I suggest in this paper the logic of going beyond the standard, poverty-targeted, elements of good social policy to a modern social contract adapted to the demands and the constraints of an open economy. Such a contract would be explicitly based on broad job-based growth. Second, it would be politically and economically directed not only at the currently poor but at the near-poor and economically insecure middle-income strata.
This study develops an index of trade policy designed to synthesize the state of developing country access to import markets in each of the major industrial country areas.
I present here a proposal for constructing a global patent regime, which could be a reasonable compromise to the current bitter dispute fueled by TRIPS. It allows the right line to be drawn between prices and incentives because different lines can be drawn for different products.
The African Growth and Opportunity Act took effect in January 2001 to allow qualifying sub-Saharan African countries to export qualifying goods duty free to the US. The act was expressly designed to "increase trade and investment between the US and sub-Saharan Africa." The evidence over the short time since it was enacted reveals that: most of the AGOA benefits have gone to oil exporters; most of the imports eligible for duty-free treatment are still being taxed, notwithstanding their eligibility. This is probably due to logistical difficulties in claiming AGOA benefits. AGOA has not increased trade flows from eligible countries to the US yet there are structural features of the law which threaten to reduce its developmental impacts.
In this paper we argue that neither the level nor the change in a country's trade/GDP ratio can be taken as an indication of the "openness" of a country's trade policy. In particular, we examine the ways in which terms of trade shifts have affected trade/GDP ratio over the past two decades, and find that the empirical evidence offered by the existing literature overstates the importance of trade policy in economic growth.
This paper examines arguments in favor and against the of patent rights on pharmaceuticals in the developing world as required by World Trade Organization membership. It emphasizes that these new pharmaceutical patents promise benefits and costs that differ with the characteristics of diseases. It also considers standard intellectual property and regulatory mechanisms that could be used to differentiate protection, and concludes that all have serious drawbacks. It then describes a new mechanism that would make differentiating protection a more feasible policy option.