had it not been for the very critical security role that the implementation force played. It made all the difference in the world so everybody has a critical role to play. It's a pie, everyone has a different piece. It's a question of how we just work better together.

Steve Radelet: And there may be another piece to this. A lot of people make the argument that you need to bring the security interest in on the development side for tactical reasons up on the hill because if it is not couched that way you just won't get the support to do the development and that may just be an uncomfortable tactical reason. Other people disagreed that that's the case but that's another part of this debate is just tactics in terms of getting wide spread support. Bill do you want to take the question from Paula about the security cooperative?

Bill Anderson: Yeah, I put up a list of some of these programs. And I do want to make clear that I don't think that something like combating terrorism fellowship program or military to military programs are something that USAID directly participates in but to the extent that those types of programs build professional militaries that lead to a more secure and stable environment. They contribute to our ability to do the work. The general point I made earlier. These are some of the programs. The amounts of funding for these programs are not that large. In fact, if you totaled up my back of the envelope calculations all the funding for security cooperation programs for EUCOM and the AFRICOM areas is under 500 million dollars. That's one tenth, less than one tenth of the resources for assistance in the same area.

Steve Radelet: Our last question, we're running out of time here but Larry's question about authorities and to some extent, Connie already talked about

that so I want to throw this to Chuck as our last question. Why didn't the administration go after legislative reform? They had lots of opportunities, some of which you in defense were not directly involved in with the MCC, the PEPFAR program where the F process and there were a lots of perhaps opportunities to tackle the legislative issues and the issues of authority but there was a decision not to do that. Why not, was it just too big a mountain to climb? Was it seen as not their central problem? Is that still something that could be on the agenda or is it now too late in the administration? How do you see that?

Chuck Kosak: Well you know again I can't really speak for why the administration made an active decision not to do this. I'm not really at that level and I haven't been involved. I've been in partnership strategy for a couple of months now but I can simply say this that what we're talking about here is in vicious incrementalism. There are so many different issues here, I mean it's the classic as I look at 1206 and 1207; it's the authority's capacity issue. There are areas where State has authority but lacks capacity, and areas where DoD has capacity but lacks authority and I can say with the FMF situation, much of it is ear marked. There's not a whole lot of flexibility in terms of the monies there and how they're used. I think over 75% of the FMF budget is earmarked for a very small percentage of the world and so there are other places where we're having to respond I think more flexibly with more agility to address different issues.

But again, the thing I can say again is that there's kind of an ambition instrumentalism afoot that we are trying, the way that we're constructing the combatant commands. The way we're thinking about innovations there. These authorities we see them as being extremely positive and bearing fruit not only as Linda's kind of eluded to in another context but also the how we're doing things. With 1206 the state betting processes with respect to human rights obligations is essential and a part of what we're doing. We're building human rights training through State Department expertise and the proposals that we're doing for FY08 and on the DoD side we were able to use these authorities to access funds by taking away from other programs that would be of a lesser priority and be able to respond to some of these threats.

So in short I can't really address the reason as to why the administration didn't do a more aggressive push but I can say that we are pushing hard in these areas. On the, and I think Connie would agree with this, on the defense committees side there's a lot of concern about us spending, you know what are you doing spending DoD money in some of these different areas and then on the foreign affairs State side, are you meddling in areas that really State ought to have the abilities but it's the capacity versus the

authority issue that we're trying to address and try to do so in a manner that's incremental and successful.

Steve Radelet: Thank you. It's rare that we get the defense and the development communities together and I want to thank the audience for your participation, your great questions, for coming together on this. I want to thank Sheila Herrling and Amy Crone and Heather Haines for their great work to make this event happen and mostly I want to thank Bill and our panelists for their insightful comments so please join me in thanking them so thank you very much.