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## **ADDRESSING STATE FAILURE: THE EVOLVING U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE**

[Transcript prepared from a tape recording]

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## PROCEEDINGS

**PROFESSOR FUKUYAMA:** I'm Francis Fukuyama, a professor here at SAIS. I'm the Director of SAIS' International Development Program. And on behalf of those that this institution and the Center for Global Development, I know we're delighted that you could all come today.

The origin of this workshop actually started with our students here. There was actually a club equally composed of students in the strategic studies program and in my program in the international development program who understand that in a post conference situation on the security and on the development side, these people have to work closely together. And they're the ones actually who suggested that in light of all of the big changes that are going on now within the U.S. Government and the organization of the history -- evolving really over the last five years -- they said "I think it would be nice to have a workshop to simply bring people up-to-date with where things stand." It is something that a lot of people, I think, are interested in focusing on.

I'd really like to thank Stewart Patrick of the Center for Global Development. He's actually teaching a course here at SAIS on post conflict reconstruction. And it's really terrific to work with our neighbors down the street in putting this together.

I think that the reason that this is of such interest is, of course, what has happened over the past five years in Afghanistan and Iraq and the perception that the Iraq reconstruction was very seriously mismanaged and that we will need to do better than the last time.

I must say that when I first started looking into this whole question of nation building, I was struck by two things. First of all, what a long experience the United States has had in this area. Secondly, how little we actually learned institutionally from one experience to another. And, in fact, if you think about it the first big post conflict reconstruction operation the U.S. Government tried to undertake was the reconstruction of the South after the Civil War. And there's actually a certain pattern established in that reconstruction that I think you can see repeated -- in terms of a very heavy handed effort that's mounted early on, and then a kind of progressive loss of interest as time goes on, leaving the reconstructed society in a very strange, halfway state. And I think there's actually some danger of that happening in Iraq. But beyond that, you know, we obviously had the Philippines, we had all these Latin American and Caribbean interventions in

places like the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua and in Mexico. And then up through the numerous interventions that took place in the 1990s after the end of the Cold War.

And it is striking that, you know, if you look at the U.S. military, they have this highly developed institutionalized system for doing lessons learned. After every single operation, there's a whole network of institutions that were set up to document the history of the operations and to extract lessons and to actually move that learning very quickly into the operational doctrine. And so I think it's a very good organization. All of the military services really have this, have this down. But unfortunately, in this area, this nation building area, the actual mechanism is really sorely lacking.

Now, as a result I think of Iraq that has been partly corrected. You know, actually among other things, there's now a very large and growing literature, academic literature on the subject like a two volume RAND study on nation building on the part of both the United States and the United Nations. But virtually every other institution in this city – USIP, CSIS, NDU, and the like -- have all been working on similar kinds of studies. So there's actually much greater literature out there to look at.

I think Stewart, who is going to speak next, will bring you up to date on the more recent history of this. But just as a kind of general background, I think that there was a learning process that began in the Clinton Administration in the 1990s on this subject, but one that was seriously disrupted when the Bush Administration came into office in 2000. There were a lot of interventions. We've had Panama, Kurdistan, Somalia, Haiti, in the early 1990s, and the Bosnia intervention. And I think as a result of the failure to coordinate properly between particularly the military and the non military agencies in the Balkans there was a big push to try to assign roles and missions. Apparently that led to the drafting of something called PDD-56 [Presidential Decision Directive 56], which was a template for better agency coordination. And that was in place at the time of the Kosovo engagement. And everybody involved seems to think at least at the margin that document did some good.

But, of course, it was not carried over into the Bush Administration. The Bush Administration relegated PDD-56 and were in the process of trying to think through a similar

planning framework. And then September 11th happened. And then the intervention in Afghanistan, which really began without an over arching framework.

I think there's now been a lot of history written about this whole subject. So there's no need to go into a lot of detail. But at the end of a long interagency struggle over who would control the reconstruction phase in Iraq, the job was ultimately given to the Pentagon under the argument that we needed [inaudible] in doing this. Of course, this came against the background of a very vicious bout of what I will call bureaucratic tribalism between State and the intelligence community on the one hand and the Vice President's Office and the Pentagon on the other. And I think there was a kind of lack trust that is one of the reasons that this thing has moved into the Pentagon.

This is a very unusual institutional set up because virtually every one of the other higher operations of this sort have gone through the usual country chain chaired by ambassador with dual lines of authority -- of the military going up through the military chain of command which leads to the Secretary of Defense, and the other one going up to the Secretary of State. I think that this organization under different circumstances might have worked. I mean, that was actually the set-up that General MacArthur had with his staff in Tokyo after 1945. But that effort had been preceded by several years of very intensive planning for what an occupation of Japan would look like. And the unfortunate thing was the kind of order establishing that line of authority was signed by the President in December of 2002. Jay Garner was appointed at the end of January [as head of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, ORHA].

Actually, I just arrived back from a trip to Europe yesterday, and I read most of Jerry Bremer's memoir on the plane coming back, which reminded me of this letter. You know, it's an amazing situation when he gets to Baghdad in the middle of May when the reconstruction is already--and it's already started an insurgency is beginning, and so forth. And they actually have a dual reconstruction job. They have to reconstruct Iraq, but they also have to build an internal bureaucracy with virtually none of the institutional sources of support that, you know, we really would have needed for this ambitious undertaking in place.

I think, you know, it's worth looking back at some of that experience because I think there are some myths. I think one of the myths floating around there was that we actually

did have a “plan” in the [State Department’s Working Group on the] Future of Iraq study that if only it had been followed, everything would have gone swimmingly in Iraq. I think that's really not the source of the problem, because I think that was actually not a detailed plan for how to turn the electricity on and so forth. And that even the State Department that had this plan really did not know how we would construct a political process in Iraq in the immediate aftermath of the active combat. So you have people like Ryan Crocker running around just trying to find other Iraqis [inaudible]. And so that sort of thing we couldn't have known in the past.

But we certainly could have drawn on a much deeper institutional source of knowledge on the part of people that had been involved in this kind of activity that might have told you, for example, to expect the general breakdown in civil order in the immediate aftermath of the invasion. And I think one of the really astonishing things was that the military did not have and was not asked to provide a phased-in plan for even simple things like enforcing a cease fire and different kinds of rules of engagement in the wake of the end of combat. As I said, Stewart will bring the history of this evolution more up-to-date when he talks.

One thing I just want to close with is on the whole question: Why is it that Americans are so bad at doing this? (With all due respect to those people in the room who spend their careers working on this). I mean, the record, overall going back over 100 years has, as I've said, not been great. And part of it is obviously political. I think that there is a kind of resistance on the part of Congress and the American people to fund very ambitious nation building exercises.

But I think we also have a bit of a problem at the level of ideas at the core of nation building (Of course, “nation-building” is a misnomer -- we really don't build nations, we build states. So the issue is state building). I think that there is a little bit of a reluctance compared to, let's say, some European countries when Americans get into this because America has a kind of anti-statist political culture in which we don't pride ourselves in being able to create new bureaucracies. I mean, that's not what Americans tend to do. We like to shrink bureaucracies.

And I think on the part of the people that thought about Iraq ahead of time, there was a feeling that democracy and free markets didn't actually have to be constructed. That this

was a kind of default condition to which society would revert, you know, if you just got rid of the authoritarian obstacles to this happening.

And I think that that's a dilemma that is going to remain as we proceed. There is, in fact, a really important difference between state building and the other big component that's now become the cornerstone of American foreign policy, which is democracy promotion. Quite frankly, these are rather different activities. What characterizes a state is a monopoly of legitimate violence. I think that this concept remains valid--this is the coercive core of the state. And if you look at what we're doing in Iraq right now, what is it? We're going to increase the capacity of the Iraqi police to enforce laws in their own territory. So that's only the first thing you undertake in the course of state building. But we also want that state to be democratic and that means doing the opposite, it means putting checks and balances and all sorts of restricting rules of law, rules of engagement, all sorts of things on power that force the state to actually exert the violent authority over its people.

And in the course of western political development, those two phases were separated by hundreds of years. The initial course of state building in Europe, although conveniently forget, was a violent process. And the restriction of state authority and the creation of rule of law stage and separation of powers, and all this sort of thing happened in a period when you could take state authority away gradually.

And one of the great problems I think we have is that we try to do these all simultaneously at the same time in a very compressed window when taxpayers are willing to fund these ambitious activities. And it leads us to a lot of the problems that we have right now in terms of, you know, extra judicial killings on the part of militias and the like and the things that are going on now in Iraq.

So with that, I am going to step down and turn the podium over to Stewart. And, again, thank you all for coming.

[Applause.]

**MR. PATRICK:** Thank you very much, Frank. And on behalf of Nancy Birdsall, I want to say how delighted the Center for Global Development is to be co-hosting this event. Nancy would

like to be here herself, except that she's involved in another CGD-SAIS collaboration. Specifically, she has the arduous task of spending this semester teaching in Bologna. Somehow she's managing to survive that ordeal. She sends her warm regards and best wishes for this symposium.

It's a particular pleasure to be able to collaborate with Frank. His own work underlines how critical it is to build effective institutions in fragile states – and how hard it is to do this from the outside. It's a quandary that preoccupies us at CGD every day, so we're excited to have him down the block. Frank has big plans for the I-Dev program, including expanding the concept of “development” into political governance and perhaps even security. We look forward to working with him on this agenda.

I want to commend the Security and Development Club at SAIS for inspiring this event and helping with logistics. The club includes 30 Master's students who recognize the intimate connection between growth, bad governance, and poverty, on the one hand, and political violence, human insecurity, and global threats, on the other. Particular thanks to Alex Pascal, who helped plan this event and identify participants.

and it's begun to focus on the problem of state fragility. Still, our collective understanding of how to build effective states after conflict remains rudimentary. .

We think this symposium is timely, as Frank indicated. The United States has taken some initial steps to build this a standing capability for reconstruction and stabilization operations. At the same time our collective understanding of how to build effective states after conflict remains rudimentary. Similarly, although we are beginning to show more attention to the problem of state fragility, we remain far more focused on post-conflict operations than on preventing states from collapsing in turmoil in the first place.

And whether we're discussing prevention or response, the government faces practical hurdles and dilemmas in trying to achieve “jointness” across the executive branch – something that took the U.S. military more than a decade after Goldwater-Nichols to achieve.

As the Bush administration moves forward with its transformational diplomacy agenda, foreign assistance reform and implementation of the 2006 QDR, the time seemed ripe to bring together officials from the worlds of diplomacy, defense, and development – the “3 Ds,” if you will -- to examine the implications of these changes. The goal is to take stock of some recent initiatives, to see what progress has been made in developing these strategies, and to explore what remains to be done.

We’re fortunate to be joined today by five senior administration officials. I want to thank each of you for taking time off from your busy schedules and, more broadly, for your commitment to public service. Our government obviously depends on the willingness of dedicated officials willing to work long hours for a lot less than you could gain in other professions – and the reward for your hard work is to get pot shots taken at you from the sidelines while you toil in the trenches. We owe you our gratitude.

Rather than asking for formal presentations, we’ve structured the two panels as a conversation, kicked off by questions from the panel chairs. I’ll chair the first session, on the strategic view from Washington. My friend Jim Schear of National Defense University will chair the second panel, which addresses field implications and challenges. To liberate the panelists from having to focus on past history, I thought I’d spend the next 10 minutes reviewing the major recent policy initiatives. That should free them to address the practical challenges of implementing the new directives. And if I leave something out, please feel free to amplify or correct my remarks.

Let’s turn first to the new innovations in Stabilization and Reconstruction. As everyone knows, bureaucracies are notoriously resistant to change. So what explains these new initiatives on Stabilization and Reconstruction? As with many institutional innovations, 3 main factors were involved: a policy failure that discredited old ways of doing business; a set of new ideas about how to do things better; and well-placed political champions.

The relevant policy failure, as Frank indicated, was inadequate planning and preparation for the post-combat phase in Iraq and the resultant difficulties in stabilizing and reconstructing that



country. There were several lessons drawn: (1) we can no longer afford an ad hoc approaches; we need a standing contingency planning process. (2) we need a greater focus by the military on stability operations; and (3) we need a standing civilian capability to serve as a reliable counterpart to DoD.

The ideas about how the United States might be better organized were supplied primarily by think tanks, notably CSIS, USIP, RAND, NDU, and even (in its modest way) CGD. Some of these insights were based on hard won lessons –less learned than forgotten by the government – from operations in the 1990s from Cambodia to Kosovo, Bosnia to East Timor.

If Iraq gave impetus to these ideas, they needed champions to become institutionalized: Here, it was Senators Lugar and Biden, the chair and ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, who gave them political traction. They forced the issue, introducing legislation authorizing the creation of a new post-conflict office at State. The implicit message: Take action or we will impose a legislative solution on you.

This congruence of factors led the Cabinet in April 2004 to endorse the creation of the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), which emerged later that summer. Although the office got to work right away, its interagency authorities were not finalized until December 7, 2005, when the White House released the National Security Presidential Decision Directive-44 on “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization.”

The NSPD-44 explicitly assigns to the Secretary of State the responsibility to prepare for, plan, coordinate, and implement reconstruction and stabilization operations in a wide range of contingencies, ranging from complex emergencies to failing and failed states, and war-torn countries. The State Department is to serve as the focal point for creating, managing and deploying standing civilian response capabilities for a range of purposes, including to advance “internal security, governance and participation, social and economic well-being, and justice and

reconciliation.” Where the U.S. military may be involved, the Department will coordinate with the Department of Defense to harmonize military and civilian involvement.

Since it was created, S/CRS has been pursuing a massive agenda. These tasks include:

Creating a monitoring system to identify states at risk of instability

Developing a strategic planning template for use in preparing and running missions, as well as a doctrine for joint civilian-military planning

Building standing operational capabilities for rapid civilian response, including (1) diplomatic “first responders”, (2) enhanced technical capabilities within partner agencies; (3) a wide network of civilian reservists; and (4) a set of pre-positioned contracts.

Creating interagency mechanisms to manage operations, including in Washington at the interagency level and with the military at Regional Combatant Commands and in the field

Providing consulting services for State Bureaus facing actual crises, from Haiti to Sudan

Mainstreaming conflict prevention and transformation across the government, including by developing an Interagency Methodology to Assess instability and Conflict

Engaging other national governments and international organizations

Conducting exercises with military counterparts

Compiling lessons learned and best practices

S/CRS lost its first coordinator, the indefatigable Carlos Pascual, to Brookings. But it just acquired a new head, John Herbst – incidentally, second consecutive U.S. ambassador to the Ukraine to occupy the position.

As the State Department has been moving forward, the Department of Defense has made a parallel set of doctrinal and institutional innovations. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has signed DoD Directive 3000.05, on “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSSTR).” This directive was heavily shaped by an influential report in 2004 by the Defense Science Board Task Force on “The Transition to and From Hostilities,” which I had the honor to serve on as a State Department representative.

The document establishes for the first time that such activities are a core DoD mission the U.S. military should be prepared to both conduct and support. To quote: “They shall be given priority

comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities and planning.” The directive mandates that every war plan include a detailed S&R annex.

While the Directive acknowledges that many S&R tasks are more appropriately carried out by civilians, it notes that this may not always be possible in chaotic environments or when civilian capabilities are unavailable. Accordingly, the Directive includes a long list of reconstruction and stabilization undertakings that U.S. military must be trained and equipped to carry out, ranging from rebuilding infrastructure to reforming security sector institutions to reviving the private sector to developing representative government.

The Directive calls on DoD to coordinate with S/CRS and other civilian agencies and to support the creation of Civilian-Military teams in the field. To support SSTR operations, the Directive calls the appointment of a senior director for Stability Ops in each Combatant Command, for the deployment of increased intelligence assets to such contingencies, and for greater education and training on specific regions and cultures where U.S. forces may be used.

Prevention: In addition to these Post-Conflict innovations, the US government has begun to address the question of how to prevent states from sliding into failure in the first place. The main rationale for this attention, of course, is the perceived lesson from 9/11 – and contained in the National Security Strategy of 2002, that “The United States is now more threatened by weak and failing states than we are by conquering ones.” (As I and others have argued, the connections between state failure and global threats may be less universal and more nuanced than sometimes asserted. Nevertheless, Afghanistan did make clear that state failure can, in certain circumstances, cause significant damage to U.S. national interests). For the past few, the Bush Administration has been grappling with how to turn this insight into practical policy.

USAID, arguably, has been at the forefront of these efforts. Its Fragile States Strategy released in January 2005, makes a strong case for adapting development policy and programs to help bolster and reform the world’s weak and failing states. The Fragile States Strategy, along with the creation of the Office of Conflict Management, is an important legacy of Andrew Natsios’ tenure.

Like the USAID White Paper, it reflects a conviction that development must be treated as a third pillar of U.S. national security.

DoD has also been engaged on the prevention front, after a fashion. The National Defense Strategy – and the QDR -- establishes as a key military objective the need to support friendly governments abroad who are endangered by terrorists, insurgents, and other internal threats. The department is preoccupied with “ungoverned spaces” where states lack the capability or will to control their territory against those that may wish to harm the US and its allies.

There have been tentative steps to coordinate prevention efforts across agencies. S/CRS and the NSC have created a sub-PCC on Conflict management and mitigation. USAID itself has created an Office of Military Affairs to better interact with DoD, and is increasingly involved in initiatives like the Trans-Sahel counterterrorism assessment. Still, from the outside, the U.S. response to this challenge has seemed to be less the creation of a single, coherent policy across the U.S. government than a collection of stove-piped efforts advanced by particular agencies. This may be changing, thanks to two final initiatives announced by Secretary Rice in January, on Transformational Diplomacy and Foreign Assistance Reform.

As Dr. Rice explains it, the primary objective of Transformational diplomacy is to help “build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.” To bolster failing states, the administration is seeking to foster a new U.S. diplomatic and foreign assistance culture, one that ensures that U.S. diplomats not only “report” on the world but “seek to change the world as it is,” for the better. For the State Department, this means among other things redeploying diplomats to global hot spots.

For foreign aid, it implies injecting greater strategic coherence and more effective coordination into our woefully fragmented assistance regime, which has aid pouring out of 20-odd spigots across the US government, addressing everything from health interventions to democracy promotion to law enforcement cooperation to military assistance. Randall Tobias, recently confirmed as both USAID administrator and as the new Director of Foreign Assistance, will be charged with developing not only a consolidated US government foreign assistance strategy but

also multi-year and annual country-specific operational plans. The devil, of course, is in the details. Negotiating the tensions and trade-offs between short-term expediency (driven by political and security concerns) and the long-term imperatives of institution-building (guided by development considerations) will be a constant challenge in developing a more effective policy.

Finally, it merits noting that the administration last month released its updated National Security Strategy. From my perspective, the most noteworthy change is the special emphasis the document places on democracy – particularly the creation of effective, responsible democracies as the cornerstone of peace and development. The clear implication would appear to be that if democratic institutions are in place, good policies will follow and the world's security and poverty problems will be largely taken care of. As Frank indicated, there are some contestable underlying assumptions here. I would be interested in hearing from the panel how the challenge of bolstering weak and failing states relates to the administration's broader freedom agenda. So here we are – with a lot of disparate initiatives, all meant to improve US policy toward failing and post-conflict countries. What are the requirements and prospects for success? What are the tensions between the goals the administration has set out? And what more remains to be done? These are the issues we hope to discuss today, and we are fortunate to have a great line-up from the administration and knowledgeable experts to help negotiate this terrain. With that I'd invite the first panel to take their places on the dais.

[End tape 1; start tape 2.]

[In progress.].

**MS. WONG:** If I could just add one thing to Doug's comments. As he pointed out, a serious problem that runs throughout the U.S. Government is the fitness on the civilian side. I think we recognize that we have to play "catch up" and help our military partners in what they could do overseas.

In the president's FY 07 budget request, he has asked for 25 million to allow our office to build a civilian reserve, and this is looking beyond the U.S. Government. We certainly

are looking at State Department's general capacity and trying to take steps to make the State Department, our diplomatic forum, more efficient, faster and robust. I know AID's looking at the same issue, and it's throughout the government, that people are identifying their experts. How do you train them, how do you get them [inaudible]?

We also know that beyond the U.S. Government, those skills elsewhere that we should be able to tap into. So that is something I think--we have supporters on the Hill, as Stewart was talking about, Senator Lugar has been one of our strongest supporters, and he has been pursuing the idea of a civilian reserve corps. It's when he goes over from the, to the world of policy to the bean counters, that's where you can get the hard arguments.

But it's something that we recognize, there are staffing gaps in certain sectors, that we need to address. That transitional security is one of them. We see that as certainly being one of the critical sectors we need to address when we go into a new, complex situation. And where do you find civilians? We don't have a constabulary, a national police corps, and how do we address the fact that you need to have security before we can even allow other experts to come and start doing their work.

So the thinness on the civilian side is something I think we're all grappling with.

**MR. PATRICK:** And I'd like to pick that up a little bit. Obviously, the initial rationale SCRS was to create a robust, deployable civilian capacity. I know that Senator Warner, on March 15th, sent a letter around to all the non-DOD Cabinet secretaries, basically saying what are you doing to implement NSPD 44, and suggesting that the military is really crying out for more civilian counterparts.

Jeff, I wonder if you have any reflections on sort of what else do you need to see from the civilian side? What do General Abizaid and his colleagues--what do they need? And also folks in the field. Is it more just bodies to staff PRTs [Provincial Reconstruction Teams]? Is that the sort of capacity we're talking about?

**MR. NADANER:** For example, provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan, and now the idea, Dr. Rice's idea of creating similar teams in Iraq. The idea behind those teams are they

should be heavily civilian to do, you know, tasks within civilian competency, such as, you know, increasing economic activity, helping advise local indigenous officials on governance, helping mediate. The problem is if you go--at least I've been to Afghanistan. You don't see that many civilians. That's certainly a different environment than Iraq. It is extremely hard for departments and agencies. I get the feeling that there are more people willing to go serve abroad for national security missions, but sometimes they're not released, sometimes they go out there, and then I've had the experience in the past, had people telling me, I just get constant pulses to come back. I'm endangering my career.

In the military, we have essentially a "float." There are more people, the Department of Defense has, you may find this hard to believe, than are needed to do the actual work at the Department of Defense on a daily basis.

And those people are in training. The training makes a good deal of difference. Colin Powell, when he first came to the State Department, he said to Mark Grossman, how many years of training did you have? Mark Grossman said I had two weeks. I think Powell had something of the order of several years, four or five years equivalent, over his career.

That also helps out in deployments, makes a big difference. Some have that in civilian agencies.

How to create that kind of float. Well, it involves different budget choices and probably a higher top line, in my personal opinion.

**MR. PATRICK:** I want to pick up, Jeff, on just some of that, the transformation that's going on within the Department of Defense and with regard to this mission.

You know, looking back on the 1990's, obviously the U.S. military are not particular enamored with the notion of stability operations, or worldwide I believe were called "MOOTWA" -- military operations other than war -- and it's obviously no secret that Secretary Rumsfeld, at least his default position on this initially, was not to get the U.S. military involved in nation-building exercises. But it seems to me with this directive, there's a real sea change. It's more of a sea change than I've seen in the civilian agencies in some regard.

What explains this sea change? Is it a recognition of the limits of Mr. Rumsfeld's "transformation" agenda, which places so much emphasis on sort of the high tech, "gee whiz" gadgetry and agility, suggesting that actually what we really need are "boots on the ground" to do sort of hard-edged counterinsurgency things? What do you attribute it to?

**MR. NADANER:** Well, certainly all the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan, and then also it's, especially the last 15 years. Certainly no shortage of studies. There was one study that caught a lot of attention, particular Secretary Rumsfeld's, from the Defense Science Board, June or August 2004, on "The Transition to and from Hostilities," and they tried to take a longer view from the '90s, a very bipartisan group, some people that Rumsfeld really respected and worked with.

And I would say that was catalytic but you had a lot of things really happening in Department of Defense, from the bottom up. But what the Secretary did was he used that report to--he wanted guidance turned out of that report, and the goal there I think was to make the changes, introduce some top-down change, and the virtues of top-down change are you can make it comprehensive in the military.

And we're not kidding ourselves, we're not going to transform the military with this category of operations, in a year or two. We think a lot can be done in a year or two. We think this is going to be very ongoing, just like the effort to create a Joint Forces has been going on for a decade and a half, and is still going on.

**MR. PATRICK:** Do you see generational changes in attitudes -- is there still resistance from the older generation, while the younger generation of officers is on board?

**MR. NADANER:** Think about the "older" generation in the U.S. military. Maybe their first appointment was in Haiti or Bosnia. So you have large numbers of troops that have been through numerous deployments. I think many of them have a desire to come in better prepared, and it's a larger force that's trained to do combat operations.

There's certainly a very long tradition in the military to do what we now call civilian operations, and in a way I'd it's recovering a older tradition.



Can I say in an organization as large as the Defense Department there are a lot of differences of opinion? Surely. All you have to do is open up the various military journals and you'll see all sorts of views, pro and con. And that's healthy.

But I would say, by and large, at least the majority of people that I come into contact with, and I would say in terms of institutional thinkers, the desire didn't change.

**MR. PATRICK:** Thanks. In terms of the DOD directive, I mentioned in my prepared remarks just the great scope of things that DOD has to be prepared to actually undertake because civilian capabilities either may be impossible to use in a particular environment or may not be present, and it's quite a long list of activities.

What does developing that capability mean, in practice, for the resources that are required at Department of Defense and how do you--you know, is there enough window, potential funding window for those sorts of activities?

And as a follow-up, I mean, in a sense, if it's still continuing to be hard to get civilian counterparts, do you in a sense need to have that sort of civilian activity function, call it colonial service, call it Thomas Barnett's "Sys-Admin Force", within the Department of Defense itself?

**MR. NADANER:** Our goal is for it to develop outside of the Department of Defense and that's why I spent part of my year last year on the Hill, trying to get those limited resources for the State Department.

Surely there'll be resource implications. Can we figure them all out? No. The Department of Defense works in a very long time cycle, very iterative, and it's in many ways locked into--things are long planned in advance.

But I would say already--let me give you an example. Last year we got the authority of the Congress, and I say "we." It's the President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, to use up to \$200 million of a particular account to do preventive [inaudible] activities in the security area.

That's a big change, because that's roughly 200 times more than we did before with the exception of war zones.

So that's significant. And now in fact the president, with the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, are now going to try and up that now to \$700 million in the coming year. So that's an example of the sorts of change. A lot of the changes that we have in mind, they're not all that costly, they don't involve weapons platforms.

They do involve perhaps changing the orientation of existing training centers. They do involve, when we look at our extensive Defense Department school system, extensive system of centers, it does involve changing personnel. Maybe you don't quite need as many classes and combat operations. You need to bring in different sorts of people. And that will happen over time. Some people are in three year contracts, they probably won't get renewed.

**MR. PATRICK:** I want to ask a question on interagency coordination and leadership. At first glance, the NSPD 44, we seem to put the State Department's sort of in charge of stabilization and reconstruction operations, although in coordination of the Secretary of Defense. Similarly, DOD Directive 3000.05 talks about coordination with interagency partners, although with a rather healthy use of the phrase, "as appropriate." I guess my question to Marcia--

**MR. NADANER:** It's appropriate; yeah.

**MR. PATRICK:** My question to Marcia is a couple things. First of all, what authorities, in terms of coordination, do you have over the interagency? And also, has the Secretary of State actually delegated these authorities to you, or to your office, in terms of coordination of an emergency? And how far does that authority extend?

**MS. WONG:** On authorities--let me go right back to the NSPD 44. When you read the language in the NSPD 44 [inaudible] very carefully, to indicate that it was meant to be, you know [inaudible].

As I mentioned at the very beginning of my remarks, we need, I think greater integration in the activities of our U.S. Government, and it's hard when you had very--well, you know, some people who study the Soviet Union would say the "power ministries," and we have very strong ministries who are used to good budgets and doing their programs, but also we had to sit around a table and talk in an integrated way, and talk about a shared mission. How revolutionary is that? And it shouldn't be, and it really shouldn't be.

This is common sense. But people--we are all guilty of that, have been stovepiped, sometimes our response has been very fragmented, and we're trying to narrow all the gaps of sunlight coming between our different agencies, and bring them together.

But it's a consultative process. We realize there's no point in blowing up this NSPD and trying to hit anybody across the nose with it.

But I think if the agencies recognize the worth of coming together, because then they understand--there's a little bit of transparency in the process. I think working with our military colleagues, certainly the [regional combatant] commands that have been extremely accommodating to the civilian interagency, come in and inject themselves into exercises, that we are trying to come together early, and then come in high, at a strategic level.

So I think there is recognition from the agencies that there's a common sense and good government approach to this.

But this is new. I think we're going to be celebrating our second birthday in April. It's a new idea, and I think we have a better understanding from our partners that together we make the way forward, not individually.

**MR. MENARCHIK:** I was just going to step in here. The 14th administrator of USAID is, ex officio, the director of foreign assistance. I hope you had a chance to look at the factsheet and job description for this new position. You flip the state aid appropriated budgets together, it's about 75, 80 percent of the foreign assistance overseas.

The point is once you get this person who owns all the economic support fund budget, all the development assistance budget, that's the USAID budget, plus security assistance budget, all in one pot of money, and with these very strong verbs in your job description, which is

to provide guidance to, to coordinate with, be responsible for very strong verbs within state aid, you're going to get a much more coherent, pure middle shape of directions, strategic guidance, budget allocation priority, maybe, and results effectiveness on the ground.

Both agencies have been very flat in the organizational structure. I came out of the military after three decades. When I arrived at USAID, I was amazed at how decentralized it was, and I think, in my view, required some of this to occur. The director of foreign assistance position creates that structure. There is now a strategic piece to provide that kind of coherence and that guidance. One person, one voice, one mind is able to direct it.

Then, once you get the State-Aid piece together, which is 75 to 80 percent of this assistance, then I would argue whether the first person to talk to would be the Defense Department and then have the three pillars in fact lashed together very closely.

Once that occurs, the vast majority of foreign assistance, which addresses fragile states' problems are very tightly wound and integrated.

Other agencies were involved in development of the interagency fora, to make this work. The new administrator, or the new director of foreign assistance is on board this week. I think the next two of three weeks, you'll see a rollout of a highway, a path forward. It will be coherent, it will be very collaborative, and I think you will see dramatic improvements.

I'd like to go back to another point that was made. I came out of the military, there were 2.2 million direct hires, boots on the ground. When I came to USAID, I assumed that there were tens of thousands of folks floating around in these 80 countries.

I heard today that the State Department foreign service officers number about six thousand. That's about a brigade's worth. USAID has a little over 2000 foreign service officers. That's about one-third of a brigade. In the COORDS program, in Vietnam alone, we had about two to three thousand developers on the ground. This is at the village hamlet level.

Americans who did development, and spoke the language, were doing "development" on the ground, in collaboration, in coordination with military operations ongoing. It was, in my humble view, a very effective program that was stained with the fall of Vietnam, but, in fact, it was a very interesting program that had military and developers and diplomats all working together.

But the number was two to three thousand folks in one country. Very interesting subject.

**MR. PATRICK:** Let me ask just a couple of other questions and then I promise we'll turn it over to the audience for their own questions.

The first question really, picking up on interagency coordination of leadership, and that is whether or not this coordination can actually be done from a single department or agency. I'd be interested to know what role the National Security Council plays in helping shepherd this organization.

**MS. WONG:** Certainly, the National Security Council, when Dr. Rice was there as national security adviser, she was an extremely strong supporter of this program. In fact one of the architects. So we had very good support coming out of the National Security Council. I think when we see a reference in any of the President's speeches about, you know, the expectations and responsibilities, this office has, for instance, the civil reserve, I think it's our colleagues at NSC are making sure that that's articulated in the speech.

And so I would like to say, without any doubt, that the support we have is strong.

I think it's a question, again, of sort of the articulation of that, you know, to go to control the resources, and I think our President and the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, you know, we certainly hope, expectation from Ambassador Tobias, that we'll continue those strong relationships.

**MR. PATRICK:** The last question that I want to ask to Jeff, and that is, are you basically looking at creating capabilities that would be used in an Afghanistan type situation – in other words, a large agency that the U.S. would be involved in? Or are you also considering in terms of international cooperation, creating sort of a modular capability that could be used, for instance, in participating in a U.N., a multilateral regional organization, the peace operations, stability operation, for instance, in Liberia, or in Darfur, for instance?

Is this on the radar screen of your current plans?

**MR. NADANER:** The goal is always to undertake operations with others. You'll see that throughout the QDR report. So it's not only interagency but it's also international.

One of the reasons why the secretary has so strongly advocated on behalf of greater train-and-equip authorities and programs, whether they are run by the Defense Department with the Secretary of State's case by case agreement, or they're run out of the State Department, new programs like GPOI (Global Peace Operations Initiative). The goal is to train many, many more foreign peacekeepers, because the idea is that the United States should always operate with partners and there are in fact many problems around the world, that if partners had the capabilities, that the United States may not have to participate as well.

**MR. PATRICK:** Thanks. I'd like now to open it up. We have about a half an hour or so for questions before we break for coffee.

We have two mikes, I think here, and let's go here to this gentleman. I'd like to take these two at a time, if I could.

**QUESTION:** Stanley Krogar [spelling?] with the CATO.

This meeting was prompted, in large part, because of the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan. Let's take it into another context, just for comparison. In 1812, Napoleon invaded Russia, beat the Russia army, crushed it at Borodino, made it to Moscow, said I will free the serfs. I will bring the democracy of the French Revolution. The people burned the city. Okay.

Was Napoleon's failure in Russia a result of his inability to understand nation building, or was it a product of its inability to understand the nature of the war he initiated?

**MR. PATRICK:** Thanks. Let's have a second question

[Laughter]

**QUESTION:** Maybe bringing us up a little closer to this century, in Nicaragua, Violeta Chamorro was running for office. She's supported by the United States, and the night before she

won, in her inner circle, she says the irony of this election will be, is that as soon as we win, and there's peace, the resources will dry up.

That the U.S. is there when there's war. They're not there to continue the relationships and to maintain peace, over time. That is my question. I don't understand bringing in--combining the short-term military response to development when we need to be investing in long-term development strategies that in fact make sure that there aren't conflicts down the lines.

**MR. PATRICK:** Okay. We have two questions there about it's a case of failure to understand nation building or the nature of the war and whether we have the staying power in effect, to do peace-building after war.

**MR. MENARCHIK:** Well, it sounds like your question is should we have gone to war and then how do you pick up the pieces after the fact.

I am a conservative. I did spend three decades in the United States military. I'm a Middle East, Africa person. My son is a naval officer in Baghdad, actually, but in the global war on terrorism, I left to come here and participate in the development side. I supported the decision to go to war. After the fighting was over, reconstruction, recovery, and the development process must begin.

[start tape side 2B]

**MS. WONG:** My office is really about 40 professionals. If I had to move them all out, really, the pit bull would be by herself. But we are using the expertise we have in strategic ways. We have the power of one, one gentleman who works on transitional security and security sector reform.

He has been out [inaudible] to help with--he's talked to the rebels and he most likely will [inaudible] again, in April. We've sent people down [inaudible] partly of the [inaudible] assessment mission. We want to send people down to Haiti to help with the election of observers, training and monitoring. We had an interagency team go out to do work in the part

of Africa to look at helping our missions institutionalize, become more aware of conflict assessment matrix and measures.

So we're trying to bring again--you know, we know [inaudible] and we're trying to bring people together to help support [inaudible].

Our office alone can't take on [inaudible] and that's a good thing, because there are all sorts of other experts in the U.S. Government [inaudible] come together to allow us to do that.

**MR. PATRICK:** Thanks very much. Two more questions. This gentleman here, please, and Frank.

**QUESTION:** I may have misunderstood but I think “development” is about the initiation of an environment where markets work, where entrepreneurs could operate, with no unnecessary government intervention. But what I've been hearing is sort of somewhat a military thing about boots on the ground, and thinking that that's going to solve the development problem, and sort of a pyramidal structure, and increasing the authority, or authoritarian structure within the organization, and sort of military type chain of command, and that the two don't seem to match. If you'd like to comment on it.

**MR. PATRICK:** Thanks. This lady back there

**QUESTION:** I'm from an NGO, working on clinical, political psychology. I'm going to take a quick minute to preface my question. My father graduated, top of his class, at West Point, in 1928, and I remember him telling me, during World War--not World War II--but during the Vietnam War, asking me--he said we never trained in leadership. We all assumed that leadership was something that came just from graduating.

And I said, well, look, Dad, the wheel turns. And when I listen to you all, I hear talk of a coalition, I hear talk of consultation, consultative status. But I parrot you. What I hear is mainly top-down, and I wonder, is there any training in consensus building, both inter and intra



agency training in consensus building? It would help development and it would help transition. I'd like to hear your comments.

**MS. WONG:** Thank you for those interlinked questions. I'd actually like to take it back to a question that's posed by the relationship in Nicaragua.

The one thing in our approach is we know that the international community is going to be in there at the beginning but at the same time, as we're addressing the needs on the ground, we also recognize very much we need to help rebuild their local and institution capacity, because there is a risk of dependency too, and we don't want to see that.

So there is this sticking point where we are helping build local institutions with the goal in sight that they will feel the ownership of making investments, it becomes a sustainability there that allows us to then be pulling back, and that they will have set up in their societies, you know, checks and balances that permit responsible leadership. But our job is to be there and allow these institutions to take some sort of root.

**MR. MENARCHIK:** We are beginning to think strategically about development, and I would argue that this is a good thing. Historically, in my agency, the budgeting process was all about the amount of money that you got last year, it's the amount of money that you're going to get this year. So we push the money out to the countries. We happen to be in 80 countries. I can assure you that I have talked to dozens of ambassadors and dozens of mission directors, and every one of them has said that if they had twice the amount of money, they could do better things in development. That's a fact.

The problem of course is there is X number of dollars that are available and there are priorities. The piece of this missing, in my agency, and I would argue in the State Department, has been a strategic piece that provides strategic priority, making allocations, strategic resources to these priorities, and making sure that these priorities are in fact carried out.

I think that's necessary in our system. Our White Paper that was written in January of 2004 is now a USAID policy. We have over 1400 strategic directives in USAID. The State

Department has over 1400 strategic directives. I can't get my mind wrapped around how to deal with that and how to prioritize it, and make sure that things are in fact carried out.

I thought the system was broken. I believe, when I saw it in the last year and a half, we had pulverized and atomized, among two or three dozen agencies in town, that has caused some of the ineffectiveness and inefficiency that you have seen in the system. Argued for an assistance reform is an attempt to get the strategic thinking into the development system, to link up with the Defense Department and with the State Department, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, to think strategically, to come up with this interagency approach, so that when three organizations don't arrive at one bridge at the same time with three different mission directives, there should be one person arriving at that bridge that knows what he's supposed to do and has money to take care of the mission.

It doesn't necessarily happen right now. The thing, strategically, with these systems and reform in place, I believe will give you that strategic thinking that has been absent in the past several decades.

MR. Fukuyama: I did want to emphasize that when I said that the United States wasn't good at nation building, I really did exclude people up on the dais and I think [laughter] you know, this is a failure of administrations to take advantage of the expertise that actually exists in the government and then of Congress to follow up in terms of visas.

But two brief questions. One tradition I've heard very widely is that because of the failure to fund on the civilian side, because of restrictions, you know, that the State Department can't do things that the military does, and so forth, that there will be an active isomorphism because all the resources are in DOD, DOD will simply create, you know, the equivalent of your office, and that's actually in the next contingency, those are people that will actually go out there.

I just wonder whether you thought that was some--I know that that's not what you want to see happen but how likely was that to actually occur? In other words, for Doug Menarchik, you haven't said anything about the Millennium Challenge Corporation. I mean, that started out as, I thought, one of the most innovative ideas, new ideas in development when it was first proposed.

The initial funding level was supposed to be \$5 billion a year and Congress only appropriated 1.75. As that number's been going down, how does that fit into, you know, the administration's overall development strategy?

**MR. PATRICK:** And this woman here, please.

**QUESTION:** Okay. One last quick question maybe. Hi. You can say, I think, that the State Department is still somewhat of an institution built to deal on a state to state level but with other, you know, state level actors.

Is S/CRS one part of a change in our foreign assistance, and our institution structure, that it's responding more to non-state actors? I'm looking at the importance of, you know, track two diplomacy, and these sort of things. Thank you.

**MR. PATRICK:** Okay. We have a couple questions there for Frank, and I guess Marcia, on the prospect of DOD creating the equivalent SCRS.

**MR. NADANER:** As I say, the goal is to empower the State Department, and, in fact, to see deployable capability develop in many departments and agencies. After all, SCRS's role will be coordinator. In the U.S. military we have the force provider. We have the services, Army, Navy, and Air Force people, and now we have Joint Forces Command, and they provide the forces, wherever they need to go.

The idea is on the other side of government and on defense side, S?CRS will act as a civilian force provider. Right now, to get back to Frank's question, in Afghanistan, Iraq, you have military personnel performing a lot of civilian type activities because there simply is not any civilian capacity deployed there, you know, American civilian capacity, or in fact international capacity.

We think that there are going to be contingencies, and, once again, it's so hard to predict what they're like, that the most deployable element of the United States Government abroad is the military. We do not envision extensive civilian activities by military personnel, but

there will be small amounts, for example, something called Commander's Emergency Response Fund. The military has a long tradition of digging wells and performing other reconstruction tasks. That we can envision. We'd like to see them do it better, with more training, so they can use those funds and authorities better.

But the goal is to get the civilians in there much quicker than they've been, and the military, U.S. military trains within itself, among the services, that's jointness, has a long tradition of it. Also doing it with international military partners. It does not have a long tradition of training and exercising with civilians.

Very often, there was sort of a prop, the empty chair. The civilian, the charity, the NGO. The State Department official. One of the things we have as our goal, and it's actually happening, is to get civilians into the exercise process right now, and it's a little bit how, you know, dogs in a park socialize. They get to know each other better. They usually come out a little different. I was down at Joint Forces Command recently, and the military guys really--we have civilians around, they learn a lot, and it's our belief that when they go into the field, they're going to be a lot more effective in dealing with the civilians for, you know, common goals.

**MR. MENARCHIK:** We look forward to this. USAID in fact has been pushing this process. As you may or may not know, we created an Office of Military Affairs within USAID, first time in our history. I'm the head of the Military Policy Board. We are pushing for creation of our Civilian Reserve Corps, we hope to do these contingencies, so that they will be up and running and trained, so that when the crisis occurs, the civilians could walk arm in arm as the conflict proceeds in development, and proceed at the same time.

We also need flexible funding. Right now, I have no pot of money that I can go to support these kind of activities. We have sliced out a very small amount of money in this year's budget to address pop up, fragile state problems that occur, but it's way too small to do our business properly, but we can get together now, talk out the issues, I think we'll be much better prepared with our Department of Defense.

Your question, sir, on the MCC. It's an independent organization just like USAID is an independent organization. We were very supportive of the concept. It is a concept that's

based upon commitment, will, and a willingness to reform by the country that wants to sign the compact.

I would argue it takes a year or two for the process to get up and running, for the countries to come on board, to understand the system, to have the compact signed and the process to work out under the leadership of Ambassador Danilovich, that this thing is on track, that you will see compacts being signed and development actually occurring.

Within our own USAID White Paper, it says that USAID will provide support to MCC compacts in the transition. So USAID will be a supportive mechanism for MCC, and USAID happened to be collated in these countries.

We think it's a good concept, it's a presidential initiative, it is kind of a "talk graduating piece," if you will, from gradual state transformational development to a graduation process. These folks are the ones that say they are committed, they have the will to do the reform, and they will actually carry it out. Those are the kind of folks that you want to put your development money into cause you can expect them to take over their own responsibilities for their own people and for their own development and they will be able to stand alone quicker.

**MS. WONG:** If I can go to the first question that was posed. I think the civilian side of the government certainly does not want to add any additional weight to the military partners, who feel that they have to play what could be seen as traditional development of diplomatic roles. So there is an onus on our shoulder, the weight is on our shoulders to try to meet that challenge and fill that gap. Again it's a resource issue. But then it's also an issue of who do you have and how are you using them.

So I think, you know, certainly inside the Department of State, or efforts now to use our presence overseas in different dynamic ways, you know, I hate to say it to my colleagues in Western Europe, but we're drawing them down, we're going to put them now in places that need to have an American presence and a chance to work it on the field, to build consensus out there.

The language? I studied in the Foreign Service Russian and Japanese. I'm not so sure about Japan's status as a fragile state right now. But language incentives, how we take our

people who are coming now, how we recruit. So we know that we've got a huge task ahead of us. Secretary Rice is quite seized with this, and I think all this feeds into everything we talked about today, feeds into the broader agenda of transformation, and transformation diplomacy.

I think as we recognize the gaps here, we certainly are clearing that up in the international community too. We hope with, for instance, the European Union, to look at the work they've done on their civilian rosters, having trained with them, how we build this interoperability.

On the State lead, that's critical, you have to have that first, but the whole idea transformational diplomacy, bringing in people who may be actually helping us in terms of analysis and monitoring, looking at implementation of programs. The NGOs and the think tanks, the academic communities, are critical of what we've done.

We have a top ten meeting list. But we certainly look to the outside community, because again, we shouldn't be creating anything, I mean there should be--we are trying to look at what's been done, try to refine it and try to improve it, and we will be offering new tools because what we had as a government were in escrow.

But the fact that there is a lot of momentum out there right now in the NGO community we've been reaching out to. We introduce NGOs into military exercises. We've been working with, for instance, Alan Marbury [ph], post-graduate, Naval School, did a week-long exercise last August which brought in seven or eight NGOs with us and the military. Again, just how you all work in the same space, how you communicate, how you share challenges.

**MR. PATRICK:** Thank you very much. Unless any of the panelists has any further comments, I just want to thank you again for being able, for being willing to come here, and to offer just candid comments, and best of luck to all of you, Doug, Marcia and Jeff as you continue this extremely difficult and challenging assignment you've got. Thank you very much.

[Applause]

[End tape 2; start tape 3.]

## **PANEL 2**

**MR. SCHEAR:** We had a terrific opening panel looking at many new initiatives being developed here in Washington, and then we're going to try and shift gears from a bit of the view from the field and what it all means. Let me just start off with a brief confession. First of all, I am not Victoria Holt. She is unable to be here today and I was delighted to be able to stand in for her on short notice. Secondly, I am a graduate of SAIS. I got a Master's Degree in 1977 at SAIS so this is hallowed ground, and if I speak in hushed reverence that explains it.

I was a pit bull, to use that term of art -- my first pit bullish job actually ties directly to the topic at hand. I was in Cambodia, Phnom Penh, in the spring of 1992, just after the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia was established, to be the custodian for the Paris Accords, and the very frustrated representative of the U.N. Secretary General asked me to come in. Among the items on his action list, would I please go over and have a discussion with the head of his Civil Administration component who was a French administrator. I asked my boss, anything particular on your mind? He said, no, I just have an uneasy feeling about this civil administrative mandate that we have.

So I went over and I met the judge and we had a very nice combination. I said, well, sir, how are things going? He said, well, they're going pretty. We do have three problems. Number one, there are no civil administrations in Cambodia to manage. The actual mandate was to supervise and control Cambodia's civil administrations to ensure a neutral political environment prior to the elections which eventually take place in June 1993. But when we arrived, we, the U.N., and the international community arrived in Phnom Penh, there were buildings and there were ministries, but there was precious little in the way of actual civil administration. That was problem number one.

Problem number two were all the provincial structures, to the extent that worked at all, are populated by Prime Minister Hun Sen's extended family and friends, second cousins supervising and controlling those [inaudible] in fact, the State of Cambodia Party, the Communist Party and political factions pretty much organized civil administration on a separate track. I asked, him what's the third problem? He said, the Khmer Rouge are really ticked off about this whole thing because we are being told you can't actually supervise the State of Cambodia, the

political party, because there are [inaudible] and money was going into the lined pockets of party functionaries.

So given all that, I felt I was going to have a difficult time reporting all this news to my boss, and I was a little side barred by a very large historical episode. But I think it actually does underline an essential problem we face which is the problem of enabling governance, how we support it, how to nurture it, how do we deal with what's there when we arrived and what we want to leave behind is by far the hardest piece. We know how to disarm the warring factions, we know how to do the cease-fires, we know how to provide humanitarian assistance, we know how to do a lot of things, but enabling governance is extremely hard.

My colleagues on this panel this afternoon all share one thing in common, they have seen reality from a field perspective. If they haven't spent most of their careers there, they certainly have been in a position to manage and deal with people in the field. They, therefore, have a good sense of what are the challenges, daily stresses, of working in the field that lay on our folks down range as we would say in the Department of Defense.

Let me introduce our panelists quickly. George Devendorf to my immediate right is the Director of Public Affairs with Mercy Corps. Prior to that, though, he directed the Corps' disaster preparedness, assessment and response efforts worldwide, and he has had considerable work down range in places like Kosovo, Macedonia, Sudan and other venues. I hate to use that word battle space for operating venues, although at the Department of Defense we do

I am also delighted to introduce to my far right Lieutenant Colonel Richard Laquement who is actually chief strategist, I think I can say that, although Jeb was on the first panel. Richard is, among other things, a Ph.D. from Princeton. I hope that wasn't held against him by the Army. Probably you were a Field Artillery officer before you had gotten your Ph.D. He has had a variety of operational assignments including Operation Iraqi Freedom. He was in northern Iraq. He has also been an assistant professor of social sciences at the U.S. Military Academy, and a professor of strategy at the Naval War College.

Finally, my good friend and former colleague Jim Kunder, Assistant Administrator of AID for Asia. Jim has had just about every job that is possible to have in the aid world, in the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance which he managed in the early 1990s, expeditionary office



if there ever was one, and he has worked also in the private sector as an analyst in the NGO would. So we've got a rich view and a variety of perspectives here.

I am going to try a gentler, kinder version of Stewart Patrick's Socratic interrogation.

[Laughter.]

MR. SCHEAR: Just lay out a couple of key questions that I'd like you each to consider in the form of a short response, 5 or 10 minutes, and then maybe we can open it up in the remaining time, there are probably some questions that folks wanted to raise from the first session. And we do have a number of folks in the audience with field experience, and I think would be delighted-- accurate perspective as we go along.

A quick opening question, a soft ball question for each of you. You all come from agencies that pride themselves in being field agencies. In Richard's, it's support for the military in Jim's case it's support the aid provider, and it's the same with George, support the NGO volunteer. In talking to field staffs, what are some of their common concerns and complaints? What do you hear frequently? Do they lack resources? Do they lack guidance? Do they lack information, intelligence? That was the missing from the first discussion, we have the three D's, but we need the "I" there as well, information and intelligence. What is it they need more of?

Secondly, how do they view each other. Richard, how does a U.S. civil affairs officer in Afghanistan view an NGO? How does an aid provider for USAID working on PRT, Jim, how do they view their interagency counterparts?

Finally, in terms of all the new policy initiatives coming from Washington, what is going to make the difference according to you? Is it possible to identify at this early stage those facets of these new initiatives and are they really going to change things for the better?

Why don't we start with those questions? Richard, I think I will ask you to kick it off.

LTC LAQUEMENT: Actually, just briefly I have to circle back to some of these later. One thing that struck me what the folks in the field or the soldiers in the field, the first thing they need is what they weren't prepared for -- whatever title you want to give to them -- stabilization and

reconstruction operations, general term [inaudible] the first thing they want to see is more civilians--the first response.

I'd say lately there kind of a different response you tend to hear [inaudible] embrace the idea of what [inaudible] and these things are natural parts of their mission. This is not just Iraq and Afghanistan, this was Kosovo [inaudible] within the military, and I'll speak specifically for the Army in the 1990s [inaudible] American military culture--20th century and sort of illustrated very strongly if you poll focus groups sort of are divided between those who [inaudible] civilian operations, peacekeeping, missions in the 1990s, were part of our repertoire [inaudible] from what we're supposed to do [inaudible] the result--people now, especially those in the field [inaudible] as part of the repertoire, but then they realize how difficult it is [inaudible] even though we understand we need to do more of this, we need more assistance, and we don't understand the expertise we don't have that needs to be there and do it in a [inaudible] effort [inaudible] we also know that missions take time. So what you hear from the folks particularly that are coming back from Afghanistan or Iraq now is it took me a while to adjust to [inaudible] done pretty well, but now what we need is time, patience [inaudible] how complex these tasks are, how much time they will take, and what are the resources needed [inaudible]

As far as the personal relationships, and I can speak [inaudible] excitement when I went to Iraq in 2003 in that I did have a Ph.D. from Princeton and one of my classmates [inaudible] but that aside, I felt very comfortable dealing with them in the sense that everybody had a very strong mission [inaudible] work to be done, people to be helped, tasks that we all sort of understood [inaudible] found ways to make sure they were in contact with us indirectly [inaudible] places we provide information and they avail themselves [inaudible] wouldn't there be some frustrations. It's not that everything sweetness and light [inaudible] helping us with our mission [inaudible] additional capabilities, assets, in the way [inaudible] our own units approach some of these agencies with you're going to [inaudible] this mission over here and suggest that the [inaudible] integrating them with our force structure created tensions that you can imagine, and it was unrealistic [inaudible] and there were some tensions, but generally speaking [inaudible] so in general I would say they were healthy, but there was also significant room for improvement and [inaudible]

There's really kind of this odd paradox that the military folks like to be left alone and don't want to [inaudible] but at the same time, they insist on very clear definitions of missions and sometimes [inaudible] and sometimes it's verifications and ambiguous situations are resolved by someone else, but at the same time, we [inaudible] watch that play out [inaudible]

MR. KUNDER: Thank you very much. It's an honor to be here. What do the operators want? Somebody that doesn't [inaudible] colleague from AID spoke at an earlier session about the number of bodies we have. He made a mistake. He was generous. He said we had 2,000 Foreign Services at USAID. We have 2,000 employees. We have about 1,100 Foreign Service officers scattered across 80 some countries, sort of a small battalion or something. We need more of them, and I'm shameless about using any forum I can to do whining and special pleading. We talk a lot about boots on the ground, we need Reeboks on the ground. There just aren't enough of them, and we haven't developed the specialized cadres that we now know that we will need in these kinds of circumstances. I can guarantee you, whatever the next country is that falls apart, that we will need people to put the justice system back in place. I guarantee you we will need experts to demobilize fighters and reintegrate them into society. I guarantee you we will need these things.

Where in the U.S. government is the office of DDR, Department of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration? It's not at the Department of Defense, it's not at the Department of State, it's not in USAID. It doesn't exist. So the first thing I think the operators need is more of them, and focus on the specialized skills that we'll need.

The other thing we need, I think strangely enough, George may contradict me, is something close to what Rich just said, what I have felt when I have been in the field and what I think my staff now feels is, need for a clear-cut management model. I am beyond disappointed at what has happened with the Office of CRS at the State Department, and I'm angered. I'm angered because of the cost in us not seizing this opportunity is measured in more deaths and suffering around the world. We need a model. Let's face it. What happens when there's a crisis? A lot of parts of the U.S. government, a lot of parts the civilian nongovernmental agencies, a lot of international agencies, a lot of bilateral donors, all rush in. What happens is some form of

organized chaos. To answer Jim's question, folks get along pretty well in the field. How do they view each other? They view each other with a can-do spirit and let's figure out how to work together by and large. You get bad apples in every barrel, but by and large people get along fine. They respect each other's relative expertise.

But they are thrown together in I'm tempted to say a chaotic management model, but that would imply that there is a management model. What I think we need is some version of what the U.S. military figured out a long time ago, because it's pretty analogous to what's happened under the Goldwater-Nichols Act, you know in a crisis you're going to need some airplanes, you're going to need some boats, you're going to need some guys who jump out of airplanes and some guys with bayonets and all of the rest of this, but how do you form this team? So they've come up with a model of task configuration.

They name a task force commander, and then they have worked out all the systems so you can pull three helicopters and four ships and a battalion of these, and we need to do that on the civilian side of the U.S. government, and then figure out modularly how to do this with our NGO colleagues and our U.N. colleagues and others, ICRC colleagues and so forth.

So I think we need more organization, and we have met the enemy and they are us. We had this model developed, it's the [inaudible] the State Department, and in my view, that office should focus with laser beam intensity on creating the team that will deploy out to the field and provide a ready made management unit, a deployable management unit, that can get the response up and running in a post-conflict situation.

I guess to answer the last question, I would say the same thing, what's happening in Washington that counts out there? Of course, you can always use more bodies, you can use more dollars, but as critical as those are, I think this effort to try to get better organization on the civilian side of the U.S. government is what is happening back here that counts most out there.

MR. DEVENDORF: Also a confession to start off. I also graduated from SAIS about 2 years ago, actually, so it came as no surprise to me that once the effects of the free luncheon wore off, we've lost roughly half of our audience --nevertheless, I'm very happy to be here.

That said, I actually have to really agree with my colleague, Jim, in terms of his thinking on the way the U.S. government exercises its various powers overseas in response to these crises. As a humanitarian and as a U.S. taxpayer, it is very hard to argue against--a more coordinated, more coherent, better focused U.S. government overseas. I think we all benefit from the humanitarian perspective, the challenge or the rub is then how do we manage our relations as independent agencies with official government structures particularly, we should make this clear, in non-permissive or occupation type settings, areas where there is active war fighting going on, where the peacekeeping element is in fact much more active than in the traditional sense. It's in those kinds of environments, as many of you know, where folks who are wearing Reeboks, but maybe Birkenstocks, get particularly nervous and particular uncomfortable and their degree of association real or perceived with [inaudible] forces, whether they speak the same way we do, whether they come from Georgia or Iowa, regardless of that, in those situations, there are in principle and in practice real red lines that exist for members of the humanitarian community with overly or overtly visible forms of collaboration, cooperation, with those military actors.

Again, I would just emphasize that this discussion today is focused very much on the fundamental problem of the tremendous imbalance in the way our government has chosen to resource various arms of the government. As the speakers from the first panel very eloquently put it, we just have a tremendous mismatch. We're talking a half a trillion dollar a year budget, more or less standing budget, for military affairs, and we're looking at an international affairs account that is a tiny slice of that and they come around with maybe a third of that.

So there is a fundamental problem there, so when we talk about CRS, I have to say that my agency, the Mercy Corps and a bunch of others have been lobbying for CRS for the last several years with folks in the administration and elsewhere advocating on behalf of an agency which would seem to sell itself in terms of what it can improve but as you all know apart from what they could shake loose from the Defense Department and the State Department purse, and that's a problem that hasn't changed despite the release of the Presidential Directive which provides all the responsibilities that is an office very much looking for a budget, very much looking for a consistent staffing pattern or a reliable pattern, and more [inaudible] relations with other arms of government. Hopefully that will change. Presumably it will begin to [inaudible] on

the Hill today there is a great deal of skepticism still about whether CRS is the real deal, whether it's the right approach, and whether or not there is another shoe waiting to drop or needing to be dropped in order to scratch this tremendous itch that we have all identified, and that is the lack of capacity on the civilian side of government.

I was a bit long-winded on that one. There are a few complaints from the field but there are also, I guess, questions around what we expect to be the biggest changes from the directives that were handed down. Maybe I should--very briefly and only somewhat glib. One of the largest complaints that you'll hear from my colleagues in the field, particularly in places like Darfur, in Liberia and in the Congo today, is where is the U.S. military? Where are they? Why aren't they here. Then my other colleagues who are working in Afghanistan today and working in Iraq today have a fairly predictable lament and that is, okay, they're here, but why are they acting the way they are? Why are they trying to address and exert themselves in such a broad spectrum of activities, the whole plate of state building and enterprises that we have been talking about? Again, this goes back in many respects to the [inaudible] but nevertheless, this is in some ways schizophrenic, but it is reflective of just how highly selective our government is [inaudible] the level that we're talking about here demand such close interagency cooperation across various department lines.

Actually apart from Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military in particular is not significantly engaged in any of the areas where we work. There about 17 or so U.N. peacekeeping operations ongoing right now in the world involving probably 70- to 75,000 troops or cops, and the U.S. tally or subset of that is somewhere around 400 to 500. So in some ways it's very important for us to talk about, focus on, pick apart our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan from the humanitarian perspective that represents a very, very small percentage of the margins that we work in today and probably will be working in for years to come.

MR. SCHEAR: George, thanks very much. My first temptation would be to ask Richard to respond to George's complaint [inaudible] in terms of not necessarily where the military isn't, because that's really not your call, but where you are. How is this complaint about the

pervasiveness [inaudible] and diversity of the mission, how has that gotten traction and how do you view that from a defense perspective?

LTC LAQUEMENT: I ought to be careful about [inaudible] something I meant to say earlier, too, and this very apropos, a couple [inaudible] when you factor in the civilians and how [inaudible] talking about some very complex operations. That's one of the frustrations at a couple of different levels. There is no doubt that there are problems, there is no doubt that there are great successes and it's very hard to balance the two [inaudible] arguments is the apparent pervasive [inaudible] this is actually a great forum for that [inaudible] speaking for myself and not the institution as a whole of what my experiences are on this. I would say that it does come down to [inaudible] what do we expect to be the biggest changes. I think in addition to getting clearer guidance, we, and I say this as the military [inaudible] and this has a lot to do with Directive 3000, understood that we didn't institutionally prepare maybe as well as we should have, that we created these missions [inaudible] didn't think about the more general fixes we should make. These are cultural, education, training sorts of things. These are situations you're going to encounter and you need to figure out how to deal with it.

So a lot of the complaints I think you'll see from the NGO side are perfectly valid responses to very uneven performance by the military that wasn't prepared for doing things that they really didn't think through. But at some level [inaudible] trying to be helpful to local populations, trying to [inaudible] can-do spirit, but they're probably amateurs in most of these settings and that's one of the parts of being [inaudible] prepared to do those things where other people have spent a lot more time thinking about them and how do we integrate that. And of course, they come back and say, yes, we want those experts, we want the AID folks out there, we want the U.S. government civilians out there. But when they're not there, there are still [inaudible] and people to be fed, and humanitarian challenges [inaudible] we look at with common sense and say this isn't right and we've got to do something about it.

By the way, there's a security [inaudible] that says they actually deal with it better [inaudible] short-term fix and maybe they won't shoot at us, so they'll be likely to be involved in things that are outside of their regular realms of expertise and they don't do them as well. That

was a valid complaint, and I said [inaudible] be careful--trying to do the right thing [inaudible] and we are trying to fix that and say [inaudible] where we are not going to become humanitarian aid workers [inaudible] alone, but you need to understand enough about [inaudible] just sort of charge into a problem [inaudible] right now, and that's hard for military folks [inaudible]

MR. SCHEAR: Could I take the Chair's prerogative to put the issue of intelligence and information on the table? Are your field staffs getting the type of information they need to both [inaudible] the correct diagnosis of a particular problem. Actually, the diagnostic problem goes back in time to the initial decision on whether [inaudible] how to engage or intervene, but having crossed that bridge, so they feel they are getting the right kind of information? Richard, in your case, the standard DIA information or open-source information [inaudible] in terms of the order of battle of the warring factions. Who is shooting who from the military observation on the front line. Jim, in your case, it's sort of the who needs what, it's the humanitarian assessment of how many broken windows are there in Pristina prior to the winter of 1999. George, in your case, it would also be a kind of who need what as well.

My impression is that a lot of field people realize [inaudible] interpreters, but that the information isn't there. So each of you could ponder briefly that and give us a quick response I'd appreciate it.

MR. : If you can let me digress just for a second here, my guess--contemplating this question and the previous question about military-NGO relations, I think it's important to something that the distinguished organizers of this conference said in their introductory letter. Everybody is touching a different part of the [inaudible] there are a lot of aspects of this. I mean, if the NGO-military relations in a fragile state where the only military guys on the ground are the defense attache at the embassy, versus a peacekeeping operation where the military forces that are there are in support of the NGOs, or, and this is where I think we get a lot of confusion, in a coalition environment where the coalition partners are there to [inaudible] and there is a secondary role for the NGOs from the U.S. government's perspective.



Part of what I was thinking is as the previous panel went on, you really have got to pick this thing apart. I think the organizers of this conference if I read this correctly sort of wanted to look at a broad range of issues, and when we asked these individual analytical questions, we've got to know what context we're dealing in to solve the problems, because I think what befuddles much analysis in this area is we keep trying to take on the whole ball of wax. How are we going to make the U.N. work? How are we going to make the NGOs work? How are we going to work on civil-military relations? How are we going to prevent state collapse? How are we going to patch them back together once they collapse? It's just too much.

So I'm going to answer your question in the context of immediate post-state collapse and how--

[Tape change.]

MR. : [In progress]--cultural differences between the various institutions that show up, like Rich alluded to earlier. There are security issues related to the military talking to the NGOs and me talking to the U.N. agencies and so forth. My sense is that that's why it's critical to construct a team ahead of time that works together and deploys together and that begins to solve the problem of some of these cultural barriers or communications barriers, and it begins to work through the problems of getting the right information to the right people on the eve of the [inaudible] invasion. NGOs were actually invited to U.S. Central Command headquarters in Tampa. They had to camp outside the fence, but there was an attempt to try to break down some of these institutional barriers on information and intelligence exchange, and that's all to the good. But I don't think they're going to really solve those kinds of problems until you create a deployable team that cuts across all these institutions and that team deploys together at the beginning of a crisis. I'm sorry to come back to a structural issue, but I think structural issues are at the core of all of these issues.

MR. : I guess there are at least two arenas if not more that [inaudible] information sharing and intelligence, do we need as much as we need to know to do our jobs well. Two come to mind, one [inaudible]

The second is within the international community the response mechanism within the international community [inaudible] there is so much getting to know you involved that [inaudible] spend a great deal of time just trying to figure out who's to your left and to your right, let alone [inaudible] on this particular question of civil-military relations, NGO-military relations, I think there is some good news [inaudible] the good news is that the kind of getting to know you process that we have been talking about has been ongoing for quite a long time, at least in the 10 to 15 years very intensively, and it has involved a great deal of effort both on the DOD side [inaudible] and then with the NGO community and manifests itself in seemingly endless seminars, games, operations, joint operations, as essentially rehearsals, both in this town and through additional [inaudible] around the world. That's an ongoing process and one which most NGOs, at least most U.S. NGOs, that find themselves deployed in these kinds of environments are open to pursuing, and in fact, the Colonel [inaudible] a group that meets every couple months specifically to try as much as possible to identify the broad outline of a framework for [inaudible] communities can identify what we're likely to do in [inaudible] scenario, where our red lines exist [inaudible] such that when we get into an actual emergency or an operation overseas we don't have to spend a great deal of time trying to [inaudible] we already have a fairly good sense of where our two communities will shake out, and that's a valuable process.

On the [inaudible] it's often times a different story, particularly, again, in nonpermissive or dangerous environments, whether it may be an ongoing conflict or combat operations. In that sense, often times I think it is very attractive to think if we only learned to communicate better, if we were just more effective in explaining what we were there to do, why we were planning to do it, the NGO side and the military side on the other could really resolve pretty much all of the issues on the table. The fact of the matter is, although we can learn to communicate better, in those kinds of environments there is fundamentally a cats and dogs aspect to the way of taking [inaudible] approach on why we're there.

I would argue that's a good thing and it's worth doing that, and I would argue that in general in terms of the [inaudible] effectiveness of the international response [inaudible] strength of diversity--diversity of approaches and independence is critical to that, particularly in a tense environment. But as well, as a humanitarian, it's our firm believe that that form of

separation ultimately, particularly the [inaudible] separation, is what ensures and helps to ensure the safety of our personnel [inaudible] very practical level it's often times in our eyes a matter of personal security, and, hence, a very [inaudible] issue for the NGO community.

MR. SCHEAR: Could I press you on that just a little bit having [inaudible] earlier? I have heard many humanitarians say that neutrality and impartiality is the key to my operational effectiveness. I have to cross the front line in a battle zone, if I've seen [inaudible] that's the cat side [inaudible] but is it also true that within your community there are NGOs [inaudible] that are doing things which are humanitarian but more than humanitarian? I'm thinking, for example, of the delivery of governance assistance for state building purposes. It's one thing to be aspired to neutrality if you're just medical care or food to [inaudible] population of each side [inaudible] extremely well. But there are humanitarian organizations that are out there building schools, helping to enable local administrators on behalf, by the way, of elected national governments, say in Kabul, which may be viewed in different ways by the population [inaudible] if you're building or refurbishing a school for girls in Kandahar, that is a kind of humanitarian activity which is going to be seen by different ways within the surrounding community. It may be polarizing. Totally separately is whether you're working next to a guy with a gun in a green short, but it's going to be polarizing.

So I guess my question for you is what are the differences within your humanitarian community? Is the quality of the assistance provided a factor in whether you choose to be neutral and separate or partisan and part of the operation?

MR. DEVENDORF: An excellent question, and a tough one, and one we could really talk about for the rest of the afternoon, but in short, let me just take a stab at this.

You used the term neutrality, and that's one that is often ascribed to NGO actions. In reality, very few major NGOs that operate in contentious environments these days ever refer to their work as neutral [inaudible] recognized some time ago that by our mere presence and the fact that we bring resources and that we work generally speaking against the status quo in terms of the situation we're engaged in, we can't drape ourselves in that cloth. So if you look at some of the

primary documents that help motivate and guide NGO like the NGO Code of Conduct, the term neutrality is not even mentioned in that Code of Conduct.

What we do tend to harp on are terms like impartiality, independence [inaudible] those are the operative terms for us [inaudible] independence and visible [inaudible] that is not being perceived as a tool or an integral part of an extraneous or I should say foreign political or military operation of some kind.

So that's how we tend to view our work. Afghanistan is a tough example because it is not really a post-conflict environment. Is Afghanistan today post-conflict? Not in the areas where we work, or at least half of them. In other areas where we work, you could argue that where we're building agricultural schools to help train the next generation of Afghan farmers in several different areas. In other parts of the country, our expatriates, frankly, can't even visit our project sites. So it's very tough to generalize about that type of operating environment, but it points out how political of an actor or how political the nature of your activities assume in a more developmentally oriented environment is a good one and one that represents a bit of [inaudible] in our community [inaudible]

I will just say though that Afghanistan is also an interesting example because it is today the most deadly area [inaudible] who are members of the NGO community [inaudible] my agency but also my community has lost more folks in Afghanistan over the last 3 or 4 years than by far anywhere else. And so these questions of why is that so--and by the way, these aren't road traffic accidents, this is intentional violence, these are direct attacks against staff in the far majority of the cases. Theft is not [inaudible] again, it's much more political in nature. And in the far majority of the cases it's our national staff that comes [inaudible] than any of the expatriates. But it's because of the threats in that kind of environment that we tend to focus as strongly as we do on our role and how it is perceived by locals on the ground.

MR. KUNDER: About 3 days after I arrived in Kabul right after the Taliban left, some NGO reps came to talk to the USAID director and a couple of NGOs came to talk to me and said we have a real problem. We got these military guys dressed in Afghan garb with beards on walking around the marketplace in downtown Kandahar. That's what my guys looked like, my NGO guys looked

like. Clearly, the local Taliban remnants don't distinguish between Westerns who are Special Forces guys and Westerns who are Mercy Corps guys, and you're going to get some of my NGOs killed [inaudible] so I go talk to the general on the scene and he gives me a different compelling argument which was, in short form, when the Taliban starts wearing regulation uniforms for my snipers at 300 meters, we'll start wearing uniforms for your snipers at 300 meters. That's a pretty compelling argument as well. So it's a very difficult issue to sort out.

Jim, you're raising a very profound, philosophical question, I'd back to I think you've got to pull this thing apart, you've got to desegregate. It was pretty clear to me in Afghanistan what the answer to that question was. I sided with the U.S. military. Actually, we worked it out so that everybody at least wore a little insignia on their civilian clothes, a military insignia, but that's a coalition environment. The U.S. government is there to win a war. I'm not neutral between the views of the Taliban and the views of the Karsai government on the question of building girls' schools in rural Kandahar. The Karsai government wants to build girls' schools in Kandahar, the Taliban wants to burn them. They believe that women should be kept in medieval bondage. This is a basic human rights issue.

So my point of view is, if any NGO shows up and takes the U.S. government's money in this--by the way, I'm a former officer of Save the Children Federation, so I'm not trying to step on the NGOs, but my view this is a coalition environment, we're there fighting a war, we got a point of view. Our point of view is that we're supporting the International Declaration of Human Rights which says girls in rural Kandahar have a right to education. This is not a neutral situation.

Taking that to Bosnia or many other peacekeeping environments, what is the role of the international community? The international community has taken the situation as a right for conflict resolution, we're there to bring peace between the warring factions and to meet the humanitarian needs of the people, and the peacekeeping forces that are there are there support that effort. Then you're in a different situation. Then we are in fact neutral between the parties.

I know what I just said could be roundly contested if we had three days to talk this through, but I think you've got to pick apart what question you're trying to answer, and that's something that I think has befuddled this analysis as well is the last two big examples that we're

burdened with, Iraq and Afghanistan, having coalition environments and then 10 years of experience before that was primarily characterized by peacekeeping.

MR. : I'll just add [inaudible] to pull the two together, the environment [inaudible] and the environment of these two big operations, where I saw the coherence in these is that these were-- the big conventional word [inaudible] World War II, Desert Storm model [inaudible] it was thinking very clearly about enemies, and it's a very general and unsophisticated view of warfare or conflict [inaudible] the way the American military has dealt with it [inaudible] includes sometimes local populations [inaudible] partly on the intelligence side is getting out the order of battle made that was [inaudible] and it was more about intelligence about local populations, cultural awareness, knowing the environment where you're operating, so that you would start to make distinctions between those who may or may not be inclined to bite your nose who are looking for a different way to engage.

Then just to push this about the [inaudible] very, very good point [inaudible] made a very good point about what tends to happen with the level of violence and the participants that are engaged, to say that [inaudible] situations like Afghanistan or Iraq [inaudible] is to prevent that [inaudible] they are the ones on the ground and so that's partly where it's--we can't set it aside and say we don't do that because precisely what the enemy is trying to do is create those unstable environments. But those are ones where now [inaudible] everybody's roles are very different in how well they can operate, and that's what I think we're struggling with, is that [inaudible] the military roles we played in the 1990s where we were sort of [inaudible] and connecting the two, so these are the same tasks with different conflict environments, and that's why it's not a 3-year response, it's a 15-year or even [inaudible]

MR. SCHEAR: I'd open this up now to the audience

MR. : Thanks. Just on this point--Jim raises a good point, and that is essentially [inaudible] we're all on the same team and the discussion tends to follow from that initial premise. Sometimes [inaudible] sometimes it's inferred. Again, I would just point out that from a military

perspective we have trouble getting to the dot, dot, dot in that type of discussion simply because although we, as I mentioned at the outset [inaudible] more unified U.S. government approach, or an international community approach for that matter in crises, that is a bit of an inverse relationship between the degree to which the governmental suppliers are unified, and by governmental I mean military and civilian, and the degree to which members [inaudible] of the NGO community will want to distance themselves at least visibly from that more and more unified governmental effort in contentious environments. So it doesn't mean we're all on the same team.

But it also does mean that we're not all in many cases working towards similar ends in most cases [inaudible] In Iraq over the last several years, a number of agencies including mine and including Jim's former agency using USAID money have been implementing extraordinarily successful community level infrastructure and forming a civil society [inaudible] program with relatively speaking peanuts [inaudible] but according to a recent inspector general's report, this program has been exceedingly successful in meeting these objectives, completing projects, and doing so on budget and on time.

Why is that? And why has it been a program, again, run by several NGOs with USAID money unarmed, outside the wire working day to day with community representatives has been able to do in some respects, and I hope this doesn't sound like I'm tooting our own horn, what a lot of the other implementing mechanisms inside Iraq today have been singularly unable to do? And I'll just focus on it at a community level [inaudible] national level which is a much tougher nut to crack. But why is that? And I think we would argue quite strongly that it is our approach and the way we've looked it, we've managed our relationship [inaudible] relationship to official actors inside Iraq is essential to that.

MR. SCHEAR: We will now open up for general discussion. I would ask you only to keep your questions brief and to the point, and identify yourself. I believe there are roving mikes. We'll try the Stewart Patrick approach of [inaudible] questions. Is that right? I believe we have one right here down front. In fact, we have two questioners right here.

MS. THOMAS: I am Melissa Thomas [ph]. I am associate professor for international development here at SAIS, and I've worked for a number of years as a governance specialist on the ground in assessing [inaudible] my question is for Mr. Kunder. We have talked a lot today about the need for boots, Reeboks and Birkenstocks on the ground for USAID. My question is, right now the way USAID operates is largely through consultants through subcontractors. There is expertise on rebuilding justice systems, but I think in the consultant and contractor community, and I USAID has mechanisms for calling in people quickly [inaudible] contracts. Can you explain why those existing mechanisms in that way of tapping expertise is not adequate and why it has to now be incorporated in USAID's budget as direct USAID [inaudible] thank you.

MR. KUNDER: I don't want to go too far [inaudible] on this one, but here is the way I would answer that question, especially in these kinds of intense circumstances, post-conflict and so forth. My parent-teacher association at my son's school is sort of an ad hoc group. We get together and we don't have very many standard operating procedures. The D.C. Police on the other hand because when you need them you need them and you want them to be trained, it's not an ad hoc group. I think in most intense occupational specialties in life, whether it's the [inaudible] the Police Department, the chemical spill apparatus, the U.S. military, you need people who have the right intelligence, who have the right training, who have a team mentality, and when you need them you need them and you want them quickly [inaudible] think it's some sort of neurosis that we have on the civilian side of the U.S. government that even though we're surrounded by the need for teams of officers who can talk to each other in most of the intense operations in life, we think we can pull it together on a roster.

You wouldn't do this with the D.C. Fire Department. You wouldn't say let's just a roster and when there's a fire we'll start calling people to come to the station and maybe some won't remember how to operate the bump. We wouldn't do the 82nd Airborne on a roster. But I've got an idea, let's do the civilian crisis response in the U.S. government on a roster, and let's have some contractors, and let's have some NGOs, and let's have some guys who are retired recalled. It's insanity, and that's why you've got the problems, in my view, that you've got with the Coalition Provisional Authority when we first landed in Iraq. They were great people. They



were dedicated people. They worked 24 hours a day [inaudible] pulling them from all over the place. They'd never worked together before.

I realize and I often argue myself that it is a huge asset for USAID to have these contract [inaudible] because we can draw on expertise around Washington and around the United States and great business leaders and others, and that's a plus. But in this environment that we're talking about in this conference, that's not what you need. You need 100 guys that you can order to the next crisis site to already have their communications gear and their contract and all that ready. And most important, they've worked together. That's what we've been talking about, they're not meeting each other at the crisis site. So that would be my short answer to what you were saying.

MR. JOSEPH: Thank you, Jim. It's great to be listening here to this distinguished panel. My name is Ed Joseph [ph]. I've worked for about 10 years in the Balkans and a short stint in Iraq and Haiti after that. If I could just make an observation and pose it as a question and see whether anyone on the panel agrees, a slightly different perspective, that this whole effort to bring coherence, to improve communication, coordination and I think is all very well and good. My own experience in the Balkans, though, would suggest that it's really secondary, and I think it's more to keep it in some perspective. That is, the really important things remain the strategic contacts, the decisions. For example, in Bosnia you would have had the best civilian-military in the world in 1996, but if the military was operating in a mission creep context in which the Serbs would have to be run out of Sarajevo in which there was no effort to [inaudible] and so forth, it's we have to just bear in mind what we're talking about [inaudible] it's important to improve the communication is important, but you have to remember the real critical decisions are the strategic ones, the decisions about what to do [inaudible]

I think that also holds true on the effort that the panel hasn't touched on but it's related to this, the very diligent effort to try and learn lessons from these different and disparate experiences, and the problem and the risk with that is it carries the assumption that are alike enough to apply these lessons. And really if you look at [inaudible] or not, just a quick example, Bosnia and Kosovo, where Bosnia was not [inaudible] law and order priority, but Kosovo was,

Iraq was [inaudible] these things is to apply and understand things to the specific context [inaudible] perhaps don't, perhaps believe that it's more important to once you bring the coherence that will improve the strategic decision making.

MR. : I'm [inaudible] and I've spent the last 10 years doing what was capacity building, but I could never tell AID that, in Ukraine and Georgia trying to make the Executive Branch of the governments work better. I'm been sitting here listening to this and coming up with a whole set of problems that I can't really define, but let me try to do [inaudible] ask two questions.

First of all, it strikes me that we've got two different subjects going on here. One is about state failure which is probably [inaudible] hard to define it until you've seen it. The second is what you do to put the state back together after it's failed. The suggestion that was just made that teams should be ready to go out and if there are common problems [inaudible] except that at the moment the folks who are working for in my experience USAID, MCC, USDA and everybody else, including myself, suffer from being amateurs. That is, there are people whose careers are not made in a place, they are either made in a generic specialty which they then hope they can apply despite the context. Or they're people who are spending a short period of time some place. In 10 years overseas I had three different sets of AID managers in both places I worked which meant three different sets of people who had to understand what I was doing, what country it was they wound up in, what the local hires who were the [inaudible] were telling them. Therefore, you wound up with a situation where very well-intentioned, very intelligent, very skilled people never really got a very good handle on things because their career incentives and their organizational incentives were not aimed at doing things [inaudible] they were aimed at doing things generically, but then mostly doing things [inaudible] therefore, it strikes me that you have a real problem of organization [inaudible] somewhat contrary to what the professor [inaudible] used to say, I think [inaudible] but I do think you do need to address the question of how you can produce incentives not just for the contract community which does have expertise, and the academic community which has expertise, but for the folks who have to manage and organize all this that it does not simply wind up being not so much related to the immediate task as some generic thing which ultimately runs contrary [inaudible]

MR. SCHEAR: There are a number of points embedded in here, intervention. Let me ask our panelists respond to that one and the previous one. Richard?

LTC LAQUEMENT: [Inaudible] harkens back to I think the first question I think it was on the previous panel [inaudible] there is the sense that [inaudible] interaction that goes in [inaudible] honor in some cultures is worth fighting about [inaudible] there is interaction, what your objectives are, and this is where you can [inaudible] beyond a lot of our control [inaudible] mindful of what those strategic decisions represent to the people with whom we're interacting and being mindful of trying to figure out of how they are going to respond, I think that is kind of a generic [inaudible] but you need to be open to [inaudible] and this is the intelligence part, it's not really about [inaudible] it's going to be about perceptions and responses to policies, some of which goes back to [inaudible] so there are a lot of ways to respond to that [inaudible] being more mindful of that interaction, who are you dealing with, these are other human beings, what are you trying to accomplish, and how good they respond.

MR. : If I take the first question, I guess I would accept the point that our overall objectives, what we're trying to accomplish, do we have the strategic calculus correct, sort of trumps organization on the ground--accept that point and we can do what we can do--what we're discussing here. Although I would argue that part of making the right decisions at the senior levels back here is having some unified vision of what's actually happening out there and that maybe I'm repeating some of what was discussed earlier, but certainly part of the CRS discussion is not simply a question of getting the right technical people on the ground, the justice experts and the demining experts and all the rest of us, but it was the notion that there would be a locus for strategic planning within the U.S. government.

Nobody is perfect. The U.S. military is not perfect, but the U.S. military does a much better job of recognizing that you've got to staff out a strategic plan. Somebody has got to be given the explicit responsibility for developing a strategic plan. We don't think we need to do that on the civilian side of the U.S. government. We have ad hoc [inaudible] somebody asked a question in the earlier session, doesn't the NSC have a role in this? Of course. Many of you

probably know more about this than I do, but basically if you haven't been to the NSC recently, you have one guy for East Asia and one guy for South Asia, and they're not going to come up with a strategic operational plan for Afghanistan.

So my argument would be that a joint interagency team properly staffed with strategic planners and given the explicit task of--

[End tape 3; start tape 4.]

[In progress]--but I completely agree with you that we tend to have great people [inaudible] is one of our agricultural experts, so we flew him into Iraq to look at food issues. But what I would argue is that if you have a team of folks who know their career path is to be [inaudible] on that basis.

MR. : --always seemed to me the conclusion that we need to invest in some cadre of individuals who will form a team for ready deployment.

MR. : Hopefully, at least tangentially, a relevant response to the question of strategy, and just to comment on the short-term lengths that we often are forced into adopting for political and military objectives in these emergencies, given the enormous expense, the attention and investment in them.

And as a student of [inaudible] from this institution, I was just reminded of her mantra, "pace and scale." The fact of the matter is [inaudible] is not maybe so much Ukraine [?], but looking at Afghanistan today. The kind of issues and the kind of challenges we're trying to tackle are apparently, and frustratingly, long-term ones that require sustained attention, funding, staffing, continuity of that staffing to see it through.

A perfect example of this is the state of the poppy economy in Afghanistan today. Poppy production went up last year. It'll be higher this year.

That's just despite all the international intention and focus on [inaudible] in Afghanistan, fueling the conflicts there for terrorism, and so forth.

These are really, in many cases, if not intractable, just plain difficult challenges to tackle, and I'm of course always tempted to point to electrification in Iraq. Never mind electrification in Iraq. Electrification in Kosovo. It's been six years. I was there a month ago.

Most of the folks outside Pristina had between three and four hours of electricity per day in the dead of winter, six years after we were there.

And there's no one blowing up power relay stations [inaudible].

So I think it's just important to keep in mind there are different challenges that require long-term approaches.

MR. SCHEAR: A question back here. Sir?

QUESTION: Frank Kozik [ph], Frank Kozik [inaudible] International. I hope my comments don't seem too awkward for the group. I want to thank [inaudible] and the people up there, because in the last 60 days in the city, you're starting to get discussions. People like yourselves are wrestling with very real issues and if we don't, we're not going to get out of the box. I'm very pleased about what's happening. I'm pleased about the questions.

Yes, there are lots of amateurs out there. Some of us are 45 years in the business, amateurs; we're still amateurs. But I want to just focus on one thing.

It's very encouraging, the prior panel, and what you folks are saying about trying to get people together.

These situations of counterinsurgency--I'd rather use that word than failed states and all the rest of it, because that's what Afghanistan is.

We need to work together. We need development. We need defense. We need diplomacy. We've got legs on the stool and there's government people and there's civilian people with all kinds of expertise.

But what you don't have, in my mind, is a top on the stool. These environments are tough enough without being totally stupid, and I use that term lightly, because when you're out there in Afghanistan the poppy is going to be bigger this year, and if we don't legalize it, it's going to kill us all.

When you build a school house--I know, Jeb, you're doing what you're told to do. Somebody somewhere in the world has a policy that girls should go to school, and I believe absolutely in that. So do most Afghan.

But if you're down there in a little back valley, in the neoconservative area of Roozdon [ph] or Kadahar, of Upper Hella [ph], or Fakran [ph] or something, you had better build two buildings and not put a sign on either one, and hope one is used for boys, or males, and the other for females. If they put sheep in the other one, walk away folks because it isn't time yet.

Teachers are getting killed down there and beheaded because some foreigner has a policy that girls should go to school in Bagram or Suntime [ph] or some of these other places. And you put Mercy Corps at risk, you put us at risk, you put all of us at risk, when we have policies that are totally stupid.

The DPR [ph] is a wonderful program. You're going to demobilize combatants. There's over 500,000 combatants in Afghanistan and the only ones we demobilized were about 40-, 50,000, have all been friendlies. So we've created a vacuum, folks. Thank you.

What we should be doing is putting everybody on the payroll who has arms and let them protect their villages and get the foreign military out of there.

Now what do I know about this? I started in the mid sixties with AID, I came out of the military in North Thailand, Laos, and we had a successful program, but we couldn't afford to do things that were stupid. We couldn't afford to pursue America [inaudible].

MR. : [inaudible].

[Laughter]

MR. : We couldn't afford to pursue American domestic policies and collection interests over there in that environment. I wouldn't be standing here today if we did. So I just wanted to not be too harsh, but I wanted to encourage people to keep thinking, not about symptoms. You're arguing whether or not the military should wear flip-flops or the Mercy Corps should wear combat boots.

You know, that's not the argument. You're all going to be out there together, just like we were in the old days. One-third of AID used to be military. So there wasn't any discussion about whether it was military or State. We had the same kind a folks at Mercy Corps all over the place. We were all members of one team.

MR. : [inaudible].

MR. : I will. But I want to go back to the lid on the stool. None of us was confused about what the objective was and we all worked as hard as we could to make it happen and it didn't take a lot of money, and we got the military out, and the one thing we haven't talked about is the local people themselves. In that case, the Thai and the Lao.

I n this case, the Afghans. They're totally capable of managing their own environment. Then we've got to stop screwing about. Thank you.

MR. SCHEAR: I'll let the panel ponder that one and as we go for a last round, I see Christa [inaudible] right there.

QUESTION: I just wanted to, for total disclosure, I work for SCRS. A question I have for everyone on the panel, actually, is one that hasn't been really touched on today. It wasn't certainly touched on by the first panel.

And that is that this presumption that if we just get it right, if we just get enough people trained up and ready, and on standby to be deployed, and if each of the parts of the U.S. Government actually talk to each other better, and if we work together better, then we will solve some problems in the countries that we're going to.

What I would like to hear from the panelists is how do we actually, up front, before we agree on a common objective, actually work together to understand the problems.

How do we identify those? How do we use each agency's individual capabilities and perspectives on a problem, and then bring it together and agree on common objectives and common fixes?

MR. SCHEAR: Thank you. I think you've raised the question of rightness, and the previous one, actually, a good point about local attitudes and not being paternalistic, i think are big issues here. We've got to questions here. Sir, I'm going to ask you, and then Stewart, and then I think we're going to go back to our panel for final comments.

QUESTION: My name is [inaudible] retired, full-time staff, in Alexandria, Virginia, working both the Washington and The World Bank in some of the troubled areas like Haiti. We talk about getting the job done, it seems this is what the emphasis has been, but I think we haven't defined what the job is in each of the countries concerned.

And how this job is perceived by, if you wish, the opposing forces in specific countries. And as long as we don't invest enough in understanding that, and this was the case in Haiti, you didn't address enough to understand what the contributing forces in Haiti were, you will not get the job done.

The next issue that I raise has to do with the question of trying to focus too much on the efficiency of the U.S. Government institutions as opposed to the perception, the competencies of the countries in which we are operating. What do we know about their skills? What do we know about their needs, and what do we know about what makes them tick?

MR. SCHEAR: Thank you very much. Stewart?

MR. PATRICK: Thank you. My question, I actually have two questions, one for Jim and one for Richard. My first question is about the difficulty of building institutions. As you know, there's a lot of pathologies that accompany large interventions and aid interventions, and a lot of those included creating parallel public sectors, creating situations where most of the resources are going to contractors and not really building on any indigenous capacity at all, and I'd be interested, Jim, in your reflections on Afghanistan but also anywhere else that comes to mind, on whether or not we actually can get any better at doing that.

You know, are we building clinics and schools, to take one example, that don't have doctors and teachers, for instance? Are there ways that we could be using indigenous capacities, in developing indigenous capacities more, because obviously that's the key to our, quote, unquote, exit strategy.

The second question is to Rich. I know that there are efforts to implement the civilian operations doctrine at DOD, and then there's also a new counterinsurgency manual.



I was wondering what the daylight is between those two things, and when does one know that one's gone from one to the other?

I recall when I was in the State Department, a lot of debates about how we're going to describe people, anti-coalition militants in Afghanistan, whether or not these were, quote, unquote, terrorists, or could we actually call them insurgents?

I'd be interested in your reflections on that, and also, if you could, you know, there's been a lot of talk about CERP funds and, you know, basically walking around money, in some ways, military commanders very entrepreneurial in their use of those, and have done a lot of great things, but there are questions about sort of the long-term sustainability of that.

I

MR. SCHEAR: [inaudible]. First up.

MR. KUNDER: Those are all good questions, that we can have a 3-day workshop on each one of them. I mean, I think if I understand some of what Frank and this gentleman here were saying, and maybe what Stewart's saying as well, I mean, I can't guarantee good policy. I mean, maybe we ought to have a separate workshop on--if there is a structural solution to good policy, that maybe we should be addressing, revising the national security act, or something like that.

I mean, how can we reconfigure U.S. policy making to better understand what makes Haiti tick? I mean, it's a big, big question. I guess I'm trying to pound this a little bit more to conflict situations and in those situations, I'm not sure why things might have worked better in northern Thailand than they do now, but I think it's broken now, and at least in my bounded world, the best thing we could do is designate some group of people who are thinking about what we, the U.S. Government, should do if we're sent to, fill in the blank, the next crisis area of the world, and that would certainly address all of the questions that people are raising.

I mean, what makes the society tick? What might we do wrong? What parallel economies might we create? How might we have negative unintended consequences? And et cetera, et cetera.

And I don't pretend that simply by putting together a team of a 100 people, that we're going to solve all those problems.

But my sense is that if--I hate to say any country--Country X, we had some inkling that it was going to fall apart three months from now, my argument is that there's no focal point now within the U.S. Government to start thinking about what we might do and what makes Country X tick, and what might be appropriate U.S. intervention, and what might we leave alone because The World Bank is doing it? Et cetera, et cetera.

Now there are analysts all around the U.S. Government thinking about Country X. But I think that in this topic, you know, addressing state failure, that it would help to have a group of people targeted with asking these questions ahead of time.

So I have a relatively, you know, humble objective here, and it clearly does not address all of these much bigger questions about getting the policy right, initially. But I think this notion of having a team tasked with doing strategic planning and immediate response would increase the probabilities of helping make the policy a little bit better.

LTC LACQUEMENT: I'll take, sort of start with Stewart's question [inaudible] even within a general framework, I think it ties into the things I've been saying, a lot of things I've been saying. Stability operations in the way the directive actually [inaudible] Secretary Rumsfeld basically [inaudible] stability operations. This is kind of the only one that I--and actually the Army probably [inaudible] and that is kind of two main things the military force, [inaudible] forces do.

One, that we're unique in doing it. Nobody else [inaudible] has used organized violence or the threat of organized violence to confront us with. However, the Army, and Marines, in particular, tend to operate on land, where there are people, and we are a--our society and international law dictates that we deal with the population in certain ways. So when we go anywhere, we're looking to represent certain values and actually promulgate them, and they're usually stated in the policy, outright, whether it's democratization or stability, whatever the objective is.

But it's these other things that the military, armed forces can influence, and that's partly by what we do. We don't do much [inaudible] influence population negatively [inaudible] building roads, providing some services, making, in the case of [inaudible] that may have a positive influence and value in terms of accomplishing our objectives.

And this goes to that larger policy part, to say we have to be realistic and sort of clear in terms of implementation, of what the risks are, and this is really the best I can do at the military level--what most of us who are executing policy do, is to under the policies [inaudible] and that we are given paths to execute them, we have to try to do our best to articulate what it is we can and can't do. Sometimes [inaudible] look--the risk [inaudible] detail this risk, and if they say do it anyway, that's our job. But I think articulating, that requires a much better understanding than we have tended to--we've tried to make it clear-cut. [inaudible] where the lines are in there.

And I would say on a more general point of--and [inaudible]--that we had this very general concept of what warfare, what conflict is, and that we're doing a much better job now [inaudible] there's a conflict spectrum, and [inaudible] peacekeeping because they're deterring violence, or they're, you know, [inaudible] they're good for defeating enemies who are challenging values we hold dear.

And then the last thing I'd say is that we tend to--there's a spectrum of policy [inaudible] has all the time. We always have these very high aspirations [inaudible] true throughout our history, and I use the Civil War as the example [inaudible].

We had union, and we had freed [?] the slaves. and we sort of had a social revolution about the South in mind. When we got the union and got to the end of the battle, we kind of let the social revolution slide over the course of 12 years, I would say, till 1877, and then I think we finally realized the social revolution in 1965, the Civil Rights Act, through other processes, not [inaudible].

But [inaudible] realizing we have these aspirations. That was after even the Civil War, the emancipation and social revolution in the South, that we then chose [inaudible] once the fighting stopped. And I think we see that in a sense of these [inaudible] the nature of dealing with politics, in general, and particularly [inaudible] that includes war or a compact.

MR. SCHEAR: George, final thoughts?

MR. DEVENDORF: I would just pick up on Crista's question that relates to our ability to accurately diagnose the situation on the ground, and that requires a level of detail and sophistication that oftentimes, frankly, we don't have. Christa and her colleagues have been holding a series of discussions recently through the Eisenhower [inaudible] really trying to look at this. What do we know? What do we need to know? How can we get closer to that position?

The fact of the matter is, we, as an international crisis [inaudible] reasonably poor job of diagnosing those level of dynamics. We're really not very good at it, we don't tend to focus on it, and that's reflected in the way that we identify objectives and goals [inaudible] as we divorce from local human realities and local perceptions.

And again that's where I think operating on a community level, through an engagement model, that forces you to ask what are the aspirations of the community? what are the things that they think they need most? how do they prioritize their own development?

And then also to do the, again, diagnostics around what are the conflicts present in our community, who are the key actors, and how did those community members traditionally resolve conflicts themselves? To build on those approaches. The rub again is that's painstaking work, it's long-term work, and it requires a level of commitment, and I would add, in commitments, that it's oftentimes quite illusive, especially in these highly conflicted environments. Sorry [inaudible].

MR. : [inaudible].

MR. : [inaudible] to wrap it up is a counterinsurgency is dominated by the non-military aspects. We say it's a stability operation. That's its main character, but there is a compact going on. So [inaudible] and so we do it very closely [inaudible].

MR. SCHEAR: Thanks to all three of you for an excellent amount of insights. It remains only for me, first of all, on behalf of those of us who are public employees, that we all absolve our parent agencies of any associations with our views, [inaudible] or otherwise. Number one.

Number two, to invite you to thank the panel for some excellent commentary.

[Applause]

MR. SCHEAR: Number three, we turn the proceedings over to Professor Frank Fukuyama for some closing observations.

MR. FUKUYAMA: Well, there are refreshments in the next room. I don't want to keep you from them. So I just want to be very brief.

I assessed all afternoon a certain tension here, in listening to these two panels, because a lot of people in the room are in the development community and they want to help countries develop, either politically, in terms of democratic institutions, or economically, or in terms of public health.

But we framed this workshop actually very narrowly in terms of American government organization to [inaudible] stability operations, and so forth, because there's been an awful lot of, you know, foment in that area, and so many of the questions have been kind of impatient, that yeah, yeah, okay, once DOD and State start talking to each other, that's fine, [inaudible] do it, and then, you know, are you going to solve these much larger problems of development and so forth. And so I did want to just explain that that was actually the subject for a much larger set of discussions, and a little bit beyond the mandate.

But I think it's an important to be made, because there really is a very big tension that is embedded in that, and George, more than anyone on the two panels, was getting at, because one of the big obstacles, I think, at the current juncture in history, is that to the extent that development is seen as subordinated to American foreign policy, it actually does, you know, provide a lot of problems for a lot of people.

For example, in the democracy promotion area where I'm the most familiar, you know, the fact that the Bush administration has made this such a centerpiece of its foreign policy, in a way, this made democracy promotion much, much harder in the field, in an area like the Middle East, because, you know, the level of anti-Americanism and dislike for the Bush administration is so high that there are a lot of people who say, well, you know, George Bush wants democracy more than authoritarianism. It's richly, you know, that thread. And I know and

I talked to a friend of mine at MDI who, you know, works in the Middle East, and he comes back saying, you know, from the area, you know, now the government people say, Oh, yeah, you're the guys in the regime change business, aren't you?

And so I think that, you know, in many respects, although the purpose of this workshop was to explore ways in which you could integrate development with American policy in nation building, to some extent, you know, that actually, in other contexts, is not all that great a thing, because a lot of people in the development business, actually, in a certain way, need to dissociate themselves from the ends of, you know, of the particular American administration in power, and that's just a tension that's going to be out there in the field.

The other big problem in terms of development is the one that Stewart just referred to, which is, you know, in a way, reconstruction and development are actually oftentimes at cross-purposes. In fact, we had this earlier conference on Afghanistan and Iraq here that [inaudible] nation building. The way I put it was reconstruction versus development, because in many respects, to the extent that you can actually do successful reconstruction, it actually hinders your long-term ability to do self-sustaining institutional and economic development.

The best case of this was Afghanistan. When Ashraf Ghani was finance minister, first finance minister in post-Taliban Afghanistan, 2000 NGOs descended on that country, World Bank, all of these bilateral, multilateral donors, and it just drove him crazy because, you know, he said I'm going to completely lose control, and all of these people are undermining the state building effort of the Afghan government to exert its authority, and so forth.

And he actually forced the outside donor community to, at least the bigger donors, to actually have everything vetted through his finance ministry, because he said otherwise you are simply going to undermine the long-term institutional development of Afghanistan, five to ten years the donor community's going to be gone, we're going to be left on our own and then be worse off.

And so it's a, you know, it is a really important question that needs to be thought through, as to how the narrowly focused issue of, you know, stability operations, humanitarian relief, getting these countries up and running again, will eventually interface with the much longer, more complicated process of long-term economic development, and to do the first in a

way that does not weaken the prospects for, you know, the latter taking place, because I think one of the final truths of this kind of operation is that donor countries, United States, in particular, they eventually get tired of the stuff.

You know, there hasn't been a country anywhere, where the initial level, including, as I was saying, in the Civil War, where, you know, I think the North might have got tired of, you know, dealing with these difficult Southerners after a while, you know, there isn't a single case where taxpayers and other people had been willing to sustain a very long-term commitment, and in a certain sense, if you don't get that interface right, and the handoff, you know, to the point at which the donor community begins to exit, then, you know, these countries are really not--and I think, you know, there was an earlier question on the first panel about Nicaragua, and that would be a case of that. That you really have to worry about what happens, you know, once the level of interest drops.

So I want to thank all of the members of this panel and the previous one, all of you for coming to our workshop today. We do have some refreshments in the next room and thank you all very much.

[END OF TAPED RECORDING.]