

**Bullets for Ballots:
Examining the Effect of Electoral Participation on Conflict Recurrence***

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Reporter for the Guardian [on Afghanistan]: “Could you please expand more on the possibility of the opposition taking part in elections given the fact that a large part of that opposition is involved in a revolutionary war against the government?”

Kai Eide, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan: “I want a political process to get underway, call it reconciliation, call it a peace process, or whatever you want... it is better we compete at the ballot boxes than to fight in the battlefield.”

May 3, 2009

Since the end of the Cold War, international involvement in terminating civil conflict and building peace has escalated dramatically. Whether or not the international community places boots on the ground at the end of a civil conflict — and United Nations peacekeeping missions are up from six in the 1980’s to thirty-three in the 1990’s — its members routinely recommend and participate in strategies for terminating violence and creating a lasting peace. Among these recommendations, international actors strongly endorse the use of post-conflict elections. The U.N., for example, began to more actively enable elections through assistance and even intervention as soon as the Cold War came to a close, even though prominent non-democracies commanded decisive positions in the organization (Farer 2004). The U.N. and others have recently displayed this support for conflict resolution through elections in Afghanistan by urging the Taliban there to compete against the government with ballots instead of bullets. Almost 40 percent of all peace agreements since the end of the Cold War include provisions for post-conflict elections (Harbom, Högladh et al. 2006).

Critics, however, contend that post-conflict elections may be detrimental to state-building and even encourage a return to fighting. Recently, members of the policy community have been most forceful in their criticism of holding post-conflict elections in Iraq. Policy-makers were concerned about the United States implementing elections prior to restoration of law and order, and allegedly using the contests as an exit strategy.¹ Former National Security Agency Director Lieutenant General William Odom, for instance, leveled an argument against the idea of holding elections in such a state: “voting only ratifies the constitutional deal that has been agreed to by elites — people with enough power, that is, guns and money — to violate the rules with impunity. Voting does not cause a breakthrough” (Hammerschlag 2006; Odom 2006). The fear

¹ Indeed, UN Resolution 1546 in 2004 — in which the Iraqi transitional government authorizes coalition action in the state — dictates that “this mandate shall expire upon the completion of the political process set out in paragraph four above,” which specifies the timeframe for holding elections.

in some of the policy community was that holding elections would actually increase the likelihood and intensity of civil conflict, and that it certainly would not lead to anything resembling democracy.

The criticism extends beyond the policy-makers referring to a specific case: the existing literature in political science advances a negative view of post-conflict elections. Violence itself is used in some elections as a mechanism for electoral competition (Klopp 2001; Wilkinson 2004; Kasara 2009; Wilkinson and Haid 2009; Altier 2010; Dunning 2011; Machado, Scartascini et al. 2011; Steele 2011). More broadly, some suggest that elections may increase the likelihood of conflict, especially when they are poorly institutionalized in newly democratizing or especially under-developed settings (Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Hegre, Ellingsen et al. 2001; Mansfield and Snyder 2002; Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Collier, Hoeffler et al. 2008; Collier 2009). Post-conflict elections may be particularly prone to failure because the institutions do not engage the population adequately (Reilly 2002; Diamond 2006); they do not organize viable parties and the competition between them (Horowitz 1991; Reilly 2002; Wilkinson 2004); or they are simply unsuitable for solving the dilemmas of some of these environments (Snyder 2000; Paris 2004). Elections that are held quite quickly after the end of a conflict, in particular, have been shown to increase the likelihood of negative consequences, like returning to fighting (Reilly and Reynolds 1999; Reilly 2002; Brancati and Snyder 2009; Brancati and Snyder 2011; Flores and Nooruddin 2011). As a whole, then, the field has adopted a nearly uniformly dismal view of post-conflict elections.

Do any post-conflict elections serve as an effective tool for conflict resolution? The existing literature suggests that they usually do not, yet much of the international community actively endorses and supports elections in this role. In contrast to other studies, I show that post-conflict elections can help terminate conflict and promote lasting peace. Post-conflict elections are useful in resolving conflict when militant groups and governments both participate as political parties.

So, why do both sides engage in certain post-conflict elections? I argue that the end of the Cold War has allowed these inclusive elections to become a mechanism for resolving conflict by facilitating international involvement in guaranteeing a peace deal above and beyond military intervention. Specifically, governments and militant groups often contest elections to commit themselves to a negotiated settlement in order to end the fighting through the engagement of an

international actor that can then more easily monitor and sanction violations of the deal. A series of implications result from this theory about the conditions under which electoral participation occurs and the effect of such participation on the duration of peace.

The commitment theory centrally implies that agreements with provisions for electoral contestation by both former militant groups and government parties will have longer durations of peace between them than agreements without these provisions. The effect is conditional, however, on international engagement. These implications distinguish the commitment theory from two plausible alternative theories: an informational and a normative theory. My main evidence comes from a cross-national comparison of post-Cold War peace agreements in civil conflicts that contain provisions for electoral participation versus those that do not. In previous work, I generated a dataset of all militant groups — terrorists, insurgents, and guerrillas — worldwide from 1980-2010, and I identified all instances of their participation in national legislative elections. This dataset indicates that electoral participation as part of a negotiated settlement between a militant group and a government occurs almost exclusively after the end of the Cold War in large internal conflicts, and so these cases are the appropriate universe for comparison. In this paper, then, I use the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset that covers large civil conflicts from 1989-2005, and I code a new variable on provisions for post-conflict elections that include militant group participation in each one. I analyze whether the average duration of peace between the signatories of a negotiated settlement with electoral participation provisions is longer than those without.

The results show that the duration of peace is longer with provisions for post-conflict elections that include militant group participation than without, when controlling for a variety of potential omitted variables and when using alternative specifications of the independent variable of interest. Identification of a causal effect remains difficult. An unmeasured omitted variable could still be causing the variation in both peace duration and electoral participation provisions, or electoral participation provisions could act through some other mechanism aside from commitment with the help of third parties. I capture some of this potential variation by controlling for agreements that are generally stronger, as measured through their inclusion of a variety of different types of power-sharing devices. Moreover, I also examine the plausibility of the causal mechanism through comparative case studies over time after that conflict, which I briefly discuss here and present in more depth elsewhere. Overall, the cross-national and

supplementary case study findings are supportive of the commitment theory. These results also crucially amend some of the recent critiques of post-conflict elections: when both the militant group and the government participate, which is likely to occur when the international community is willing and able to monitor and punish violations, the electoral process can effectively facilitate the termination of violence and a longer subsequent duration of peace between the actors involved.

This paper proceeds as follows. First, I briefly discuss the variation in post-conflict elections in which both the former militant group and government parties run candidates. I then offer a commitment theory to explain the variation. I also offer two plausible alternative theories, and specify a testable implication that distinguishes them. Finally, I test the implication empirically and discuss the results.

I. Identifying the phenomenon

When do militant group and government candidates compete at the ballot box rather than on the battlefield? What is the purpose of these elections? And, do they lead to peace? A handful of cases suggest that militant groups do participate in elections at times, especially after a peace deal (Ryan 1994; Irvin 1999; Zahar 1999; Neumann 2005; De Zeeuw 2007; Soderberg Kovacs 2007; Klapdor 2009), and a cross-national study of terrorist organizations confirms that there is variation to explore (Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003; Weinberg, Pedahzur et al. 2009). In order to identify the variation of interest, and to begin to understand the purpose of these elections, this project draws on extensive data collection that documents electoral participation for all known militant groups. Before summarizing that data, I briefly define “militant group” and “electoral participation” to delimit the project.

Militant groups are defined here as all non-governmental entities using violence to achieve a political agenda. Terrorist, guerrilla, insurgent, and other rebel groups may use different tactics at times but all pursue a political aim with violence not at the legal behest of the state. Most groups use a combination of tactics, so examining them together overcomes the sometimes artificial divide between the terrorism and civil war literatures. Moreover, electoral participation may occur in any of these groups, and so, to get a good idea of the variation, it makes sense to examine all of them. The groups are non-governmental in that they are not *legally* paid by the state to use arms to achieve the political agenda they seek; however, it is

possible for a group to be pro-state in its aims or even affiliated with a party that has been elected and thus is paid to govern. Thus, paramilitary groups are included. Professed intent of the violent actions is a crucial consideration: the act must have a professed political aim or it is merely common crime. This criteria is used in many definitions of militancy (for example, see Gleditsch, Wallensteen et al. 2002). Finally, and most obviously, the group must use violence that seeks to destroy property and/or injure or kill civilians.²

Political participation is complex: it potentially includes a variety of actions, and militant groups may employ a variety of them. This study focuses on one component of political participation — electoral participation — which is a minimalist definition of democratic engagement (Downs 1957). It is a theoretically important component, however, since it is an overt signal of engagement. Groups may instead place their united support behind a particular candidate or party, but the motivations that lie behind such political endorsements may be significantly different from those that drive a group itself to participate in elections since one entails a very overt gesture while the other may not. Thus, the militant group or its clearly designated political front or wing must present a candidate eligible in terms of law and governmental electoral rules to contest a national legislative election (Sartori 1976).³ I examine national legislative elections to see if any militant group ran candidates. These national contests represent the type of overt strategy decision that is of interest here. I do not examine presidential because there is less variation for those elections. Local electoral participation may serve a very different function given the many different dynamics at work in these contests, and especially how little attention surrounds some of them. Analysis of local electoral participation would make an instructive extension to this study.

My dataset includes 672 militant groups in 97 states, covering 1980-2010. I find that while this electoral path post-conflict is not common, it does occur in a number of significant conflicts, especially larger conflicts in the post-Cold War period. Ten percent of militant groups

² The new dataset compiles a series of different datasets to capture potential militant groups and then vets each organization to be sure it meets the standards in this definition. The initial conflict actors come from the Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPs), the Terrorists, Insurgencies, and Guerrillas in Education and Research's Terrorist Groups Worldwide (TIGER), the armed actors from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, and the Minorities at Risk (MAR) qualitative assessments. Each is vetted through newspaper searches — including translations of local sources — to ensure that it has stated political goals and uses violence to achieve those goals.

³ I search for each group in national election records from all relevant states to see if it, perhaps under an alias, participated in any of the legislative elections during each year of its existence as a violent group or in the five years afterward. Detailed coding rules are in the Appendix of Coding Rules (available from the author upon request).

worldwide participate in national legislative elections at some point in their lifespan.⁴ Table 1 presents these percentages by region. Electoral participation is the most likely in Africa and the least likely in the Middle East. Of these 67 groups in 32 states, the vast majority — 48 groups in 24 states — do so after signing a peace agreement with a specific provision for electoral participation, as opposed to entering while still fighting or doing so after defeat or cessation without a negotiated settlement. This “peaceful participation” is the focus of this study.

TABLE 1: Militant group electoral participation by region, 1980-2010


	Groups	Participation	Percent
Africa	149	25	17%
Americas	127	15	12%
Asia	198	13	7%
Europe	88	9	10%
Middle East	110	5	5%
Overall	672	67	10%

Two major trends are apparent in analysis of the cases where militant group electoral participation occurs with a peace agreement. First, all of these incidents of peaceful participation occur in states with at least “minor” civil wars — that is, the conflict has reached the threshold of at least 25 battle deaths per year. In other work, I suggest that this is because governments prefer to deal with smaller, weaker militant groups through policing without negotiation; indeed, in “major” civil wars, those that reach 1,000 battle deaths, 51 percent of the groups enter negotiations with the government, but, across civil conflicts including terrorist campaigns with much lower battle death counts, only 18 percent do (Walter 2002; Cronin 2009). Second, almost all of these conflicts occur after the end of the Cold War. Figure 1 shows incidents of new

⁴ One group, the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) is included three times in the electoral participation count because it terminates and then reforms its political party for three different elections (while fighting). These counts exclude groups that win against the government, either by gaining an independent state or expelling it from the state, and then holding elections without competition from both sides. An example of this would be Nicaragua, where the Sandinistas took control of the state in 1979 and then held elections in 1984 (in which they ran candidates and won). These situations are different theoretically from the incidents of participation that entail both a government and a group decision, and so the analysis excludes them. These stringent coding also excludes groups participating in regional elections not run or sanctioned by the sovereign state recognized by most members of the United Nations Security Council as holding a particular territory. An example here would be the Republic of Krajina in Croatia, which set up its own election, ran, and won, but the process was not recognized by the state.

electoral participation by militant groups over time, and participation with a peace agreement occurs much more frequently in the 1990's and 2000's compared to the 1980's, whereas participation without a peace agreement does not have such a substantial increase. In fact, militant groups enter elections with a negotiated settlement before the end of the Cold War only in Colombia in 1986 and in Sri Lanka in 1989 (with substantial armed intervention by India in the peace process).

FIGURE 1: Militant group electoral participation over time, 1980-2010



Among negotiated settlements for civil wars after the end of the Cold War — the universe of cases where electoral participation is most likely — participation occurs frequently: forty-three percent of peace agreements in post-Cold War civil wars result in a militant group-government dyad moving from contesting power on the battlefield to doing so at the ballot box. Why is electoral participation a prominent feature of these settlements to civil wars? What explains why it occurs in almost half of the deals but not in the other half? Does it lead to a more lasting peace compared to other bargains?

II. The Theory

What role do post-conflict elections play? There is a lack of consensus in the field as to what purpose elections in general serve, even outside of the post-conflict context. Much of the existing literature, and most common wisdom, treats elections simply as a mechanism for distributing power and resources: the electorate through a constraining set of institutions decides on how power and resources are divided between political parties, which, in turn, divide these among their supporters (for example, see Acemoglu and Robinson 2001; Boix 2003). However, any mechanism for distributing power and resources would work just as well as elections if distribution is their only purpose (Przeworski 1991). Thus, if in a negotiated settlement, elections were only to serve to divide power and resources, the signatories could use any type of power-sharing deal that channels the same amount of each to them. If a non-electoral arrangement exactly reflects an electoral arrangement — cabinet positions that provided the exact amount of resources as the legislative seats the group could otherwise win — and both cost the same, then neither actor should have any preference between the agreements as a settlement mechanism. In Chad, for example, former president Hissene Habré pursued a power-sharing strategy by distributing portfolios among rebels who agreed to stop fighting; both he and these former rebels should have been exactly as satisfied with this arrangement as if elections had yielded the same distribution of resources, and if both equally committed the two sides to maintaining this distribution over time (Atlas and Licklider 1999). Indeed, other power-sharing deals may even be preferable to elections since they can cost less to implement given that the electorate need not vote, and they can provide more flexibility because electoral outcomes are constrained by institutional rules that make the potential outcomes somewhat inflexible or “lumpy” in the payoffs they can provide to different actors.⁵

Elections, however, can provide benefits beyond simply dividing power and resources, and so they may be more useful than other power-sharing mechanisms. They can (1) engage a

⁵ Governments may be able to alter institutions to some extent, however, to gain a wider — if still constrained — range of options for sharing resources. Some governments may alter the electoral rules in ways that allow greater representation for the group’s supporters or that make it easier for a third party to participate. Both of these types of changes were made by the government in the Colombian case. The institutional form is made public before the election, though, so it can be represented as a fixed outcome, and it is thus lumpy compared to more fluid trades of portfolios and the like over time.

commitment to a particular distribution, or at least rules to decide it, over time or (2) reveal information about social support for the contending parties that might change the distribution. The existing literature on elections indicates that they sometimes serve both roles. Elections serve primarily as a mechanism to make a governance arrangement self-enforcing and, especially, to lock in an elite agreement over the form of governance (Przeworski 1991; Weingast 1997; Lazarev 2005; Fearon 2006; Brownlee 2007; Magaloni 2008). Elections do so by providing a focal point for protest against and punishment of violations to the power-sharing arrangement (especially Przeworski 1991; Weingast 1997; Fearon 2006). However, elections also serve primarily to provide information about the preferences of the electorate at times, especially in autocracies and under single-party rule (Ames 1970; Magaloni 2006; Brownlee 2007; Blaydes 2010). Outside of these mainly functionalist arguments, elections may instead or in addition serve a normative purpose in increasing legitimacy (which can also lead to functionalist outcomes in terms of international aid and even domestic support) (Waterbury 1999; Schedler 2006; Driscoll 2009). These potential functions of elections, in particular, match the problems that usually face parties seeking to achieve a negotiated settlement to a civil conflict.

In preventing conflict and perhaps in negotiating settlement to conflict, two major obstacles present themselves: commitment problems and information asymmetries. The literature on inter- and intra-state war suggests that the parties to the conflict will stop fighting when an acceptable alternative results in a similar distribution as what is expected from fighting, or at least a distribution that is within the margin of inefficiency that fighting causes by destroying resources. A peace deal should always be theoretically obtainable because anything within this margin of inefficiency is the “bargaining” range where both sides prefer an agreement to using violence because they each receive at least what they would have from fighting (on this point, see Fearon 1995). Two reasons that war occurs despite the existence of a bargaining range are (1) that there is a commitment problem for the sides in agreeing to a deal within the bargaining range because one side or the other believes that its opponent will have an incentive to renege on the agreement later when it gains an advantage, or (2) that each side has information about either its capabilities or its resolve that the other side does not have, and that it has an incentive to misrepresent (Fearon 1995; Powell 2006).

Examining literatures on elections and negotiated settlements together, we can see that post-conflict elections that include participation by the warring sides can potentially overcome either the commitment problem or the information asymmetry or both. This section argues that elections help overcome the commitment problem by engaging international actors to monitor and potentially sanction violations of a negotiated settlement. Other potential roles for elections, especially that elections help overcome an information asymmetry in the context of a negotiated settlement are not very convincing in this context. I return to the possibility that elections serve a normative purpose later in this section, which is an alternative argument that I test in the empirical section, as well.

1. The Commitment Theory

This section show how post-conflict elections that are part of a settlement, and that include participation by both the government and a militant group, effectively function as a commitment device. The commitment problem — where a negotiated settlement will place one side in a stronger position, at least temporarily, and so that side will have an incentive to renege on its commitment then — is a major impediment to enacting peace deals in civil conflict; electoral contestation by the two sides helps solve the dilemma by facilitating long-term engagement by the international community at less cost than an extended boots-on-the-ground mission. The electoral process, almost regardless of the electoral results, (1) sets clear rules and deadlines, (2) provides regular, highly exposed assessments of their implementation, and (3) identifies public representatives who can be held responsible and easily punished for violations. All three of these aspects of the electoral process help facilitate monitoring and punishment, when necessary, by the international community.

In contrast, two alternative theories common in the broader elections literature suggest that post-conflict elections, even those with participation by both sides, serve very different purposes: elections may operate as a division mechanism by providing information on the relative strengths of the sides, or they may be enacted due to a change in legitimacy if normative concerns drive the change. These theories have implications about the conditions under which both militant group and the government candidates contest elections and about the outcome of that contestation, especially in terms of terminating the conflict and sustaining peace. In the setting of electoral contestation between a militant group and a government as part of a peace

agreement, elections as a commitment device have substantially different implications compared to elections as a division mechanism or as an indicator of norm adoption. An example can illustrate how a post-conflict election can serve as a commitment device before I explain each of these aspects of the theory in a bit more depth.

The Republic of Macedonia ended the violence in its civil conflict in 2001, and post-conflict elections with participation by both sides then engaged international actors in ensuring that the peace lasted. The case suggests that the elections were particularly useful in solving the commitment problem, especially over time. The conflict started when the Albanian minority's National Liberation Army (NLA) faced off against the Macedonian security forces in January 2001. The NLA demanded greater Albanian rights, and its most radical factions even suggested secession. The United States, the European Union, and NATO soon stepped in both to help deal with the violence and to resolve the political issues. The NLA and the security forces signed a ceasefire in June, and, with international assistance, the two Albanian political parties acting explicitly with the NLA as of May 2001 began to negotiate a settlement (Liotta and Jebb 2004). The main issues between the two sides surrounded police reform and local deference to the majority culture. The Ohrid Framework Agreement of August 2001 allowed Albanians to serve their police duties within their own regions, Albanians to speak Albanian, and required a majority of the minority vote for changes to certain laws specifically affecting the minority. The inclusive electoral process was explicitly used monitor the implementation of the deal and to threaten punishment of any violations, even though a change in the balance of power through national legislative elections was not a central feature of the political demands.

In Macedonia, the fear that one side or the other would renege on its commitment was a central barrier to achieving a peace agreement (Pardew 2011). The electoral process provided the opportunity to monitor the situation in the country over time; in fact, the international community organized the largest electoral observation mission yet for the September 2002 elections, including 800 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) observers, in a tiny state of just two million people (Bjornlund 2004). The objectives of this effort were broader than ensuring a fair election: in a press release, U.S. Department of State Deputy Spokesman Philip T. Reeker warned, "the world will be watching to see how Macedonia conducts these elections. We look to Macedonia's leaders to ensure that the elections are fair, free from violence, in conformity with international standards, and that the results are respected"

(quoted in Liotta and Jebb 2004). The statement went on to warn that international involvement in economic renewal depended on meeting standards not just of competition but of peace. Such monitoring was on the minds of the negotiators even in 2001, as well: James Pardew, the U.S. negotiator, recalled that both sides knew that they had to comply because “we would all be, first of all, monitoring and, secondly, they knew that anybody who got caught failing to hold up their end of the bargain would be held accountable” (Pardew 2011). The international community had plenty of carrots and sticks to use in the state — Macedonia had mutually proclaimed expectations of EU and NATO membership that were very popular with voters in the state — and employing them hinged on both sides’ behavior that was especially visible and especially punishable through the electoral process. The Macedonian case highlights how elections engage this international community to ensure that there is observation and, potentially, punishment after a peace agreement, which allows both sides to overcome the commitment problem they face.

Elections as a mechanism for engaging the international community

As the Republic of Macedonia example suggests, electoral contestation between a militant group and the government supplies a mechanism for engaging third parties, especially international actors, in the peace process in order to help the two actors overcome the commitment problem. Negotiated settlements to civil conflicts are relatively rare; they are also more likely to fail to terminate the civil conflict than victory by either side. In civil wars, peace agreements terminate fighting in over 50 percent of the conflicts, while at lower levels of violence, they are even more infrequent, or about 10 percent of the conflicts (Walter 2002; Cronin 2009). Moreover, once a conflict ends, the most pessimistic analysis of civil war data suggests that ending through a negotiated settlement increases the chance of reoccurrence by 27 percent of the time compared to truces or stalemates, whereas victories reduce the chance of reoccurrence by 24 percent (Toft 2009). A compelling explanation of the infrequency and instability of peace deals is the commitment problem. Usually the commitment problem exists for the government with regard to the militant group: the two actors sign a settlement, and the militant group disarms as part of the agreement, which puts the government in a stronger position vis-a-vis the militant group, increasing the incentive of the government to renege on the deal and defeat the militant group. Thus, even if both sides will be much better off with a negotiated settlement, it is difficult for the government to make a credible commitment to the militant group that implementation will

actually occur. The militant group may also face such a commitment problem if the peace deal weakens the government initially (on the commitment issue in civil conflicts, see Walter 1997; Walter 1999; Walter 2002; Fearon 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2007).

How do negotiated settlements overcome the commitment problem? Sometimes they do so through political power-sharing or security sector reforms that often include integrating the warring parties sides (Walter 2002; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Fortna 2004). Once these reforms are enacted, each side has some control over the institutions that the other side might otherwise use against it. Implementation of either provision, however, presents profound challenges in terms of the commitment problem. Even slight disparities in the timing of the integration will result in one side's weakness relative to the other side, which then provides incentives to end further implementation or even revert to fighting for protection of the balance of relative strength. Much of the existing literature, then, proposes third party guarantees to implement such reforms, usually through international peacemaking and peacekeeping missions, or "boots on the ground" (Walter 1997; Walter 1999; Walter 2002; also discussed in Cronin 2009; Weinberg, Pedahzur et al. 2009). International intervention of this type reduces the commitment problem by providing a third party to prevent and punish violations of the implementation of a deal, among other functions (Fortna 2004; Fortna 2008).

Having troops on the ground is quite costly, however, for the international actor, which makes the presence and persistence of the external guarantor questionable. Thus, international intervention has its own commitment problem because external actors often cannot credibly promise to send a mission to support an agreement; to supply a sufficient mandate and the necessary capabilities to guarantee punishment of non-implementation through the use of force; and, to stay on the ground through the implementation period. Indeed, international intervention even in the most pressing cases — civil wars reaching at least 1,000 battle-deaths — is infrequent: 36 percent of these conflicts between 1944-1997 received such missions (Fortna 2004). Troops are also often in place for a much shorter period of time than the agreement provides for full implementation; in Guatemala, for example, the United Nations mission provided "military observers" for six months in 1997 but many of the major deadlines in the settlement were in 1999. Electoral participation provides a much cheaper and easier mechanism for international actors to observe how well as peace deal is implemented and honored over time,

as well as to sanction any violations that do occur. This section explores the components of the electoral mechanism, and then the next section discusses why third-party engagement occurs.

Rules and deadlines. Elections, with or without participation by both the militant group and the government, provide the advantage of requiring formalization of the rules and deadlines under which political competition plays out in that state. Agreements that include electoral competition between the militant group and the government make the selection rules of the new government and the deadlines by which to do so more explicit than in other deals, which allow easier monitoring of their implementation. The rules consist of clear expectations for the electoral process, and often, through negotiated power-sharing arrangements, provide at least a minimum guarantee of power for each side. For example, different parties or ethnic groups receive a certain number of seats, or whichever side loses is guaranteed a compensatory position such as a vice-presidency. The deadlines usually consist of dates set for the electoral calendar, which must be planned in advance, and then are also used for other provisions of the agreement, especially for force integration. For instance, a certain percentage reduction in army personnel is set for a date that is three months from signing the peace deal, or all militant group forces must be cantoned before the date for candidate registration. In many cases, electoral participation is actually conditional on fulfilling the other obligations. Setting explicit rules and deadlines is particularly useful in implementing a peace agreement over time because it indicates that all actors have settled on specific standards, which makes measuring success or failure much easier by providing a metric.

Regular assessments. Electoral participation exposes the government and the former militant group to increased exposure at a set interval after they sign the peace agreement. Both sides have this regular opportunity to indicate whether the other side is meeting their expectations (Przeworski 1991; Weingast 1997; Fearon 2006); both sides also respond to the other's claims against it, and, in doing so, are forced to report some of their own activities. Monitors — third parties from inside or outside the state, discussed in the next section — then assess the government and former militant group claims. The theory anticipates that the monitors will specifically compare them to the standards indicated in the agreement, especially in terms of their commitment to peace, human rights protection, redistribution or other distributive policies,

and more general institutional design regarding the elections and the broader state bureaucracy. The monitors are seeking information about whether the rules are enacted according to the deadlines. In terms of elections, specifically, they want to know whether parties abide by the human rights protections and electoral laws that were agreed to within the state — the election observers are usually less concerned with judging the electoral system for engineering. These moments of public, often international, scrutiny occur at regular intervals that provide both sides with the opportunity to remind those observing the situation to compare the behavior on both sides to this metric during every election period. The opportunity is particularly productive because elections, especially post-conflict elections, receive a lot of attention (Golan and Wanta 2003).

Responsible representatives. Finally, electoral participation facilitates punishment of the government and the former militant group by providing public leadership that bears responsibility for violations of any rules or deadlines. Each party's candidate becomes highly visible through his or her role in campaigning, and he or she is now held publically responsible for missteps. Thus, the electoral process increases the individual's exposure and credibility, but also his or her accountability for violations. The candidate can then be sanctioned through such mechanisms as shaming or withdrawing aid, and he or she is vulnerable to these sanctions because of the elected positions. If a candidate is losing resources for his or her constituents, he or she, and even the party itself, is unlikely to maintain its position of power for long. The actual act of participating in elections contributes to the ease with which these types of punishments work. When both sides participate in elections after a peace agreement, a third party can pressure or punish either side's leadership because it is interested in maintaining its position and possibly gaining in future elections. Thus, pressure or sanctions are threats that more easily outweigh incentives to violate the agreement in most cases. Due to these incentives, the politicians also become legitimate domestic partners for other governments and non-governmental organizations (NGO's) seeking to help because they have an incentive to behave appropriately (Murdie and Bhasin 2010). These advantages reinforce the punishment mechanism since the advantages provided by foreign governments, NGOs, and the like can then be taken away. Through this process, the party becomes a public, responsible representative that must answer to a variety of stakeholders and can thus be even more effortlessly punishable by

any of them. Even in a highly engineered electoral system, voters can turn from failing parties to their competitors.

Engaging international actors through elections to overcome the commitment problem

As mentioned, the wider literature on democracy and democratization shows that elections can serve as a mechanism to make a governance arrangement self-enforcing, and, especially, to lock in an elite agreement over the form of governance (Przeworski 1991; Weingast 1997; Lazarev 2005; Fearon 2006; Brownlee 2007; Magaloni 2008). Actors inside of the deal or outside of it, however, must make the bargain self-enforcing by using it as a focal point. The previous section describes the ways in which post-conflict elections including both the militant group and the government can function as a very explicit focal point in this way, provided that there is a third party willing to use the mechanism of participation to observe whether the agreement is implemented and punish the responsible side if it is not.

This study focuses on international actors monitoring and potentially punishing peace deal violations. It is possible that the competing factions within the political sphere or even civil society can function as the guarantor of the agreement, especially in more mature democracies (Przeworski 1991; Weingast 1997; Fearon 2006). Indeed, dissatisfaction with election results, for example, is correlated with more protests and riots (Hyde and Marinov 2011; Kricheli, Livne et al. 2011). Many of the states that experience civil conflict, especially at the level of war, however, are not democratic and are already internally polarized. Locating internal sources of effective monitoring and potentially punishing violations of a peace agreement is unusual. In the empirical analysis, though, this study does test some of the implications of having a higher domestic ability to provide such a monitor and potential punisher. In post-conflict elections, however, an international actor can at times provide this role. When are international actors willing to perform these functions?

In large part, external actors fill this void by involving themselves much more in terminating civil conflict and building peace, especially since the end of the Cold War. Intrastate war has become more and more common in the years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and, increasingly, the United Nations, the United States, and other members of the international community came to view it as an important threat to security. In addition to being more frequent, the death toll from civil wars in the current era is much higher than from interstate wars

— 16 million as opposed to three million, according to a 2003 estimate — and they tend to last longer and reoccur more frequently (for example, see Walter 1997; Fearon and Laitin 2003 provide these figures; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). With the end of the Cold War, international actors were also more able to engage in these internal conflicts, outside of using them as proxy wars (Dobbin 2003; Lacina, Gleditsch et al. 2006). As mentioned, only six new United Nations peacekeeping missions obtained in the 1980's, compared to 33 in the 1990's. The international community — especially the United Nations and the United States — did then delve into peacemaking and peacekeeping (for many examples, see Dobbin 2003; Dobbin, Jones et al. 2005; Dobbin 2008; Dobbin, Jones et al. 2008). As that conflict wrapped up, the new civil wars also became of even greater concern, and so these actors had reasons to engage, as well.

International actors identified the threat of intrastate conflict to the wider security and stability, and then moved to help terminate it. Contagion is a major concern. Intrastate war often occurs alongside broader interstate war, even leading to it (Chiozza and Goemans 2004; Gleditsch, Salehyan et al. 2008). The causal mechanism may be that international conflict can help solidify internal support for a leader (see Levy 1989; Downs and Rocke 1994). If the particular conflict does remain largely within a single state, it may draw in other states in supporting roles or spread new conflicts to its neighbors (Brown 1996; especially de Jonge Oudraat 1996). Civil war is also frequently linked to weak states, which were a concern beginning at the end of the Cold War and gaining renewed interest with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Proposals for how to bolster weak states, especially post-conflict, extend far beyond ordinary assistance because the threat is so great and so challenging (for example, see Fearon and Laitin 2004; Krasner 2004). In intrastate wars, the severity of the threat seems to be the most consistent driver of the most visible action of the United Nations, peacekeeping (de Jonge Oudraat 1996; Fortna 2004; Fortna 2008). These trends in where boots go onto the ground are consistent with a broad concern about international security emanating from intrastate conflict. These interventions may be motivated by norms, rather than material interests (Finnemore 1996; Finnemore 2003). A couple of cases of intervention, like Somalia, for example, may be better explained by the normative theory (Finnemore 1996; Finnemore 2003), but, in general, the normative and the material arguments both predict the surge in international intervention in civil conflict that occurred after the end of the Cold War.

Despite the emerging interest in intervention in intrastate war, sending boots onto the ground in a foreign state can be difficult, even with material concerns, normative impulses, domestic pressure, or some combination of these motivations. These engagements are costly and not necessarily beneficial enough to any particular state to encourage it to shoulder the costs. The first problem is that early catastrophes in these operations, especially the incident involving downed Black Hawk helicopters with U.S. troops in Mogadishu in 1993, made even willing actors less willing to send their own men into these fights (Dobbins 2003). Many nations aside from the United States had troubling experiences with military intervention, and especially protracted military intervention (for example, see Levite, Jentleson et al. 1992). For democratic third parties, at least, new empirical work suggests that the cost of intervening in intrastate conflict rarely outweighs the benefits (Enterline, Garrison et al. 2009). Aside from these incidents and drawbacks, the other problem is that the threat posed by civil war to security and stability diffuses across the international community. Thus, each member of the community sees intrastate conflict as a “public bad,” something that all would be better off without but no one would be so much better off without that the risk of removing the bad would be worthwhile (for example, see Fearon and Laitin 2004). Institutions like the United Nations can help overcome the collective action problem inherent in such a threat, but the institutions are often not autonomously powerful enough to do so (Fearon and Laitin 2004; Krasner 2004). Overcoming the collective action problem is a challenge even where the U.N. has initiated peacekeeping missions: soliciting adequate troops from the member states is difficult and almost always results in an insufficient force (on this, see Hillen 2000).

Beyond engaging in intervention with force, then, the international community, especially the United States and inter-governmental organizations (IGO's) but also non-governmental organizations (NGO's), also began to assume a set of responsibilities that facilitated monitoring peace agreements and sanctioning their violations. The international community may adopt these policies for many different reasons — I discuss the possibility of post-conflict elections as an exit strategy as an alternative — but perhaps they do so because they expect them to work in securing lasting peace. Some argue that even armed peacekeeping missions actually have an effect just through their presence, perhaps even just their symbolic presence, or through the functions that they serve without their weapons, such as election monitoring (for an overview of this literature, see Fortna 2008). In all civil conflicts, whether

international actors send peacekeeping missions or not, international actors have expanded other institutions that allow it to more easily watch peace deals and punish those who do not abide by their provisions. These institutional developments can build on electoral participation by both sides in the conflict to increase transparency and provide punitive capacity long after the parties negotiate a settlement.

Most well-known, the international community has massively increased its election observation, but also the attention surrounding these contests more generally. Monitoring pervades elections, even across regime types: about eighty percent of all national elections were monitored in 2004, for example (Kelley 2008; Hyde 2010). International observers are specifically invited into the state by the government, during the election period, and then they are allowed to report on their findings. Much of the monitoring process was initiated by the demand of opposition figures, including some former militant group leaders (Bjornlund 2004). Many of the reports from these organizations, like the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Carter Center, assess the electoral process itself but also the state's performance on democracy promotion and human rights protection policies (Hyde 2007; Kelley 2008), which brings the focus onto many of the major elements of settlement. Democracy assistance and election monitoring specifically both address the rule of law, in particular (Carothers 1999) (Bjornlund 2004). These monitoring reports, as well as increased media coverage during election periods raise the exposure of these regular reviews of the deal. Media coverage of elections in United States news sources, for example, is highest in regions with pre-existing conflict (Golan and Wanta 2003).

Not only are international actors more able to observe states long after civil conflict, but they have also created mechanisms for punishing those who fail to implement the provisions of peace. Of particular interest here is election-related aid, which has increased dramatically since the end of the Cold War, especially through the United Nations' electoral assistance funds (Farer 2004). Other types of aid and assistance more broadly are also conditioned on governance standards and performance. The government in Georgia and Tajikistan, with backing of different warlords, employed semi-electoral strategies to extract resources from the United States and elsewhere in the form of internal aid, for example; the aid was provided in part due to the legitimacy of the governance strategy in the eyes of the international community (Driscoll 2009). While some of the change that conditions can extract may be somewhat superficial in certain

cases, and may not work in others (especially where natural resources are easily accessible as an alternative source of revenue) (Girod 2008), they often prove quite effective as carrots or sticks in altering the incentives of combatants post-conflict (for example, see Soderberg Kovacs 2007).

Even in the post-Cold War period, the willingness of the international community to potentially scrutinize and sanction each state is likely not uniform. Strategic allies or invaluable trading partners to the United States or the other permanent members of the United Nations' Security Council may escape the kind of critical examination and potential for punishment necessary to make electoral participation a useful component of peace agreements. Variation in the expected willingness of the international actor to actually engage effectively may explain why, even in the post-Cold War era, electoral participation is absent from some negotiated settlements. As the data shows in the first section, just 10 percent of all militant groups participate in elections, but, after the end of the Cold War, almost half of all peace agreements to civil wars included provisions for electoral participation (and most of them were enacted). The differences between these cases appear to be the results of international engagement (Matanock 2011).

2. Alternative Arguments

The literature on elections and international intervention after the end of the Cold War offer two alternative theories on the purpose that elections serve when both militant groups and government participate in the contests. The first argument is another functional argument that suggests that electoral participation provides information; the second argument is a set of closely related normative arguments that fit under the concept of the logic of appropriateness. This section lays out each alternative and then concludes with an overview of the observable implications of the commitment theory versus these competing explanations.

The informational theory

The existing literature suggests a functional alternative explanation within the bargaining framework: electoral participation provides information about the government and the militant group's relative strength, at least along one dimension — social support. The elections determine how much social support each side has, and, thus, enables the government and the militant group to divide power and resources in a peace agreement based on this measure of their

relative strength. Inherent in this theory of the informational purpose of elections are two assumptions: (1) there must be an information asymmetry between the two sides that the electorate can resolve, and (2) the elections must reflect the electorate's preferences, so the contests must be competitive rather than engineered. The first assumption of the theory, however, discredits the informational mechanism as a functional component of a peace agreement: the electoral results must match the government and militant group's beliefs about their relative strength in order for the elections to actually resolve the conflict. If relative strength based on a measure of social support already matches both sides' beliefs, likely based on their fighting capacity, then the actors do not have an information asymmetry to resolve. If it does not match one side's beliefs, which inherently must be the case if there is an information asymmetry, the dissatisfied side may return to fighting for a better bargain than it can get polling. Thus, electoral contestation under the informational theory either does not perform the function anticipated by the existing literature or does serve this function, but then may not actually result in a more durable peace post-conflict. The 1991 negotiated settlement in Angola, for instance, arranged a winner-take-all election to determine who would rule post-conflict, and, predictably, the loser, UNITA's Jonas Savimbi, immediately returned to violence upon his loss at the polls (O'Toole 1997).

The logic of appropriateness theory

A logic of appropriateness provides an alternative explanation to the commitment theory about the role of post-conflict elections when both the government and the militant group agree to participate. The fundamental argument is that the relevant actors — an intervening member of the international community, or one of the parties engaged in the conflict — act according to a “logic of appropriateness,” which are rules, institutions, and norms that define legitimate behavior for the entities. In the post-conflict environment, the existing literature makes two compelling normative alternative arguments based on such logics.

Exiting Legitimately. In the first version of the argument, international actors, especially those conducting peacekeeping missions in the state with a civil conflict, are basing their behavior on a logic of appropriateness. Peacekeepers bring a template for what appropriate behavior is with them, and then they rely on it each time they engage a conflicted state. Specifically in this

context, the theory predicts that international actors with boots on the ground will press the government and the militant group to sign a peace agreement that includes electoral competition between them. They do so because, after the end of the Cold War, the international community came to view elections as the legitimate way for opposing sides to compete over resources and power; thus, the external actors advance this system of governance in any post-conflict state, even where it may be undermined (Finnemore 1996; Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Paris 2004). The adoption of electoral participation — a legitimate form of self-rule — then also allows the international actor to exit legitimately in many accounts of this argument (for example, see Dobbins, Jones et al. 2005). Consideration of an exit strategy does blur the line between a logic of appropriateness and a logic of consequences. Some even suggest cynically that elections are merely an easy exit strategy, not specifically a legitimate one, for the international actor in these cases (for example, see Collier 2009). Easier options for self-governance, however, include an appointed dictator supported by hired mercenaries, or even power-sharing without the added cost of actually holding elections. Thus, the argument in its most compelling version relies on the legitimacy of elections at some level, not merely ease of a transition. The theory, then, is clear about where electoral participation provisions should exist in negotiated settlements — they should be included where an international actor is providing peacekeepers. Under a logic of consequences, the external actor will condition their pressure for elections on whether or not they believe elections will help resolve the conflict (which, indeed, is a central component of the commitment theory), but here they enact the electoral template because it is the legitimate thing to do. It may or may not serve any purpose in maintaining peace.

Normalizing Combatants. A slightly different take on the logic of appropriateness theory suggests that electoral participation functions over time to normalize, or socialize, combatants, especially militant groups. This is a mechanism that could work alongside any of the other theories in lengthening the duration of peace between signatories, but it cannot stand on its own to explain why the combatants sign onto these deals initially. Specifically, electoral participation, especially repeated participation, may strengthen the desire and ability of militant groups to continue to use this non-violent means of contestation (Lyons 2004; Manning 2004; Manning 2008). There are a couple of different ways in which this process might occur: the organization may reorganize itself to participate effectively, which might either lead to a

difficult-to-reverse institutional change or to the rise of more politically savvy and potentially dovish leaders (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). Alternatively, it may be the interaction between the former militant group and the government that leads to the development of a non-militarized norm of interaction. Rearranging the group to be a political party and reestablishing norms of non-violent interaction likely take time. Certainly these changes may operate in the longer term to sustain peace between the combatants regardless of other factors, such as whether international actors can enforce a commitment. The theory of normalizing combatants does not help explain why electoral participation is initially included in a negotiated settlement, but it may help explain the duration of peace afterward.

3. Testable Implications

An implication of the commitment theory is that the inclusion of electoral participation provisions in a negotiated settlement should lead to a more lasting peace between signatories compared to settlements that do not include them. This implication about the duration most strongly distinguishes the commitment theory from alternative arguments. Under the commitment theory, electoral participation by both sides creates clear expectations about the rules and deadlines for implementation, affords them regular periods during which they are highly visible to international actors when they can detail any complaints about the other side's behavior, and identifies representatives for each side that an international actor can more easily hold accountable for violations of the peace agreement. When a dyad terminates violence through a settlement that includes electoral provisions, compared to those with another type of settlement, then, the theory implies that the duration of peace will be longer between the two actors. Additionally, the commitment theory further refines this implication: international actors must engage in observing and, potentially, punishing violations of the peace agreement through the electoral mechanism in order to help both sides commit to implement and honor such a deal. If an international actor is not present to do so, the theory does not imply that electoral participation provisions will act as a commitment mechanism on their own. The theory thus implies a longer duration of peace when these electoral participation provisions included in negotiated settlements *that an international actors is likely willing and able to observe and potentially punish violations.*

The hypotheses to test in the analysis, then, are:

Main Hypothesis: Signing a peace agreement with electoral participation provisions (as opposed to other provisions) should make the duration of peace between the militant group and the government longer.

Conditional Hypothesis: Signing a peace agreement with electoral participation provisions *and a greater expectation of international monitoring and enforcement* should make the duration of peace between the militant group and the government longer.

By contrast, the alternative theories — the informational and the normative theories — do not have the same predictions about a longer duration of peace between the signatories. Indeed, the informational theory predicts either no difference compared to any other agreement since concern about the commitment of the opposition should lead back to conflict, or, even a potentially shorter duration of peace because, if there is a difference in the two sides' beliefs about their relative strength (which must be the case if elections are to be useful in providing information), the side appearing weaker at the polls than on the battlefield may have an incentive to return to the battlefield where it was in a position to gain a better bargain.

The normative theories based on logics of appropriateness have different predictions about the duration of peace. The theory of a legitimate exit has no expectation of greater peace duration because, in this account, elections are being held purely to satisfy third parties' "logic of appropriateness." Elections, under this theory, are simply the template the international actors apply to post-agreement scenarios without regard to the consequences. The more cynical view version of this argument, which posits that elections are not just a template but an exit strategy to facilitate the international actor's departure in cases of failing intervention, predicts a shorter duration of peace with the electoral participation provisions.

The normative theory of combatant normalization, on the other hand, suggests that the duration of peace will be longer. As combatants participate, they adopt norms of non-violent contestation that make them less likely to revert to violent contestation. The literature predicts that this effect works through electoral participation in any elections, and so it should not be conditional on international involvement. Electoral participation, with or without likely international observation, is equally likely to normalize combatants. The commitment theory hinges on the engagement of international actors who create the conditions under which elections

are likely to lead to peace, whereas there is no such conditional effect of the normalizing combatant theory. These different implications of these two theories allow a test between them.

III. The Empirical Analysis

In order to assess whether negotiated settlements with electoral participation provisions are associated with a more lasting peace, as the commitment theory implies, this section presents a cross-national analysis using duration models. Based on previous work shown briefly in the introductory section, I limit the scope of this investigation to conflicts that reach at least minor civil war status and that are still active by the end of the Cold War because these are the cases in which electoral participation provisions are sometimes negotiated into the settlements.⁶ Most of the comparison in the analysis occurs across different conflicts, but some of the comparison occurs within the same conflict, either over time or when multiple groups in the same conflict adopt divergent strategies. Groups diverge along two important dimensions: sometimes one group signs a peace agreement with electoral participation provisions and another signs one without them, or sometimes multiple groups sign the same agreement but then return to fighting at different times (if at all). For example, in Cambodia, three militant groups signed the Paris Agreement in 1991, but then the Khmer Rouge returned to fighting within a year, while the Funcinpec Party held the peace for five years and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) holds it to this day. The analysis, then, is of the duration of peace between each militant group-government pair that signs a negotiated settlement, comparing those deals that have participation provisions to those that do not.

The Dependent Variable

The variation of interest is the duration of peace between signatories of an agreement after they sign the agreement — that is, the period of time from when they sign the agreement until they reengage in the conflict (if ever). In order to code the dependent variable, I use the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset to identify all peace agreements in conflicts with at least 25 battle deaths from 1989-2005 (Harbom, Högbladh et al. 2006). To be included in the dataset, the peace agreements must at least address the incompatibility over which the warring sides are fighting

⁶ Comparing these cases to smaller cases or to cases in different time periods would simply introduce irrelevant heterogeneity into the analysis.

the intrastate conflict, even if it does not fully resolve it.⁷ The dataset codes various degrees of resolution in the peace agreements. Some of the agreements included in the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset only entail agreeing to negotiate, and so they are not the result of negotiations that have already resolved some aspect of the incompatibility to end the conflict. In these data, then, I cluster any agreements in the same conflict that specify the subject, and often the date or the negotiator, of the next set of negotiations and then undertake them by the following year.⁸ Agreements that specify further negotiations may have systematically different effects because they are ostensibly intended as part of a larger peace process.⁹ The remaining set includes the actual peace agreements in these post-Cold War civil conflicts. They are different from, and potentially last longer, than ceasefires or truces that merely pause fighting but do not actually seek to settle the conflict (Fortna 2008). The UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset identifies all signatories of the included peace agreements, and so I code each militant group, as defined by its inclusion in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch, Wallensteen et al. 2002), as a unique case. The resulting dataset, then, is composed of peace agreement dyads, with one entry for each militant group-government pair in each complete peace agreement that they sign.

I use the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset to measure whether the militant group and the government reengage in the conflict, and, if so, when. I identify whether the group, under the same name, reenters the dataset in a later year. If the group reenters, I count each year from the signing of the peace agreement until the year that the group reenters.¹⁰ If the group does not reenter, the dyad is considered censored beginning in 2010, which is the last date of the conflict

⁷ I exclude the two cases that the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset codes as interstate wars: these are the agreements about border issues between Ecuador/Peru in 1998 and Eritrea/Ethiopia in 2000.

⁸ Cases of clustering include Burundi in its later negotiations with the CNDD-FDD (2001-2002), two of Colombia's dealings with the FARC, Los Pozos (2001-2002), the Democratic Republic of the Congo's "Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations (2001-2003), two of Djibouti's agreements (2000-2001), the El Salvador negotiations under the UN (1990-1992), the Guatemala negotiations guided by the UN (clustered in two stages according to the criteria: 1990-1991, 1994-1996), the Machakos process in the Sudan (2002-2005), two agreements in Niger (1994-1995), Israel with the PLO/PNA (1993-1995, 1997-1999), the Tajik process (1995-1997), Rwanda's negotiations leading to the Arusha Accords (1991-1993), Mozambique with the help of the UN (1991-1992), and Liberia both early on (1990-1991) and then in the Accra process (2003). I stop clustering if a militant group drops out of the agreement in a particular peace process (which is only the case in the early Liberia decision).

⁹ To check that cases of larger, failed peace processes do not drive the results, I identify all cases that stipulate further negotiations (whether or not they actually follow through on them within the next year), and then I also use both this coding and the coding by the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset that identifies "an agreement where one or more dyad agrees to initiate a process that aims to settle the incompatibility" to single out these cases. I re-run the analysis without these clustered cases. For both, the direction, general size of the effect, and statistical significance of the coefficients are reduced but still show the same substantive effect for the independent variable of interest.

¹⁰ I include the year of agreement if the parties signed before the first of July, and I excluded it otherwise. Monthly data does not exist for each variable in the set, so I prefer this route compared to measuring by month.

data (Gleditsch, Wallensteen et al. 2002).¹¹ This censored or uncensored duration constitutes the dependent variable that I analyze.^{12 13} Potentially, a lower level conflict could ignite, or splinters could break off of the group in question. While both problems are reported in the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset, neither is systematically linked to electoral participation provisions based on their reports.

The resulting dataset contains 106 peace agreement dyads between 1989 and 2005. These agreements occur in conflicts in 42 states. Of these peace agreements, 32 percent (or 34 dyads) return to civil conflict by 2010. The other 72 agreements are still peaceful. The minimum break in fighting is less than one year (before the groups return to fighting or the data is censored because the observation period ends), and the maximum break is 19 years. The average break in fighting is almost seven years.

The Main Independent Variable

What exactly are electoral participation provisions in a negotiated settlement? In order to allow a militant group to contest elections against the government, two conditions are necessary: elections must be held, and both the militant group and the government must be allowed to participate as political parties in these elections. To measure these conditions, I identify whether

¹¹ I also coded this differently, using the year after the militant group exited the UCDP/PRIО Armed Conflict Dataset as the beginning of the duration of peace. In some cases this resulted in longer peace spells because the two sides had not been engaged in a conflict in the years immediately preceding the peace agreement. Such a lapse could be due to a ceasefire not captured in this dataset that has held or to a lull in the fighting. These cases include the Bangladesh, Uganda, and the United Kingdom. Agreements that come after a prolonged break in the fighting may be more likely to hold for other reasons about the conditions of the conflict that I do not capture, and so I also add a control for such conflicts in the analysis: those in which the group was not in the UCDP/PRIО Armed Conflict Dataset in at least five years before the peace agreement. I re-ran the analysis changing the peace duration to be based on the last year of fighting and then to including the control for no fighting in the previous five years, and, again, the direction, general size of the effect, and statistical significance of the coefficients on the independent variables of interest do not change in the preferred model.

¹² There are a few coding decisions that were more challenging than this analysis would suggest. First, in a few cases (Liberia, the Comoros, and Chad) a new agreement was signed with a group that had not returned to violence. In these cases, I counted the first agreement as censored in the year the second agreement took place. Additionally, the unit of analysis here is one year, so any peace duration lasting less than one year is rounded up (and most last some months, so this seems accurate). A couple of problems present themselves in only one case: if an agreement ends due to an overthrow of the government by an actor not involved in the conflict, I count this as a censored event because the agreement is not expected to withstand after this (only one case fits this description, Afghanistan, where the Taliban takes over the government in 1996, and so I count the previous agreements between the other groups and the government as censored in that year — that is, for reasons not related to the agreement’s provisions or even the signatories’ incentives). I also coded the one case in which an agreement was signed in January but then the group was reported in the UCDP/PRIО Armed Conflict Dataset in that year as failure. These one case oddities should be of little concern since I check the robustness of the model to excluding each case individually.

¹³ I code reoccurrence only by the name given in UCDP, not by leadership or another factor. This coding biases against my theory because the questionable cases are mostly settlements without electoral participation provisions.

clear expectations of a future election exist at the time of the peace agreement or are created in it, and whether clear expectations of both sides running candidates in the election exist or are created in the deal, as well. Both of these expectations are explicitly created through the agreement in most cases, and at least one is in all cases.

In order to make a commitment to hold elections, the agreement must meet one of two standards: in the negotiated settlement, the two sides can either (1) explicitly bind themselves to an exact election date or timeframe for holding elections — or delegate this power entirely to an external actor, like the United Nation’s mission in Cambodia under the Paris Accords; or (2) specify reform of elections (either by enacting new rules or by creating a new body, especially in territorial disputes) when elections have been held regularly, without abnormal delay or cancellation for at least two cycles, throughout the conflict and pre-conflict period. If neither of these criteria fits, or if another aspect of the agreement specifically revokes the historical basis on which elections are promised, then I count this aspect of electoral participation as absent. An example of such an absence is the Ivory Coast in 2003: although the state had a history of partial democracy, the conflict broke the expectation of regular contests because the agreement called for a new date to be decided upon to hold post-conflict elections. Thus, in this case, it would fail the historical criterion and not be counted. In general, the important aspect is that an outside observer must be able to assess whether the parties intend for elections to be part of the settlement that they negotiated. Either of these criteria indicates that elections are a crucial component of the peace agreement. There are two cases in which the militant groups participate despite no clear provisions for participation: UNITA in Angola after the 2002 deal, and the Cocoyes and Ninjas in the Republic of the Congo after the 1999 deal. Although participation in both states may have been somewhat expected by external observers because these militants had participated in previous elections, they do not meet the standards set here for inclusion.¹⁴

If the agreement includes electoral provisions, are both sides allowed to participate as political parties? If the government is running the elections, its participation can be assumed; all of the negotiated settlements in this dataset, except perhaps Cambodia, fit this scenario. The militant group, however, must meet one of the following criteria in order to establish an expectation of its participation: (1) the group must already be a legal political party, or already

¹⁴ Adding these cases as instances of electoral participation provisions did not alter the statistical significance or the substantive effect of the independent variable of interest in the standard model.

have a legal political wing, as was the case for Northern Ireland's Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in the form of Sinn Fein; (2) the group must be legalized or promise a concrete timeline for legalization as a party in the agreement; or, finally, (3) the group must be explicitly included as a party in a transitional government, and not prohibited from running in the elections due to its position in the transitional government, in the agreement.

Peace agreements with any one of these three provisions, along with the provisions to hold elections, produce clear expectations about participation in elections by these actors. Including participation provisions in the form of inclusion in the transitional government, the final criterion in this concept, is important because many peace agreements require a transition period before the provisions in the deal are to be implemented. Electoral participation provisions are especially likely to require such a transition in order to set up or reform the component institutions. In Southern Sudan, for example, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed a set of agreements that terminated fighting between the signatories in 2004 and generated a transitional government that explicitly included the militant group in 2005. Elections, however, were not held until 2010. One last nuance in capturing this particular provision for participation is that militant groups in territorial conflicts may not be included in transitional governments in the same way as center-seeking government, even if they are expected to participate in elections because they often only seek to gain more autonomy in a particular region. Thus, I also coded whether there are provisions in agreements regarding militant groups in territorial conflicts for inclusion into regional bodies that specifically deal with development or governance outside of just the implementation of the deal.¹⁵

Alternative operationalizations of the independent variable

To address any potential concerns about including parties that are included in a transition government of elections, in addition to those that are specifically legalized to run in elections, I include an alternative operationalization the independent variable of interest differently. Some may either believe that these parties that are included in the transitional government are not

¹⁵ The cases that are then included are Indonesia and the Philippines; in Mali and Niger, the groups are included in boards that help implement the peace agreement but do not extend beyond that to governance. Mexico has a similar committee, but the agreement explicitly excludes electoral participation by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN). I also re-run the analysis including Mali and Niger, and then excluding all four, and the results on the independent variables of interest do not change substantively as long as a control for conflict type — center-seeking versus territorial — is included in the standard model.

setting up an expectation of actual inclusion, or that the transitional government is actually the causal factor in the analysis. A longer pause before elections is correlated in some studies with a reduction in the return to violence (for example, see Brancati and Snyder 2009), and, indeed, the mechanism at work may be normalizing the combatants as the alternative argument predicts. Thus, I also examine these different types of parties separately to see if the longer transitional period, rather than electoral participation provisions, is driving my results. To analyze these potentially different effects, I split the independent variable into two parts: legalized parties and transitional parties that are not formally legalized for electoral participation in the peace agreement.

Additionally, if electoral participation provisions are included in a peace agreement, one side or the other can fail to implement the provision. I discuss these cases and then I propose on more alternative operationalization of the independent variable of interest to deal with implementation. A government may fail to hold elections, or, less problematically, it may do so late. In these cases, the commitment theory's prediction is that the punishment received by these governments for violating a provision of the implementation would be harsher than in another type of deal. There are a few cases in which elections are not held or are not held regularly, despite provisions for them (and for the militant group's participation in them). These include Afghanistan where the 1993 and the 1996 deals had not produced any elections before an overthrow by the Taliban upset both signatories to the agreement in 1996, Rwanda where the 1993 agreement was entirely broken by the genocide, and, finally, the Ivory Coast where the 2004 arrangements for legislative elections have not yet been put into place after the highly contentious presidential election.

At times provisions allowing for militant group participation are in place, and elections are held, but the group does not participate. These cases include the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, which abandoned the Paris Accords soon after it was signed in 1991, Frolina and Palipehutu that did not join the National Council for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD) in actually participating in Burundi after the 2000 agreement, and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) that likewise did not join the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) in participating after the 2003 deal. In all three of these cases, other militant groups that

signed the deal did participate, and only in the first case did this specific group return to civil war.¹⁶

In the analysis, I also include an alternative operationalization of the independent variable of interest that takes into account whether electoral participation actually occurred. I code a variable for the cases in which the negotiated settlement includes participation provisions and the government then holds an election that the militant group runs candidates in, without conflict reoccurring between these parties in between. I also code a variable for cases in which the negotiated settlement includes participation provisions, but they have not been implemented — either because the government did not hold elections or because the militant group did not participate — at least by the end of the study in 2010. The cases of provisions without actual participation may still see a slight increase in the duration of peace because the side that is not cooperating may sometimes be punished to such an extent that the compliant side will not have an incentive to return to violence; the main effect should be in the cases in which the provisions do result in actual participation because then the mechanism for observation and sanction is in full effect.


Overall, then, 43 percent of the negotiated settlements in this post-Cold War dataset include electoral participation provisions by both explicitly requiring elections to be held and militant groups to be allowed to participate. In 28 of these agreements, or 68 percent of these cases, both the government and the militant group follow through on these provisions and participation actually occurs. The peace agreements that do not contain electoral participation provisions usually have other institutional arrangements for sharing control of the government or, at least, the military.

Initial analysis shows that including electoral participation provisions in an agreement — which, again, can be thought of as intent by both sides to compete against one another in elections — has a positive effect on the duration of peace. In the following figure, I show the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates on negotiated settlements that include electoral participation provisions and those that do not. The survival probability is calculated as the number of peace

¹⁶ In some cases, I could not locate the full text of the peace agreements. In five of these instances, I could find fairly detailed summaries that allowed me to interpret their provisions with some certainty. In all but one of the Chad cases, however, even the summaries were not detailed. Thus, I drop these 10 cases from the main analyses here. I do interpret the provisions as best as I can from these summaries, and including them does not substantively alter the results when I re-run the standard model.

agreements in which the signatories do not return to conflict by that time over the total number of peace agreements by that time. The graph thus shows the “survival” of peace. Peace agreements with electoral participation provisions survive longer than those without such provisions. A log-rank test for equality of survivor functions suggests that these curves are statistically significantly different from each other at a 0.01 level. The relatively flat shapes of the survival estimates indicate that most peace agreements that are going to fail do so within the first few years after they have been signed. Both survival estimates also have relatively low failure rates, although the rate is much lower for deals that include electoral participation provisions: by the end of the analysis in 2010, only 20 percent of the deals with these provisions had returned to conflict, whereas 44 percent of those without such provisions had done so.¹⁷

FIGURE 2: Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates of Peace after Negotiated Settlements



¹⁷ Given that these agreements uniformly fail early, and that there is significant variation in whether or not they fail, it is also possible to use a binary indicator of failure as the dependent variable in order to run logistic regression analysis. Including the main independent variables in such a model, I find a statistically significant decrease in the likelihood of failure associated with the inclusion of electoral participation provisions, which is supportive of the theory. Duration models, however, account for more variation about these failures, even given that the failures occur early, and so I use those models in the rest of the analysis.

3. Other variables

Aside from the main independent variable of interest, and the alternative operationalizations presented in the previous section, the commitment theory and other theories in the existing literature also predict effects of other variables on the duration of peace.

The conditional effect

The commitment theory specifically implies that electoral participation provisions are associated with a longer duration of peace conditional on the expectation that an international actor will observe and potentially punish violations. In order to test the commitment theory of electoral participation through a conditional effect, I add a measure of the percentage of other elections in the region that were observed by international missions in the previous year to the model, and then I interact this variable with the electoral participation provisions (data from Hyde 2010). By including the election observation variable and the interaction, I rule out its direct effect as an omitted variable that independently explains both the variation in the main explanatory variable and the dependent variables, and then I assess the conditional effect. Election observation can be predicted by regional observation rates over time, and so this variable provides a proxy for states that expect to be watched in this way (Kelley 2008; Hyde 2010). If I instead use an indicator of whether the state under analysis was actually monitored in its election, or a regional measure of the percentage of elections monitored in that year that includes the state under analysis, another effect could be at work, such as an omitted variable in which states that expect to keep the peace also invite election monitors. I use the lagged percent of elections monitored by region to avoid such an omitted variable. I also operationalize this measure as the percent of elections monitored in the region excluding the state under analysis in an alternative specification of the model, and the results are substantively the same. Both of these variables capture an expectation of election observation, which also predict electoral participation provisions in the first place (Matanock 2011).

Other variables may represent international interest in the peace process, but the theory does not tie them directly to the conditional effect of the commitment theory. I include an alliance with one of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council as an indicator of

one such type of involvement that should not have the same effect, because both sides are unlikely to see it as a credible guarantor of their deal.¹⁸ These alliances also do not predict electoral participation provisions (Matanock 2011). Alternatives to this variable, which I include in other specifications of the model, are maximum affinity with the five permanent members of the Security Council, contiguity with them, and a former colonial relationship with them. None of these variables have a statistically significant correlation with the duration of peace, except for the alliance variable that I include, and none have a substantial impact on the main effect of interest (Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Fortna 2008). I show all of the control variables in Table 2.

Other provisions in the agreement

The provisions of the peace agreement, aside from electoral participation provisions, may also have an effect on conflict reoccurrence but be codetermined with electoral participation provisions. Including precise and demanding provisions of any type may be correlated with the duration of peace because of an exogenous factor that makes the two sides more likely to sign a more rigorous agreement. Thus, by including controls for other provisions in the agreement, I can both assess whether each of these make the agreements more likely to hold, as well as whether any particular provisions overcome the effect of electoral participation provisions.

Provisions that address the composition and control of force are the most likely to have an effect on peace duration. A set of studies discuss the importance of requirements for revisions to the national army and police, especially through integration of the two sides' forces into one new entity that both will then trust to protect their interests (Hoddie and Hartzell 2007; Toft 2009). If the two sides actually reform their security sectors — that is reconstitute and restructure their armed forces — then the duration of peace after major wars is longer (Toft 2009). Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) provisions may also help disband illegal forces more quickly (for one example among many, see Werner 1999). Additionally political power-sharing agreements may have a similar ameliorating effect on fear, which may help keep the agreement in place, although other conditions may be needed to actually enact these (Walter 1999; Walter 2002; Derouen, Lea et al. 2009). The UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset codes whether the agreement “provided for the creation of a new national army or the

¹⁸ I also include an interaction with this variable in an alternative specification of the model, but it does not have a statistically significant effect, nor does it change the effect of electoral participation provisions, in terms of their statistical significance or their substantive effect.

integration of rebels into the army,” whether some sort of DDR provisions exist in the deal, and whether the two parties share political power (Harbom, Högbladh et al. 2006).

Other controls

In order to control for other factors that may influence both the dependent variable directly and the independent variable through another mechanism, I consult the existing literature to identify other variables that are correlated with the duration of peace that may or may not be correlated with provisions for electoral participation in the agreement, as well. These variables include measures of the balance of force between the two sides, indicators of more severe and longer-lasting conflicts, markers of how difficult the conflict might be to resolve, an indicator of the presence of peacekeeping missions, and measures of democracy and development. I include these controls in the model, but most of them are either insignificant or are found to work in opposite directions in other studies of the duration of peace after the termination of civil conflict. Table 2 shows all of the hypotheses about the effect of the controls on the dependent variable, as well as their measures and their sources.

TABLE 2: Hypotheses and measures for the analysis

Hypothesis	Variable	Source
Unbalanced capabilities reduce hazard	Binary indicator of either side as much stronger <i>Alternatives:</i> <i>Expenditure on the government's armed forces per cap.</i> <i>Number of the government's armed forces per capita</i>	Cunningham, et al. 2009 Singer, Bremmer, et al. 1972 Singer, Bremmer, et al. 1972
Loss of military support reduces hazard	Binary indicator of proxy wars <i>Alternatives:</i> <i>Dyad fighting prior to 1990</i> <i>Ending external aid in previous five years</i>	Lacina, Gleditsch, et al. 2006 Gleditsch, et al. 2002, v.4-2010 Cunningham, et al. 2009
Costly conflicts reduce hazard	Binary indicator of major war (1,000+) during the conflict <i>Alternatives:</i> <i>Binary indicator of major war year prior to agreement</i> <i>Maximum number of deaths in the conflict (high est.)</i> <i>Binary indicator of rebels funded by contraband</i> <i>Binary indicator of oil > 1/3 of exports</i> <i>Mountainous terrain</i> <i>Size of the population</i>	Gleditsch, et al. 2002, v.4-2010 Gleditsch, et al. 2002, v.4-2010 Lacina and Gleditsch 2005 Fearon and Laitin 2003 World Development Indicators Fearon and Laitin 2003 Penn World Tables

Table continues on the next page...

More severe commitment problems increase hazard	Duration of the conflict Binary indicator of an identity conflict Binary indicator of a territorial conflict <i>Alternatives:</i> <i>Past failed agreements in the conflict</i> <i>Duration of the dyad's fight</i> <i>Number of factions not signing onto the agreement</i> <i>Maximum number of factions</i>	Gleditsch, et al. 2002, v.4-2010 F&L 2003 + Humberst 2005 Gleditsch, et al. 2002, v.4-2010 Author Gleditsch, et al. 2002, v.4-2010 Author Author
Peacekeeping reduces hazard	Binary indicator of third party intervention for peacekeeping + any U.N. mission in the agreement year <i>Alternatives:</i> <i>Lag and lead for peacekeeping missions</i> <i>U.N. missions only</i>	Mullenbach and Dixon 2007 + United Nations United Nations Mullenbach and Dixon 2007
Permanent 5 alliance reduces hazard	Binary indicator of an alliance with a P5 member of U.N. <i>Alternatives:</i> Contiguity with a P5 member of U.N. Former colony of a P5 member of U.N.	Leeds, Ritter et al. 2002 Fortna 2008 Fortna 2008
Power-sharing provisions reduce hazard	Binary indicator of provisions for security sector reform Binary indicator of provisions for DDR Binary indicator of provisions for power-sharing	Harbom, Högladh, et al. 2006 Harbom, Högladh, et al. 2006 Harbom, Högladh, et al. 2006
Economic development reduces hazard	Per capita GDP in the year before the agreement <i>Alternatives:</i> <i>Per capita GDP in the year before the conflict</i> <i>Infant mortality within five years prior to agreement</i> <i>Infant mortality within five years prior to conflict</i>	Penn World Tables Penn World Tables World Development Indicators World Development Indicators
Democratic regimes reduce hazard	Polity2 score in the year before the conflict <i>Alternatives:</i> <i>Polity2 in the year before the agreement</i> <i>Democracy measure in the year before the conflict</i> <i>Democracy measure in the year before the agreement</i>	Marshall, Jaggers, et al. 2006 Marshall, Jaggers, et al. 2006 Cheibub, Gandhi, et al. 2009 Cheibub, Gandhi, et al. 2009

Robustness checks: included alternative operationalizations of the variables described in the table; changed duration to begin after the last year of fighting ; dropped cases labeled by the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset as only initiating a process to settle an incompatibility but not actually settling it and those with provisions for continued negotiations; dropped cases where the dyad does not enter into the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset in the five years prior to the agreement; included Chad cases missing full text in the peace agreements and then excluded of all of the agreements with only partial text; dropped all cases in with unclear participation provisions, and then recoded them the opposite way, as well, and re-ran; added region and state indicators; dropped each control IV and each conflict.

4. The Model

In order to estimate the effect of electoral participation provisions on the duration of peace between signatories, I use a duration model, which is also known survival or hazard analysis. If the conflict resumes, the duration of peace ends and the model estimates the factors that affect its “survival.” If the conflict does not resume, the duration is censored in 2010, the final year for which conflict data are available. Duration models are particularly useful because they inherently estimate the hazard rate, which is the probability of failure in each interval of time, $t + \Delta t$ as the Δt approaches 0, given that peace has survived to that time, t . Thus, the model accounts for censoring — rather than estimating the probability of failing in every time period, the model estimates it in each period until the event is censored. Given that the majority of the conflicts that ended with these peace agreements remain terminated by 2010, the method is particularly appropriate for these data. The duration analysis yields these hazard rates, which are relative to one: values less than one imply a reduction in risk, and those greater than one indicate an increase in risk.

The specific duration model that I use is the Cox proportional hazards model, which assumes that the baseline hazard rate is unknown and is thus left un-parameterized. The Cox proportional hazards model does, however, assume that the hazard is proportional over time. I test this assumption through a variety of methods, including a linear regression model of the Schoenfeld residuals of time to see if there is a nonzero slope, and the results indicate that this assumption is valid for each of the variables that I include and for the model as a whole. One of the most flexible parameterizations of the baseline hazard is the Weibull distribution, which characterizes the baseline hazard as monotonically increasing or decreasing. The hazard rate on the duration of peace appears to be monotonically decreasing, at least in the basic model, and so I also analyze the data with the Weibull model since it is slightly more efficient. For ease of interpretation in all of the models, I also include these hazard rates interpreted as beta coefficients, as one might expect from a regression model. Finally, since observations may be related by conflict, I cluster the standard errors by conflict, so the tables provide robust standard errors.

5. The Results

The main hypothesis

This analysis first examines whether electoral participation provisions are associated with a longer duration of peace. In the next section, I examine whether the effect is conditional on regional election observation. The basic model, without any controls, indicates that the inclusion of electoral participation provisions is associated with a longer duration of peace. In Model 1 in Table 3, the Cox model, the hazard rate on participation provisions in this dataset of negotiated settlements is 0.43, which reduces the risk of a return to conflict by approximately 57 percent compared to a hazard rate with no impact (a value of one). The predictor is significant at the 0.10 level in this model. The Weibull model produces a similar hazard rate both in terms of the size and statistical significance, as Table 3 shows in Model 2.

TABLE 3: Effect of participation provisions on the duration of peace

	Model 1	Model 2
Participation Provisions	0.4303* <i>-0.8432</i> (0.1972)	0.4068* <i>-0.8994</i> (0.2152)
<i>P</i>	-	0.6336
Log pseudolikelihood	-142.0614	-111.6268

Note: N=96 for all models.

Numbers in **bold** are hazard ratios.

Numbers in *italics* are the beta translations of the hazard ratios.

Numbers in parentheses are standard errors for the hazard ratios.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p > 0.05$, *** $p > 0.01$

Controls. When I add the controls, the result on electoral participation provisions remains, although it is highly correlated with DDR provisions (41 percent), which makes the results on electoral participation provisions somewhat more fragile in models where both are included. For the rest of the analysis, I return to the Cox model, so as to not assume a monotonic hazard in all of the data. When I calculate a model without the independent variable of interest, Model 3 in Table 4, it is clear that few other variables have any statistical significance. When the initial control variables — a measure of the regional elections monitored; a marker of relative strength between the two sides; an indicator of a proxy war; a measure of the conflict duration; markers

of ethnic and non-territorial conflict; an indicator of peacekeeping missions; and of an alliance with the U.N.'s permanent five, economic development; and level of democracy — are added to the model with the independent variable of interest, the hazard rate on electoral participation provisions shows an even larger effect, 0.28, which is a 72 percent reduction in the risk of a return to conflict, as in Table 4, Model 4. Thus, when the electoral participation provisions are included with the control variables in the model, the statistically significant correlation between electoral provisions and peace durability remains. In fact, the coefficient is even stronger in these fuller models. The only control variable that is also statistically significant in the model is an alliance with one of the permanent five members of the U.N. As expected, this also has a hazard rate of less than one, which indicates a decrease in the risk of a return to conflict of about 70 percent. In some specifications of the model, the percent of the elections that were monitored in the region in the last year is also correlated with the duration of peace. Its effect also indicates a reduction in the risk of a return to conflict, but its size and significance disappear once the indicator of electoral participation provisions is added. These two variables are not significantly correlated. Non-territorial conflict is also statistically significant in some specifications of the model, but its hazard rate, 2.40 in Model 5 of Table 4, for example, indicates a decrease in the duration of peace, rather than an increase. If the warring parties in a territorial conflict reach an agreement (which may be more difficult but has happened if the conflict enters this dataset), it may actually be less difficult to guarantee generally than a deal in a non-territorial conflict. Mechanisms like greater autonomy, for example, allow for potentially more-stable power-sharing settlements in the former case. Other variables, including the presence of peacekeepers, are not statistically significant, which may be due to the scope of the theory: we are only examining conflicts with negotiated settlements in the post-Cold War era (because this is where the commitment theory predicts variation in electoral participation provisions).

TABLE 4: Effect of participation provisions on the duration of peace, with controls

	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Participation Provisions	-	0.2828***	0.4352*
		-1.2628	-0.8319
		(0.1364)	(0.2033)

Table continues on the next page...

Regional Election Monitoring	0.2915* <i>-1.2323</i> (0.1998)	0.4818 <i>-0.7302</i> (0.3344)	0.2716* <i>-1.3032</i> (0.1873)
Uneven Strength	0.9834 <i>-0.0166</i> (0.3169)	0.9650 <i>-0.0356</i> (0.2683)	0.8425 <i>-0.1712</i> (0.2371)
Proxy War	1.3362 <i>0.2898</i> (0.7339)	2.0332 <i>0.7096</i> (1.1532)	2.0672 <i>0.7262</i> (1.1421)
Major War	1.4709 <i>0.3859</i> (0.5033)	1.2342 <i>0.2104</i> (0.4838)	1.2341 <i>0.2103</i> (0.4977)
Conflict Duration	1.0087 <i>0.0087</i> (0.0157)	1.0093 <i>0.0092</i> (0.0149)	1.0154 <i>0.0153</i> (0.0136)
Ethnic Conflict	0.7320 <i>-0.3119</i> (0.1998)	0.6287 <i>-0.4639</i> (0.1870)	0.6830 <i>-0.3812</i> (0.2039)
Non-Territorial Conflict	1.9839 <i>0.6850</i> (1.9480)	2.1603 <i>0.7702</i> (1.1433)	2.4001* <i>0.8755</i> (11.192)
Peacekeeping Mission	0.6173 <i>-0.4823</i> (0.2016)	0.8715 <i>-0.1375</i> (0.2267)	0.8051 <i>-0.2167</i> (0.1931)
Alliance with the Perm-5	0.3147*** <i>-1.1559</i> (0.1073)	0.2895*** <i>-1.2393</i> (0.0844)	0.3007*** <i>-1.2015</i> (0.0827)
SSR Provisions	-	-	1.0561 <i>0.0546</i> (0.3615)
DDR Provisions	-	-	0.5067* <i>-0.6796</i> (0.1845)
Power Sharing Provisions	-	-	1.7613 <i>0.5660</i> (0.6519)
Lagged GDP per capita	0.9999 <i>0.0000</i> (0.0000)	0.9999 <i>0.0000</i> (0.0000)	.9999 <i>0.0000</i> (0.0000)
Pre-Conflict Polity2	1.0621 <i>0.0603</i> (0.0399)	1.0445 <i>0.0436</i> (0.0444)	1.0678 <i>0.0656</i> (0.0531)
Log pseudolikelihood	-137.9381	-134.7403	-132.6516

Note: N=95 for all models.

Numbers in **bold** are hazard ratios.

Numbers in *italics* are the beta translations of the hazard ratios.

Numbers in parentheses are standard errors for the hazard ratios.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p > 0.05$, *** $p > 0.01$

When I add variables for other provisions in the settlement to the model, the significance of the electoral participation provisions becomes somewhat fragile (Model 5 in Table 4). When DDR and the other provisions are in the model, the hazard ratio on electoral participation provisions rises slightly to 0.44, and it is only significant at the 0.10 level. DDR has a statistically significant reduction in the risk of a return to conflict: the hazard rate is 0.51. Neither of these relationships is completely robust. Even adding affinity with the permanent five members of the U.N. changes the effect, so that the indicator of electoral participation provisions is not quite significant, for example, when DDR is included. Electoral participation provisions and DDR provisions are highly correlated, which may strain the ability of this statistical model, given the data. The inclusion of other provisions in the model, aside from DDR, does not change the significance or size of the hazard ratio on electoral participation provisions. Security sector reform (SSR) provisions are not statistically significant in the model. Interestingly, political power-sharing provisions, either through electoral means or not, are associated with an increase in the risk of a return to conflict and are quite close to statistical significance at conventional levels.¹⁹ This result indicates that not all provisions in an agreement reduce the hazard rate. Overall, then, electoral participation provisions are associated with a statistically significant increase in the duration of peace in both a basic model with no controls and a model with controls. Only the inclusion of DDR provisions, which are highly correlated with electoral participation provisions, affect these results.

Alternative operationalizations of the independent variable of interest. In addition to adding controls to the model, I also run the analysis with alternative operationalizations of the independent variable of interest. First, I split the independent variable into two different categories of political parties: those that the agreement explicitly legalizes to run in elections and those that it implicitly legalizes through inclusion in a transitional government. When I replace electoral participation provisions with these two categories in the Cox model with controls, I find that the hazard rate on explicitly legalized parties remain statistically significant, and the hazard rate on implicitly legalized parties is close to a conventional level of statistical significance. Each reduces the risk of a return to conflict, as the theory predicts. These results are in Model 6

¹⁹ When I do interact power-sharing provisions with the binary indicator of a United Nations mission (result not shown), the hazard ratio on the interaction is less than one, although it is not quite statistically significant. This finding is somewhat consistent with existing arguments.

in Table 5. In fact, a likelihood ratio test suggests that including these two components separately does not significantly improve the fit of the model compared to including them together. Thus, while there is some justification for grouping these two types of electoral participation provisions together, the explicitly legalized parties actually have the more significant effect, and so overt participation in a transitional government is not driving the results (which also suggests that this mechanism, at least, for normalizing combatants under the logic of appropriateness theory also is not driving the results).

Another alternative operationalization of the independent variable of interest is the measure of whether or not the participation provisions were actually carried out after the peace agreement was signed. In order to capture these distinct measures, I again split the electoral participation provisions again into two parts. The first variable indicates that participation provisions are included in the negotiated settlement *and* that the militant group actually runs candidates in the next election held by the government (without either side returning to conflict in between). The second variable indicates that participation provisions are included, but then either elections have not yet obtained, or the group did not run any candidates in them. As the theory predicts, the variable for electoral participation provisions resulting in participation is statistically significant, and it is associated with an increase in the duration of peace, when it is included in a Cox model with the standard controls (shown as Model 7 in Table 5). As one would expect, the implementation of the electoral provisions has a larger effect than electoral provisions that were included in the peace agreement, but not implemented. This effect is statistically significant. Non-participation increases the duration of peace, as well — the hazard rate is 0.53 — but this is less of a reduction, and it is not statistically significant in this specification of the model. This is consistent with the commitment theory: with failed implementation, the government and the former militant group may see some punishment by the international community for not getting the agreement off the ground, but the mechanism through which external actors can help both sides maintain the settlement over time is never put in place. Overall, then, when the electoral participation provisions are implemented, which happens 68 percent of the time, they are associated with a statistically significant increase in the duration of peace. When they are not, the effect is not statistically significant.

TABLE 5: Alternative specifications for participation provisions

	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Provisions Legalizing Party	0.2647*** -1.3287 (0.1318)	-	-
Provisions for Transitional Party	0.3069^ -1.1811 (0.2235)	-	-
Participation Provisions + Participation	-	0.2102*** -1.559 (0.1177)	-
Participation Provisions + No Participation	-	0.4321 -0.8390 (0.2914)	-
Participation Provisions	-	-	1.4421 0.3661 (0.7146)
Participation Provisions*Regional Election Monitoring	-	-	0.0534*** -2.929 (0.0520)
Regional Election Monitoring	0.4665 -0.7624 (0.3415)	0.4704 -0.7541 (0.3247)	0.8844 -0.1228 (1.7106)
Uneven Strength	0.9515 -0.0496 (0.2823)	0.9315 -0.0709 (0.2666)	1.0908 -0.0869 (0.3062)
Proxy War	2.0960 0.7400 (1.1230)	1.9478 0.6667 (1.1959)	1.5754 0.4545 (0.9032)
Major War	1.2242 0.2023 (0.4900)	1.3540 0.3030 (0.5561)	1.3736 0.3174 (0.5396)
Conflict Duration	1.0092 0.0092 (0.0150)	1.0091 0.0091 (0.0158)	1.0125 0.0124 (0.0139)
Ethnic Conflict	0.6222 -0.4744 (0.1881)	0.6179 -0.4813 (0.1813)	0.7217 -0.3260 (0.2219)
Non-Territorial Conflict	2.1895 0.7836 (1.1862)	2.0463^ 0.7160 (1.0857)	2.217* 0.7961 (1.0350)

Table continues on the next page...

Peacekeeping Mission	0.8647 <i>-0.1453</i> (0.2253)	0.8546 <i>-0.1570</i> (0.2187)	0.8793 <i>-0.1285</i> (0.2193)
Alliance with the Perm-5	0.2833*** <i>1.2611</i> (0.0789)	0.2898*** <i>-1.2385</i> (0.0907)	0.2996*** <i>-1.2051</i> (0.0831)
Lagged GDP per capita	1.000 <i>0.0000</i> (0.0000)	1.000 <i>0.0000</i> (0.0000)	1.000 <i>0.0000</i> (0.0000)
Pre-Conflict Polity2	1.0446 <i>0.0436</i> (0.0447)	1.0417 <i>0.0408</i> (0.0437)	1.0537 <i>0.0523</i> (0.0474)
Log pseudolikelihood	-134.7249	-134.2725	-133.0008

Note: N=95 for all models.

Numbers in **bold** are hazard ratios.


Numbers in *italics* are the beta translations of the hazard ratios.

Numbers in parentheses are standard errors for the hazard ratios.

[^] $p < 0.15$, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p > 0.05$, *** $p > 0.01$

The conditional hypothesis

Next, in order to further test the implications of the commitment theory, I examine the effect of electoral participation provisions conditional on the expectation of actually receiving international election observation in the state. I measure this expectation as the percent of elections in the region that were observed in the previous year. This variable is already included as one of the standard controls. In Model 8 of Table 5, I add an interaction term between electoral participation provisions and the lagged regional election observation variable. As the theory predicts, neither variable on its own is statistically significant, but the interaction term is statistically significant. I calculate the marginal effect and marginal standard errors on the interaction term and display them in Figure 3. This figure indicates that when at least 25 percent of the elections in the region in the past year were monitored, including electoral participation provisions in the agreement is associated with a statistically significant reduction in the risk of a return to the conflict.

FIGURE 3: Marginal effect of the interaction term

Comparison with the existing models of post-conflict elections

Finally, in order to compare these results to others in the field, I examine a variable for all electoral provisions, whether or not they include participation by the militant group. Model 9 in Table 6 indicates that this combined variable does not have a statistically significant effect, like the findings of many other overall analyses of the effect of post-conflict elections on the duration of peace (for example, see Collier, Hoeffler et al. 2008). Once I break the independent variable into three parts — electoral provisions that do not entail participation by the militant group (which is the omitted variable in the analysis), electoral participation provisions, and no provisions of either kind — electoral participation provisions again are associated with a statistically significant increase in the duration of peace. These results are in Model 10 in Table 6. The hazard rate is 0.33, which indicates a 67 percent reduction in the risk of a return to violence. Interestingly, the effect of no electoral provisions of either kind is not statistically significantly different from either type of provisions. Thus, the significant hazard ratio on

electoral participation provisions is relative to other electoral provisions, which indicates that these other types of electoral provisions do actually reduce the duration of peace, and, thus, may be dangerous as the existing literature suggests. I return to this result and the others in the discussion.

TABLE 6: All electoral provisions

	Model 9	Model 10
All Electoral Provisions	0.8132 -0.2067 (0.4053)	-
Electoral but Not Participation Provisions	-	(omitted)
Electoral Participation Provisions	-	0.3317*** -1.1034 (0.1909)
No Provisions on Elections	-	0.1368* -1.9891 (0.0759)
Regional Election Monitoring	0.3044* -1.189 (0.2052)	0.3044 -1.1893 (0.2052)
Uneven Strength	0.9675 -0.0330 (0.3101)	0.9675 -0.0330 (0.3101)
Proxy War	1.3055 0.2665 (0.7083)	1.3055 0.2665 (0.7083)
Major War	1.3490 0.2994 (0.5037)	1.3490 0.2994 (0.5037)
Conflict Duration	1.0097 0.0096 (0.0157)	1.0097 0.0096 (0.0157)
Ethnic Conflict	0.6907 0.3700 (0.2084)	0.6907 -0.3700 (0.2084)
Non-Territorial Conflict	2.0165 0.7013 (0.9520)	2.0165 0.7013 (0.9520)
Peacekeeping Mission	0.6137 -0.4881 (0.2048)	0.6137 0.4881 (0.2048)

Table continues on the next page...

Alliance with the Perm-5	0.3138***	0.3138***
	<i>-1.1588</i>	<i>-1.1588</i>
	(0.1049)	(0.1049)
Lagged GDP per capita	.9999	.9999
	<i>-0.0000</i>	<i>-0.0000</i>
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Pre-Conflict Polity2	1.059	1.0595
	<i>0.0578</i>	<i>0.0578</i>
	(0.0403)	(0.0403)
Log pseudolikelihood	-137.8637	-133.5449

Note: N=95 for all models.

Numbers in **bold** are hazard ratios.

Numbers in *italics* are the beta translations of the hazard ratios.

Numbers in parentheses are standard errors for the hazard ratios.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p > 0.05$, *** $p > 0.01$

6. The Mechanism

The duration analyses match the implications of the commitment theory, and I control for all of the potential omitted variables that I can identify in the existing literature on the duration of peace post-conflict. Given that this is observational cross-national data without good proxies, it is still possible that another omitted variable drives the duration of peace and the inclusion of electoral participation provisions, or that another mechanism explains the correlation between electoral participation provisions and the duration of peace. In order to assess whether the mechanisms at work in this empirical analysis are those predicted by the commitment issue, I briefly examine some aspects of these cases beyond the duration of peace. First, the commitment theory requires specific rules and deadlines, which may allow for more concrete deadlines for other provisions. I find support for this additional effect of the electoral participation provisions as agreements that include such provisions also have much more specific provisions for security sector reforms, such as police or army integration, for example. These results are in Table 7. Negotiated settlements with electoral participation provisions more often provide a clear rule (specifically a numeric benchmark) for security sector reforms, or an exact date by which they must be enacted, compared to other negotiated settlements. The results are statistically significant. Even where an exact date was not provided, tying these provisions to the electoral calendar seems to have helped with the entire implementation. An example is Burundi, where the Arusha process required that all of the National Council for the Defense of

Democracy—Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) forces move to cantonments prior to the group’s transformation into a political party and subsequent participation in elections. The CNDD-FDD initially procrastinated, but, as another party began to campaign in its strongholds, it rapidly advanced to meet the timeline set for both processes since it did not want to lose its support for the ballot box (Bentley and Southall 2005).

TABLE 7: Coexisting provisions in peace agreements

		Specific Security Sector Reforms:	
		No	Yes
Participation Provisions:	No	35	8
	Yes	14	17
		49	25

Chi-Squared (single): 10.5721, ($p=0.001$)

It is also possible to determine whether post-conflict elections involving participation by both sides provide a repeated chance to assess the implementation of the peace agreement. Specifically, we can assess whether more contests were held after the initial post-conflict election, and whether these contests actually received international election monitoring as anticipated by the theory. The electoral process did occur repeatedly in most cases, and, in all of these cases, the elections were thoroughly observed by international teams. Of the 14 cases in which electoral participation provisions were included in agreements by 2000 and at least partially enacted in that a first election was held with some militant groups participating, 13 of them have held at least one other post-conflict national legislative elections with only 2 reported as substantially delayed (for data on this, see Hyde and Marinov 2010). Of the latest elections held in the 13 states, all of them were internationally observed. Many had substantial teams observing them. Examples of these repeated contests include both states with prior histories of elections, like the Republic of Macedonia, as well as states with newly initiated elections, like Mozambique. In many of these elections, the international observation is quite rigorous. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, a core team set up in Sarajevo and deployed in 20 long-term observers throughout the state by August 2010 for October 2010 general elections. Over 300 more short-term observers were deployed for the day of the elections. The final report from the mission primarily measured the elections against the metric set up in the peace agreement

and declared them to be “generally conducted in line with OSCE and Council of Europe commitments” (2010). It did go on to mildly object to violations of European standards in basing the right to stand for elections on ethnic group membership; it did not, however, discount the elections on the basis of this key aspect of the power-sharing deal. Earlier attempts to overcome the ethnic character of politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina had met substantial opposition, perhaps because it has largely kept at least a fragile peace (Soderberg Kovacs 2008).

Within-case evaluation also shows evidence of the commitment mechanism at work. I give just a few brief illustrations of this here from my larger case study work. In the cases where electoral participation provisions are included in the agreement, implemented, and sustained peace followed, we can see the mechanism at work in the form of cajoling and convincing that took place during the implementation of the deal. In El Salvador, for example, the United Nations’ officials continuously employed elections as a mechanism to enforce compliance by both sides. On the government side, the incumbent candidate for the presidency faced right-wing resistance and competition, and so the U.N. Under-Secretary involved used very public statements to internationally embarrass the government into implementing terms of the agreement, which led to threats from the United States and others of withdrawing aid as leverage to gain compliance on the government’s side (Fortna 2008; Howard 2008). Costing the state these crucial funds would have been very unpopular at election time. In contrast, the U.N. was sometimes seen as too lenient on the militant group. Such perceptions changed when an explosion in an arms cache in Managua, Nicaragua was attributed to the FMLN. The U.N. Secretary-General criticized the FMLN in the most forceful terms, while the government suggested that the militant group be banned from elections. The strong reaction against the group, and the potential threat of cutting off access for its political parties to participate in elections, worked, as the FMLN immediately revealed and destroyed over one hundred other weapons caches (Howard 2008).

The presence of the U.N. is not necessary to generate similar pressures through the electoral process in these successful cases. In Indonesia, international monitors that were part of the Helsinki Peace Process intervened with a variety of tactics to convince the government to actually sign into law the provisions in the agreement that would allow the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) to participate in elections. The government was meant to legalize regional parties. As forces decommissioned and demobilized, the Aceh Monitoring Mission’s (AMM) focus turned

to this last, very visible missing provision from the memorandum of understanding that the two sides had signed. Elections were approaching, and so “we started to look at the LoGA [Law on the Governing of Aceh]” which was then in parliament (quotation from an AMM official in Aspinall 2008). The team did not press the government too hard for fear of being excluded from the process, but it did push hard enough, in conjunction with a long-term European Community, to gain enough compliance to keep GAM from opting out of the peace process (Aspinall 2008). By the 2006 regional elections and then the 2009 national elections, the former militant group was allowed to participate in elections as specified in the deal despite initial resistance from the government in implementing this and other provisions of the agreement.

A couple of cases also show evidence that the outside actors are important later in the process to punish violations. In the existing cases, the electoral process is especially useful for punishing either side caught failing to honor the agreement. These violations often occur where some substantial militant groups remained outside of the deal, which placed pressure on one side or the other to violate the deal despite the electoral provisions in it. The Northern Ireland case is one of the most obvious examples of punishment resulting from a violation of a peace agreement, which is facilitated by the electoral participation of the militant group. The Progressive Unionist Party (PUP), the political wing of the Northern Ireland militant group the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), was held responsible when the UVF leadership was seen as failing to stop violence that violated the terms of the agreement. Many other groups were also using violence, but the PUP provided public leadership that was easy to hold accountable for its own allowing the continuation of such fighting. Northern Ireland Secretary Paul Murphy suspended the PUP’s funds for community work (£27,000 annually), which hurt the party’s chances in a political environment in which party leaders are required to provide for their constituencies. The party subsequently worked with the community to end the violence (Happold 2004; Purvis 2009).

Colombia provides a case in which the government, rather than the militant group, was the target of such sanction. A militant group, the 19th of April Movement (M-19), gave up its weapons to participate in elections beginning with a constitutional congress in 1990. The major concern in the peace deal was protecting human rights for the disarmed group since neither the government nor the paramilitaries had a clean track record: an earlier attempt at such an agreement led to the assassination of hundreds of members of the FARC’s political party, the

Patriotic Union, and so leftist guerrillas feared trying again (Quiroga 2009). Conditions had changed, however, as international actors became more engaged in Colombia, and especially through monitoring the transition of M-19, now known as Democratic Alternative M-19 (AD M-19). AD M-19's first presidential candidate, however, was killed by a paramilitary before the 1991 general election. In the aftermath, the government faced particularly critical feedback: one report suggested that "the Barco administration has been criticized far more over the Pizarro assassination than over the previous deaths" (Dermota 1990).

There is some evidence that both non-state and state actors — especially the United States — sanctioned the Colombian government for bad behavior committed after entering the peace agreement. In 1993, the U.S. government first diverted funds from the military to the police due to human rights abuses by the former, which were widely known after AD M-19's first campaign cycle (Dermota 1990). In 1996 and 1997, it went one step further and even decertified the Colombian government from receiving military assistance for counter-narcotics purposes under the Leahy Law since the state could not meet the human rights standards required. Leahy, in designing this law, "felt it was important that it be applied to Colombia because of the long history of abuses by the Colombian Army, and the failure to hold those responsible accountable" (2010). Other organizations similarly punished the government: the U.N.'s Human Rights Council condemned Colombia's practices in every year forward through an advisory panel or chair statement, and these condemnations appear to carry actual consequences in terms of the amount of aid the government receives from the World Bank and other sources (Lebovic and Voeten 2009). Given all of this intervention, AD M-19 fared far better than the FARC's party had (Quiroga 2009). AD M-19 continued, and continues to this day, to operate as a political party and to protest any and all government violations of human rights during the two decades since the deal, which often effectively engages the international community. In both the case of Northern Ireland and, especially, Colombia, major armed groups remained outside of the peace agreement and continued fighting. This external presence seems to have made it difficult for the groups within the process to entirely honor the deal, even if they did so to an extent that prevented their own members from re-engaging in violent competition with one another.

Outside of cases where electoral participations provisions were included and implemented fully, the commitment mechanism appears not be engaged, as the theory implies.

In the case of the fully or partially failed peace agreements that included electoral participation provisions, the credibility of international monitoring itself was severely challenged. Resolving the conflict in Rwanda in 1993 would have been difficult due to structural conditions, but the problems were compounded by the timing. After the Arusha Agreement was signed in August, the mandated U.N. mission was fleshed out within the organization's headquarters. The mission was voted into action on October 5th, which was just two days after U.S. Blackhawk helicopters were downed in intervention in civil conflict in Somalia (Howard 2008). The date likely accounted for some of the reluctance to enact the backing for the implementation; it resulted in not just a small number of troops deployed but also due to a lack of resources provided that could have been used, for example, to provide conditional resources to get compliance (Howard 2008). Lack of resources need not be the cause for the international community's lack of credibility: the U.N. mission to Cambodia faced grave concerns about impartiality. The international community was seen as siding against both the incumbent and the Khmer Rouge, and so assuring either that their needs, too, would be accounted for, especially in the electoral process, was impossible. Hun Sen, the Cambodian People's Party leader, ultimately had to be included in an ad hoc power-sharing deal just to keep the peace. He would later go on to say that "international standards exist only in sports" (Bjornlund 2004; Howard 2008). Finally, in Afghanistan, the issue of credibility of the international commitment to ensuring implementation through electoral participation was basically moot. Although the agreement called for a joint monitoring committee composed of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and all Afghan parties to monitor the ceasefire, nothing was mentioned about longer term observation and no such observation occurred.

The mechanisms in these cases — resulting in both successes and failures — seem to operate as the commitment theory predicts. Many of the other peace agreements that do not include explicit electoral participation provisions so that both the militant group and the government can compete in elections do include some type of power-sharing arrangement. Often, these agreements came into effect under little international interest, and so they relied on a mechanism like granting greater autonomy to a region to allow the former militant group to maintain some control over time to protect itself against the government reneging. An example of this is the Chittagong Hill Tract Peace Accord in Bangladesh, which was signed in 1997. The whole process might have gone more smoothly, however, according to those involved, if an

international actor had been willing to monitor and potentially sanction violations of the process (see interview in Fortna 2008). These examples suggest that the commitment mechanism may actually be employed in these cases.

7. Discussion

The most important conclusion regarding the commitment theory that emerges from the empirical analysis is that participation provisions in a negotiated settlement are associated with a strong and statistically significant increase in the duration of peace. This is the main implication of the commitment theory that I am testing in this paper, and the expected relationship holds. In these models, the hazard rate on the basic measures of electoral participation provisions is between 0.28 and 0.44, which indicates between a 56 percent and a 72 percent reduction in the risk of a return to the conflict with their inclusion. None of the potential omitted variables suggested by the existing literature, and included as standard controls, drive this relationship. The inclusion of other provisions in the agreement does not generally change the result substantively or in terms of its statistical significance. DDR and electoral participation provisions are highly correlated, and the inclusion of DDR does make the result on electoral participation provisions somewhat less robust in certain models.

The commitment theory actually implies that electoral participation provisions succeed in increasing the duration of peace in part because they are included alongside other specific provisions, and they help ensure that these are implemented. In the mechanism section, I show that electoral participation provisions are correlated with the inclusion of specific security sector reform provisions in these peace agreements. Both these DDR and specific SSR reforms may be correlated with electoral participation provisions because the expectation that they will be enacted in these agreements is higher *due to* the inclusion of electoral participation provisions. Indeed, in the examples of Burundi, El Salvador, and Indonesia, the approaching elections provide deadlines for enacting other aspects of the peace deal. Interestingly power-sharing has a non-significant effect in the opposite direction, which suggests that there is not something inherently different about agreements that include any type of these rigorous provisions.

In the analysis, I include several alternative operationalizations of the independent variable of interest that clarify what is driving the statistically significant increase in the duration of peace in these models. First, to see if there is an independent effect of legalization of militant

parties that is different from the effect of the inclusion of the militant group in a transitional government, I divide the independent variable into political parties that the agreement (1) explicitly legalizes to run in elections, and (2) implicitly legalizes through inclusion in a transitional government. A test of the fit of the two models indicates that including these two types of participation provisions together is just as useful as including them separately. This works against theories, including some versions of the alternative argument about normalizing combatants that suggest that the transition government is driving the results.

Second, for those who believe that any agreements that include electoral participation provisions, I also include a measure of whether or not the provisions were actually implemented. As the theory predicts, the hazard rate on electoral participation provisions *that actually result in participation* reveals a statistically significant increase in the duration of peace. The electoral participation provisions that do not result in participation do not have a statistically significant effect on the duration of peace. Overall, then, electoral participation provisions can be thought to include each of the types of participation that I code into the independent variable, and they are associated with a statistically significant increase in the duration of peace only when they are actually implemented to engage the monitoring and sanctioning mechanism. They are implemented, however, about 68 percent of the time when they are included in the peace deal. Once implemented, the cases of Colombia and Northern Ireland show electoral participation at work in sanctioning violations, so the mechanism seems to be in effect, as well. The violations likely occur in the first place due initially to both sides' reactions to militant groups that are not included in the peace agreement. Such groups are often problematic for peace agreements (for example, see Kydd and Walter 2002; Cunningham 2007).

Finally, the implication of the commitment theory on electoral participation provisions is actually conditional, and so I test the conditional hypothesis: assuming an international actor is willing to monitor and potentially sanction violations of a peace agreement, then participation in the electoral process by both sides should help them do so. This conditional implication distinguishes the theory from a normative theory of normalizing combatants through the electoral process. Focusing on just electoral participation provisions in peace agreements that are likely to receive international election observation, the empirical results show an increase in the duration of peace, which is statistically significant; electoral participation provisions in peace agreements that are unlikely to receive international electoral observation are actually associated with a

decrease in the duration of peace, although the relationship is not statistically significant. In cases of failed electoral participation provisions, including Rwanda, Cambodia, and Afghanistan, international monitoring and potential sanction of violations of the deal is either not credible or non-existent. This study, then, begins to assess the role of elections in negotiated settlements. Little attention is devoted to the purpose of these contests in most previous studies of post-conflict elections.

In this data, I can replicate the finding of no significant effect of post-conflict elections that emerge from many of the other studies (again, for example, see Collier, Hoeffler et al. 2008). Once I refine the study to elections in which both sides engage — which is where the commitment mechanism is plausible — I again find that these intentionally inclusive elections are associated with a statistically significant increase in the duration of peace. These results, then, suggest that elections in which the militant group and the government explicitly plan to compete against one another have a different effect from those in which they do not. This finding also suggests that some post-conflict elections actually seem to increase the risk of a return to the conflict, even as elections in which former warring parties compete against one another reduce the risk. Thus, there is further work to be done on what aspects of the remaining post-conflict elections drive the dangerous trends found outside of the post-conflict elections that I study here.

IV. Conclusion

Are post-conflict elections an effective tool for maintaining a durable peace? This paper suggests that one type of elections — those that include participation by both sides of a warring dyad in a civil conflict — engage a commitment mechanism where international actors are willing and able to observe and punish violations of a peace deal. Electoral participation lowers the cost for external engagement by (1) establishing specific rules and deadlines, (2) fixing regular, highly visible moments for checking in with both sides, and (3) establishing public representatives for each side that are then easier to punish if they fail to uphold their end of the bargain. After the end of the Cold War, the international community could help commit both sides to implementing and honoring a peace agreement using this mechanism. Through cross-national analysis of the duration of peace in settlements to civil conflicts after the end of the Cold War, this paper shows that electoral participation provisions are associated with a longer duration

of peace. Initial evidence suggests that the expected mechanisms are at work, as well. Overall, in contrast to more uniformly pessimistic views of post-conflict elections as a tool for maintaining a durable peace, at least, this paper suggests that contests entailing participation by the government and at least one former militant group can, in fact, serve this function.

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