Ideas to Action:

Independent research for global prosperity

Publications

 

February 27, 2016

Designing Contracts for the Global Fund: Lessons from the Theory of Incentives - Working Paper 425

This paper uses contract theory to suggest simple contract designs that could be used by the Global Fund. Using a basic model of procurement, we lay out five alternative options and consider when each is likely to be most appropriate. We ultimately provide a synthesis to guide policy makers as to when and how 'results-based' incentive contracts can be used in practice.

February 26, 2016

Global Health Donors Viewed as Regulators of Monopolistic Service Providers: Lessons from Regulatory Literature - Working Paper 424

Controlling healthcare costs while promoting maximum health impact in the recipient countries is one the biggest challenges for global health donors. This paper views global health donors as the regulators of monopolistic service providers, and explores potential optimal fund payment systems under asymmetric information. It provides a summary and assessment of optimal price regulation designs for monopolistic service providers.