# Assessing the Quality of Aid for Agriculture

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### **Abstract**

New international initiatives signal strong commitment to agriculture and food security in the face of growing demand and climate-change challenges. But aid to agriculture still represents just five percent of total official development assistance. With donor budgets under intense pressure, making aid effective is more important than ever, but we still know relatively little about the quality of aid in general and of agricultural aid in particular.

The Quality of Official Development Assistance (QuODA) project, a joint initiative of the Center for Global Development and the Brookings Institution, is one effort to address this knowledge gap for aid in general. This paper presents the results of applying the QuODA methodology to agriculture, explains the limitations of the approach, and compares donor performance with the original QuODA results.

The authors find donors rank similarly in both Ag QuODA and the original. They also find that quantitative assessments of aid at the sector level suffer from constraints of data quality and availability and encourage the continued improvement of sector-level aid data and the use of more and better independent impact evaluations to measure development effectiveness for agricultural aid projects.

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### Introduction

After decades of neglect, food security and agricultural development rose to the top of the donor agenda in the wake of the 2007-08 food price spikes. The challenge is clearly huge, with the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (2009) estimating that food production will have to rise by 60 percent by 2050 to meet rising demand, and do so in an environment where climate change is causing evermore extreme weather events. In response, G-8 leaders launched the L'Aquila Food Security Initiative at their 2009 summit and pledged \$20 billion over three years, about a third of it new money. In Washington, at the beginning of the 2012 summit, US President Barack Obama announced that the G-8 would follow this initiative with a New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, but this time relying primarily on the private sector to finance it. The shift in emphasis, whatever its merit substantively, highlights the fact that sluggish economies, large deficits, and rising debt in most donor countries are putting aid budgets under severe pressure and that, however great the need, aid to agriculture will not escape unscathed.

While the magnitude of the challenges in agriculture accentuates the need to ensure that aid is being used as well as possible, there is also a broader movement underway among both donors and recipient governments to improve aid effectiveness. Yet, the most recent report on implementation of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness found mixed progress at best, and concluded that donors had fully met only one of thirteen targets for more effective aid. Wanting to go beyond the Paris Declaration monitoring process and provide an independent evaluation of donor performance, Nancy Birdsall, Homi Kharas, and colleagues launched a joint Center for Global Development and Brookings Institution project to assess the "quality of official development assistance" (QuODA).3

Given the renewed attention to agriculture, this paper explores whether it makes sense to adapt the QuODA methodology to the agricultural sector. To preview what we find, methodological challenges arise from both the relatively small volume of official development assistance (ODA) for agriculture, and the fact that much of the data used by the QuODA project are unavailable at the sectoral level. Also, unlike aid to the health sector, which is examined separately in Duran and Glassman (2012), there are fewer specialized donor agencies focused on agricultural development and the agencies that are involved tend to be the same as those involved in ODA overall. Perhaps not surprisingly, the overall outcomes for Ag QuODA are broadly similar to those in original QuODA.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Official statements and other materials are collected on the website of the Partnership to Cut Hunger and Poverty in Africa at http://www.partnership-africa.org/special-coverage-2012-g8-summit-chicago-council-global-agriculture-and-food-security-symposium (accessed August 10, 2012).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The results of the 2011 Paris Declaration survey are available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/aideffectiveness/assessingprogressonimplementingtheparisdeclarationandtheaccraage ndaforaction.htm (accessed August 15, 2012).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See Birdsall, Kharas et al. (2010) for the original analysis, and Birdsall, Kharas, and Perakis (2012) for the update.

A final, and important, caveat, as recognized in both the Paris Declaration and the QuODA reports, is that this approach measures donor *efforts* to improve the quality of aid and not donor *impact*. It is worth quoting from the second report where the authors emphasize that QuODA "is an assessment of donors' efforts to comply with their commitments to those dimensions of aid quality that evidence and experience suggest lead to effective aid" (Birdsall, Kharas, and Perakis 2012, p. vi). Thus, the quality of aid as measured by QuODA is one piece of what is needed to assess donor performance, but more systematic and independent evaluation of *actual* impact is still essential.

### Aid to Agriculture: Scope and Context

Donor commitments of aid for the agricultural production sector roughly doubled from \$4 billion in the mid-2000s to just over \$8 billion in 2010, but it was still just 5 percent of total ODA commitments. To put this in context, table 1 (end of document) shows the distribution of donor commitments across key sectors, along with each sector's share of total ODA and the average annual growth in commitments. While aid to agriculture grew relatively rapidly the last few years, in real terms, it remains well below the levels of the 1970s, when food prices last spiked and the green revolution was in full swing (figure 1).

While different approaches are possible, we decided to focus analysis on aid for the agricultural production sector, as shown in table 1, rather than include all aid aimed at the broader, and often ill-defined, concept of food security. To be specific, with the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and Creditor Reporting System (CRS) databases as our primary sources, the universe of agricultural aid we are examining is under CRS sector code 311.4 In addition, we include agro-industry from the industrial sector (CRS purpose code 32161) because it includes mainly agricultural processing activities that involve adding value to the production of basic commodities, for example funding a mill to extract oils from sesame and sunflower seeds in Gambia. Table 2 shows the subsectors included in this category, as well as the number of projects and value of assistance under each code. Both in terms of activities and disbursements, most agricultural aid is reported in the categories of agricultural policy and administrative management, and development, which appear to be catchall categories with unclear boundaries. Water and food crop production also attract significant donor funding.

Since we are focusing on aid for agricultural sector development, we exclude some categories that would fall under the broader heading of food security. For example, the CRS includes nutrition projects in the health sector and that aid is included in the QuODA Health analysis, but not here. We also exclude emergency food aid (included under humanitarian aid in table 1) and the category of development food aid/food security programs (CRS purpose

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Links to both databases and information about them are at http://www.oecd.org/dac/aidstatistics/internationaldevelopmentstatisticsidsonlinedatabasesonaidandotherresou rceflows.htm (accessed August 15, 2012).

code 52010).<sup>5</sup> Food aid, whether in emergencies or for development is typically provided under very different conditions than development assistance. In emergencies, donors are interested in getting relief to people as quickly as possible and appropriate measures of effectiveness will be different than for longer-run development projects. In-kind food aid, even when nominally for development, is delivered differently and much of it appears to be for humanitarian or other purposes that are not related to development of the agricultural sector.

Finally, we also exclude multi-sectoral, rural development aid (CRS purpose code 43040). Examination of the project descriptions in this category suggests that it includes many initiatives not closely linked to agricultural development. But it is difficult to clearly identify projects supporting agricultural development from those that have only weak links, if any, to that objective, so we opted to keep a narrow and clearly-defined focus on the agricultural sector in this analysis.<sup>6</sup>

### Applying the QuODA Methodology to Agriculture

The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) were intended to respond to the growing criticisms that aid was not helping and might even be hurting developing countries.<sup>7</sup> That initiative revolves around a set of principles for more effective aid and a peer review process to encourage implementation. Birdsall, Kharas, et al. (2010, 2012) draw on these principles and the indicators developed to track progress in implementing them, but they go beyond that to develop a mechanism for ongoing, independent, annual assessments of donor performance. They focus on four dimensions of the quality of aid that roughly parallel the five fundamental principles (in parentheses) of the Paris Declaration:

- maximizing efficiency, or development bang for the buck (results)
- fostering institutions in the recipient country (country ownership and alignment)
- reducing burdens on recipient countries associated with management of aid (harmonization)
- transparency and learning (mutual accountability)

The authors cite evidence and analysis suggesting that the indicators chosen to represent each of these dimensions are associated with higher quality aid, which, in turn, is expected to deliver greater development impact. But it is important to reiterate that QuODA does not

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> The full list of CRS purpose codes is at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/27/46804196.xls.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> We did do a sensitivity analysis including aid for rural development, but it had minimal effect on the results.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Birdsall and Kharas, (2010), review key contributions to the aid effectiveness debate; the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda are available at

http://www.oecd.org/development/aideffectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm (accessed August 15, 2012).

directly measure aid effectiveness or impact, and that its focus is on policy and operational measures that donors control.

Other caveats are that the data used in these exercises are not as timely as is desirable and are often incomplete or inconsistent. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development is constantly working to improve the quality of reporting and of the data collected, and some important progress is being made, which the other QuODA exercises may want to incorporate in future editions. For example, more information regarding budget support and aid using program-based approaches is becoming available, including at the sectoral level (see box 1).

One particular problem arises in compiling comparable indicators for the multilateral institutions because they are observers, not DAC members, and are under no obligation to report certain items that bilateral agencies must report. Thus, we cannot be sure from the CRS data whether the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) Special Fund really does no technical assistance or just does not report it, as the International Development Association of the World Bank (IDA) and the institutions of the European Communities (EC) do. Similarly, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) suffers on the transparency and learning dimension because it does not report detailed information about its projects to CRS, even though it publically releases such information on its website. Nevertheless, we think it is important to assess the multilateral institutions alongside the bilaterals and some do report more fully than others, showing that it is feasible. Moreover, one of the objectives of the QuODA project is to encourage better and more systematic reporting of information.<sup>8</sup>

An additional challenge for our analysis arises from the fact that we are drawing from a much narrower universe of donor activities. Agricultural aid disbursements, which are the focus of the analysis, represent only around 5 percent of total disbursements for all sectors (table 3).9 The amounts provided range from just \$4 million for Greece, New Zealand, and Portugal, to nearly \$1 billion for the United States and \$1.4 billion for IDA. As a share of the total, agricultural aid ranges from roughly 1.5 percent for some small donors, and the United Kingdom, to around 10 percent for Belgium and Ireland. The United States at 4.6 percent is a bit below the overall average for the donors in our sample. We should also point out that, while the table shows IFAD providing only about half of its disbursements for agricultural development, that is what IFAD reported under the CRS sector code that we are using and all of IFAD's assistance is directly or indirectly aimed at this objective.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> For recommendations on key improvements, see Birdsall et al. (2012, p. vii).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Note that the figures in table 3 are for disbursements in 2009, our base year and unit of analysis, while the figures in table 1 are for commitments in 2010.

### Box 1. Notable Changes in the Creditor Reporting System

For a number of years, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has been working to merge the reporting for the DAC aggregate tables and the detailed, activity-level reporting for the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) to improve consistency and utility. A number of changes developed in recent years and reported by some donors voluntarily became mandatory last year for reporting on 2010 aid. Some of the new data allow for more detailed analysis at the sectoral level and, possibly, improvements to the overall QuODA methodology. Much of it, unfortunately, remains optional for multilateral donors, but there is now more consistent and more detailed reporting by bilateral donors on items such as the type of aid provided, the channel through which it is delivered (multilateral, NGO, recipient government, and so on), and whether programbased approaches are used, including at the sectoral level.

Some of this data was reported voluntarily before last year, but it was quite spotty. For example, in 2009, only Australia reported on aid channeled through recipient governments, doing so for 87 of the more than 12,000 activities reported to CRS. With more complete reporting for 2010, 27 donors reported more than 16,000 aid activities, out of roughly 250,000 total, that were channeled through recipient governments. Many more donors also reported the names of specific ministries or agencies that received the aid.

Aid provided as budget support is also now being consistently reported, including at the sectoral level, and could be used, along with aid channeled through recipient governments, to provide additional indicators for the fostering institutions or reducing burdens dimension at the sectoral level. As an illustration, box table 1.1 (end of document) shows what donors reported in terms of providing budget support and program-based aid for the agricultural sector in 2009 and 2010. The table highlights that only some countries bothered to report this information before it became mandatory last year. And, there are still indications of problems with full reporting, as the United States reported no aid channeled through recipient governments in the agricultural sector in 2010, though the reporting guidelines say it should do so for budget support (reported in box table 1.1 as 20 percent of total agricultural ODA) (OECD 2011, p. 21). International Development Association (IDA) and the African Development Fund also reported providing around 10 percent of agricultural aid as budget support, but, because of reporting inconsistencies, we have no way of knowing whether IFAD and the IDB Special Fund provided no budget support for agriculture or simply did not report it.

Original QuODA already uses program-based approaches to aid, as reported in the Paris declaration surveys, as one of the indicators in the reducing burden dimension. In the CRS reports, an indicator for sector program aid was replaced last year with an indicator for program-based approaches in all activities. That information is now

supposed to be consistently reported by bilateral donors at the sectoral level, but the definition also changed so that programmatic aid might be considered as fostering institutions, as well as reducing burdens. According to the CRS reporting guidelines (OECD 2008, p. 2), to qualify as program-based approach aid, there must be "leadership by the host country or organization" and donors must make "efforts to increase the use of local systems for programme design and implementation, financial management, monitoring and evaluation." Box table 1.1 again shows which countries reported in 2009 and which in 2010. We did not try to use the 2010 data in this analysis because there are some anomalies in the data and we are not sure that all countries are yet fully reporting. For example, we are not sure whether the sharp drop in program-based aid for some countries, such as Norway, is due to misreporting or to the new definition.

Finally, there is a new distinction in reporting on aid for climate change that could be interesting to explore in overall QuODA, as well as for its potential impact on agriculture. Previously, countries just reported whether or not addressing climate change was an objective of a given aid activity. Now they must report whether aid is designed to address climate change through mitigation or adaptation. Aid in the former case could be considered a contribution to a global public good, whereas aid in the latter case could be an indicator of need for agricultural assistance. For 2010, donors reported providing a little less than 10 percent of total agricultural aid for climate change objectives, with twenty donors providing \$223 million for climate change mitigation (with adaptation sometimes also a goal of those activities), and twenty-two donors providing another \$245 million for adaptation.

With those general caveats in mind, we focus here and in appendix A on the adjustments that we made to apply the QuODA methodology to the agricultural sector. <sup>10</sup> One difference is that we cover only 28 of the 31 donors included in the original QuODA analysis. The Asian Development Bank Special Fund, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, and the select UN agencies—UNAIDS, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, and WFP—report either no or only limited activities in the agricultural sector. Interestingly, this includes the World Food Program, which appears in the overall QuODA agency analysis, but not in ours because it reported only 3 small activities in the agricultural production sector in 2009. We discuss the World Food Program and the results from the original QuODA analysis in box 2. The UN Food and Agricultural Agency also does not appear in the analysis because it characterizes itself as a "knowledge institution" and is not a donor agency. IFAD is, therefore, the only agriculture-focused agency included in our analysis.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>For those seeking more detail on the methodology and how the indicators are defined and calculated, please see Birdsall et al (2010, 2012).

In applying the QuODA methodology to agriculture, we faced serious data constraints arising from the fact that many of the indicators used in the original are based on Paris Declaration monitoring surveys or other sources where information is not available at the sectoral level. Thus, we are able to include only three of the four dimensions, and eighteen of the original thirty-one QuODA indicators.<sup>11</sup> Unfortunately, none of the data for the eight indicators in the fostering institutions dimension are available at the sectoral level so that had to be dropped entirely. In addition to having to drop a number of indicators, we also had to modify six of the remaining indicators (highlighted in italics in table 4). Appendix A provides details on the adjustments, while appendix table A.1 shows the average values for all the indicators, as well as the degree of correlation between our indicators and the original QuODA indicators, adapted as necessary to be comparable.

All remaining indicators use the same methodology as used in overall QuODA. The data is generally for 2009, though we followed original QuODA in reflecting the most recent information available on membership in and implementation of the International Aid Transparency Initiative. For purposes of calculating overall scores for donors on each dimension, the raw values for each indicator are converted to standardized z-scores, with the means equal to zero and one standard deviation equal to one. The donor's score on each dimension is the simple average of the standardized z-scores, with each indicator given equal weight. In doing this transformation, we are benchmarking donors' scores relative to other donors and are not measuring the absolute level of performance.

### Box 2. The World Food Program and Agricultural Development

According to its mission statement, the World Food Program (WFP) uses food aid to promote food security with the objective of eradicating hunger and poverty. It focuses on refugees and emergencies, nutrition of the poorest, and food aid in support of economic and social development.\* So, WFP's mission has a lot to do with food security for the most vulnerable, but not necessarily much to do with development of the agricultural sector. As it turns out, WFP reports only three disbursements in 2009 under the CRS purpose code for the agricultural production sector (each worth less than \$100,000).

Box table 2.1 (end of document) shows the distribution of WFP's aid activities in 2009 as reported to the CRS database, with the number of activities in the top half and the value of the aid in each category in the bottom half. Just over half of its activities were recorded as protracted relief operations worth \$130 million out of a total of \$290 million. Another \$70 million went to emergencies, while WFP reported spending \$78

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>In Duran and Glassman (2012), the authors apply QuODA to the health sector and, given a larger sample size and a greater variety of sources, opt to include additional or different variables in some areas. Aid for health may also be different in a variety of ways from aid to a productive sector, like agriculture, so for all those reasons, we do not include comparisons to the health QuODA analysis.

million on activities identified as "development," about half of them for basic education and health (mostly nutrition). WFP also spent almost \$20 million on activities related to HIV/AIDS. Those activities might very well be related to agricultural productivity and development, but only indirectly.

The World Food Program is also a good example of how donor reporting can often be confusing and difficult to analyze. While there is a CRS purpose code for emergency responses, half of the \$94 million reported under that code is described as protracted relief operations (\$43 million) and roughly \$20 million in disbursements described as emergencies is reported under other sector codes, including education and health. Because WFP, like IFAD, does not record long project descriptions in CRS, there is no way to know how protracted relief operations in support of basic education differ from emergency operations reported under the same purpose code.

Overall, WFP's activities are qualitatively different from those of most other donors and it is not particularly surprising that the agency does not do well in the original QuODA rankings. In Box Figure 2.1, we compare the results for WFP and IFAD. Both institutions are below average on transparency and learning but, where IFAD is above average on maximizing efficiency and reducing burdens, WFP is at or below the mean. The measures of quality used here are simply not well-suited for an agency that spends much of its time and money in the most dire of situations and with a principal goal of saving lives now. The results for IFAD are discussed in more detail below.

\* The mission statement is available at <a href="http://www.wfp.org/about/mission-statement">http://www.wfp.org/about/mission-statement</a> (accessed April 1, 2012).

### Results

A priori, we have no particular expectations as to whether donors would do better or worse on these particular measures of aid quality when delivering agricultural aid, or, among donors, which ones would do well with agricultural aid. What we find is a fair amount of consistency, with average values for many of the indicators looking similar, overall, and with many of the same donors showing up at either the top or bottom of the rankings in both areas. As in overall QuODA, the multilateral institutions do well, with all five multilaterals analyzed here appearing in the top 10 on at least two of three dimensions in both the original and overall QuODA, as adapted, and four of the five doing that well in Ag QuODA. Among bilateral donors, Ireland generally does well on these measures of quality, despite being penalized by missing data on the reducing burden dimension, while the United Kingdom generally performs well, but less so on agriculture than overall. One of the biggest surprises is Switzerland, which is highly protective of its own agricultural sector and which is one of only three countries in original QuODA that scores in the bottom ten on all four

dimensions, yet it vaults to the top ten on two of the three dimensions of agricultural aid quality.

Before turning to the core results, it is worth considering how the missing data for several indicators affects our assessments of quality. In addition to not having data for any of the indicators in the fostering institutions dimension, we do not have data at the sectoral level on administrative costs in the maximizing efficiency dimension or on three indicators in the reducing burden dimension, relating to coordination of missions and of analytical work, and use of programmatic aid. The missing data does have substantial effects on the scores for some donors.

Table 5 shows the rankings for donors across all three approaches—original QuODA, adapted overall QuODA, and Ag QuODA, with donors arrayed in descending order of the sum of their ranks across all dimensions. <sup>12</sup> The absence of sectoral data for the fostering institutions dimension has particularly marked effects for two donors in terms of the overall ranking across dimensions (shown by donors' placement in each list, not by a number). Denmark, which is tops on that dimension in original QuODA, falls from sixth overall to eleventh in the summed ranking across dimensions in adapted overall QuODA; New Zealand, which does quite poorly on fostering institutions, rises to third in the adapted QuODA rankings. Denmark's ranking on the maximizing efficiency and reducing burdens dimensions are also affected by missing data, but in opposite directions so that there is little if any effect on its summed, overall ranking in adapted QuODA.

Other large changes in the ranks on particular dimensions that are attributable *in part* to missing data are highlighted (in yellow) in the middle part of the table 5, which shows the results for the adapted QuODA approach. For example, Sweden, which has relatively high administrative costs, moves from 21 on the original QuODA rankings for maximizing efficiency to 11 on the adapted QuODA rankings, while Australia, which is well above the mean in original QuODA on administrative costs, drops from 13 to 22. Similarly, Ireland drops from 3 to 17 and Italy rises from 21 to 9 on the reducing burdens dimension, in part, because it is well above average on the missing indicators, but at or below the mean on the four that remain. Italy is well below average on the three missing indicators. But it is not solely because of the missing data. Sweden also does better than Australia on the adapted indicator for high country programmable aid share, while Italy also does much better than Ireland in channeling its agricultural aid through multilateral institutions. The African Development Fund also appears to do significantly better in reducing burdens in the adapted overall QuODA, but that is also because it is below average on the three missing indicators, but also because it is well above average on two of the three that remain.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Because of differences in the software used, there are some minor differences in the rankings between original QuODA as it is calculated here and as it was published in Birdsall et al. (2012) because the latter uses Excel to calculate the standardized Z-scores where we use Stata. The effect is minimal on overall scores and rankings.

The rankings of almost half the donors are affected on at least one dimension (none on all three) but, as with Denmark, assessments of how donors are doing overall, across the dimensions, changes relatively little. The African Development Fund, for example, is in the top 10 on three of the four dimensions and just outside out in on reducing burdens in original QuODA. When we discuss the agriculture results in relation to the overall results below, we will be comparing apples to apples so that these data limitations are not the reason that some donors do better or worse in *agriculture* relative to overall ODA in the adapted methodology.

### Overall Patterns in the Quality of Agricultural Aid versus Overall Aid

Turning to the results on agriculture, we begin by exploring whether aid for agriculture looks systematically different than overall aid. Appendix table A.1 shows the mean values for the common indicators between overall adapted QuODA and agricultural QuODA, as well as the correlations between the two sets of average indicator values. The table shows relatively high correlations between indicators for overall and agricultural aid across all three dimensions, with thirteen of the eighteen indicators having correlation coefficients greater than 0.6. Only two indicators, which are not expected to be comparable because of differences in how they are calculated, have negative correlation coefficients.

With respect to maximizing efficiency, the comparisons do not suggest large differences in the quality of agricultural aid versus aid overall. On average, aid to agriculture is somewhat less likely to go to poor countries and slightly less likely to be directed towards well-governed countries. Agricultural aid, however, is more focused by recipient country and, while donors have not yet met the Paris Declaration target of untying 89 percent of aid overall, they have met it in agriculture, with 92 percent of aid untied in 2010. The flipside of the finding that donors are more focused in their allocations agricultural aid across recipients is that donors also tend to impose lower administrative burdens on recipient countries by engaging in more quantitatively significant aid relationships with recipients of agricultural ODA than for ODA overall. Agricultural aid is also less fragmented across donor agencies, though by less than one might expect. Also somewhat surprisingly, the median size of agricultural projects tends to be a bit larger than with aid projects overall.

Not surprisingly, the results on transparency and learning are broadly similar. Several of the indicators on the transparency and learning dimension cannot be differentiated by sector and we assume that the impact, for example of the "quality of evaluation policy," is the same across sectors (table 3 shows that for most donors, the major aid agency for overall aid is also the major agency delivering agricultural aid). The major difference is on the indicator for

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Because of the way "share of allocation to poor countries" and "share of allocation to well-governed countries" are constructed, higher values indicate lower quality.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> As calculated from the CRS database.

project-level reporting, which appears to be more complete for agricultural aid than for ODA overall.

### The Quality of Agricultural Aid

While the top performers tend to be the same across the versions of QuODA considered here, there is somewhat more heterogeneity across the three dimensions in agriculture, and all donors have ample scope to improve. In agriculture, 19 of 28 donors are in the top ten on at least one dimension of aid quality, more than for original QuODA (17 of 31), but none are in the top ten on all three dimensions, compared to three in the top 10 on all dimensions in original QuODA (see table 5). Just one donor is in the bottom ten on all three dimensions, versus three in original QuODA, with Greece falling there in both cases. That all donors can do better on at least one dimension of aid quality is underscored by the fact that 24 of 28 have at least a 10 point differential in their rankings across the three dimensions in Ag QuODA. Three of remaining four donors—France, Greece, and South Korea—are all in the bottom tier and need across-the-board improvements.

Figure 2 shows the ranking of donors on each dimension of quality of agricultural aid. Multilateral donors do particularly well at reducing the aid burden on recipient countries, taking five of the top seven slots on that dimension. The multilaterals are not quite as clustered at the top on the maximizing efficiency dimension, though all but the EU-based agencies are above the mean, and their performance on the transparency and learning dimension is even more mixed. IDA does worse in maximizing efficiency with its agricultural aid because the allocation is less focused with respect to recipient countries and slightly less pro-poor. The African Development Fund consistently does well on maximizing efficiency, but, as noted above, we confront data problems in assessing its aid quality overall. It tops the rankings for reducing burdens in Ag QuODA, but that is at least partly due to the fact that the three indicators on which it does poorly are dropped. Yet it does well on fostering institutions in original QuODA and it could easily do much better on transparency and learning if it reported as fully on agriculture as it does overall. IFAD, the only agriculture-focused donor agency in the analysis, does slightly less well with agriculture-focused aid (as defined here) than with all ODA, a result that is discussed further in box 3.

Among bilateral donors, Ireland consistently does well, while the United Kingdom does well, but less so with agricultural aid than overall. Ireland is tied with IDA for the overall best ranking in agriculture, despite being penalized on the reducing burdens dimension because of the lack of data. The United Kingdom consistently does well on transparency and learning, but in the agricultural sector it drops several slots on the maximizing efficiency dimension because less of its aid goes to well-governed countries and a relatively large share of its agricultural aid is provided as technical cooperation, giving it a low score on the share of country programmable aid indicator.

### Box 3. Results for the International Fund for Agricultural Development

Since IFAD is the only agriculture-focused donor agency in our analysis, it is worth a more focused look. In all three iterations of QuODA presented in table 5, IFAD does well on maximizing efficiency and reducing burdens, but it does far less well on fostering institutions (in original overall QuODA) and transparency and learning. The results are similar for agriculture, though the agency drops a bit on the maximizing efficiency dimension because it is less specialized by recipient country in the agricultural production sector than overall. In addition, IFAD does less well in *relative* terms on country specialization and focus while other bilateral donors do better when aid is narrowed to just the agricultural sector. Looking at the raw indicator values, IFAD's score is 0.96 overall and 0.88 in agriculture, while the average value for all other donors rose from 0.83 to 0.90 (appendix table A.2).

Another reason that IFAD does not do as well on these measures of aid quality in agriculture as one might expect could be that we are not including all of its aid activities, even though the short project descriptions provided indicate that most are related to agricultural or rural development. To check that possibility, we recalculated everything including IFAD's activities in all sectors, not just agricultural production as defined by CRS, and it makes very little difference. IFAD's overall ranking is the same, though it does slightly worse on maximizing efficiency and better on reducing burden, mainly because it has a higher median project size when all its projects are assessed.

On transparency and learning, IFAD scores above the average on three indicators, but its rank among donors is low both overall and for the agricultural sector because it because it does not provide title and long project descriptions to CRS. IFAD does somewhat worse in the adapted overall agricultural QuODA iterations because we stick with CRS reporting on this indicator, rather than using a nongovernmental source that fills in missing data from other sources (AidData). While CRS does not require multilateral donors to report this information, and while IFAD does provide extensive project information on its own website, other multilateral donors do voluntarily report much of this information and, it is useful for transparency to have it consistently in one place. IFAD could easily raise its rank on the dimension with just a little extra effort in reporting to the CRS (see box figure 3.1).

Switzerland makes the most striking improvements, moving from the bottom half on all dimensions on overall aid quality, to top ten rankings on maximizing efficiency and reducing burdens. On the first dimension, Switzerland does better on focusing its aid on particular countries (ME5) and it gets high marks for its contributions to CGIAR (ME7) (see figure 3). Switzerland also does better on all parts of reducing burdens with its agricultural aid and it is above the mean on the indicators for more significant aid relationships (RB1) and lower

fragmentation across agencies (RB2). By comparison, Finland has a mixed performance in agriculture, doing better on maximizing efficiency through better country allocations (ME2, ME5), but worse on reducing burdens, mainly because it channels relatively little of its sectoral aid through multilaterals (RB4) (figure 4).<sup>15</sup>

Among other notable results in agriculture, Japan does surprisingly poorly on maximizing efficiency. It is the top performing bilateral donor on this dimension in original QuODA (fourth in adapted QuODA), but falls to 26 of 28 in Ag QuODA because of a subpar performance on strict CPA share, specialization by recipient country, and contributions to public goods. Norway, by contrast, does far better in maximizing efficiency in agricultural aid by allocating relatively more of it to poorer and, especially, well-governed countries. Canada, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands do markedly better on reducing burdens for recipient countries, while Denmark does worse. At the other end of the spectrum, with the exception of Switzerland, countries at the bottom of the overall ranking tend to do poorly in all dimensions and across all three QuODA measures. Of those in the bottom ten on the overall ranking across the dimensions, only five fall in the top half on any dimension in the agricultural analysis—Germany, Japan, and the United States on transparency and learning, Australia on reducing burdens, and Belgium on maximizing efficiency.

Figure 5 provides a snapshot of how donors do overall in agriculture, and how the quality of aid in this sector compares to the quality of ODA overall (comparing it to original QuODA on the three common dimensions). The scatter plot shows that thirteen donors are above the 45 degree line, indicating that they do better on Ag QuODA than on original QuODA, led by Switzerland and several other small, northern European countries. <sup>16</sup> Portugal has the biggest drop in quality in agricultural aid, compared to overall aid, but recall that it provides only a tiny amount of agricultural aid. And, as noted above, while the multilateral donors do well, they are all below the line, meaning that they do relatively worse in agriculture. But most donors cluster fairly close to the line, which is not surprising if we recall that the lead agency in each donor country is generally providing both agricultural and most other aid (table 3).

### Conclusions

The most important point to reiterate is that the measures of aid quality analyzed here are *not* direct measures of aid effectiveness or development impact. As discussed in more detail in the original QuODA reports, these measures of quality are thought to be associated with more effective aid, but more and better independent impact evaluations are needed to truly understand what works under what conditions. Moreover, even as proxies, these quality measures suffer from incomplete and inconsistent reporting by donors, though there is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> See table 4 for indicator names.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> For a more intuitive visual in figure 5, we inverted the rankings so that higher numbers indicate better quality.

progress, both in the reporting to the Creditor Reporting System and in the growing commitment to harmonized reporting standards under the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI). We endorse the recommendations from the second QuODA report to improve the data used for quality assessments, including by continuing to improve the consistency and comparability of the data reported to CRS and DAC, especially by multilateral institutions, and to develop new indicators for reporting on results-based aid (Birdsall et al. 2012, p. vii).

Focusing on agriculture specifically, having no or only partial data for fostering institutions is a significant weakness of trying to apply QuODA at the sectoral level as we believe this is an important dimension of aid quality. The improvements being implemented by the Creditor Reporting System should be helpful in continuing to refine and improve the overall QuODA methodology, but they provide only a little help at the sectoral level. Finally, given the relatively small size of agricultural aid, there is likely to be more bang for the buck by focusing resources on independently evaluating the *actual* impact of those aid dollars.

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### Appendix A: Adaptations to the QuODA Methodology

In adapting QuODA to reflect both substantive differences and data availability in agriculture, we had to modify a number of variables. One key difference is in the types of aid being examined. Original QuODA uses overall ODA for some indicators, and "country programmable aid" (CPA), aid that is available at the country level for development projects and programs, for others. For DAC purposes, CPA is defined by the exclusion of items such as humanitarian aid, administrative costs, and funds for promotion of development awareness (Birdsall et al. 2012, p. 3). It turns out that many of the elements excluded from ODA for purposes of the CPA definition are reported under separate purpose codes and do not appear at all in the agricultural sector data. Therefore, with one small exception, we are working with country programmable aid in all cases, rather than ODA.<sup>17</sup>

The CPA versus ODA distinction generally does not make much difference when we calculate the indicators, because it generally affects both the numerator and denominator, but there is one exception. In the maximizing efficiency dimension, the original QuODA gives credit to donors that provide a high share of ODA as country programmable aid. For purposes of this indicator, the QuODA methodology uses a definition of strict CPA that also excludes interest receipts and funding for technical cooperation from gross CPA (as defined above). Since gross CPA is on average only about half of overall ODA, our estimates of the strict CPA share (ME4) for agriculture, which effectively has gross CPA rather than ODA as the denominator, tended to be much higher than those in the original. To ensure we are comparing apples to apples when we get to the results, we recalculated the overall QuODA indicator to also be strict CPA over gross CPA. This means that donors that provide a relatively large share of sectoral aid in the form of technical cooperation may look relatively worse in Ag QuODA because that is the quantitatively most important difference between strict and gross CPA in our calculation. Secondly, donors that do well in original QuODA on this indicator may also find themselves doing relatively less well in Ag QuODA because the denominator is smaller. For example a donor could have a small CPA share in total ODA, but a large percentage of that share might be strict CPA, earning that donor a high score in Ag QuODA, but a low score in overall QuODA.

Also in the maximizing efficiency dimension, we had to adapt the indicator for support of global public good facilities. Overall QuODA includes eleven facilities contributing to global public goods across a range of areas and calculates the contributions to those facilities as a share of total ODA for this indicator. We include only contributions to the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) when calculating this indicator.

In the reducing burden dimension, we modify two indicators to reflect differences at the sectoral level. First, for the indicator on median project size, a proxy for relative

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>We found only one instance of aid in the agriculture sector that would fall under one of the CPA exclusions, \$12 million in equity investments by Norway.

administrative costs associated with projects, we lower the cutoff for small projects from \$250,000 to \$10,000 and, for consistency, we do the same for overall QuODA for our apples to apples comparisons. We do that because, as shown on the left-hand side of appendix figure A.1, retaining the higher QuODA cutoff would mean that we would lose three-fourths of all projects in the agricultural sector and some donors would have only one or a handful of projects remaining.

Second in reducing burdens, the fourth indicator on this dimension gives donors credit for contributions to multilaterals, which is measured as the share of ODA that is allocated to core support of multilaterals. Since core support is not relevant at the sectoral level, Ag QuODA gives credit to donors that channel sectoral aid through multilateral institutions because it could have some benefit in reducing the burden that recipients bear. It is measured simply as the share of sectoral aid that is reported as being channeled through a multilateral institution.

In the transparency and learning dimension, we are able to use all eight of the indicators, but two of them—the detail of project descriptions (TLA) and the completeness of project level commitment data (TL6)—use different data sources. The first indicator confronts the problem that the different reporting requirements for multilaterals creates discrepancies in the CRS data, with some institutions reporting this information and others, such as IFAD, choosing not to do so. Some bilaterals also do not report as fully to the CRS as they do on their websites, though the differences tend to be less pronounced. Some of the multilaterals also do not fully report project titles, short descriptions and long descriptions to the CRS. Only in the case of detail of project descriptions (TL4) does the original QuODA analysis use an alternative—the AidData database, instead of CRS. AidData uses agency annual reports and other sources to supplement the CRS data for agencies that do not report to CRS. We decided to stick with CRS data for both TL3, on the reporting of project titles and descriptions, and TL4, on the detail of project descriptions, because doing seems more consistent and CRS data are available earlier in the year. In addition, some multilateral institutions do report this information, and it is easier for users if data are reported consistently in one place by all donors, multilateral or bilateral. Thus, the original and agricultural QuODAs are similar with respect to TL3, but use different sources for TL4, the detail of long project descriptions. For purposes of comparing apples to apples, however, we adapted the overall QuODA indicator to match our approach.

Finally, the indicator for "completeness of project level commitment data" assesses what share of aggregate aid commitments reported to DAC are also reported at the project activity level to CRS, as donors have promised to do. Overall QuODA obtains the total commitment data from DAC table 3a, which does not include commitments by sector. Sectoral commitments are nominally reported in DAC table 5, which is what we use to compare to commitments as reported to CRS, but some donors report disbursements instead. Although we are careful to compare apples to apples—using disbursements from

CRS for donors that report disbursements rather than commitments for table 5, this indicator is still not strictly comparable with what is calculated in overall QuODA.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> The following bilateral donors reported disbursements for table 5 in 2009: Australia, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

Table 1 Official Development Assistance by Sector and Selected Subsector, 2010

	Commitments (million dollars)	Share of total ODA (percent)	Average annual growth, 2005-2010
I. SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE & SERVICES	64,325	38.7	4.9
I.1. Education	13,412	8.1	3.9
I.2. Health	9,850	5.9	9.5
I.3. Population Policy and Progress, and Reproductive Health	9,774	5.9	18.0
II. ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES	29,020	17.5	7.4
III. PRODUCTION SECTORS	13,409	8.1	7.1
III.1.a. Agriculture	8,395	5.1	12.5
IV. MULTISECTOR / CROSS-CUTTING	21,038	12.7	7.1
IV.1. General Environment Protection	6,698	4.0	25.9
IV.2. Other Multisector	14,340	8.6	17.9
VI.1. General Budget Support	4,985	3.0	13.7
VI.2. Dev. Food Aid/Food Security Ass.	1,680	1.0	1.9
V. TOTAL SECTOR ALLOCABLE (I+II+III+IV)	127,792	76.9	18.9
VI. COMMODITY AID / GENERAL PROG. ASS.	6,935	4.2	7.5
VII. ACTION RELATING TO DEBT	5,943	3.6	30.4
VIII. HUMANITARIAN AID	13,373	8.0	12.0
XII. UNALLOCATED/UNSPECIFIED	12,173	7.3	1.7
TOTAL ODA	166,216	100.0	5.9

Source: OECD, DAC Table 5.

Table 2 Agricultural ODA by Subsector, 2009

Purpose code		Number of activities	Disbursements (million dollars)
31110	Agricultural policy, and administrative management	2441	1029
31120	Agricultural development	2668	1042
31130	Agricultural land resources	527	211
31140	Agricultural water resources	882	810
31150	Agricultural inputs	175	105
31161	Food crop production	859	559
31162	Industrial crops/export crops	289	78
31163	Livestock	556	136
31164	Agrarian reform	57	15
31165	Agricultural alternative development	227	484
31166	Agricultural extension	569	232
31181	Agricultural education/training	586	106
31182	Agricultural research	703	152
31191	Agricultural services	418	222
31192	Plant/post-harvest protection and pest control	106	14
31193	Agricultural financial services	212	82
31194	Agricultural co-operatives	395	49
31195	Livestock/veterinary services	198	83
32161	Agro-industries	505	105

Source: OECD, Creditor Reporting System.

Table 3 Agricultural Aid Activities by Donor, 2009

						Share of agricultural
		Agricultural		Number of		agricultural
		aid as		agencies		disbursed
	Disbursements	share of	Number	with	Number of	by primary
D	(million	total aid	of	agricultural	agricultural	aid agency
Donor	dollars)	(percent)	recipients	activities	activities	(percent)
Austria	13.4	3.4	43	5	108	55.1
Belgium	108.9	10.3	57	6	509	91.6
Denmark	73.7	6.5	28	1	99	100.0
France	144.7	2.0	83	5	341	45.1
Germany	202.7	2.9	96	5	918	89.8
Italy	33.3	3.6	75	4	320	75.7
Netherlands	89.0	4.0	28	1	84	100.0
Norway	70.4	4.0	48	4	145	16.8
Portugal .	4.2	1.4	8	3	22	22.8
Sweden	55.6	3.0	18	1	89	100.0
Switzerland	60.7	5.4	51	1	261	100.0
United Kingdom	80.1	1.5	23	3	66	98.8
Finland	17.5	3.1	30	1	63	100.0
Ireland	52.4	9.2	33	1	171	100.0
Luxembourg	11.9	5.1	24	1	81	100.0
Greece	3.8	1.6	17	4	26	10.7
Spain	171.1	4.3	77	8	875	52.9
Canada	150.3	5.5	115	4	1,987	96.0
USA	943.4	4.6	90	9	1,367	77.6
Japan	557.2	4.9	131	5	1,234	76.8
Korea	38.4	7.0	49	3	247	49.1
Australia	64.4	3.5	57	1	623	100.0
New Zealand	4.1	2.1	17	1	36	100.0
IDA	1,397.8	10.9	92	1	1,371	100.0
IDB Special	25.2	4.3	25	1	187	100.0
AfDF	244.3	8.1	30	1	133	100.0
EC	593.1	5.0	109	2	889	76.5
IFAD	314.6	55.3	30	1	121	100.0
Total	5,514.7	5.4		83	12,373	

Source: OECD, Creditor Reporting System.

Table 4 QuODA Indicators Adapted for Ag QuODA

Dimension	Indicators included in Ag QuODA	Indicators excluded from Ag QuODA or modified (in italics)
	Share of allocation to poor countries (ME1)	
	Share of allocation to well-governed countries (ME2)	
		Low administrative unit costs (ME3)
Maximizing Efficiency	High country programmable aid share (ME4)	Calculated as strict CPA over gross CPA, rather than strict CPA over gross ODA for both Ag QuODA, adapted overall QuODA
•	Focus/Specialization by recipient country (ME5)	
		Focus/Specialization by sector (ME6)
	Support of select public good facilities (ME7)	CGIAR only for Ag QuODA
	Share of untied aid (ME8)	
		Share of aid to recipients' top development priorities  Avoidance of Project implementation units
		Share of aid recorded in recipient budgets
Fostering Institutions		Share of aid to partners with good operational strategies  Use of recipient country systems
		Coordination of technical cooperation
		Share of scheduled aid recorded as received by recipients Coverage of forward spending plans/Aid
	Significance of aid relationships (RB1)	predictability
	Fragmentations across donor agencies (RB2)	
	Median project size (RB3)	Cut-off for small activities is \$10,000, rather than \$250,000 for both Ag QuODA, adapted overall QuODA
Reducing Burden	Contribution to multilaterals (RB4)	Aid channeled through multilaterals for Ag QuODA Coordinated missions (RB5)
		Coordinated missions (RB3)  Coordinated analytical work (RB6)
		Use of programmatic aid (RB7)
	Member of IATI (TL1)	ose of programmatic and (ND7)
	Implementation of IATI standards (TL2)	
	Recording of project title and descriptions (TL3)	
	Detail of project level description (TL4)	Uses CRS rather than Aid Data as source for both
<b>-</b>		Ag QuODA, adapted overall QuODA
Transparency and Learning	Reporting of aid delivery channel (TL5)	
g	Completeness of project-level commitment data (TL6)	Some donors report disbursements rather than commitments at the sectoral level in DAC table 5 for sectoral aggregates
	Quality of evaluation policy (TL7)	
	Aid to partners with good monitoring and evaluation frameworks (TL8)	

**Table 5 Rankings by QuODA Methodology** 

Original QuODA					Adapted QuODA	A rankings		Agriculture QuODA rankings					
Donor	ME	FI	RB	TL	Donor	ME	RB	TL	Donor	ME	RB	TL	
IDA	4	3	2	1	IDA	5	3	1	IDA	13	2	4	
Ireland	6	2	3	6	AfDF	1	2	8	Ireland	1	17	1	
AfDF	1	4	12	5	NZ	9	1	10	Sweden	8	13	2	
UK	8	8	8	4	UK	7	11	4	AfDF	2	1	23	
EC	10	14	10	2	EC	18	5	2	IDB Special	5	7	15	
Denmark	14	1	5	20	Ireland	3	17	6	UK	15	14	3	
Sweden	21	6	9	7	IDB Special	2	7	18	Netherlands New	12	8	14	
Finland	16	10	15	3	Finland	14	13	3	Zealand	11	3	20	
IFAD	2	19	6	18	Sweden	11	14	5	Switzerland	3	10	21	
Japan	5	7	20	14	IFAD	4	4	25	Austria	19	9	7	
IDB Special	3	26	1	19	Denmark	6	12	19	Norway	6	21	8	
NZ	9	24	4	13	Portugal	12	6	23	Canada	20	11	5	
Canada	15	12	17	9	Australia	22	8	12	Denmark EU	4	22	13	
Australia	13	17	16	10	Japan	8	20	14	Institutions	18	4	17	
Portugal	7	18	7	24	Netherlands	13	15	16	IFAD	9	5	26	
Netherlands	22	11	11	16	Italy	17	9	26	Finland	7	25	10	
Norway	19	16	24	11	Luxembourg	10	16	27	Luxembourg	10	6	28	
Germany	25	13	18	15	Norway	19	25	9	Spain	22	18	9	
Spain	23	21	19	12	Canada	23	21	11	Germany	25	19	6	
Korea	17	15	27	17	Austria	26	10	21	Australia	24	12	16	
France	11	22	22	25	Spain	21	23	13	Japan	26	16	12	
Luxembourg	12	29	14	27	France	16	18	24	USA	21	26	11	
Italy	20	20	21	26	USA	25	28	7	Belgium	14	20	27	
Austria	28	25	13	22	Switzerland	15	26	20	Greece	23	23	19	
USA	26	27	28	8	Germany	27	22	15	Italy	28	15	22	
Belgium	18	23	25	28	Belgium	20	19	28	France	17	24	25	
Switzerland	24	28	26	21	Korea	24	27	17	Portugal	16	28	24	
Greece	27	31	23	23	Greece	28	24	22	Korea	27	27	18	

NB: ME = maximizing efficiency; RB = reducing burdens; TL = transparency and learning; yellow highlighting = countries that move up or down more than 5 slots due to missing data.




Figure 2 Ranking of Donors on Ag QuODA by Dimension




Figure 3 Sources of Switzerland's Higher Quality of Agricultural Aid






Figure 4 Finland Maximizing Efficiency and Reducing Burden



NB: For indicator names, see table 4.



NB: To make the presentation of the data more intuitive, we inverted the rankings on each dimension so that higher numbers indicate higher quality. Specifically, for each donor, we subtracted their rank on each dimension from 29 and summed the results for the three dimensions that original and Ag QuODA have in common.

**Box Table 1.1 Donor Use of Program-Based Approaches and Budget Support** 

	Pro	gram Based	Aid (Percent)		Budget Support ODA (Percent)							
	Share	of All Ag										
		Activities	Share of Al	l Ag ODA	Share of All A	g Activities	Share of All Ag OD					
	2009	2010	2009	2010	2009	2010	2009	2010				
			40.4	46.0			40.4					
Austria	0.9	4.5	10.4	16.3	0.9	1.8	10.4	6.0				
Belgium	2.8	2.3	12.2	10.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0				
Denmark	56.6	31.7	84.3	60.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0				
France	0.0	8.5	0.0	2.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0				
Germany	0.0	1.6	0.0	13.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0				
Italy	32.5	0.0	40.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0				
Netherlands	7.1	7.3	23.1	5.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0				
Norway	60.7	0.0	71.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0				
Portugal	0.0	20.0	0.0	40.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0				
Sweden	11.2	15.9	15.3	20.5	0.0	1.6	0.0	10.6				
Switzerland	1.1	0.0	3.8	0.0	0.0	1.4	0.0	4.3				
United Kingdom	0.0	4.6	0.0	14.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0				
Finland	3.2	11.3	18.8	51.7	0.0	1.3	0.0	37.9				
Ireland	5.3	86.0	20.2	88.2	0.0	0.7	0.0	12.5				
Luxembourg	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0				
Greece	15.4	0.0	31.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0				
Spain	10.5	8.4	32.4	27.9	0.0	0.1	0.0	1.0				
Canada	6.1	8.7	34.4	15.2	1.5	2.2	22.0	7.0				
USA	3.0	2.5	14.8	19.1	3.0	2.5	14.8	19.1				
Japan	3.8	0.3	11.5	0.0	0.4	0.4	1.0	0.0				
Korea	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0				
Australia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	1.0				
New Zealand	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0				
IDA	6.1	9.0	15.8	12.3	0.0	9.0	0.0	12.3				
IDB Special	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0				
AfDF	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.0	8.0				
EC	3.6	15.8	11.0	30.8	0.0	1.2	0.0	16.5				
IFAD	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0				

Source: OECD, Creditor Reporting System.


**Box Table 2.1 WFP Grants Reported to CRS, 2009** 


**Number of Activities** Emergency Protracted Special Development Total Purpose Code Operations relief **Basic Education** Health/Nutrition Population and Reproductive Health (includes HIV/AIDS) Public sector mgmt. Social mitigation, HIV/AIDS Road transport Agriculture Forestry Administrative costs **Food Security** Emergency response Reconstruction, Relief, Rehabilitation **Disaster Prevention** Total 

	Millions of Dollars											
		Protracted	Special									
Purpose Code	Emergency	relief	Operations	Development	Total							
Basic Education	5	9	0	24	37							
Health/Nutrition	9	6	0	15	30							
Population and Reproductive												
Health (includes HIV/AIDS)	0.1	7	0	3	10							
Public sector mgmt.	0.04	0.4	0.2	2	3							
Social mitigation, HIV/AIDS	0.1	6	0	2	8							
Road transport	0	negl.	0	0								
Agriculture	0	0.1	0	negl.								
Forestry	0	0	0	negl.								
Administrative costs	0	0	0	0	11							
Food Security	0	49	0	23	72							
Emergency response	50	43	1	0	94							
Reconstruction, Relief,												
Rehabilitation	0.4	2	0.03	1	4							
Disaster Prevention	7	7	negl.	7	21							
Total	72	130	1	77	290							

Source: OECD, CRS Database.

Box Figure 2.1 Aid Quality Diamond from Overall QuODA for IFAD and World Food Program





Appendix Table A.1 Means and Correlations for Indicator Values for Ag QuODA and Adapted Overall QuODA


Maximizing Efficiency		Agricultural QuODA mean	Overall QuODA mean	Correlation
Share of allocation to poor countries (log)	ME1	7.69	7.08	0.68
Share of allocation to well-governed countries	ME2	70.38	67.82	0.39
High country programmable aid share	ME4	0.69	0.66	0.86
Focus/Specialization by recipient country	ME5	0.90	0.83	0.65
Support of select global public good facilities	ME7	0.01	0.07	-0.21
Share of untied aid	ME8	0.92	0.85	0.65

Reducing Burden		Agricultural QuODA mean	Overall QuODA mean	Correlation
Significance of aid relationships (log)	RB1	3.12	0.63	0.65
Fragmentation across donor agencies	RB2	0.80	0.73	0.87
Median Project Size (log)	RB3	0.60	0.57	0.97
Contribution to multilaterals	RB4	0.14	0.33	0.20

		Agricultural QuODA	Overall QuODA	
Transparency and Learning		mean	mean	Correlation
Member of IATI	TL1	0.68	0.68	1.00
Implementation of IATA	TL2	0.39	0.39	1.00
Recording of project title and descriptions	TL3	0.90	0.91	0.97
Detail of project description (log)	TL4	3.93	4.00	0.95
Reporting of aid delivery channel	TL5	0.85	0.87	0.86
Completeness of project-level commitment data	TL6	0.12	0.39	-0.11
Quality of Evaluation policy	TL7	1.36	1.36	1.00
Aid to partners with good M&E frameworks	TL8	0.55	0.56	0.76

NB: For ME1, ME2, and TL6, a lower score indicates higher quality.

Appendix Figure A.1 Breakdown of Agricultural Projects by Project Size



Source: OECD, Creditor Reporting System.

**Appendix Table A.2 Agricultural QuODA Scores** 

Appendix Table A	A.Z Ag	ricuitt	arai Qi	UODA	Scores	•												
	Share of allocation to poor countries	Share of allocation to well- governed countries	High strict programmable aid share	Focus/Specialization by recipient country	Support of select global public good facilities	Share of untied aid	Significance of aid relationships (log)	Fragmentation across donor agencies	Median Project Size (log)	Contribution to multilaterals	Member of IATI	Implementation of IATI data reporting standards	Recording of project title and descriptions	Detail of project description (log)	Reporting of aid delivery channel	Completeness of project-level commitment data	Quality of evaluation policy	Aid to partners with good M&E frameworks
Donor	ME1	ME2	ME4	ME 5	ME7	ME8	RB1	RB2	RB3	RB4	TL1	TL2	TL3	TL4	TL5	TL6	TL7	TL8
Austria	7.68	66.40	0.39	0.87	0.01	0.91	3.91	0.46	0.06	0.47	0.00	0.00	1.00	4.54	0.86	0.00	2.00	0.75
Belgium	7.31	70.04	0.23	0.90	0.01	1.00	2.26	0.84	0.10	0.13	0.00	0.00	0.67	0.00	1.00	0.01	0.50	0.53
Denmark	7.26	67.13	0.93	0.94	0.01	0.99	1.49	1.00	0.75	0.02	1.00	1.00	0.97	5.02	0.08	0.00	2.00	0.55
France	7.76	62.49	0.44	0.91	0.00	0.98	4.59	0.37	0.17	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.86	4.37	0.95	0.48	0.50	0.60
Germany	7.92	66.12	0.41	0.76	0.00	0.89	3.37	0.81	0.18	0.03	1.00	0.00	1.00	4.56	0.99	0.12	1.00	0.69
Italy	8.13	65.90	0.85	0.85	0.01	0.16	4.28	0.60	0.03	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.91	4.47	0.98	0.00	0.00	0.60
Netherlands	7.64	75.36	0.91	0.92	0.01	1.00	2.65	1.00	1.08	0.24	1.00	1.00	1.00	4.37	0.85	0.28	0.50	0.57
Norway	7.24	68.63	0.91	0.85	0.01	1.00	2.33	0.68	0.14	0.19	1.00	0.00	1.00	5.22	0.79	0.09	2.00	0.56
Portugal	7.46	70.44	0.33	1.00	0.00	1.00	2.05	0.53	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	4.31	1.00	0.08	0.50	0.28
Sweden	7.84	68.97	0.95	0.91	0.01	1.00	2.99	1.00	0.86	0.10	1.00	1.00	0.85	4.75	0.76	0.11	2.00	0.69
Switzerland	7.58	71.84	0.78	0.95	0.02	1.00	3.98	1.00	0.28	0.12	1.00	1.00	0.67	1.23	0.88	0.21	2.00	0.48
United Kingdom	6.99	83.66	0.58	0.97	0.01	1.00	2.06	0.98	0.24	0.19	1.00	1.00	0.99	4.94	0.99	0.25	2.00	0.53
Finland	7.60	64.61	0.45	0.95	0.01	0.99	1.64	1.00	0.09	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	5.12	0.56	0.29	2.00	0.52
Ireland	6.99	71.44	0.95	0.95	0.02	1.00	1.75	1.00	0.25	0.12	1.00	0.00	1.00	5.50	1.00	0.05	2.00	0.68
Luxembourg	7.67	68.69	1.00	0.87	0.00	1.00	4.11	1.00	0.07	0.25	0.00	0.00	0.67	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.58
Greece	8.27	64.93	0.44	0.98	0.00	0.77	1.71	0.38	0.10	0.34	0.00	0.00	1.00	5.20	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.60
Spain	8.21	68.63	0.77	0.90	0.00	0.86	3.63	0.42	0.16	0.21	1.00	1.00	0.96	4.78	0.90	0.04	0.50	0.47
Canada	7.50	69.35	0.29	0.78	0.02	0.90	2.99	0.92	0.09	0.30	1.00	0.00	0.88	5.25	0.82	0.01	2.00	0.60
USA	7.65	79.38	0.99	0.85	0.00	0.93	2.77	0.63	0.18	0.03	1.00	0.00	1.00	5.21	0.51	0.05	2.50	0.53
Japan	8.09	69.36	0.47	0.77	0.00	1.00	3.97	0.63	0.49	0.04	0.00	0.00	1.00	3.42	0.96	0.02	2.00	0.68
Korea	8.20	77.47	0.82	0.96	0.00	0.49	3.13	0.46	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	4.55	0.97	0.01	1.00	0.61
Australia	7.81	78.17	0.25	0.90	0.01	1.00	3.95	1.00	0.12	0.12	1.00	1.00	0.89	4.55	0.80	0.13	1.50	0.36
New Zealand	7.87	74.48	0.59	0.98	0.01	0.98	6.21	1.00	0.08	0.21	1.00	1.00	0.93	4.42	0.83	0.25	1.00	0.30
IDA	7.38	72.89	0.90	0.82		1.00	2.47	1.00	3.04		1.00	1.00	1.00	5.50		0.43	1.00	0.77
IDB Special	8.83	60.06	1.00	1.00		1.00	4.00	1.00	0.32		1.00	0.00	1.00	3.90		0.00	1.50	0.45
AfDF	7.07	71.23	0.96	0.98		1.00	2.82	1.00	3.18		1.00	0.00	0.67	0.00		0.00	2.00	0.59
EU Institutions	7.72	69.79	0.86	0.84		0.82	3.86	0.64	2.47		1.00	1.00	1.00	4.80		0.57	2.00	0.46
IFAD	7.58	73.17	1.00	0.88		1.00	2.46	1.00	2.18		1.00	0.00	0.33	0.00		0.00	2.00	0.51

Note: For ME1, ME2 and TL6 a lower score signifies better performance in the indicator

Appendix Table A.3 Adapted Overall QuODA Scores

Appendix Table 2	Share of allocation to poor countries	Share of allocation to well- governed countries	High strict programmable aid share	Focus/Specialization by recipient country	Support of select global public good facilities	Share of untied aid	Significance of aid relationships (log)	Fragmentation across donor agencies	Median Project Size (log)	Contribution to multilaterals	Member of IATI	Implementation of IATI data reporting standards	Recording of project title and descriptions	Detail of project description (log)	Reporting of aid delivery channel	Completeness of project-level commitment data	Quality of Evaluation policy	Aid to partners with good M&E frameworks
Donor	ME1	ME2	ME4	ME 5	ME7	ME8	RB1	RB2	RB3	RB4	TL1	TL2	TL3	TL4	TL5	TL6	TL7	TL8
Austria	7.51	62.39	0.07	0.86	0.07	0.48	1.07	0.32	0.06	0.55	0.00	0.00	1.00	4.43	0.72	0.67	2.00	0.63
Belgium	6.72	73.02	0.41	0.81	0.05	0.96	0.12	0.79	0.11	0.38	0.00	0.00	0.67	0.06	0.97	0.56	0.50	0.53
Denmark	6.69	65.19	0.97	0.85	0.03	0.96	0.20	1.00	0.55	0.32	1.00	1.00	0.97	4.80	0.21	0.51	2.00	0.63
France	7.59	51.91	0.29	0.79	0.06	0.88	1.08	0.31	0.19	0.40	0.00	0.00	0.77	4.00	0.89	0.45	0.50	0.59
Germany	7.49	65.79	0.22	0.63	0.06	0.72	0.43	0.49	0.12	0.37	1.00	0.00	1.00	4.45	0.94	0.51	1.00	0.64
Italy	7.11	69.78	0.85	0.77	0.15	0.55	0.37	0.35	0.05	0.70	0.00	0.00	0.88	4.43	0.79	0.74	0.00	0.62
Netherlands	6.97	66.88	0.92	0.79	0.03	0.98	0.56	1.00	0.28	0.25	1.00	1.00	0.97	4.07	0.89	0.62	0.50	0.58
Norway	6.82	72.71	0.83	0.77	0.03	1.00	0.15	0.70	0.16	0.22	1.00	0.00	1.00	5.07	0.92	0.62	2.00	0.62
Portugal	7.26	61.75	0.37	0.92	0.12	0.60	1.30	0.76	0.05	0.43	0.00	0.00	1.00	4.51	1.00	0.47	0.50	0.34
Sweden	6.84	70.47	0.94	0.83	0.04	0.98	0.31	0.92	0.33	0.34	1.00	1.00	0.91	4.78	0.92	0.58	2.00	0.66
Switzerland	6.93	69.39	0.83	0.74	0.06	0.99	0.16	0.53	0.17	0.24	1.00	1.00	0.69	2.16	0.89	0.66	2.00	0.58
United Kingdom	6.76	73.26	0.87	0.85	0.10	1.00	0.73	0.86	0.11	0.34	1.00	1.00	1.00	4.57	0.97	0.48	2.00	0.67
Finland	6.78	67.23	0.41	0.83	0.05	0.92	0.05	0.98	0.30	0.39	1.00	1.00	1.00	5.11	0.75	0.41	2.00	0.76
Ireland	6.45	67.13	0.99	0.85	0.05	1.00	0.12	1.00	0.18	0.31	1.00	0.00	1.00	5.48	0.96	0.43	2.00	0.66
Luxembourg	7.18	62.00	0.97	0.86	0.03	1.00	0.13	1.00	0.09	0.36	0.00	0.00	0.67	0.56	0.98	0.43	0.00	0.56
Greece	7.80	67.97	-0.28	0.95	0.09	0.37	0.10	0.23	0.07	0.51	0.00	0.00	1.00	4.36	1.00	0.61	0.00	0.62
Spain	7.56	65.29	0.73	0.83	0.07	0.77	0.79	0.38	0.13	0.30	1.00	1.00	0.98	4.77	0.95	0.45	0.50	0.51
Canada	6.83	72.38	0.11	0.73	0.12	0.93	0.94	0.74	0.14	0.21	1.00	0.00	0.87	5.17	0.85	0.27	2.00	0.56
USA	7.12	76.19	0.95	0.73	0.05	0.68	0.83	0.37	0.29	0.12	1.00	0.00	1.00	5.23	0.79	0.28	2.50	0.62
Japan	7.53	64.02	0.64	0.80	0.16	0.95	0.71	0.72	0.69	0.20	0.00	0.00	1.00	3.35	0.94	0.28	2.00	0.72
Korea	7.47	71.75	0.72	0.79	0.15	0.46	0.16	0.42	0.04	0.28	0.00	0.00	1.00	4.27	1.00	0.30	1.00	0.67
Australia	7.28	70.36	0.35	0.82	0.08	0.99	1.56	1.00	0.21	0.16	1.00	1.00	0.96	5.04	0.71	0.10	1.50	0.34
New Zealand	7.43	57.67	0.63	0.89	0.08	0.87	3.26	0.99	0.10	0.27	1.00	1.00	0.96	4.55	0.95	0.29	1.00	0.42
IDA	6.58	73.02	0.93	0.84		1.00	0.37	1.00	3.02		1.00	1.00	1.00	5.50		0.00	1.00	0.72
IDB Special	7.00	71.79	1.00	1.00		1.00	0.77	1.00	0.39		1.00	0.00	1.00	3.97		0.00	1.50	0.27
AfDF	6.20	71.34	0.99	0.98		1.00	0.30	1.00	3.18		1.00	0.00	0.80	2.64		0.00	2.00	0.65
EU Institutions	7.39	64.22	0.84	0.79		0.79	1.10	0.53	2.07		1.00	1.00	1.00	4.72		0.19	2.00	0.55
IFAD	6.92	73.95	1.00	0.96		1.00	0.12	1.00	2.74		1.00	0.00	0.33	0.00		0.00	2.00	0.57

Note: For ME1, ME2 and TL6 a lower score signifies better performance in the indicator

**Appendix Table A.4 Original Overall QuODA Scores** 

		- Igiii ui			<i>-</i>							S	a			.1.		р
	Share of allocation to poor countries	Share of allocation to well-governed countries	High strict programmable aid share	Focus/Specialization by recipient country	Support of select global public good facilities	Share of untied aid	Significance of aid relationships (log)	Fragmentation across donor agencies	Median Project Size (log)	Contribution to multilaterals	Member of IATI	Implementation of IATI data reporting standards	Recording of project title and descriptions	Detail of project description (log)	Reporting of aid delivery channel	Completeness of project- level commitment data	Quality of Evaluation policy	Aid to partners with good M&E frameworks
Donor	ME1	ME2	ME4	ME 5	ME7	ME8	RB1	RB2	RB3	RB4	TL1	TL2	TL3	TL4	TL5	TL6		TL8
Austria	7.51	62.39	0.10	0.86	0.07	0.48	1.07	0.32	0.51	0.55	0.00	0.00	1.00	4.49	0.72	0.67	2.00	0.63
Belgium	6.72	73.02	0.14	0.81	0.05	0.96	0.12	0.79	0.53	0.38	0.00	0.00	0.67	0.08	0.97	0.56	0.50	0.53
Denmark	6.69	65.19	0.34	0.85	0.03	0.96	0.20	1.00	0.65	0.32	1.00	1.00	0.97	4.45	0.21	0.51	2.00	0.63
France	7.59	51.91	0.15	0.79	0.06	0.88	1.08	0.31	0.61	0.40	0.00	0.00	0.77	4.29	0.89	0.45	0.50	0.59
Germany	7.49	65.79	0.17	0.63	0.06	0.72	0.43	0.49	0.53	0.37	1.00	0.00	1.00	4.43	0.94	0.51	1.00	0.64
Italy	7.11	69.78	0.15	0.77	0.15	0.55	0.37	0.35	0.66	0.70	0.00	0.00	0.88	4.63	0.79	0.74	0.00	0.62
Netherlands	6.97	66.88	0.26	0.79	0.03	0.98	0.56	1.00	0.87	0.25	1.00	1.00	0.97	4.07	0.89	0.62	0.50	0.58
Norway	6.82	72.71	0.30	0.77	0.03	1.00	0.15	0.70	0.54	0.22	1.00	0.00	1.00	5.50	0.92	0.62	2.00	0.62
Portugal	7.26	61.75	0.24	0.92	0.12	0.60	1.30	0.76	0.43	0.43	0.00	0.00	1.00	4.80	1.00	0.47	0.50	0.34
Sweden	6.84	70.47	0.30	0.83	0.04	0.98	0.31	0.92	0.70	0.34	1.00	1.00	0.91	5.05	0.92	0.58	2.00	0.66
Switzerland	6.93	69.39	0.26	0.74	0.06	0.99	0.16	0.53	0.44	0.24	1.00	1.00	0.69	2.56	0.89	0.66	2.00	0.58
United Kingdom	6.76	73.26	0.31	0.85	0.10	1.00	0.73	0.86	0.62	0.34	1.00	1.00	1.00	4.44	0.97	0.48	2.00	0.67
Finland	6.78	67.23	0.14	0.83	0.05	0.92	0.05	0.98	0.71	0.39	1.00	1.00	1.00	5.55	0.75	0.41	2.00	0.76
Ireland	6.45	67.13	0.46	0.85	0.05	1.00	0.12	1.00	0.43	0.31	1.00	0.00	1.00	6.36	0.96	0.43	2.00	0.66
Luxembourg	7.18	62.00	0.42	0.86	0.03	1.00	0.13	1.00	0.45	0.36	0.00	0.00	0.67	1.84	0.98	0.43	0.00	0.56
Greece	7.80	67.97	0.07	0.95	0.09	0.37	0.10	0.23	0.38	0.51	0.00	0.00	1.00	4.59	1.00	0.61	0.00	0.62
Spain	7.56	65.29	0.33	0.83	0.07	0.77	0.79	0.38	0.37	0.30	1.00	1.00	0.98	5.60	0.95	0.45	0.50	0.51
Canada	6.83	72.38	0.11	0.73	0.12	0.93	0.94	0.74	0.58	0.21	1.00	0.00	0.87	7.10	0.85	0.27	2.00	0.56
USA	7.12	76.19	0.50	0.73	0.05	0.68	0.83	0.37	0.82	0.12	1.00	0.00	1.00	5.67	0.79	0.28	2.50	0.62
Japan	7.53	64.02	0.41	0.80	0.16	0.95	0.71	0.72	1.46	0.20	0.00	0.00	1.00	3.32	0.94	0.28	2.00	0.72
Korea	7.47	71.75	0.46	0.79	0.15	0.46	0.16	0.42	0.75	0.28	0.00	0.00	1.00	4.27	1.00	0.30	1.00	0.67
Australia	7.28	70.36	0.22	0.82	0.08	0.99	1.56	1.00	0.58	0.16	1.00	1.00	0.96	5.95	0.71	0.10	1.50	0.34
New Zealand	7.43	57.67	0.33	0.89	0.08	0.87	3.26	0.99	0.41	0.27	1.00	1.00	0.96	4.49	0.95	0.29	1.00	0.42
IDA	6.58	73.02	0.82	0.84		1.00	0.37	1.00	3.47		1.00	1.00	1.00	7.95		0.00	1.00	0.72
IDB Special	7.00	71.79	0.57	1.00		1.00	0.77	1.00	0.59		1.00	0.00	1.00	4.07		0.00	1.50	0.27
AfDF	6.20	71.34	0.87	0.98		1.00	0.30	1.00	3.18		1.00	0.00	0.80	6.69		0.00	2.00	0.65
EU Institutions	7.39	64.22	0.60	0.79		0.79	1.10	0.53	2.07		1.00	1.00	1.00	4.85		0.19	2.00	0.55
IFAD	6.92	73.95	1.40	0.96		1.00	0.12	1.00	2.74		1.00	0.00	0.33	5.83		0.00	2.00	0.57

Note: For ME1, ME2 and TL6 a lower score signifies better performance in the indicator