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Part II: The Pace of Progress

Part II: The Pace of Progress

working with pestle, Madagascar Government officials, MCAM staff, regional representatives, other donors and representatives of civil society all complained about the slow progress of the MCAM program to date. There was no consensus, however, about what was behind the delays. Some concerns are based on real delays such as those associated with being a start-up, navigating procedures designed for high accountability, and building in time for learning. Other concerns are more rooted in perception, and the product of misplaced expectations of the program. This section takes a look at some reasons behind the real and perceived slow pace of progress in MCAM's first year.

Start-up blues: The MCAM has been a global guinea pig for the MCA. As the very first MCA country, it has had to work hand-in-hand with MCC staff to test-run procedures and develop systems.[1] Before Madagascar, the MCC had no templates or standards for contracts, procurement procedures or tenders, terms of reference for service providers, cooperative agreements with government or private entities--or any of the other nuts and bolts of getting a multi-million-dollar program up and running. The managing director of the MCAM joked that "it is a pain to be a pioneer; we should get royalties for helping MCC set up its systems." Senior MCAM and MCC officials also attributed delays to the fact that the MCC pursues negotiation, deliberation and collaboration with partner countries in establishing program systems, rather than imposing them. Officials argued that this is part of the ownership principle, and that it means "you get a much better product in the end."

Cumbersome procedures: A second implication of Madagascar being the first MCA country is that there is a lot riding on its success--it will be the first real test of the MCC's approach. Like a first-time parent, the MCC is rather risk-averse and protective. It has designed a strict and a multi-tiered oversight and decision-making structure that tends to slow things down. This is particularly true for financial accountability and procurement issues. For example, Washington-based MCC staff must sign off on all procurement over $100,000 including budget expenditures, terms-of-reference, and tenders for services (to be increased, in some cases, to $250,000 after an interim period), and clear the French/English translations of all binding documents. While staff see this as cumbersome, they acknowledge the importance of accountability. The MCC resident country director also acknowledged an important benefit of having to pass so much through Washington--a buffer for MCAM management and Antananarivo-based MCC staff from high-level Malagasy political pressures to move faster than is advisable.

Many interviewees partially attributed procurement delays to GTZ. MCAM staff explained that in the early months GTZ simply did not have enough staff or the proper expertise. But the good news, according to the MCC resident country director, is that GTZ is restructuring, bringing on more and better qualified staff, and is responding to MCAM concerns about its services. And even as MCAM staff complained about the delays in dealing with GTZ, they easily acknowledged that it is smoother and more reliable than working through the government procurement systems.

agriculture, Madagascar

Time for learning: The degree to which the MCAM is managed and staffed by Malagasy nationals is unique among donor-funded programs. There is an explicit effort to create a cadre of professionals with expertise in priority-setting, program planning, financial management, coordination with other development actors, and monitoring and evaluation. While this takes time up front, it is an investment that will last well beyond the life of the MCA compact in Madagascar.

Revision of M&E plan: The decision to revise the MCAM plan for M&E has caused delays as well. There were four key aspects to the revision of the M&E framework. First, MCAM had to add the newly-selected target zones and their areas of investment. Second, the MCAM wanted to better coordinate goals across the three components. Rather than have specific targets for the land tenure, finance and agriculture components, the MCAM is designing program-wide goals that are supported by all three components. Third, MCAM staff was readjusting targets that were overly optimistic or significantly underestimated. For example, the initial goal of the number or loans and amount of new microcredit available will easily be met in the first few years, and therefore will be revised upward. Finally, the MCAM was working to build in external risk factors, such as increasing fuel prices.

Inflated and incorrect expectations: Finally, the perception of a slow start is partially due to the fact that some people simply have the wrong expectations about what the MCAM is designed to deliver. People observed a ceremonious compact signing in April 2005, and heard the sum of $110 million broadcast over the airwaves, so they expected to see the things they associate with big new aid programs--seeds, tractors, water pumps, financial hand-outs, new buildings and other tangibles. The MCAM approach of investing first in an "enabling environment" deviates from the instant-gratification approach that some have come to expect from aid programs. For example, two different regional leaders independently complained, "we have lost two planting cycles waiting for the MCAM." This illustrates that they are waiting for the wrong things. Rather than provide direct inputs for a given crop cycle, the MCAM is designed to help farmers gain the capacity to meet their needs for many crop cycles to come, and this takes longer to deliver. The issue of expectations of the MCAM program is one of the key themes in the MCA Madagascar story and is discussed at length in the next section.

Next: Part III: Three Big Stories: Expectation, Consultation, Innovation


[1] As Madagascar designed its compact proposal, and even as it signed its compact, the MCC had very little formal guidance and few institutional systems in place. Figure 4: Timeline of MCC Guidance Issuance and Investment Memo Dates on page 14 of the July 2006 GAO report illustrates this point effectively.