The core of the MCAH—the actual program approach, is excellent. But it is surrounded by significant risk. Many of the risks derive from the premature EIF of the compact. The MCAH compact entered into force on September 29, 2005—the last day of the 2005 fiscal year in the U.S. The fact that the compact was not fully fleshed out at the time suggests that the MCC accelerated EIF to get in under the wire of the waning fiscal year and thereby increase the tally of obligated funds for 2005.[5] Political motives on the Honduran side may have played a role as well. Facing the end of his term, President Maduro was probably eager to prove his capacity to secure $215 million in development assistance. The short-term political gains of early EIF have been completely eclipsed by the programmatic risks it has created.
This section is divided into five sub-sections:
- What the MCC Could Have Known
- Compressed Time Line
- Weak Government Buy-In
- Weak Civil Society Outreach
- Overzealous MCC Risk Management
Next section: What the MCC Could Have Known
5. In 2005 the MCC was under enormous pressure from Congress to prove that it could move money in order to justify increased budget requests. Full compact funds are “obligated” when the compact enters in force (not at signing).