Part IV: Recommendations

The three key aspects of Madagascar's early MCA experience--the challenge of managing expectations, the process of fostering ongoing consultation, and MCAM/MCC innovation, inform a series of recommendations for other MCA countries, the MCC and the U.S. Congress.

Managing Expectations

MCC and partner countries should emphasize appropriate sequencing over expediency. The MCC should offer clear guidance and financing to help countries set and meet pre-compact milestones and thus improve chances of reaching program goals within the compact period. MCA countries should not rush compact signing or "entry into force." By working to get administrative structures, baseline surveys, M&E frameworks, consultation and other foundational pieces in place before the official clock starts ticking, countries are more likely to meet public expectations and program goals. The MCC can shield against political pressure to rush entry into force by offering clear guidance about what needs to be in place before compacts coupled with creative, pre-compact financing mechanisms to meet these milestones. To its credit, the MCC has made strides in this area. For example, to accelerate compact implementation in Ghana, the MCC obligated $10 million in 609(g) resources to get key structures and assessments in place before the compact entered into force (and the implementation clock started ticking). This kind of creative approach should be encouraged and indeed should occur even earlier in process--prior to compact signature.

MCA countries should develop, with MCC support, an explicit communications strategy for expectations management and education about its approach. MCC's emphasis on transparency in the planning and implementation process leads to a high level of public awareness about a country's MCA program. If not coupled with clear information about the program approach and expected outcomes, this heightened awareness can lead to unrealistic expectations, public disappointment and loss of political capital. By investing up front in a communications plan, a country can buy itself more time and flexibility to pursue long-term program goals with public support.

MCA countries should balance short-term and long-term interventions to keep momentum alive and expectations satisfied. Long-term, national-level policy and institutional reforms are critical for sustained economic growth, but they are not sexy or particularly visible. Countries should pursue components of the program that deliver immediate, tangible benefits to average citizens while longer-term reforms are taking effect. This is vital for generating and maintaining support for MCA programs, and in some case, winning the hearts and minds of the public in the context of politically tough reforms.

The MCC should insist on a comprehensive M&E framework before a compact begins, but be flexible about revisions during the course of compact implementation. Having a comprehensive M&E framework at the beginning of a compact period is a sign that fundamental steps (like baseline surveys, regional selection, impact assessments, and detailed program planning) have been taken. But even the most seasoned development planners cannot predict the future. Allowing for flexibility to rethink and revise targets during the life of the program encourages country staff to pursue ongoing (rather than just after-the-fact) monitoring and evaluation. MCC flexibility in this area goes hand-in-hand with its emphasis on ownership and capacity building. Finally, revising targets to keep them realistic, while still keeping them ambitious, can be critical for managing expectations about the program.

Fostering Consultation

MCC and MCA countries should bring in expertise on civil society consultation earlier, as is done for technical areas like procurement and sectoral interventions. A lot of countries have struggled with civil society engagement. For many, MCC standards in this area are as new and as challenging as those associated with measuring economic rate of return and establishing fiduciary accountability. If the MCC is going to push countries to meet its standards for consultation, it should be explicit about offering technical assistance in this area. This includes, but is not limited to: analysis of previous consultation efforts as a baseline for devising and assessing MCA-specific consultation; developing creative mechanisms to fund consultative processes that occur before compacts begin; and encouraging countries to include costs for ongoing consultation in compact budgets. Like in other technical areas, the MCC's goal should be to build and improve on existing country capacity in fostering civil society consultation.

MCA countries should seek partnerships that will strengthen civil society's capacity to participate in program planning and implementation, with a special focus on complimentarity with other USG programs. MCC's focus on country ownership often means that MCA programs are in fact government programs. Thus there may be a conflict of interest in having governments use MCA compact resources to directly fund civil society capacity building (as is the case in Madagascar). This should not stop MCA programs from making use of 609g funds to strengthen pre-compact consultation, using compact resources to fund participatory processes, and identifying opportunities, through collaboration with NGOs and the private sector, to strengthen civil society capacity. Most importantly, the MCC and MCA countries should try to capitalize on USAID investments and experience in this area.

Promoting Innovation

MCC and partner countries should continue to talk loudly about country ownership. While MCC has done a lot to promote country ownership, it is the perception of ownership that has really galvanized support and generated cooperation and momentum around Madagascar's compact. By constantly reminding MCAM staff and the general public that the country is in charge, MCC has increased political initiative, staff enthusiasm, and intergovernmental cooperation surrounding the program. The MCC should continue to explore ways to expand its ownership principle, including serious consideration to providing budget support in especially well-performing countries.

The US Congress should support the MCC's willingness and courage to support tough, overarching policy and institutional reforms. Fundamental reforms are sometimes the key to jump-starting economic growth and poverty reduction in MCA countries. Similarly, strong institutions - particularly fiduciary systems - play a key role in bringing sustainable development. Few donors have the guts to support major, tricky reforms or institution building on a large scale. So if these reforms are the initiative of the national government, and supported by local civil society, they should be enthusiastically supported by Congress. The Congress could enhance innovation potential and impact of the MCA if it had a higher risk threshold for supporting and strengthening country systems while insisting upon results, and remembering "transformational development" can occur at the approach level as well as at the outcome level.

MCC and the US Congress should allow, and even encourage, countries to pursue concurrent MCA compacts. In Madagascar, implementation of the first modest compact is helping to clarify where phase-two investments will be most effective. This is a responsible approach in countries with limited capacity or where fundamental reforms are a prerequisite to sustainable growth and poverty reduction, and one that MCC should encourage. Allowing Madagascar, and other countries where appropriate, a concurrent compact would not only improve the chances that programs will be sustainable and transformational, but could help meet public expectations about the MCC's promise of economic growth and poverty reduction.