With the steady decline in new confirmed cases of coronavirus in China beyond Hubei Province, public scrutiny has increasingly shifted to the economy affected by the outbreak, particularly the impact on the plethora of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). An earlier CGD note explored the impact of coronavirus on SMEs using data from the Enterprise Survey for Innovation and Entrepreneurship in China (ESIEC) and follow-up interviews. In this accompanying note, we consider how SMEs can resume production without compromising epidemic control.
In recent years, a large number of countries have implemented policy changes to advance financial inclusion, especially by using digital financial services (DFS). However, results are mixed.
China’s “Counterpart Assistance” Approach to Coronavirus: Lessons from the Wenchuan Earthquake Response
In early 2020, a new type of coronavirus epidemic (COVID-19) emerged suddenly and spread steadily from China’s Wuhan City, Hubei Province, disrupting China’s social order. The epicenter of the epidemic, Hubei Province lacked medical personnel and epidemic prevention supplies; assistance was urgently needed. This note identifies the Chinese government’s “counterpart aid” strategy in response to the epidemic and explores the strategy’s utility, drawing on earlier experiences with disaster response.
The novel coronavirus outbreak that emerged in late 2019 has infected tens of thousands in China, community transmission is feared in other countries, and containment looks increasingly unlikely.
In the Harry Potter novels, a magic hat decides which of four school houses new pupils should join. Development finance institutions (DFIs) need something like that when trying to decide which private firms to subsidise, although applicants only need sorting into two groups: firms that are doing something socially valuable and which genuinely require a subsidy, and firms that are merely trying their luck to get a subsidy for a project they would undertake in any case.
Unpacking the Black Box of Payer Policy: A Demand-Side Approach for Equitable Uptake of Cost-Effective Health Innovation
Over the past two decades, global health innovation has delivered important new tools for use in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) and saved many lives. Nonetheless, the current innovation ecosystem suffers from significant limitations that are likely to worsen with aid transition.
Management by way of top-down controls and targets sometimes gets in the way of aid donors’ aims, undermining project success. These unhelpful controls often stem from a need to account for performance; legislatures or executive boards induce agencies to exercise tight process controls and orient projects towards what is measurable and reportable.
The market-driven, value-based advance commitment (MVAC) builds on the advance market commitment (AMC) mechanism previously used in global health with several important innovations and improvements. Most crucially, the MVAC is driven by MIC demand rather than donor contributions; is informed by countries’ ability to pay rather than a single, “cost-plus” price; and allows pharmaceutical companies to reap higher revenues from a more effective product. In this report, we apply our new model—the MVAC—to a target product profile (TPP), published by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2016 and endorsed by BMGF, for a pan-TB regimen.
Actually Navigating by Judgment: Towards a New Paradigm of Donor Accountability Where the Current System Doesn’t Work
This paper explores how donors can move towards greater Navigation by Judgment, highlighting the actions people inside and outside aid agencies can work to make change—encouraging more Navigation by Judgment on the margin, starting today.
From Principles to Practice: Strengthening Accountability for Gender Equality in International Development
This policy note seeks to contribute to maximizing the impact of Beijing +25, and strengthening accountability for global gender equality more broadly, by grappling with three core questions: For what should governments be held accountable? To whom should they be accountable? And how can feminist researchers and advocates hold governments accountable?
This note sets out three ways that the UK government can continue to improve access to UK markets for the poorest countries following Brexit.
The CDI has carved out a fairly specialized niche in the index ecosystem. For 15 years, the Center for Global Development has produced the Commitment to Development Index (CDI). This is a good time to take stock and ask how, if at all, the CDI should be modified.
Mikaela Gavas gives oral evidence to the United Kingdom's House of Lords EU External Affairs Sub-Committee on development cooperation after Brexit.
This paper revisits the concept of international development aid effectiveness and its measurement as part of a review of the Quality of ODA (QuODA) assessment published regularly since 2010.
Despite remarkable success in terms of growth, poverty reduction, and improvements in other socio-economic indicators, Bangladesh suffers from chronic revenue shortfalls and an extremely low tax/GDP ratio. The overall size of the government is also quite small and inadequate to meet the growing demand for public services and infrastructure, primarily due to revenue-generating limitations by the country’s tax authorities
International tax issues are a concern for both developed and developing countries, with evidence of aggressive tax planning by multinational enterprises (MNEs). MNEs are able to exploit weaknesses in the design of the international tax framework to reduce their tax liabilities.
Senegal’s recent economic performance is impressive. For the first time, Senegal has achieved a GDP growth rate of more than 6 percent for three consecutive years (2015–2017), and per capita GDP has increased at an annual average of 4.1 percent. In parallel, progress in fiscal revenues has been recorded, with the ratio of average revenues to GDP increasing by 5.7 percentage points between 2000-2002 and 2014-2017, placing Senegal above the regional average of 15 percent.
Financial inclusion is a fundamental pillar of development. But Mexico poses a conundrum. In many respects it has been successful at growing its economy and integrating with global markets. Yet among its peers in Latin America, Mexico is the worst-performing at financial inclusion relative to its income; at 36.9%, its rate of inclusion only surpasses three other countries regionally—all with much lower per capita incomes.