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U.S. Military and Police Assistance to Poorly Performing States

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For the last fifty years—since the United States' emergence as a global superpower, the breakup of Europe's colonial empires, and the cold war's onset—it has been a central U.S. foreign policy objective to maintain close military relationships with virtually every nonenemy country in the world. Several programs managed and funded primarily by the U.S. State and Defense Departments carry out arms transfers, training and education, joint exercises, stationing of U.S. military personnel, and "engagement" efforts, ranging from academic conferences to exchanges of entire units. The reach of these programs is extensive; in 2002, for instance, the United States sold over US$12.9 billion worth of weapons to these countries and trained 42,169 of their military and police personnel.[1]

The following stated goals guide these programs:

—Protecting U.S. security interests such as counterterrorism; or preventing rogue states from gaining control of strategic areas.

—Protecting economic interests, particularly access to natural resources, open markets, and trade routes.

—Countering narcotics and international organized crime.

—Enhancing relationships with key military officers.

—Familiarizing U.S. forces with foreign terrain and cultures.

—Easing possible future coalition efforts by improving interoperability.

—Supporting postconflict rebuilding.

—Professionalizing security forces and improving human rights, democratic governance, and civil-military relations.

Despite these understandable, and in some cases noble, objectives, U.S. military and police assistance has been a controversial subject at least since the cold war. While militaries have a monopoly of legitimate violence in all states, many of the world's armed forces routinely employ this violence in ways that hinder achievement of the objectives listed above, particularly where state institutions are weak, impunity is widespread, and societies are divided. Lethal U.S. aid to military and police bodies that abuse human rights has been a source of much contention, and such aid remains widespread today despite decades of reform and legislation seeking to limit it. Some critics question the message sent by any U.S. engagement with notoriously abusive or corrupt security forces, even when the aid in question is nonlethal or focused on governance issues.

The impact of security assistance on civil-military relations and democracy remains controversial as well, particularly when U.S. assistance appears to neglect civilian governance needs or when it aims to increase the internal role of the armed forces. Other concerns surround the potential impact that a military aid buildup might have on security balances in unstable regions and the possibility that a strengthened military might someday cease to be a U.S. ally. Meanwhile, management and oversight of U.S. military and police cooperation programs—including the degree of diplomatic and legislative control over them within the U.S. government—is an increasing point of concern.

U.S. security assistance worldwide decreased somewhat in aggregate terms during the 1990s. The number of countries receiving assistance expanded, however, as the imperative of "engagement" with foreign militaries led Washington to initiate relatively small military aid programs in dozens of new countries. For instance, the number of countries participating in one of the principal military training programs, International Military Education and Training (IMET), grew from 97 in the 1988-93 period to 122 in 2002.[2] Much of this expansion benefited the militaries of countries that fit the criteria of poorly performing states as determined by various international groups: the United Nations Development Program, the World Bank, and Freedom House (see appendix table 13A-1 for the ranking on these criteria of the world's poorly performing states). U.S. assistance to police forces, which came to a near halt in the mid-1970s as human rights concerns placed strong restrictions in foreign aid law, crept steadily upward throughout the 1990s

among poor performers and elsewhere. Counternarcotics programs account for much of the renewal of police assistance, as do efforts to assist security sector reforms in postconflict or democratizing states and programs to improve border controls and investigate terrorist activity.

To determine the nature of current U.S. security assistance to poorly performing states, the authors consider the forty-seven countries that meet at least four of five criteria (see appendix table 13A-2). Though inexact, this selection method gives a useful idea of the scale and scope of U.S. military and police assistance to poorly performing states.

Because of legislative or policy bans, fifteen of the forty-seven countries listed in table 13A-2 receive almost no military or police assistance. The remaining thirty-two countries fit into three categories: seven are priority countries for the post–September 11, 2001, war on terror; twelve other countries are of strategic importance to the United States; and thirteen are lower priority countries (see appendix table 13A-3). The nature of U.S. assistance varies widely among these three categories. The poorly performing states engaged in the war on terror receive the vast majority of military and police aid: 90 percent of assistance during the five-year period 2000–04. Much of this aid closely resembles the assistance that Washington provided to developing world allies at the height of the cold war. Peacekeeping, border security, and professionalization are the primary rationales for the provision of arms and training to strategically important countries. The relative trickle of aid to lower priority countries is geared toward interdicting narcotics; rebuilding the postconflict security sector; and strengthening democracy, human rights, and civil-military relations. All military aid programs share the underlying imperative of military-to-military engagement, however. Even the poor performers legally banned from receiving assistance through standard aid channels participate in conferences, seminars, and engagement programs.

Poorly Performing States and the War on Terror

Seven poorly performing states in the sample are at the forefront of Washington's anti-terror efforts (see table 13-1). All have overwhelmingly Islamic populations. Some are frontline states bordering Afghanistan and played a critical role in helping the United States and coalition partners stage Operation Enduring Freedom and subsequent efforts to root out terrorist groups in Afghanistan. Afghanistan itself received a large amount of assistance during this period (2000 to 2004), enough to make it the world's number-three recipient of U.S. military and police aid in 2004 (after Israel and Egypt). The

Table 13-1. *Expenditures, Military and Police Assistance, Seven War-on-Terror States, by Year, 2000–04*
US$ thousand (except as noted)

State	*2000*	*2001*	*2002*	*2003*[a]	*2004*[a]	*Total*	*Reason for classification as war-on terror state*
Afghanistan	0	0	179,604	348,074	829,407	1,357,085	Rebuilding security forces after war to oust Taliban and bin Laden
Pakistan	4,651	3,900	395,340	257,617	121,104	782,611	Staging area for operations in Afghanistan and hunt for terror group leaders
Uzbekistan	2,879	4,116	41,746	11,775	13,648	74,164	Staging area for operations in Afghanistan, allows use of military base
Yemen	308	338	20,871	2,877	16,138	40,532	Collaborating in attacks against al Qaeda elements
Indonesia	110	131	20,655	542	4,697	26,135	Large Islamic population, 2002 Bali bombing attributed to al Qaeda
Tajikistan	473	384	11,600	731	1,720	14,908	Front-line state bordering Afghanistan
Djibouti	228	241	1,710	204	2,247	4,630	U.S. military base, headquarters for counterterror Combined Joint Task Force on Horn of Africa
Total[b]	8,649	9,110	671,526	621,820	988,961	2,300,066	

Source: See appendix 13B.

a. At the time of this study, 2003 figures were estimates and 2004 figures were estimated at 114.3 times the 2000 figures.

b. These seven states account for 90 percent of such expenditures in the 47-state sample.

aid was part of a multinational effort, led by the United States, to build a post-Taliban army, police force, and presidential protective service. In addition, the U.S. military contingent in Kabul continues to carry out joint military operations, alongside Afghan counterparts, against Taliban and al Qaeda remnants. Across the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the United States cooperates on antiterror operations with Pakistan's army, which has seen a sharp increase in the amount and sophistication of U.S. security assistance since the September 11 attacks.

Afghanistan and Pakistan account for 93 percent of all aid to the seven war on terror countries, but U.S. military and police aid to all poorly performing states on the list (see table 13A-1) began to multiply in 2002. Taken together, these countries were to receive 114 times as much assistance in 2004 as they did in 2000. While much of this remarkable increase owes to jumps in aid to Afghanistan and Pakistan, U.S. aid in 2004 to the other countries reached 10 times their 2000 levels.

Beyond helping recipient governments take on al Qaeda and other terrorist and Islamic extremist groups, U.S. military aid to the seven war on terror countries seeks to achieve several other policy goals. One is to maintain good military-to-military relations in several states that do not have a long history of friendly relations with the United States. Washington hopes to foster a climate in which the U.S. military can use bases, maintain overflight rights, and rely on the antiterror information of local intelligence services. Security assistance also seeks to help governments to improve their control over porous borders, with an eye toward restricting the transit of terror cells, illegal drugs, and weapons of mass destruction. This border control assistance includes control of maritime borders for those countries with coastlines. Afghanistan and Pakistan are also receiving assistance in their efforts to eradicate opium poppy.

U.S. government documents claim that an underlying purpose of aid to all of these states is to encourage human rights and pluralistic politics. In Tajikistan, for instance, the State Department's 2004 congressional presentation for foreign aid programs holds that IMET-funded military training would "expose the armed forces and civilian officials to Western concepts of democracy, rule of law, human rights, and free markets, with the goal of exposing the Tajik military to Western standards and doctrine."[3]

The war on terror countries received very little U.S. security assistance before the September 11 attacks. Nearly all aid since 2000 (US$2.28 billion of US$2.30 billion) was appropriated or requested since the U.S. government's fiscal year 2002 (October 2001–September 2002). Of that, the U.S. Congress approved nearly all of the funds through four emergency supplemental spending measures, signed into law after September 11, 2001.[4] In fact, on September 11 three of these seven countries were legally banned from receiving U.S. security assistance. Aid to Pakistan, other than counternarcotics programs, had already been frozen by Foreign Assistance Act prohibitions on aid to countries developing nuclear weapons and countries whose government reached power through a military coup. Concerns over the Taliban regime's human rights record and sponsorship of international

terrorism had frozen aid to Afghanistan. Congress had prohibited most aid to Indonesia's security forces due to serious human rights concerns. (As of 2003, nearly all of Indonesia's aid still went only to the police.) The Bush administration waived these prohibitions in the weeks following the attacks on New York and Washington.

Though not banned, the remaining countries in the war on terror category received very little military and police aid before 2002. Military-to-military relations with former Soviet republics of Central Asia were cordial but distant; to institute greater cooperation with them was not deemed worth antagonizing Russia, though all have serious human rights concerns. After the Somalia debacle, the Clinton administration gave little priority to Djibouti and most other Horn of Africa states. Relations with Yemen were warming, but this Arabian Peninsula nation of few oil reserves was undergoing a difficult political transition during the late 1990s.

Grant Aid

Aid to the war on terror countries consists of weapons and equipment, especially mobility and communications equipment, necessary to carry out joint operations in Central Asia; training in counterterror techniques and border control, offered mostly by teams of U.S. Special Forces; and a great deal of intelligence and training in intelligence gathering and analysis. Some militaries in this category, particularly those of Central Asia, are so unestablished, unprofessional, or underequipped that U.S. funds pay for such basic items as food, uniforms, and even salaries. In Afghanistan, of course, U.S. funds support an effort, in concert with France and a few other countries, to establish an Afghan national army. Other security forces, including Pakistan's army and Indonesia's police, receive more sophisticated and high-priced items such as cargo planes, helicopters, and small boats. All receive vehicles, communications equipment, ammunition, spare parts, and similar items, as the United States seeks to build or upgrade their military infrastructure.

In Pakistan, for example, the State Department indicates that it sought "better security cooperation with Pakistan as a friend, ally and strategic coalition partner" through the transfer of C-130 cargo aircraft, Cobra and Huey helicopters, and communications equipment, including air-ground radios; in addition Pakistan received P-3C airborne surveillance aircraft fighter training, ground support equipment, and high-mobility transport vehicles.[5] Table 13-2 lists the principal U.S. aid programs providing assistance to these countries. The seven war on terror countries account for the vast majority of aid from the main programs used to grant weapons and equipment. The largest

Table 13-2. *Expenditures, Military and Police Aid Programs, Seven War on Terror States, by Program 2000–04*
US$ thousand (except as noted)

State	*Total*	*Foreign military financing*	*Counter-narcotics and law enforce-ment*	*Afghan Freedom Support Act drawdowns*	*Peace-keeping*	*Nonprolifera-tion, counter-terrorism, demining, and related programs*	*Inter-national military education and training*	*Section 1004 Defense Deptart-ment counter-narcotics*	*Unified Marshall Center European security*	*Command activities (includes JCETs)*	*Other*
Afghanistan	1,357,085	664,256	258,097	300,000	23,949	110,084	600	0	0	0	99
Djibouti	4,630	3,600	0	0	0	0	868	0	0	51	111
Indonesia	26,135	0	4,000	0	8,000	12,000	1,405	0	0	246	484
Pakistan	782,611	375,000	163,877	0	220,000	16,100	3,144	2,700	0	0	1,791
Tajikistan	14,908	4,400	0	0	0	7,900	1,009	0	1,599	0	0
Uzbekistan	74,164	59,152	0	0	0	7,230	4,721	1,144	1,800	0	117
Yemen	40,532	37,041	0	0	0	440	2,461	0	0	142	448
Total	2,300,066	1,143,449	425,974	300,000	251,949	153,754	14,208	3,844	3,399	439	3,050
Percent of 47-state sample	90.0	89.0	98.2	100	87.7	95.2	32.1	29.1	39.0	6.0	n.a.

Source: See appendix 13B.

Table 13-3. *U.S.-Funded Trainees, Seven War on Terror States, by Year, 2000–03*

State	*2000*	*2001*	*2002*	*2003*[a]	*Total*
Uzbekistan	67	133	224	230	654
Pakistan	44	32	92	320	488
Yemen	101	75	151	106	433
Tajikistan	38	37	64	214	353
Afghanistan	0	0	0	142	142
Djibouti	6	9	42	81	138
Indonesia	6	9	47	74	136
Total[b]	262	295	620	1,167	2,344

Source: See appendix 13B.

a. At the time of this study, 2003 figures were estimated at 4.5 multiple of 2000 trainees.

b. These seven states account for 17.2 percent of such expenditures in the 47-state sample.

single source, Foreign Military Financing, is the primary military assistance program in U.S. foreign aid law. Used heavily during the cold war, this program declined during the 1990s; until the terror war revived it, the program overwhelmingly benefited only two countries, Israel and Egypt.

Training

Though the United States trained 4.5 times as many military and police personnel from the war on terror countries in 2003 as it did in 2000, military training figures for this category still appear relatively small, accounting for only 17 percent of all trainees in the forty-seven-country sample (see table 13-3). The low numbers are in part accounted for by the fact that much training does not appear in official reports to Congress; it takes place either through joint military operations (such as the U.S. Special Forces' activities with Afghan and Pakistani forces near the border of the two countries), which are not considered training activities, or through joint training exercises, which occur frequently but go unreported to Congress because, by law, the "primary purpose" of such activities is the training of U.S. personnel, not their counterparts.

Training figures also appear low because the United States lacks a historical relationship with the militaries of most of these countries; before U.S. personnel can teach dozens or hundreds of students a year, they must first understand the structure of the forces they are training, gain their willingness to cooperate, and overcome language barriers. U.S. forces have been developing

this cultural competency, and training for war on terror countries is expected to increase.

Several countries, in particular Pakistan and Uzbekistan, receive training in combat skills. Another training program frequently used is that of policing, which is funded by the State Department and the Justice Department's International Criminal Investigation Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP). This program trains Pakistani border guards, for example, and instructs Indonesian police in "civil disturbance management" and community policing skills.[6] Established in the 1980s, ICITAP is the U.S. government's principal program for encouraging police reform and improvement of technical skills.

Most other training aid to the war on terror countries is education in nonlethal, nontechnical subjects: human rights, civil-military relations, defense resource management, international law, military justice, and U.S. doctrine. Such courses, referred to as Expanded IMET courses after the subset of the IMET program that often funds them, are available to nearly all poorly performing states; the United States offers them in an effort to encourage adoption of U.S. values and doctrine as well as to develop relationships with the students who take such courses, usually low- and mid-ranking officers climbing the ranks. Some training in these subjects takes place at regional security studies schools established by the Defense Department since the late 1990s. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, and Near East–South Asia Center for Strategic Studies offer courses to military and civilian personnel in defense management topics, while fostering relations between U.S. personnel and regional leaders and among the leaders and officers of each region. Finally, nearly all seven war on terror countries receive extensive English language training, since instructors lack the capability to teach skills in most recipient countries' native languages.

The following lists the number of students from the seven war on terror countries and the courses these students enrolled in during 2000–02:[7]

—Department of Defense security studies: 557 students.
—Counternarcotics course: 285 students.
—Coast Guard course: 130 students.
—English language course: 124 students.
—Health care course: 55 students.
—Leadership course: 42 students.
—Maintenance: 30 students.

—Civil-military relations: 21 students.
—Officer training: 19 students.
—Joint combined exchange training: 10 students.

Poorly Performing States of Strategic Importance to the United States

The principal U.S. interest served by security aid to the twelve countries categorized as strategically important (see table 13-4) is to maintain governments friendly to the Unites States; these countries have something the United States wishes to protect, usually natural resources, geographic location, or a position of regional leadership.

Among countries in this category, U.S. State Department documents most frequently cite the following interests:

—A geographical location considered strategic: according to the State Department, for instance, Cameroon has a "strategic location and excellent airport facilities," Tanzania is "adjacent to the Great Lakes region and just south of the conflict-prone Horn of Africa," and Georgia lies "at the crossroads of Russia, Iran and Turkey."[8]

—Volatile borders: the State Department refers to "Azerbaijan's shared border with Iran and its long-standing conflict with Armenia" and Zambia's proximity to "ongoing conflict in one of its largest neighbors (the Democratic Republic of Congo) and political and economic instability in Zimbabwe," while warning that "Chad is vulnerable to its neighbors Libya and Sudan."[9]

—Significant natural resources: oil and gas are found in Azerbaijan, Chad, and Nigeria, and pipelines run through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Cameroon. Niger is a significant source of uranium.

—Assistance in the war on terror: the State Department maintains that Georgia "has been a strong supporter in the war on terrorism, granting the United States overflight rights and potential basing permission." For its part, "the Eritrean military is ready to assist the counterterrorism effort and has offered use of its facilities for logistical and/or operational purposes." "Ethiopia is an African frontline state in the war on terrorism, supporting efforts to apprehend terrorists in Ethiopia and beyond," while "Kenyan support for the war on terrorism has been solid and wholehearted, a reflection of national values, and a recognition that Kenya has twice been a target of al Qaeda bombs."[10]

Although the security forces of some of these countries (particularly those of Kenya, Nigeria, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) receive counterterror assistance,

Table 13-4. *Expenditures, Military and Police Assistance, Twelve Strategically Important States, by Year, 2000–04*
US$ thousand

State	*2000*	*2001*	*2002*	*2003*[a]	*2004*[a]	*Total*	*Reason for classification as strategically important state*
Georgia	6,239	5,754	32,900	8,572	11,994	65,459	Fossil fuels and pipelines, strategic location, support against insurgency, overflight, possible base use
Nigeria	10,539	10,676	$9,052	8,613	7,128	46,008	Size, regional influence, Islamic population, fossil fuels
Kenya	436	3,972	15,529	2,119	7,121	29,177	Strategic location, U.S. personnel allowed to use some facilities, 1998 al Qaeda bombing
Azerbaijan	1,399	1,338	9,826	6,098	5,277	23,938	Fossil fuels and pipelines, proximity to Iran and Iraq, overflight, possible base use
Ethiopia	159	14	2,717	1,025	1,087	5,002	Strategic location
Guinea	264	3,368	313	287	377	4,609	Wars in neighboring countries
Eritrea	41	166	617	919	968	2,711	Strategic location
Cameroon	805	492	467	362	516	2,642	Oil pipeline
Zambia	370	771	827	243	252	2,463	Borders with troubled Democratic Republic of Congo and Zimbabwe
Chad	396	348	329	447	170	1,690	Oil, pipeline, proximity to Libya and Sudan
Tanzania	181	222	355	248	256	1,262	Proximity to Great Lakes and Horn of Africa regions, 1998 al Qaeda bombing
Niger	14	116	182	159	228	699	Islamic population, uranium reserves
Total[b]	20,843	27,237	73,114	29,092	35,372	185,658	

Source: See appendix 13B.

a. At the time of this study, 2003 figures were estimates and 2004 figures were estimated at 1.7 times the 2000 figures.

b. These twelve states account for 7.3 percent of such expenditures in the 47-state sample.

these poor performers are not first-tier states in the war on terror. Only a modest amount of funding from Washington's 2002-04 supplemental antiterror appropriations found its way to this group. As a result, despite their strategic significance they account for only 7.3 percent of U.S. military grant and police aid among the forty-seven most poorly performing states. Security assistance to this group is growing, but nowhere near as rapidly as in the case of the seven war on terror countries. Aid for 2004 was about 70 percent over 2000 levels.

U.S. military aid to the strategically important countries seeks to achieve several policy goals. As with the war on terror group, the defense of land and maritime borders, including export controls, is a frequently invoked mission for aid. U.S. aid encourages internal security missions as well: State Department documents mention combating insurgencies as a purpose of aid to Georgia and Chad, while interdicting narcotics flows is a stated purpose of aid to Azerbaijan and Nigeria. Perhaps the principal expressed rationale for military and police aid to these countries, however, is peacekeeping. The State Department's 2004 foreign aid requests for Azerbaijan, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Niger, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zambia called for improving the recipient country's ability to participate in peacekeeping missions, whether under the auspices of the United Nations or regional arrangements such as the Economic Community of West African States' Military Observer Group and the U.S.-funded pan-Sahel border cooperation initiative.

Peacekeeping (the deployment of military personnel to observe, verify, or enforce a negotiated cessation of hostilities) is a frequent mission in Africa. The continent is the site of most of the world's armed conflicts; since the 1993 Somalia fiasco Washington has been reluctant to commit U.S. troops to these countries. Several African recipient states have played leading roles in regional peacekeeping efforts, particularly in West Africa, while Kenya and Tanzania have provided soldiers to many UN missions worldwide. Some countries in this group participated in the Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), a State Department–managed program of training and (until recently) equipment transfers designed to improve the ability of regional leaders to mount peacekeeping missions. The program, now an Africa region version of the State Department's Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), has been christened African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) and has been scaled back significantly under the Bush administration.

A key subsidiary goal of peacekeeping assistance is interoperability, the ability of recipient country militaries to work with each other and with the

United States on joint operations. Interoperability requires that militaries have similar structures and training and use similar weapons and equipment. Interoperability not only is useful for peacekeeping but also prepares armies to fight alongside the United States, if that becomes necessary. It also benefits U.S. defense industries: for a country's military equipment to be interoperable with U.S. military equipment, it must buy this equipment from the United States. At the same time, the peacekeeping mission provides the United States with a politically palatable reason for maintaining close military ties with troubled yet strategic countries. It would be difficult otherwise to convince the U.S. Congress and the international community to give tens of millions of dollars annually to the militaries of poor, unstable states to guarantee access to oil reserves or trade routes. Transferring weapons and teaching lethal skills are less controversial, however, if the goal is to create a corps of blue-helmeted guarantors of human rights and regional stability.

Beyond peacekeeping, State Department documents also cite improving civil-military relations and human rights among their goals for this group of countries. Several of these states are haltingly transitioning from dictatorship to some form of more open rule, and U.S. education programs offer several courses in such topics as the role of the military in a democratic society, military law and discipline, and defense resource management (see table 13-5).

Grant Aid

Though on a smaller scale, weapons and equipment transfers to strategically important countries resemble those provided to the war on terror countries. Aircraft and technical equipment go to countries with larger or better-established militaries, such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and the two former Soviet states. Others receive more basic assistance, including uniforms, spare parts, vehicles, and communications equipment. U.S. documents mention improvements to military infrastructure in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kenya. The ICITAP police aid program is helping to establish forensics labs in the former Soviet countries and is promoting an ambitious overhaul of Nigeria's police.

Training

Training programs (chiefly for peacekeeping, civil-military topics, and technical courses) account for much of the assistance to the strategically important countries. Due largely to peacekeeping programs like ACRI and ACOTA, this group accounted for over 57 percent of military and police trainees in the forty-seven-country sample (see table 13-6).

Table 13-5. *Expenditures, Military and Police Aid Programs, Twelve Strategically Important States, by Program, 2000–04*
US$ thousand (except as noted)

State	*Total*	*Foreign military financing*	*International military education and training*	*Nonproliferation, counterterrorism, demining, and related programs*	*International counternarcotics and law enforcement*	*Unified Command Activities (includes JCETs)*	*Marshall Center European Security*	*Africa Crisis Response Initiative*	*Africa Center for Security Studies*	*Students at U.S. service academies*	*Other*
Azerbaijan	23,938	9,500	2,027	7,775	0	2,752	1,884	0	0	0	0
Cameroon	2,642	0	1,005	0	0	59	0	0	96	1,481	0
Chad	1,690	606	769	0	0	215	0	0	100	0	0
Eritrea	2,711	1,250	1,372	0	0	0	0	0	89	0	0
Ethiopia	5,002	3,250	1,667	0	0	0	0	0	85	0	0
Georgia	65,459	55,490	4,279	0	0	1,419	3,441	0	0	0	830
Guinea	4,609	3,000	1,299	0	0	177	0	0	133	0	0
Kenya	29,177	24,000	2,551	0	0	50	0	2,470	106	0	0
Niger	699	0	544	0	0	0	0	0	139	0	16
Nigeria	46,008	36,000	3,588	0	6,280	0	0	0	140	0	0
Tanzania	1,262	0	1,116	0	0	17	0	0	129	0	0
Zambia	2,463	500	957	0	0	872	0	0	134	0	0
Total	185,658	133,596	21,174	7,775	6,280	5,561	5,325	2,470	1,150	1,481	846
Percent of 47-state sample	7.3	10.4	47.8	4.8	1.4	75.9	61.0	59.2	36.6	78.0	

Source: See appendix 13B.

Table 13-6. *U.S.-Funded Trainees, Twelve Strategically Important States, by Year, 2000–03*

State	*2000*	*2001*	*2002*	*2003*[a]	*Total*
Kenya	114	1,419	144	177	1,854
Guinea	127	285	1,043	51	1,506
Georgia	416	468	310	219	1,413
Azerbaijan	84	150	167	416	817
Nigeria	126	79	219	161	585
Zambia	168	136	126	49	479
Chad	125	49	74	99	347
Niger	4	16	117	109	246
Cameroon	126	18	22	57	223
Eritrea	4	8	70	88	170
Tanzania	14	12	22	63	111
Ethiopia	4	4	10	34	52
Total[b]	1,312	2,644	2,324	1,523	7,803

Source: See appendix 13B.

a. At the time of this study, 2003 figures were estimated at 1.2 times of 2000 trainees.

b. These twelve states account for 57.2 percent of such expenditures in the 47-state sample.

This group also receives the sample's largest share of training from three other programs, one under State Department management and two under the guidance and budgetary authority of the Defense Department. The IMET program funded the training of approximately 2,980 military and police personnel from strategically important countries between 2000 and 2003. This program, created in 1976 and governed by U.S. foreign aid law under diplomatic supervision, is the principal source of State Department–managed grant training.

Programs established by the Defense Department during the 1990s provide further training without explicit State Department budgetary authority or policy guidance. Every country in this group participates in the Pentagon-run security studies centers described in this chapter's discussion of war on terror countries. Another 700 or more military and police personnel from strategically important countries trained with U.S. Special Forces between 2000 and 2002 under a Pentagon program called Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET). Established in 1991, the JCET program carries out joint exercises in foreign countries covering a wide variety of military topics, from light infantry training to internal defense to mountain warfare; the program is largely secret (the Bush administration has classified the only Pentagon

report that provides any significant information to Congress on JCETs) and has been controversial, as JCETs have taken place in countries banned from receiving military aid through standard foreign aid channels.

The courses most commonly offered to the strategically important group were

—Courses provided by the Africa Crisis Response Initiative: 1,300 students.

—International law courses: 736 students.

—Courses given at the Defense Department security studies centers: 721 students.

—Courses provided by the Joint Combined Exchange Training: 708 students.

—Port security courses provided by the U.S. Coast Guard: 447 students.

—Courses in finding and destroying land mines: 217 students.

—Courses in defense resource management: 145 students.

—Infantry courses: 118 students.

—English language courses: 114 students.

—Courses in security assistance management: 74 students.

—Courses in helicopter piloting and maintenance: 58 students.

—Command and general staff officer courses (leadership training for higher-ranking officers): 55 students.

—Special operations courses: 50 students.

—Health care courses: 26 students.

Poorly Performing States of Lower Priority to the United States

With no significant terror activity, few strategic resources, and little regional political clout, the thirteen remaining countries account for only a minuscule portion of U.S. security assistance: 2.4 percent of that provided to the forty-seven-country sample. U.S. economic and social assistance outlays to these countries are far greater, totaling an estimated US$599.3 million (or 90.6 percent of all of their aid) between 2000 and 2004.

Military and police aid to this group has not increased; in fact, aid in 2004 was only 60 percent that provided in 2000. The decrease owes largely to the winding down of the UN-led postconflict rebuilding effort in East Timor, to which the United States was a significant contributor. Students from these countries received little combat-related or other sophisticated equipment and almost no combat or technical training. In fact, three countries

Table 13-7. *Expenditures, Military and Police Assistance, Thirteen Lower Priority States, by Year, 2000–04*
US$ thousand

State	*2000*	*2001*	*2002*	*2003*	*2004*[a]	*Total*
Timor-Leste	8,500	10,296	8,146	7,136	4,159	38,237
Haiti	5,143	2,977	2,342	2,323	2,432	15,217
Lao People's Dem. Rep.	384	559	261	238	268	1,711
Papua New Guinea	244	267	327	311	392	1,541
Sierra Leone	7	144	199	285	320	955
Central African Republic	110	124	195	133	176	738
Swaziland	119	189	123	112	154	697
Solomon Islands	75	104	180	186	84	629
Lesotho	100	87	157	118	151	613
Togo	14	65	230	138	154	601
Congo	14	94	187	132	133	560
Guinea-Bissau	36	69	100	112	124	441
Gambia	14	14	98	93	130	349
Total[b]	14,760	14,989	12,545	11,317	8,675	62,287

Source: See appendix 13B.
a. At the time of this study, 2004 figures were estimated at 0.6 times the 2000 figures.
b. These twelve states account for 2.4 percent of such expenditures in the 47-state sample.

(East Timor, Haiti, and Sierra Leone) either recovering from conflict or transitioning from dictatorship account for over 87 percent of the military and police assistance to this group. Aid for these purposes was transferred largely through State Department–managed accounts: FMF, PKO, and IMET. In all three countries, U.S. assistance contributed to efforts to reestablish security forces. In East Timor, U.S. contributions to a multilateral effort (the UN Mission of Support in East Timor) included largely nonlethal equipment and extensive training for the East Timor Police Service and the East Timor Defense Force.

Narcotics interdiction is a significant mission for aid to Haiti and Laos, as indicated by significant outlays of Defense Department counternarcotics funds for the former and State Department International Narcotics Control aid to the latter. In Haiti, U.S. funds helped to establish and maintain a Haitian coast guard, with a key purpose of limiting drug transshipments to the United States. In Laos, where most U.S. narcotics assistance seeks to offer economic alternatives to opium cultivation, modest amounts of narcotics funds also help to train and maintain police antidrug units.

Table 13-8. *Expenditures, Military and Police Aid Programs, Thirteen Lower Priority States, by Program, 2000–04*[a]
US$ thousand (unless otherwise noted)

State	*Total*	*Peace-keeping operations*	*Section 1004 Defense Dept. counter-narcotics*	*Foreign military financing*	*Inter-national military education and training*	*Inter-national counter-narcotics and law enforcement*	*Africa Center for Security Studies*	*Asia-Pacific Center*	*Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies*	*Unified Command Activities (including JCETs)*
Central African Republic	738	0	0	0	607	0	131	0	0	0
Congo	560	0	0	0	446	0	114	0	0	0
Gambia	349	0	0	0	198	0	151	0	0	0
Guinea-Bissau	441	0	0	0	321	0	120	0	0	0
Haiti	15,217	3,891	9,365	1,330	486	0	0	0	145	0
Lao People's Dem. Rep.	1,711	0	0	0	200	1,321	0	190	0	0
Lesotho	613	0	0	0	485	0	128	0	0	0
Papua New Guinea	1,541	0	0	0	1,083	0	0	458	0	0
Sierra Leone	955	0	0	0	857	0	98	0	0	0
Solomon Islands	629	0	0	0	461	0	0	168	0	0
Swaziland	697	0	0	0	522	0	93	0	0	82
Timor-Leste	38,237	31,103	0	6,796	293	0	0	45	0	0
Togo	601	0	0	96	360	0	145	0	0	0
Total	62,287	34,994	9,365	8,222	6,319	1,321	979	860	145	82
Percent of 47-state sample	2.4	12.2	70.9	0.6	14.3	0.3	31.1	38.4	90.1	1.1

Source: See appendix 13B.
a. At the time of this study, figures for 2003 and 2004 were estimates.

Table 13-9. *U.S.-Funded Trainees, Thirteen Lower Priority States, by Year, 2000–03*

State	*2000*	*2001*	*2002*	*2003*[a]	*Total*
Lesotho	73	69	62	341	545
Haiti	189	7	8	186	390
Papua New Guinea	102	89	45	60	296
Swaziland	22	75	19	136	252
Sierra Leone	2	16	87	112	217
Congo	4	4	14	128	150
Togo	5	18	80	44	147
Solomon Islands	21	36	32	33	122
Gambia	4	6	8	94	112
Central African Republic	4	5	16	14	39
Guinea-Bissau	5	6	8	16	35
Lao People's Dem. Rep.	5	0	2	6	13
Timor-Leste	0	0	0	4	4
Total[b]	436	331	381	1,174	2,322

Source: See appendix 13B.

a. At the time of this study, figures for 2003 were estimated at 2.7 of 2000 figures.

b. These thirteen states account for 17 percent of total trainees in the 47-state sample.

Nearly all of the remainder of the security-related aid to this group is in the form of education in civil-military relations, human rights, and defense and security issues. The training, usually to a handful of students a year, is intended to ease transitions to democracy, to improve the military's democratic credentials, and to build relationships with key officers. Students at the Defense Department security studies centers account for a disproportionate share of total trainees from this category of countries. The following lists the courses and number of students taking the courses in 2000-02:

—Courses in military justice: 361 students.

—Coast Guard courses: 332 students.

—Courses in civil-military relations: 247 students.

—Courses in international law: 236 students.

—Courses at Defense Department security studies centers: 206 students.

—Defense resource management courses: 119 students.

—Boat maintenance courses: 60 students.

—Courses provided by the Joint Combined Exchange Training: 40 students.

—English language courses: 22 students.

—Health care courses: 14 students.

Poorly Performing States Banned from Receiving U.S. Aid

In fifteen of the listed poorly performing states, internal political conditions or relations with Washington are poor enough to have forced a cutoff in U.S. security assistance. The Foreign Assistance Act, which governs most U.S. military and police aid, bans security assistance to states that commit gross human rights violations against their citizens, that have a communist government, that are governed by the military after a coup, that detonate nuclear weapons, that support terrorism, that are in default on their debt, and that fail to meet drug war certification conditions. The U.S. president can waive these prohibitions if he determines that to do so is in the national security interest. (Some of the largest aid recipients in the forty-seven-country sample would still be on the list of banned countries had the war on terror not occurred.)

Several of the fifteen banned countries listed are not completely cut off from aid. The Defense Department's budget, which is outside the reach of the prohibitions in foreign aid law, can provide some forms of military and police aid: chiefly, counternarcotics aid, Special Forces JCET deployments, and education at Pentagon-run security studies schools. Significant amounts of security assistance were given to some banned countries between 2000 and 2004, either because the aid cutoff took place after 2000 or because Washington expected conditions to improve sufficiently to allow aid to resume flowing in 2004 (see tables 13-10 and 13-11). The tables indicate a sharp drop in assistance beginning in 2001, as bans to Côte d'Ivoire, Zimbabwe, Uganda, and Rwanda took hold. Estimates for 2003 and 2004 creep slightly upward, as State Department estimates forecast a possibility of renewing aid to some countries.

Training

After 2000 the number of U.S.-funded trainees from banned countries dropped sharply, although not to zero (see table 13-12): 136 students attended security studies schools funded through the Defense Department budget and 78 Cambodians participated in a 2002 Defense Department–funded training event that is listed, but not described, in the State and Defense Departments' annual Foreign Military Training Report to Congress.[11] Additionally, in 2003 inauguration of an ICITAP program in Uganda was inaugurated, supported by State Department narcotics funds, to improve the Uganda police force's criminal investigation capacities.

Table 13-10. *Expenditures, Military and Police Assistance, Fifteen Banned Countries, by Year, 2000–04*
US$ thousand

State	*2000*	*2001*	*2002*	*2003*[a]	*2004*[a]	*Total*	*Reason for classification*
Côte d'Ivoire	1,736	13	51	86	29	1,915	Military coup
Zimbabwe	1,222	0	34	6	14	1,276	Human rights
Uganda	261	9	51	189	223	733	Human rights
Cambodia	0	0	328	200	202	730	Human rights, POW-MIAs
Rwanda	171	9	47	170	196	593	Involvement in neighbors' conflicts
Angola	14	10	66	118	127	335	Civil war; ban is gradually ending, and Angola provides 7% of U.S. oil imports
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	0	0	62	72	121	255	Civil war
Burundi	7	8	44	69	120	248	Civil war
Comoros	7	8	48	68	70	201	Military coup
Equatorial Guinea	7	0	0	63	55	125	Human rights (US$5 billion in private U.S. oil sector investment in past five years)
Liberia	7	0	0	0	2	9	Civil war, contribution to regional instability, human rights
Myanmar	0	0	0	0	0	0	Human rights
North Korea	0	0	0	0	0	0	Human rights, communist, poor relations, nuclear proliferation
Somalia	0	0	0	0	0	0	Absence of central government
Sudan	0	0	0	0	0	0	Civil war, on list of terrorism-sponsoring states
Total[b]	3,432	57	731	1,041	1,158	6,419	

Source: See appendix 13B.

a. At the time of this study, 2003 figures were estimates and 2004 figures were 0.3 percent of 2000 figures.

b. These fifteen states account for 0.3 percent of such expenditures in the 47-state sample.

Table 13-11. *Expenditures, Military and Police Aid Programs, Fifteen Banned States, by Program, 2000–04*
US$ thousand (except as noted)

State	*Total*	*International military education and training*	*Africa Crisis Response Initiative*	*Unified Command activities (includes JCETs)*	*Africa Center for Security Studies*	*Asia-Pacific Center*
Angola	335	200	0	0	135	0
Burundi	248	150	0	0	98	0
Cambodia	730	400	0	319	0	11
Comoros	201	100	0	0	101	0
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	255	150	0	0	105	0
Côte d'Ivoire	1,915	72	1,700	0	143	0
Equatorial Guinea	125	100	0	0	25	0
Liberia	9	0	0	0	9	0
Myanmar	0	0	0	0	0	0
North Korea	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rwanda	593	489	0	0	104	0
Somalia	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sudan	0	0	0	0	0	0
Uganda	733	617	0	0	116	0
Zimbabwe	1,276	286	0	922	68	0
Total	6,419	2,564	1,700	1,241	903	11
Share of 47-country sample	0.3	5.8	40.8	16.9	28.7	0.5

Source: See appendix 13B.

Table 13-12. *U.S.-Funded Trainees, Fifteen Banned States, by Year, 2000–03*

State	*2000*	*2001*	*2002*	*2003*[a]	*Total*
Côte d'Ivoire	748	7	7	7	769
Uganda	24	3	7	49	83
Cambodia	0	0	79	2	81
Zimbabwe	73	0	2	2	77
Rwanda	10	2	5	46	63
Angola	4	2	6	41	53
Burundi	3	2	5	8	18
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	0	0	8	8	16
Comoros	1	3	6	4	14
Equatorial Guinea	1	0	0	3	4
Liberia	2	0	0	0	2
Myanmar	0	0	0	0	0
North Korea	0	0	0	0	0
Somalia	0	0	0	0	0
Sudan	0	0	0	0	0
Total[b]	866	19	125	170	1,180
Likely 2003 trainees, as a multiple of 2000 trainees: 0.2			(8.6% of 47-country sample)		

Source: See appendix 13B.
a. At the time of this study, 2003 figures were 0.2 times the 2000 figures.
b. These fifteen states account for 8.6 percent of such expenditures in the 47-state sample.

Major Issues Raised by U.S. Security Assistance to Poorly Performing States

This overview of U.S. security assistance to poorly performing states raises several policy-relevant concerns.

—The focus on security bodies (the armed forces, the intelligence services, paramilitary forces, and the police) rather than on assistance designed to strengthen democratic accountability and the capacity to provide security for all.

—The tendency to encourage internal military roles.

—The focus on short-term U.S. interests rather than on the long-term stability and security of both aid recipients and the United States.

—The impact of U.S. assistance on regional security.

—The relatively low levels of security assistance available to most poorly performing states.

—The growing role of the U.S. Defense Department and the U.S. military in determining security assistance policies and the need for transparency and oversight of military and police aid programs.

While these concerns are not relevant to all poor performers in the same way, each of these factors does carry important consequences for U.S. policymakers.

Security Bodies

The characteristics of democratically governed bodies capable of providing security for the state and its population are outlined below. For all countries, including the United States, achieving these objectives is a work in progress. U.S. assistance rarely addresses the serious constraints that poor performers face in this regard.

—Professional security forces: professionalization encompasses doctrinal development, skill development, rule orientation, internal democratization, technical modernization, accountability, and the rule of law.

—Capable and responsible civil authorities: the relevant civil authorities in the executive and legislative branches of government have the capacity to develop security policy and to manage and oversee the security sector. They carry out these activities in a responsible manner.

—High priority for human rights protection: both civilians and members of the security forces respect human rights.

—A capable and responsible civil society: civil society has the capacity to monitor the security sector, promote change, and provide input to government on security matters. It conducts these activities in a responsible manner.

—Transparency: although it is legitimate to keep some information about the security sector confidential, basic information about security policies, planning, and resourcing is accessible both to the civil authorities and to members of the public.

—Regional approaches: countries and their populations benefit from regional approaches to shared problems.

In poorly performing states, members of security bodies typically enjoy some degree of political and economic impunity.[12] The security bodies play a direct or indirect role in politics, complicating the ability of reform-minded civilians to introduce or strengthen the rule of law or democratic practice. This political dominance enables security forces to play a considerable economic role as well. Police and military forces have a substantial advantage in competing for a share of state resources, and many are engaged in a wide range of economic activities, including trafficking in drugs and weapons and exploiting natural resources.[13] Security bodies that are heavily engaged in economic and political activities tend to be professionally weak and to prioritize regime security above the security of the state and the population.

Rather than seeking to improve the accountability of security bodies or their capacity to provide appropriate security, civilian political elites are often allied with security elites in many poor performers governed by repressive regimes. Additionally, since civilians do not have much experience in the security arena, even those who would seek greater accountability for security bodies are unable to exercise it.[14] Civil society is frequently quite weak, without much influence in the security sector. All of this perpetuates poor governance and inadequate security for the state and its population, which in turn perpetuates poor development outcomes.

Neither U.S. development assistance nor U.S. security assistance is likely to reverse this crisis of governance in poorly performing states, since neither has as a main objective greater democratic accountability of the security sector. Although there is some recognition within both the Department of Defense and USAID that unaccountable armed forces constitute a major threat to emerging democracies, neither organization is equipped to address the problem effectively and neither is committed to developing the capacity necessary to do so. The memorandum of understanding between the two departments in the late 1990s (see note 14) was limited to the State Department–guided, Defense Department–administered, expanded IMET program (a relatively small source of aid though a significant funder of training programs) and USAID's small civilian-military relations program. Excluded from this arrangement are other training and arms transfer programs,

Defense Department regional security studies schools, counternarcotics and peacekeeping programs, and JCET deployments, among others.

A good deal of U.S. security assistance to poor performers takes the form of training and equipment transfers for security bodies, especially the armed forces. Very little is aimed at strengthening democratic civil control of security bodies, and even less is directed toward civil management and oversight authorities. These latter actors are, however, critical to the quality of governance in the security sector. Most assistance is instead oriented toward military or paramilitary type activities and intelligence. The security sector consists of

—Organizations legally authorized to use force: armed forces, police, paramilitary forces, gendarmeries, intelligence services (military and civilian), secret services, coast guards, border guards, customs authorities, civil defense forces, national guards, presidential guards, militias, and others.

—Security management and oversight bodies: president or prime minister, national security advisory bodies, legislature and legislative select committees, ministries (defense, internal affairs, foreign affairs), customary and traditional authorities, financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget offices, financial audit and planning units), and statutory civil society organizations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions).

—Justice and law enforcement institutions: judiciary, justice ministries, prisons, criminal investigation and prosecution services, human rights commissions and ombudsmen, correctional services, and customary and traditional justice systems.

Two other groups influence the quality of security sector governance:

—Nonstatutory security forces: liberation armies, guerrilla armies, private bodyguards, private security companies, and political party militias.

—Nonstatutory civil society bodies: Professional organizations and research organizations.

The U.S Department of Defense does provide some assistance to help countries build more accountable ministries of defense, but this assistance has been available to a limited number of former Warsaw Treaty Organization countries and larger Latin American states. The courses offered by the Defense Department's regional security studies centers are designed for individuals rather than organizations or institutions.[15] While changing patterns of behavior and attitudes and building skills among senior-level security force personnel, legislators, and bureaucrats is important, organizational reform is also critical.

The United States has the capacity to support police reform, but this has not been a priority for most poorly performing states. The Department of Justice's ICITAP program is intended to develop the "capacity to provide professional law enforcement services based on democratic principles and respect for human rights."[16] ICITAP could be a useful police reform tool, if carried out with executive, legislative, and citizen oversight sufficient to avoid repeating the ugly human rights consequences of past police assistance programs, such as USAID's notorious Office of Public Safety during the 1960s and 1970s.

As the first part of this chapter indicates, however, ICITAP has provided very little assistance to poor performers. Of the trickle of aid that has flowed to the forty-seven poorly performing countries studied, most has sought to improve border controls, investigative techniques, and the capacity of police forces to undertake policing based on consent rather than repression. This is central to improving the ability of the police to provide security for all. However, little assistance has focused on strengthening civil oversight and management. In the absence of high-level commitment to the concept of democratic policing and adequate civil oversight, it is doubtful that efforts to train the police officers themselves will have their desired outcome.

ICITAP has provided assistance to seven countries of the forty-seven (Azerbaijan, East Timor, Georgia, Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan) and is launching programs in four others (Nigeria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, and Uganda). Though these recipients encompass all four categories of poorly performing countries, the size of the programs is small (roughly US$1 million a year for each country).

In Uzbekistan, ICITAP provided forensics aid "to reorient regional law enforcement agencies toward reliance on scientific and physical evidence versus confessions as the preferred means of resolving crimes." In Indonesia, it provided instruction on strengthening police command and control capabilities, on nonconfrontational critical incident tactics, and on improving police-community relations. It hopes to develop a broader program that would help the Indonesian police make the transition to a civilian police service committed to democratic principles.[17] ICITAP is far from the only U.S. agency engaging with the Indonesian police, but these other agencies primarily focus on counterterrorism.

Development assistance suffers from a similar lack of emphasis on democratic accountability over security. The main category of USAID funding that would be expected to support democratic civil control of the security

sector—democracy and governance—has a number of shortcomings. To begin with, USAID provides only limited support for strengthening executive branches in general and cannot provide any assistance to ministries of interior or defense. While it does provide support to ministries of finance, that assistance does not seek to increase their political weight vis-à-vis "power" centers, such as the ministries of defense and internal affairs and the security forces themselves. Thus ministries crucial to the democratic management of security policy do not receive USAID assistance.

USAID does provide more extensive support to oversight bodies, particularly the legislature and the judiciary. USAID also supports a range of other activities that help strengthen the rule of law, an important component of democratic governance. These include enhancing the capacity of civil society groups, including the media, political parties, and advocacy groups; strengthening the legal system; and promoting the protection of human rights. Most often, however, these activities are not directed toward the security sector. While generalized attention to oversight can help build a culture of and capacity for democratic accountability, it does not address the core problem of democratic unaccountability in the security sector, which characterizes most poor performers.

What is more, most development assistance to these countries, including those that receive the largest amount of security assistance, tends to support trade and commercial activities, basic health and education, and energy and natural resource development. Support for democracy and governance in general holds a lower priority for USAID than these other activities. USAID does give a small amount of money to work on civil-military relations.[18] A significant proportion has been channeled through the Security Sector Reform program of the National Democratic Institute, which has provided support to eight poor performers under this program: Angola, Cambodia, East Timor, Guinea, Indonesia, Lesotho, Niger, and Sierra Leone.[19]

The second major channel for USAID's civil-military relations work is the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) within USAID itself. OTI has pursued this work in both Indonesia and Nigeria. In Indonesia, OTI has partnered with local academics, NGOs, and international groups such as NDI and the Asia Foundation to address such critical issues as executive and legislative control over the armed forces, separation of the police from the military, the military's legal and institutional framework, and budget transparency. In September 2002, OTI funded a workshop on the issue of off-budget funding. Minister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono spoke to members of Parliament's Commission I, presenting data and material on his calculations that 70 percent

of the expenditure of TNI (the Indonesian armed forces) is drawn from off-budget sources. Members of Parliament used the data to formulate questions to TNI's commander-in-chief General Endriartono Sutarto at a parliamentary hearing on September 17. This exchange was widely published by the media, with Endriartono acknowledging that TNI used off-budget funds to increase the welfare of its troops. He stopped short, however, of admitting that TNI relied heavily on extortion and illegal businesses to cover its organizational costs.[20]

Internal Military Roles

When the United States perceives a threat to its interests coming from a foreign state's own problems (anti-U.S. insurgencies, narcotics trafficking, weapons proliferators, terrorist cells), it usually does not respond with civilian police assistance programs like ICITAP. At least since the cold war, the United States has exhibited a pattern of turning to the militaries of these countries to confront the problems. U.S. officials either distrust the capacity of civilian bodies in these countries to deal with the problems or believe that developing country militaries are the only place to turn.

A classic example of this pattern is the drug war in Latin America, in which the United States has used diplomatic pressure and massive aid to encourage the region's militaries to take on an ambitious internal mission. Though the U.S. military has almost no counternarcotics role within U.S. borders, the commander of the U.S. Southern Command, General James Hill, argued in January 2003 that militarization is the only counterdrug option in the region.[21] In Chile, only the military has the assets to protect Chilean borders and land in northern Chile from drug trafficking. In Paraguay, only the military can counteract the continuous violations of Paraguayan airspace as drugs enter and exit the country. In Brazil, only the military can prevent the country's rivers from becoming highways for precursor chemicals and go-fast boats (the preferred boat of drug smugglers).

Though perhaps it promises a quicker outcome than efforts to improve police and the rule of law, militarization carries strong disadvantages. The purpose of a military in nearly every successful democracy is limited to defending against violent threats to the state. Unless organized as an opposition army, a nation's own citizens never meet this definition and thus should not be subject to military arrests, interrogations, roadblocks, surveillance, searches, and seizures. Because of the military's unique training, few democracies regularly call on them to play internal roles, from building roads to meting out justice, which civilians can easily perform.

Particularly in the war on terror countries, however, the United States is continuing to urge expanded military roles. This expansion not only increases the risk of human rights abuse but also increases the power, prestige, and impunity that militaries enjoy within their own states. This is especially damaging in weak or transitional democracies, where civilian rule is tenuous.

Short-Term U.S. Interests and U.S. Security

Before September 11, 2001, the present war on terror countries received very little in the way of U.S. support for their security sectors, but by 2003 they accounted for 94 percent of U.S. security assistance to poorly performing states and roughly one-third of security assistance worldwide, excluding Israel and Egypt. While protecting the United States against future terrorist activities may be a valid, short-term national security interest of the United States, the way in which it is being implemented may undermine U.S. security in the long term.

Weak States

If a major threat to U.S. security comes from terrorism harbored in, if not actually fostered by, weak states, U.S. security assistance policy is helping to make weak states weaker. All of the war on terror countries have extensive records of repression of civil and political liberties, human rights violations, and economic impunity on the part of civilian and security elites. The same is true of many other poor performers. Such states are extremely weak institutionally. In some cases, their governments are no more than personalized rule by authoritarian leaders backed by the security forces. Historically, governments that have focused on regime protection, that have consistently repressed political opposition, and that have engaged in serious violations of human rights are breeding grounds for internal instability and external adventurism. They are, to say the least, poor partners in the quest for security, either their own or that of the United States.

Turkmenistan, one of the United States' newest war on terror allies (though not a poor performer in the forty-seven-country sample) provides an important example. Saparmurad Niyazov, the last communist leader of the Soviet republic of Turkmenistan, has ruled this Central Asian nation since independence from the Soviet Union. A *Washington Post* article says that "the collapse of the Soviet Union did not lead, as many hoped, to democratic rule," and continues:

> Early attempts by Turkmen intellectuals to establish some kind of political pluralism were short-lived. Proto-political parties such as Agzybirlik soon disappeared as political life became increasingly dominated by the former Communist Party leader, Saparmurat Niyazov. He outlawed political parties except for the Communists, renamed the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan (DPT), and established himself not just as the dominant political force, but as the embodiment of all things Turkmen. Taking on the title of Turkmenbashi (Head or Father of all Turkmens) the Great, his rule became increasingly bizarre during the 1990s, developing a cult of personality to rival those of Mao Zedong or Saddam Hussein.[22]

Not surprisingly, opposition to Niyazov has grown both within Turkmenistan and among Turkmen exiles. The state has been severely weakened and increasingly criminalized. The primary function of Turkmenistan's security bodies is to keep Niyazov in power. The rule of law is continually degraded. Under the pretext of what many believe was a staged assassination attempt against him on November 25, 2002, Niyazov changed the legal code to ensure that some of those accused of plotting against him will receive life in prison, if they survive to stand trial. Hundreds of Turkmen citizens have been arrested in connection with the assassination attempt: some are political opponents of the president, others are relatives of political opponents, still others are reportedly politically unaffiliated NGO activists.

The exile-based opposition to Niyazov has been seriously weakened by this change in the legal code as well as by internal divisions. But Niyazov will leave power at some point, and the political vacuum that he has created will inevitably produce what the International Crisis Group (ICG) terms "an unpredictable transition." What is more, there are signs that the security bodies are poised to play a direct political role. According to ICG, the main threats to the continuation of Niyazov's rule include the Presidential Guard, which is closely associated with Niyazov; the intelligence service (the KNB), which was severely purged in 2002; army officers, who are increasingly disinclined to support the regime; and finally, the people, who have begun to voice their opposition more publicly.[23] At the same time, Niyazov has accused Uzbekistan of supporting Turkmen exiles opposed to his rule, ratcheting up tension between two U.S. allies in the war on terror.

Uzbekistan, the third-largest security assistance recipient in the forty-seven-country sample, is an equally problematic ally.[24] Like his Turkmen

counterpart, Uzbek president Islam Karimov is essentially an unreconstructed Soviet leader. As in Turkmenistan, a central role of the security forces is to protect Karimov's position of power, often by engaging in serious, sustained human rights violations and religious persecution.[25] Similar assessments can be made for many other poor performers.

Some analysts believe that the United States has very little leverage over allies such as Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and that the leverage it does have has been dissipated "by the desire to avoid regional opposition to its [Washington's] counterterrorism agenda."[26] The kind of assistance offered these countries is at best inappropriate and ineffective; at worst, it is counterproductive. During 2002, for example, much U.S. security assistance to Tajikistan went to a border security program seeking to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and to interdict the trade in narcotics. However, as the State Department's annual *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report* indicates, "public speculation regarding trafficking involvement by government officials is rampant," and "the lavish lifestyles of some . . . do give some credence to corruption allegations."[27] Of course, this greatly reduces the likelihood that U.S. counternarcotics assistance will bear any results. The ICG believes that this will also undermine U.S. credibility in the region.

One of the clearest examples of how the U.S. focus on its short-term objectives can make a weak state weaker is Afghanistan. During the Taliban period, the power of the regional warlords was severely eroded. In order to minimize the number of U.S. casualties during the fighting in Afghanistan, the United States began to use some of the warlords' troops as proxy fighters in 2001 and to reward warlords who did not fight against coalition forces and the new government in Kabul. This has enabled warlords to rebuild their regional power bases and to threaten the authority of the central government.[28] Even when one part of the U.S. government (the Pentagon) decided to limit support for one or more warlords, another part of the U.S. government (the Central Intelligence Agency) continued to provide support to the same warlords in order to continue to carry out its own operations.

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

If a major threat to U.S. security comes from rogue states with weapons of mass destruction capacity, the United States has to be concerned about two poorly performing states in particular.[29] One of these, Pakistan, was for many years a recipient of significant amounts of U.S. security assistance. This assistance was banned throughout the 1990s because U.S. legislation requires aid to be halted to countries that possess nuclear devices and whose governments

come to power through a coup d'état. After September 11, 2001, Pakistan's overwhelming strategic importance in the effort to destroy al Qaeda and to remove the Taliban regime allowed the Bush administration to cite national security reasons for resuming U.S. security assistance.

The other state, North Korea, remains on the list of those banned from receiving U.S. security assistance, although Washington has shown periodic signs of reengaging with the North Korean government in an effort to prevent it from resuming its own nuclear weapons development program, to return it to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime, and to prevent it from becoming a source of nuclear technology for other states.

It appears that, rather than guaranteeing U.S. security, current security assistance risks becoming a zero-sum game, in which both the United States and its aid recipients become more insecure. In our view, U.S. security would be better served by an effort to enhance the quality of governance in the security sectors of key countries. This would help strengthen the states of strategically important countries, reducing the risk of generating or sustaining local or regional instability or providing havens for terrorist groups.

Regional Security

Some U.S. security assistance has the potential to enhance regional security, notably through peacekeeping training and support and through the regional security studies centers, which help foster dialogue among regional actors and provide a forum for discussing issues of common concern. Many participants in the seminars held by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, for example, highlight the importance of bringing together Africans from across the continent to address issues of common concern. At the same time, the appropriateness of the U.S. peacekeeping model has sometimes been questioned, particularly in Africa. The same is true of the content of the courses and seminars offered by the regional security studies centers, which have been criticized for drawing too heavily on U.S. experience rather than attempting to identify or develop models more appropriate to the region.[30]

U.S. security assistance can also increase regional instability. First, disputes between states generally require political solutions reached through negotiation and accommodation rather than the use of force. By encouraging a role for the security bodies in addressing problems between states, U.S. security assistance can contribute to a tendency to use force to "resolve" disputes. Second, arms transfers can create the perception of regional imbalances, if not actual imbalances. This can encourage leaders in neighboring states to build up their arsenals as well. Arms races do not by themselves create conflict, but

they do little to improve regional relations. The two nuclear powers in South Asia, India and Pakistan, came very close to war in 2002 over the disputed territory of Kashmir, for instance, raising the specter of a nuclear exchange.

Third, regional arms races can have extraregional effects, thereby helping to destabilize other objectives of U.S. assistance. For example, it was revealed in late 2002 that Pakistan was the source of a key element of North Korea's nuclear program. North Korea reportedly bartered missiles and missile technology for uranium enrichment technology. What is more, North Korea has sold missiles to Yemen, seemingly without U.S objections. As Jon Wolfsthal at the Carnegie Endowment observes, "These decisions demonstrate to the rest of the world that the U.S. war on terrorism—in which Pakistan and Yemen are key American allies—takes precedence over the fight against proliferation. As a result, states bent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction may be in a position to play this preference to their advantage, as has Pakistan."[31]

Fourth, by sending the message that security bodies are important interlocutors both domestically and between states, U.S. security assistance can undermine the civil authorities and the rule of law. While the civil authorities in many poor performers cannot be described as adherents to the democratic process, politically active security forces always complicate efforts to introduce more democratic forms of government. Countries in which the rule of law is routinely violated, either domestically or with neighboring states, are more likely to engage in activities that will destabilize the region.

Low Levels of Assistance

The attacks of September 11, 2001, ended the post–cold war decline in worldwide U.S. security-related assistance, a period during which very few countries beyond Israel and Egypt received more than US$10 million a year. Countries experiencing subsequent changes in the volume and content of their assistance include such poor performers as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan. Nonetheless, for the most part, security assistance to poorly performing states has remained low. Twenty-nine of the forty-seven countries sampled received less than US$2 million in U.S. security assistance over a five-year period. U.S. economic and social assistance typically outstrips security assistance, even for most countries receiving the largest amounts of weapons and training (see appendix table 13A-2). Moreover, U.S. security assistance represents but a small portion of the resources available to the government in each of these countries. While such assistance is an important policy tool, the United States does not employ security assistance to the exclusion of other forms of engagement or assistance.

This raises the question of whether low levels of assistance will have much impact, either for good or ill. From the perspective of the U.S. government, providing even a small amount is a seemingly cost-effective method of enabling the United States to develop or maintain relations with security bodies in as many countries as possible. Since much security assistance going to the low-priority countries is for education through expanded IMET and the regional security studies centers, policymakers may argue that these resources will have a small, positive effect on civil-military relations in the world's poorest countries.

However well intentioned, even small amounts of assistance carry important risks when the recipients suffer from serious deficits of governance. Aid can confer legitimacy on corrupt or abusive security forces through the symbolic power of association or partnership with the United States. Small amounts of assistance can be enough to upset delicate civil-military balances or to prop up abusive regimes or institutions. A safe and secure environment for states and their populations is critical for sound governance, which in turn is a necessary condition for sustainable economic and political development and social well-being. If U.S. security assistance, even in small amounts, contributed to these goals, the argument of positive benefits might be tenable.

It is difficult to argue, though, that U.S. security assistance to poorly performing states is part of a concerted effort to strengthen the democratic accountability of police and military forces or to enhance their capacity to create a safe and secure environment for both the state and its population. As it is, neither U.S. development assistance nor U.S. security assistance is likely to provide sufficient support to improve democratic accountability or to provide safety and security.

Assistance Decisionmaking

"Long before September 11, the U.S. government had gown increasingly dependent on its military to carry out its foreign affairs," notes the journalist Dana Priest. "The military simply filled a vacuum left by an indecisive White House, an atrophied State Department, and a distracted Congress."[32] Foreign policy decisionmakers responsible for the "big picture," as well as legislative oversight personnel, largely abdicated the design of U.S. security assistance to those with the greatest zeal for militarization, such as regional military commands and hawkish members of Congress. Consistent losers in bureaucratic battles, if they choose to fight at all, are those charged with guaranteeing the full spectrum of U.S. interests in the region: the National Security Council,

the State Department's regional bureaus, and moderates on the congressional foreign relations committees. The result is that U.S. assistance packages too often end up reflecting the concerns of agencies charged with preparing for even the most hypothetical threats to U.S. security.

Security assistance programs to poor performers show symptoms of this shift. During the cold war, nearly all U.S. military and police aid was funded through programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, a law passed to rationalize military aid, to ensure that it is carried out in line with policy objectives, and to give civilians (more precisely, the State Department) the leading role in setting military aid policy. While such programs continue to provide the bulk of aid to poorly performing states, the first section of this chapter shows how the activity of programs managed by the Pentagon and funded through the defense budget have expanded.

Congressional and citizen oversight of Defense Department security assistance accounts has been difficult. While much of what these accounts pay for is classified, they are also tiny in comparison to the entire defense budget, which exceeds US$400 billion (foreign aid, by contrast, totaled about US$18 billion). Congressional oversight committees have surprisingly small staffs; the House Armed Services Committee, for instance, has a staff of forty-five people from both parties, including administrative staff, overseeing a US$400 billion annual budget, and is therefore unable to subject Defense Department counternarcotics activities to much scrutiny.[33] Even the little transparency that is available has been under assault from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who has placed a priority on reducing the number of annual reports the Pentagon must provide to Congress.[34]

Policy Recommendations

As the security priorities of the United States shift in the post-September 11 world, U.S. security assistance to poor performers is changing—and in many cases, expanding—quite rapidly. If it is to be effective, Washington's military and police assistance must address the crisis of governance afflicting the security sectors in recipient countries, not simply the short-term interests of counterterrorism, counternarcotics, geopolitics, or oil. In fact, these immediate interests will not be served if security assistance aggravates the political and social conditions that led many poor performers into their current crises.

This review of security assistance provides a number of lessons for policymakers focused on the capacity of police and military assistance in poorly performing states:

—Improve civilian governance of the security sector. Greatly increased resources must go toward improving civilian security and control institutions, training civilians in security planning and defense resource management, and improving access to information for legislators and civil society. The United States must also offer emphatic political support to local reformers working to increase civilian control and expertise, to end impunity, and to impose the rule of law.

—Recognize the great danger inherent in aiding the security forces that are abusive, corrupt, pose a likely threat to their neighbors, or are proliferating weapons. While the imperatives of the war on terror might force the United States into an uneasy partnership with such security forces, clear limits to cooperation (including legal restrictions on aid to security force units that commit gross human rights violations with impunity) must be strictly observed. The U.S. Congress and citizens' groups must be vigilant for indications that security assistance is strengthening leaders whose attacks on their own people and behavior toward neighbors indicate their potential to be future enemies of the United States.

—Articulate a long-term vision and encourage governments to work toward it. When hard-headed realism or security imperatives demand close cooperation, it must be clear that even when the United States has little leverage (when, for example, U.S. forces need to use an airfield or seal a border), U.S. engagement has its limits. The civilian and security elites of recipient countries must understand that the long-term security interests of the United States will be at risk if its aid is not linked to a full spectrum of economic, political, and social reforms. In cases like this, the United States may find its security assistance to be counterproductive and cut it off.

The United States is encouraging such reform to some extent in Uzbekistan. President Islam Karimov undoubtedly received a boost at home from the diplomatic attention, economic aid, and military partnership with the United States. Yet for the first time since Uzbekistan became independent, U.S. officials are also meeting regularly with a wide range of Uzbek officials and conveying strongly worded messages about the need for change. And there are signs of nascent political and economic reforms, albeit small, tentative ones.[35] Even when dealing with the states seen as most essential for the U.S. counterterror strategy, it is not in Washington's interest to simply write checks, ship weapons, and transfer lethal skills. Strong, sustained diplomatic and political engagement with recipient countries must directly link further aid and a closer relationship with clearly defined reform goals. Thus follow two more lessons:

—Assess objectively the real results that aid is achieving. Evaluations of aid programs must do more than cite process goals, like the number of students, the number of border patrols, or the frequency of engagement. Looking at intermediate achievements, and not at progress toward larger goals like security and democratic consolidation, is a product of bureaucratic inertia and the need to sustain agency budgets. A counterterror strategy should measurably reduce the ability of terror groups to operate; a counternarcotics strategy should reduce the availability of drugs on U.S. streets; and peacekeeping assistance should increase the role of recipient countries in leading peacekeeping missions. It does not matter how efficiently a strategy is being implemented if that strategy is failing to meet its larger goals. When strategies are failing, or in fact are subverting their own goals, Congress and aid agencies must be prepared to scrap them and radically alter their approaches.

—Make security assistance as transparent as possible. Assistance to foreign militaries carries significant foreign policy risks and cannot be shrouded in secrecy. Yet the Bush administration has been increasingly stingy with the information it doles out about security assistance programs, especially those that benefit the war on terror countries and those funded through the defense budget. To the extent that force protection is not compromised, congressional oversight bodies and nongovernmental monitors must have access to regular reporting about the cost, extent, goals, and nature of arms transfers, training programs, joint operations, intelligence sharing, overseas military presences, and other forms of military cooperation. Democratic control over the security sector must begin at home.

Appendix 13A: Data on Poorly Performing States

Table 13A-1. *Poorly Performing States, According to Five Criteria*

State	*Fallling below the mean of the human development index in 2003*	*Having a gross national per capita annual income of $735 or less in 2002*	*Ranking in the bottom 2 quintiles of policy and institutional quality in 2003*	*Scoring a freedom ranking greater than 7 in 2001–02*	*Ranking in the bottom 2 quintiles of governance indicators in 2002*	*Total*
The 47 states satisfying 4 or 5 criteria						
Afghanistan	n.a.	1	n.a.	1	1	5
Angola	1	1	1	1	1	5
Azerbaijan	0	1	1	1	1	4
Burundi	1	1	1	1	1	5
Cambodia	1	1	1	1	1	5
Cameroon	1	1	1	1	1	5
Central African Republic	1	1	1	1	1	5
Chad	1	1	1	1	1	5
Comoros	1	1	0	1	1	4
Congo, Republic of	1	1	1	1	1	5
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	1	1	1	1	1	5
Côte d'Ivoire	1	1	1	1	1	5
Djibouti	1	0	1	1	1	4
Equatorial Guinea	1	1	0	1	1	4
Eritrea	1	1	0	1	1	4
Ethiopia	1	1	0	1	1	4
Gambia	1	1	1	1	1	5
Georgia	0	1	1	1	1	4
Guinea	1	1	0	1	1	4
Guinea-Bissau	1	1	1	1	1	5
Haiti	1	1	1	1	1	5
Indonesia	1	1	1	0	1	4
Kenya	1	1	1	1	1	5
Lao People's Dem. Rep.	1	1	1	1	1	5
Lesotho	1	1	1	1	0	4
Liberia	n.a	1	n.a.	1	1	5
Myanmar	1	1	n.a.	1	1	5
Niger	1	1	0	1	1	4
Nigeria	1	1	1	1	1	5
North Korea	n.a.	1	0	1	1	4
Pakistan	1	1	0	1	1	4
Papua New Guinea	1	1	1	0	1	4
Rwanda	1	1	0	1	1	4
Sierra Leone	1	1	0	1	1	4
Solomon Islands	1	1	1	1	1	5
Somalia	n.a.	1	n.a.	1	1	5
Sudan	1	1	1	1	1	5

Table 13A-1 *(continued)*

State	*Fallling below the mean of the human development index in 2003*	*Having a gross national per capita annual income of $735 or less in 2002*	*Ranking in the bottom 2 quintiles of policy and institutional quality in 2003*	*Scoring a freedom ranking greater than 7 in 2001–02*	*Ranking in the bottom 2 quintiles of governance indicators in 2002*	*Total*
Swaziland	1	1	0	1	1	4
Tajikistan	1	1	1	1	1	5
Tanzania, U. Rep. of	1	1	0	1	1	4
Timor-Leste	n.a.	1	n.a.	1	1	5
Togo	1	1	1	1	1	5
Uganda	1	1	0	1	1	4
Uzbekistan	0	1	1	1	1	4
Yemen	1	1	1	1	1	5
Zambia	1	1	0	1	1	4
Zimbabwe	1	1	1	1	1	5
The 14 states satisfying 3 criteria						
Bangladesh	1	1	0	0	1	3
Bhutan	1	1	0	1	0	3
Burkina Faso	1	1	0	1	0	3
Egypt	1	0	0	1	1	3
Kyrgyzstan	0	1	0	1	1	3
Madagascar	1	1	1	0	0	3
Malawi	1	1	0	0	1	3
Mali	1	1	0	0	1	3
Mauritania	1	1	0	1	0	3
Mozambique	1	1	0	0	1	3
Nepal	1	1	0	0	1	3
Nicaragua	1	1	0	0	1	3
São Tomé and Principe	1	1	1	0	0	3
Vietnam	0	1	0	1	1	3
The 31 states satisfying 2 criteria						
Albania	0	0	0	1	1	2
Algeria	0	0	0	1	1	2
Armenia	0	0	0	1	1	2
Belarus	0	0	0	1	1	2
Benin	1	1	0	0	0	2
Bolivia	1	0	0	0	1	2
Bosnia-Herzegovina	0	0	0	1	1	2
Botswana	1	1	0	0	0	2
Colombia	0	0	0	1	1	2
Cuba	0	0	0	1	1	2
Gabon	1	0	0	1	0	2
Ghana	1	1	0	0	0	2
Guatemala	1	0	0	0	1	2

State	*Fallling below the mean of the human development index in 2003*	*Having a gross national per capita annual income of $735 or less in 2002*	*Ranking in the bottom 2 quintiles of policy and institutional quality in 2003*	*Scoring a freedom ranking greater than 7 in 2001–02*	*Ranking in the bottom 2 quintiles of governance indicators in 2002*	*Total*
Honduras	1	0	0	0	1	2
India	1	1	0	0	0	2
Iran	0	0	0	1	1	2
Iraq	0	0	0	1	1	2
Kazakhstan	0	0	0	1	1	2
Lebanon	0	0	0	1	1	2
Libya	0	0	0	1	1	2
Macedonia	0	0	0	1	1	2
Moldova	0	1	0	0	1	2
Mongolia	1	1	0	0	0	2
Morocco	1	0	0	1	0	2
Russia	0	0	0	1	1	2
Senegal	1	1	0	0	0	2
Syria	0	0	0	1	1	2
Tonga	0	0	0	1	1	2
Turkmenistan	0	0	0	1	1	2
Ukraine	0	0	0	1	1	2
Venezuela	0	0	0	1	1	2
The 21 states satisfying 1 criterion						
Argentina	0	0	0	0	1	1
Bahrain	0	0	0	1	0	1
Brunei	0	0	0	1	0	1
China	0	0	0	1	0	1
Ecuador	0	0	0	0	1	1
Jordan	0	0	0	1	0	1
Kiribati	0	0	1	0	0	1
Kuwait	0	0	0	1	0	1
Malaysia	0	0	0	1	0	1
Maldives	0	0	0	1	0	1
Namibia	1	0	0	0	0	1
Oman	0	0	0	1	0	1
Paraguay	0	0	0	0	1	1
Qatar	0	0	0	1	0	1
Saudi Arabia	0	0	0	1	0	1
Singapore	0	0	0	1	0	1
Tunisia	0	0	0	1	0	1
Turkey	0	0	0	1	0	1
United Arab Emirates	0	0	0	1	0	1
Vanuatu	1	0	0	0	0	1
Yugoslavia	0	0	0	0	1	1

Source: See appendix B.

n.a. Means datum is not available and is scored as 1.

Table 13A-2. *U.S. Aid to Forty-Seven Poorly Performing States, by Category, 2000–04*[a]

US$ thousand unless noted otherwise

State	*Military and police aid*	*Economic and social aid*	*Military/police aid share (percent)*
Afghanistan	1,357,085	1,537,999	47
Pakistan	782,611	1,387,394	36
Uzbekistan	74,164	246,006	23
Georgia	65,459	473,716	12
Nigeria	46,008	324,069	12
Yemen	40,532	43,468	48
Timor-Leste	38,237	111,495	26
Kenya	29,177	331,654	8
Indonesia	26,135	665,349	4
Azerbaijan	23,938	216,763	10
Haiti	15,217	303,562	5
Tajikistan	14,908	193,573	7
Ethiopia	5,002	522,024	1
Djibouti	4,630	8,501	35
Guinea	4,609	143,149	3
Eritrea	2,711	64,444	4
Cameroon	2,642	17,232	13
Zambia	2,463	244,742	1
Côte d'Ivoire	1,915	13,818	12
Lao People's Dem. Rep.	1,711	28,859	6
Chad	1,690	17,123	9
Papua New Guinea	1,541	2,257	41
Zimbabwe	1,276	101,128	1
Tanzania, U. Rep. of	1,262	149,646	1
Sierra Leone	955	111,462	1
Central African Republic	738	1,434	34
Uganda	733	396,418	0
Cambodia	730	169,103	0
Niger	699	43,886	2
Swaziland	697	2,885	19
Solomon Islands	629	1,097	36
Lesotho	613	11,829	5
Togo	601	10,516	5
Rwanda	593	149,786	0
Congo, Republic of	560	0	100
Guinea-Bissau	441	2,276	16
Gambia	349	11,590	3
Angola	335	191,045	0
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	255	139,459	0

State	*Military and police aid*	*Economic and social aid*	*Military/police aid share (percent)*
Burundi	248	40,565	1
Comoros	201	0	100
Equatorial Guinea	125	0	100
Liberia	9	250,202	0
Myanmar	0	34,985	0
North Korea	0	0	0
Somalia	0	55,770	0
Sudan	0	316,871	0
Addendum			
War on terror states	2,300,066	4,082,290	36
Strategically important states	185,658	2,548,448	7
Lower priority states	62,287	99,262	9
Banned states	6,419	1,859,150	0
Total	2,554,430	8,589,150	22

Source: See appendix B.

a. These figures represent the authors' best estimates based on U.S. government sources. Some countries may secretly receive additional military assistance from U.S. intelligence agencies. Economic and social assistance does not include emergency humanitarian aid, such as food drops to Afghanistan and funds from regional accounts.

Table 13A-3. *U.S. Programs Providing Military and Police Assistance to Forty-Seven Poorly Performing States, 2000–04*[a]

Program	*War on terror states*	*Strategically important states*	*Lower priority states*	*Banned states*	*Total*
Foreign military financing					
US$ thousand	1,143,449	133,596	8,222	0	1,285,267
Percent to these states	49.7	72.0	13.2	0.0	50.3
International narcotics and law enforcement					
US$ thousand	425,974	6,280	1,321	0	433,575
Percent to these states	18.5	3.4	2.1	0.0	17.0
Afghan Freedom Support Act drawdowns					
US$ thousand	300,000	0	0	0	300,000
Percent to these states	13.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.7
Peacekeeping operations					
US$ thousand	251,949	340	34,994	0	287,283
Percent to these states	11.0	0.2	56.2	0.0	11.2
Nonproliferation, antiterrorism, demining, and related programs					
US$ thousand	153,754	7,775	0	0	161,529
Percent to these states	6.7	4.2	0.0	0.0	6.3
International military education and training					
US$ thousand	14,208	21,174	6,319	2,564	44,265
Percent to these states	0.6	11.4	10.1	39.9	1.7
Defense Department regional security studies institutes					
US$ thousand	5,320	6,491	1,984	914	14,709
Percent to these states	0.2	3.5	3.2	14.2	0.6
Defense Department counternarcotics (sec. 1004)					
US$ thousand	3,844	0	9,365	0	13,209
Percent to these states	0.2	0.0	15.0	0.0	0.5
Unified command activities (includes JCETs)					
US$ thousand	439	5,561	82	1,241	7,323
Percent to these states	0.0	3.0	0.1	19.3	0.3
Africa Crisis Response Initiative					
US$ thousand	0	2,470	0	1,700	4,170
Percent to these states	0.0	1.3	0.0	26.5	0.2
U.S. service academies					
US$ thousand	418	1,481	0	0	1,899
Percent to these states	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.1

Program	*War on terror states*	*Strategically important states*	*Lower priority states*	*Banned states*	*Total*
Excess defense articles					
US$ thousand	366	460	0	0	826
Percent to these states	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
Exchanges					
US$ thousand	276	0	0	0	276
Percent to these states	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Aviation Leadership Program					
US$ thousand	69	30	0	0	99
Percent to these states	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total (US$ thousand)	2,300,066	185,658	62,287	6,419	2,554,429

Source: See appendix B.
a. See note to table 13A-2.

Appendix 13B: Sources for Tables

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, *Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Congressional Justification;* Office of Management and Budget, *Reports on Expenditures from the Emergency Response Fund, 2003;* Office of Management and Budget, *Supplemental #4—Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003;* Office of Management and Budget, *2004 Supplemental: Iraqi/Afghanistan War—9/17/03;* U.S. Congress, *Conference Report 108-76;* U.S. Congress, *Conference Report 108-337;* White House, *FY 2002 Foreign Operations Emergency Supplemental Funding Justifications;* U.S. Department of State, *FY 2003 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations;* U.S. Department of State, Department of Defense, *Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest: Joint Report to Congress 2003;* U.S. Congress, *Conference Report 107-593;* U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, *Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Congressional Justification;* U.S. Department of State, *FY 2002 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations.*

Notes

1. U.S. Department of State, *FY 2004 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations* (Washington: 2003); U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Defense, *Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest: Joint Report to Congress* (Washington: 2003). These numbers do not include significant but smaller amounts of police assistance provided by the U.S. Department of Justice through the International Criminal Investigative Training Program (ICITAP) and a number of U.S. Defense Department military exercises and unified command activities.

2. John A. Cope, "International Military Education and Training: An Assessment," McNair Paper 44 (Washington: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995); U.S Department of State, *FY 2004 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations*.

3. U.S. Department of State, *FY 2004 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations,* p. 380.

4. H.R. 2888, signed into law September 18, 2001; H.R. 4775, signed into law August 2, 2002; H.R. 1559, signed into law April 16, 2003; and H.R. 3289, signed into law November 6, 2003.

5. U.S. Department of State, *FY 2004 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations,* p. 436.

6. U.S. Department of Justice, *International Criminal Investigative Assistance Training Program* (Washington: 2003).

7. U.S Department of State, U.S. Department of Defense, *Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest: Joint Report to Congress* (Washington: 2001, 2002, 2003).

8. U.S. Department of State, *FY 2004 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations,* pp. 202, 263, 340.

9. Ibid., pp. 206, 268, 322.

10. Quotations from ibid., pp. 340, 216, 217, 226.

11. U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Defense, *Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest.*

12. Poorly performing states are not, however, the only countries in which security forces exercise political and economic impunity. That problem is far more widespread.

13. For example, on Indonesia, Niger, and Pakistan, see the papers presented at a conference organized by the Bonn International Centre for Conversion, "Soldiers in Business: The Military as an Economic Player" (www.bicc.de/budget/events/milbus/confpapers.html). On Indonesia, see also M. Riefqi Muna, "Money and Uniform: Corruption in the Indonesian Armed Forces in Stealing from the People: 16 Case Studies of Corruption in Indonesia," in *The Big Feast: Soldier, Judge, Banker, Civil Servant,* edited by Richard Holloway (Jakarta: Aksara Foundation, 2002).

14. "A continuing threat to many emerging democracies is military control of, or inappropriate intervention in, the government decision-making process. Without effective civilian control and legitimacy, democracies falter, instability thrives, and economic and political development is impeded. To counter the threat of military dominance, there must be a shift in the ways that militaries define their responsibilities and an improvement in the ways that civilians exercise theirs." Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Agency for International

Development, Center for Democracy and Governance, and Office of Transition Initiatives on the Conduct of Building Democracy Programs.

15. "The specific purpose" of the senior leader seminar, according to the website of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, "is to afford African policymakers an opportunity to consider and evaluate alternative approaches to the pressing challenge of 'democratic defense.'" The course in democratic civil-military relations "examines the nexus between democratic societies and security organs. It includes a broad assessment of the appropriate ways in which executive branches, legislatures, judicial institutions, and civil society relate to security forces and suggests mechanisms through which an acceptable balance can be maintained. The imperatives of civilian control over the military and the responsibilities of each party and organization responsible for national security are a critical part of this module." The course in national security strategy "examines the concept of national interests in a democratic society and identifies the various instruments of national power which can be harnessed to protect those interests. The various instruments of national power—diplomacy, economic, informational, and military—are examined in detail." The course in defense economics "addresses the efficient allocation of national resources between security and nonsecurity related requirements. It examines how national security is financed in a democracy and addresses the relationship between economic growth, development, and security, particularly under emerging market conditions" (www.africacenter.org/english/e3100_senior.htm).

16. According to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) website, "ICITAP'S mission is to serve as the source of support for U.S. criminal justice and foreign policy goals by assisting foreign government in developing the capacity to provide professional law enforcement services based on democratic principles and respect for human rights. It was created by DOJ in 1986 to respond to a request from the Department of State for assistance in training police forces in Latin America. Since then, ICITAP's activities have expanded to encompass two principal types of assistance projects: (1) the development of police forces in the context of international peacekeeping operations, and (2) the enhancement of capabilities of existing police forces in emerging democracies. Assistance is based on internationally recognized principles of human rights, rule of law and modern police practices. ICITAP's training and assistance programs are intended to develop professional civilian-based law enforcement institutions. This assistance is designed to: (1) enhance professional capabilities to carry out investigative and forensic functions; (2) assist in the development of academic instruction and curricula for law enforcement personnel; (3) improve the administrative and management capabilities of law enforcement agencies, especially their capabilities relating to career development, personnel evaluation, and internal discipline procedures; (4) improve the relationship between the police and the community it serves; and (5) create or strengthen the capability to respond to new crime and criminal justice issues" (www.usdoj.gov/criminal/icitap/).

17. U.S. Department of Justice, *ICITAP Project Overviews: Indonesia* (Washington: 2003). Some observers feel that ICITAP is spreading itself too thin in Indonesia.

18. U.S. Agency for International Development, *USAID Civil-Military Programs* (Washington: 2003).

19. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, *Global Programs: Security Sector Reform* (Washington: 2003). The institute's website provides this overview of the program in Cambodia: "The goal of this program is to work with Cambodian NGOs,

supporting them by enhancing their understanding of the role of the armed forces in a democratic society, by initiating dialogue about the role of the military in Cambodia, and by providing advice and financial assistance to their current efforts to improve civil-military relations in the country. NDI has chosen not to work directly with the Cambodian government in demobilization efforts or to assist the military. Instead, by working directly with civil society organizations, NDI hopes to begin to build civil society's familiarity with the discourse on civil-military relations, to raise the confidence of these civil society organizations as they engage in discussions with the government and military about security issues, and to encourage civil society organizations to eventually advocate for responsible security policy. In the future, NDI hopes to provide technical assistance to NGOs involved in reviewing defense proposals or to help them develop advocacy efforts on military reform issues" (www.ndi.org/globalp/civmil/programscm/cambodia/cambodia_202.asp).

20. See www.usaid.gov/hum_response/oti/country/indones/rpt0902.html.

21. General James Hill, U.S. Southern Command, "Comments before the Council of the Americas, November 1, 2003" (www.ciponline.org/colombia/03010901.pdf).

22. Robert G. Kaiser, "'Dribs and Drabs' of Information Keep Turkmen Plot in Shadows," *Washington Post,* January 13, 2003, p. A16. The International Crisis Group writes that "Turkmenistan has become a major drugs transit state, with the connivance of the authorities, including President Niyazov himself. The government's close relations with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, combined with corruption in the security forces, has reportedly allowed Taliban and al Qaeda fighters to escape from Afghanistan across the border. Further decline will merely increase the risk of Turkmenistan becoming a failed state that poses a serious threat to regional and international security." ICG, "Cracks in the Marble: Turkmenistan's Failing Dictatorship," Asia Report 44 (Brussels: 2003), p. ii.

23. ICG, "Cracks in the Marble," p. ii.

24. The 2001 *U.S. Human Rights Report on Uzbekistan* claims that its "human rights record remained very poor. . . . Citizens cannot exercise the right to change their government peacefully; the Government does not permit the existence of opposition parties." It goes on to claim that treatment by security forces resulted in the deaths of citizens in custody and that the police and other security forces "tortured, beat, and harassed persons. Prison conditions were poor, and pretrial detention can be prolonged. The security forces arbitrarily arrested and detained persons, on false charges, particularly Muslims suspected of extremist sympathies, frequently planting narcotics, weapons, or banned literature on them." Furthermore, "the judiciary does not ensure due process and often defers to the wishes of the executive branch," allowing the police and security forces to infringe "on citizens' privacy, including the use of illegal searches and wiretaps. Those responsible for documented abuses rarely are punished. The Government severely restricts freedom of speech and the press, and an atmosphere of repression stifles public criticism of the Government. Although the Constitution expressly prohibits it, censorship is practiced widely. The Government limits freedom of assembly and association. The Government continued to ban unauthorized public meetings and demonstration . . . and continued to deny registration to opposition political parties as well as to other groups that might be critical of the Government; unregistered opposition parties and movements may not operate freely or publish their views. . . . The Government restricted local nongovernmental organizations working on human rights and refused to register the two main human rights organizations. Security forces abused human rights activists. The Office of the Human Rights

Ombudsman reported that it assisted hundreds of citizens in redressing human rights abuses, the majority of which involve allegedly unjust court decisions and claims of abuse of power by police. . . . Violence against women, including domestic violence, was a problem, and there continued to be significant traditional, societal discrimination against women. Workplace discrimination against some minorities persisted. There are some limits on worker rights. Some children, particularly in rural areas, are forced to work during the harvest season. Trafficking in women and girls to other countries for the purpose of prostitution was a problem." Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, "Uzbekistan: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2001."

25. Uzbekistan does have a short history of military collaboration with the United States. Since the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the two countries have shared intelligence and conducted joint covert operations aimed at capturing al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. See, for example, Thomas E. Ricks and Susan B. Glasser, "U.S. Operated Secret Alliance with Uzbekistan," *Washington Post,* October 14, 2001.

26. ICG, "Cracks in the Marble," p. 33.

27. U.S. Department of State, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report* (Washington: 2003).

28. For example, see Thomas Carothers, "Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror" (www.foreignaffairs.org/20030101faessay10224/thomas-carothers/promoting-democracy-and-fighting-terror.html ([January 30, 2003]).

29. The United States has given considerable attention since the late 1990s to the possibility of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction, especially chemical and biological agents. There are reasons to believe that a focus on nonstate actors is misplaced and that any genuine threat will come from state actors. See, for example, Milton Leitenberg, "An Assessment of the Threat of the Use of Biological Weapons or Biological Agents," in *Biosecurity and Bioterrorism,* edited by Maurizio Martellini (Como, Italy: Landau Network Centro Volta, 2000); Milton Leitenberg, "Biological Weapons in the Twentieth Century: A Review and Analysis," *Critical Reviews in Microbiology* 27, no. 4 (2001): 267–320.

30. An example of programs is the yearly conferences held at the Marshall Center. The center's website describes the program as "divided between bilateral, single nation seminars and multinational and regional conferences," the latter focusing on security and economic concerns, "giving participants the opportunity to hear from experts and to discuss with their peers impacts and concerns" (www.marshallcenter.org/Conference%20Center/default.htm).

31. Jon Wolfsthal, "U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy," Proliferation Brief, January 6, 2003 (www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/templates/Publications.asp?p=8&PublicationID=1144 [January 30, 2003]).

32. Dana Priest, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), p. 14.

33. Personal communication from House Armed Services Committee staff, May 29, 2003.

34. See, for instance, Donald H. Rumsfeld "Defense for the 21st Century," *Washington Post,* May 22, 2003, p. A35.

35. Carothers, "Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror."