Country Platforms and Delivery of Global Public Goods

Daouda Sembene, Nancy Lee, and Mark Plant

Abstract

This paper discusses three potential requirements for country platforms to facilitate effective delivery of GPGs. We propose that existing country platforms be repurposed to coordinate the contribution of domestic and external stakeholders to GPG delivery efforts at the country level. For this proposed approach to be successful, an explicit link must be introduced between country-level efforts and global initiatives to provide GPGs. There is also merit in setting up country and global coordination mechanisms, with relevant agencies assigned to operate them both at the national and international levels.

Using relevant country platforms, we suggest that international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the IMF and multilateral development banks (MDBs) be mandated with helping developing countries meet the financing needs associated with the provision of GPGs. In addition, technical support from the IFIs should be put on the table to improve the effectiveness of developing countries’ contribution to GPG delivery. In this regard, MDBs can and must play a central role in developing capacities in these countries as part of their own contribution to GPG delivery. At the same time, securing the contribution of civil society and the private sector to GPG delivery efforts is essential given the magnitude of potential financing needs.
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Daouda Sembene, Nancy Lee, and Mark Plant
Center for Global Development

We are grateful to various country and IFI officials for insightful discussions on some of the issues raised in this paper. We also thank Dan Citrin, Sanjeev Gupta, and Scott Morris for their comments on initial versions of the paper as well as Hannah Brown and Samuel Pleeck for valuable assistance. All errors and omissions are ours.

The Center for Global Development is grateful for contributions from the Rockefeller Foundation in support of this work.

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1. Introduction

Ongoing and looming global crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change have brought renewed attention to the delivery of global public goods (GPGs). At the same time, it has become clear that strong international cooperation will be required to solve challenges associated with preparing or mitigating them. Yet, making progress on this front is proving to be challenging in the face of recent developments that complicate international collective action problems, including the rise of nationalist sentiment, eroding trust in multilateral institutions, and geopolitics. As a result, the global political and economic system has yet to deliver at the scale needed on critical global public goods such as public health, climate action, sustainable development, and peace, as noted by the UN Secretary-General.¹

In addition to international cooperation, national and local actions will be needed to mitigate threats from inadequate delivery of many GPGs. As highlighted by the 2018 Report of the G20 Eminent Persons Group on Global Financial Governance (EPG Report), solving one single threat may require producing several transnational and local public goods. Unlike local public goods, the costs of providing global public goods cannot be expected to be borne by any single country. For instance, mitigating rising temperatures requires collective action by a critical mass of countries to be effective. Hence, there is a growing need for, and interest in, developing mechanisms for collaboration within countries to enhance country contributions to GPGs.²

This paper explores how collaborative initiatives at the developing country level could greatly increase country contributions to GPGs. We examine whether country platforms could be used to facilitate GPG delivery at the national level. These platforms are typically multi-stakeholder partnerships among development actors designed to help achieve common goals, with participants generally representing governments, civil society, donors and philanthropic investors, businesses, and financial institutions.

The development community has long made use of government-led country platforms to help define shared priorities and a pathway for achieving common objectives in developing countries. Following its PRSP experience which began two decades ago, the World Bank recently expressed renewed interest in working with aid-recipient countries and development partners to launch new country platforms.³ Similarly, the UNDP vowed to support multi-stakeholder country partnerships with the aim of securing progress toward sustainable development goals (SDGs). Developing effective country platforms was also among the key recommendations made in the EPG Report. The idea was to use them as instruments that could help catalyze the efforts of development actors to unlock investments in developing

² This is generally in line with the principle of subsidiary according to which problems must be solved closest to where they occur. See International Task Force (2006).
countries. More recently, renewed calls and interest have been expressed for the design of country platforms as the Italian presidency of the G20 begins building on the principles that the G20 agreed on in early 2020.

While country platforms have been typically used to coordinate the delivery of development assistance, we explore how they could be repurposed to help coordinate global and national GPG delivery efforts. For illustrative purposes, we apply our proposed approach to the delivery of climate GPGs. The paper builds on discussions with a variety of practitioners and experts with a rich experience on multi-stakeholder platforms and GPG delivery.

The next section reviews the collective action challenges associated with the delivery of GPGs and proposed ways to overcome them. The third section explores the potential role of country platforms in the provision of GPGs. An application to climate GPGs is discussed in the fourth section, while the final section concludes.

2. Collective action to deliver GPG: Challenges and solutions

The global commons face several challenges that include environmental and public health threats arising notably from climate change, biodiversity loss, and pandemics, but also forced migration due to insecurity, conflict, and natural disasters. To overcome these challenges, the EPG Report calls on the international community to act in a collaborative manner to deliver public goods, including by assisting developing countries in playing their part through their own national actions.4

However, multiple collective action problems constrain international cooperation and are complicated by the specific nature of GPGs giving rise to dual-economic and political-market failure and internationally varying preferences for their opportunity and delivery.5 Most notably, these are rooted in free-riding—the idea that each country will minimize its costs by relying others to supply the GPG and in the end no country acts. For instance, free riding is considered as a norm in the climate commons and continues to incentivize delays in costly mitigation efforts along with commitment problems.6 Intergenerational tradeoffs are also a constraint to multilateral action—mitigation efforts today are to mostly benefit future generations (Carattini, Levin, and Tavoni (2019)), so today's benefits do not outweigh today's costs. In addition, geopolitical and diplomatic challenges perpetuate the inability of the international community to agree on common goals and effectively enforce global treaties. These challenges are partly rooted in inequities across countries with respect to climate change causes and effects. Poorer countries, for example, are often disproportionately

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4 See report of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG).
vulnerable to climate-related shocks, yet they contribute very little to greenhouse gas emissions. This situation is currently aggravated by rising populist and nationalist sentiment which erodes trust in multilateral institutions and solutions. Additional factors include the existence of transnational public benefits and a high share of nation-specific benefits, a limited number of critical participants, and the lack of an influential leader nation (Sandler, 2005).

The literature identifies several proposals for tackling transnational collective action problems. Among the various solutions, it is proposed that the international community works collaboratively toward shared priorities and common goals, notably by facilitating knowledge sharing, research, and capacity building, developing mechanisms to better enforce global agreements, and protecting the vulnerable (Ötker-Robe, 2014). According to Sandler, raising public awareness of the nature of the GPG issue can also help by reducing uncertainty as to their efficacy. Other authors have advocated policy interventions to alter norms and behaviors to support for GPG delivery (Carattini, Levin, and Tavoni (2019)).

In this paper, we explore how to address intra-national and transnational collective action problems using country platforms which convene relevant stakeholders with shared priorities with a view to coordinating efforts to achieve them. By design, platforms are thus meant to help solve collective action problems and are typically deployed to coordinate aid delivery. The paper reviews ways to use country platforms to support the delivery of GPGs.

3. The role of country platforms in the delivery of GPGs

Though variously defined, country platforms are generally viewed as mechanisms through which government officials and development partners agree on shared priorities and coordinate support for policy and institutional reforms needed to achieve them. Platform participants may include representatives from multilateral institutions, bilateral official agencies, CSOs, the private sector, and philanthropies.

Typically, country platforms include a high-level steering group chaired by the head of state or government and a sector-level group led by a member of government supported by a secretariat generally led by the ministry in charge of finance or planning.7

While governments generally play a central role, models of country platform leadership vary across countries. Single leadership models are developed to support national development strategies and forge agreement on common priorities, with the country’s head of state or government or a minister at the helm of the platform. Shared-leadership approaches are adopted sometimes, with a designated country official assuming co-chairing responsibilities with a representative from development partners.

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7 For more information, see Papoulidis (2020).
Regional and global platforms could be envisioned as well. For instance, the EPG called for the establishment of regional platforms to facilitate cross-border infrastructure projects, while seeing merit in global platforms to support collaboration between international financial institutions (IFIs) at the country level, particularly on thematic issues such as sustainable infrastructure (EPG). In practice, this has successfully implemented in some regions, notably in the Western Balkans (Box 1).

As discussed in Plant (2020), a country platform may serve several purposes. It could seek to advance the broad development agenda of either a country or a sector, improve decision-making in selecting development projects, finance and implement a set of projects, promote private investment, or encourage cross-country collaboration on global or regional public goods. In practice, multi-stakeholder platforms are typically set up to coordinate aid delivery even when they aim to foster collaboration on GPGs.

### Box 1. Western Balkans Investment Framework

The Western Balkans Investment Framework (WBIF) is a regional blending platform which finances the preparation and implementation of priority infrastructure projects in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia. The WBIF was established in 2009 as a joint initiative of the European Commission, the Council of Europe Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank, and several bilateral donors. The World Bank Group, the KfW Development Bank and AFD (Agence Française de Développement) subsequently joined the Framework.

Under the WBIF governance framework, the Steering Committee (SC) initiates calls for proposals and approves grant applications which are assessed and recommended by the Project Financiers’ Group (PFG). Approved grants are then implemented by the Infrastructure Project Facility team and/or IFIs themselves. The WBIF Secretariat is hosted by the European Commission and is tasked with preparing, supporting and implementing decisions of the Project Financiers’ Group and the Steering Committee, and to maintain an efficient working relationship with the NIPACs and the other WBIF Stakeholders.

The WBIF is composed of two facilities: the Joint Grant Facility which provides grants and technical assistance and the Joint Lending Facility which provides concessional loans. The first pools resources from the European Commission, the IFIs and bilateral donors, while the latter exclusively sources funding from IFIs. Projects supported by these two facilities cover six sectors: energy; environment; social; transport; digital infrastructure; private

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8 The Western Balkans Investment Framework is a regional platform that was jointly established in 2009 by the European Commission, the Council of Europe Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank and 19 bilateral donors. It helps to mobilize financing for the preparation and implementation of priority infrastructure projects.
sector development. Notable infrastructure projects supported by WBIF included the construction or rehabilitation of roads; refurbishment or construction of railway lines; electricity generation from renewable energy resources; access to clean drinking water; refurbishment and construction of healthcare and educational facilities.

It is estimated that WBIF’s grant allocation to Western Balkans beneficiaries has totaled €1.4 billion and is matched by €6.5 billion in signed loans for projects with a total estimated value of €23.1 billion.

Source: https://www.wbif.eu/

Yet, some authors argue that any financing for GPGs extended to developing countries must not be viewed as development aid, rather it should be seen as a payment for services rendered (Kaul et al., 2015). The rationale is that developed countries’ support for the provision of climate and health GPGs in these countries are in principle an international extension of their domestic policies.

By failing to reflect the notion that financing for GPGs should be considered as a payment for services rendered to the global community rather than aid, most platforms—if not all—lack the focus and features needed to effectively support current efforts to boost the provision of critical GPGs. They seek to promote the coordination of aid inputs where the focus should be on outputs and outcomes, that is, coordination of GPG delivery. Their features are generally designed to align donor interventions more effectively instead of embedding country-level efforts into a global effort by the international community to deliver on GPGs.

As opposed to aid delivery, effective provision of GPG requires complementary global and national coordination mechanisms and effective engagement between their respective coordinators. This yields several benefits, notably by encouraging collective actions to deliver GPGs, aligning national and global efforts to deliver GPGs, and addressing the free-rider problem.

While the existing literature has focused on how country platforms may be used as a tool for making headways toward the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development, the differing financing implications between public goods of national and global relevance have not been clarified. Still the achievement of many SDGs would require the provision of GPGs even though these goals are framed as depending on country actions. These include ensuring healthy lives (Goal 3), combat climate change (Goal 13), and promoting sustainable energy, industrialization and cities (Goals 7, 9, 11 and 16). This clear distinction between national and global goals within the SDG framework may warrant the need for separate financing and implementation arrangements, as noted by Kaul et al. (2015).

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9 See World Vision International and the Partnering Initiative (2016).
In light of the above, existing country platforms are unlikely to be effective in coordinating GPG delivery due to their exclusive focus on aid coordination and exclusive country focus. To facilitate countries’ contributions to the provision of GPGs, we propose that three main innovations be considered in designing new country platforms or redesigning existing ones:

- Shifting the focus to GPG delivery, rather than aid coordination
- Linking explicitly country-level efforts to global initiatives to provide GPGs.
- Developing an accountability framework at both the country and global level to help meet global delivery goals.\(^\text{10}\)

There are a number of requirements that need to be fulfilled to make inroads in this direction:

- First, the governance framework of the country platform should reflect the need for a leadership model that enables the government to lead (Figure 1).\(^\text{11}\) This contrasts with a number of existing donor-led country platforms for aid coordination.
- The platform leadership should be supported by an ongoing management team with strong implementation, follow-up and monitoring capacities, exploiting potential synergies of country and donor expertise but led by local staff.
- Stakeholder engagement processes undertaken under the country platform must be underpinned by clear terms of reference, outlining the purpose as well as the membership and operating rules, including decision-making responsibility.
- Country platform participants should be selected based on the criticality of their contribution to the provision of the GPGs, either political, financial or technical. Everyone at the table should have a reason to be there and something to contribute.

The EPG underscores the importance of country platforms agreeing to and enforcing common standards in financing and project execution, including debt sustainability, environmental, social and governance standards, coherent pricing principles, local capacity building, procurement, transparency, and anti-corruption. Given the importance of country ownership and leadership of platforms, we believe that the buck stops with country authorities on these issues in the provision of GPGs. Country platforms should not be the vehicle to arbitrate differences among external partners on their aid delivery or project standards.

Second, there is merit in targeting specific outcomes for GPG delivery and creating strong incentives for countries to achieve them. In vulnerable developing countries, the provision of financial incentives may be needed to help offset the actual costs and potential opportunity costs associated with mitigation policies.

Third, depending on the nature of the GPG, participation of a global coordinating agency such as the relevant UN agency or multilateral development bank could be considered

\(^{10}\) See Lee and Cardenas Gonzalez (2021).
\(^{11}\) Many existing studies have called for governments to play a central role in the leadership of country platforms. See for instance the World Vision International and the Partnering Initiative (2016).
both at the local and global level. The platform chair would oversee GPG delivery effort at the national level, serving as a liaison with the global coordinating agency and domestic stakeholders, including government officials, Parliamentarians, and local representatives. For instance, in the event a UN agency is selected as coordinating agency at the global level, the UN or MDB Resident Coordinator could be tasked with facilitating its collaboration with the platform chair, while ensuring that the platform’s objectives and agenda are appropriately aligned with GPG delivery commitments at the global level.

Figure 1. Governance framework

4. Application to the provision of climate GPGs

Stronger incentives to take climate action could result from linking climate finance with the specific outcomes targeted by country platforms. This would also be in line with the spirit of Article (c) of the Paris Agreement which calls for “making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.”

While there has been extensive debate on the “Paris alignment of finance”—that is, aligning public and private financial flows with the objectives of this global agreement, existing approaches for assessing it have yet to be fully effective (Rydge, 2020). Yet, making progress on this front will be essential to ensure that investment decisions taken by public, private and multilateral stakeholders are consistent with the Paris Agreement and the COP26 consensus recently reached in Glasgow.12

12 The COP26 Conference in Glasgow contributes to making the Paris agreement fully operational. Under the Glasgow Pact, various pending items that prevented the full implementation of the Paris Agreement on carbon markets and transparency were approved.
Encouragingly, a growing body of work has recently been conducted by various private financial institutions and multilateral development banks (MDBs). At the Glasgow climate summit, participants expressed support for at least doubling finance for adaptation, reaffirmed the need to fulfill the pledge of providing 100 billion dollars annually from developed to developing countries, and initiated a process to define the new global goal on finance.

A set of monitorable climate change adaptation and mitigation outcomes could be extracted from the countries’ NAPs and NDCs (Box 2). These selected outcomes could be calibrated to help achieve targeted global adaptation and mitigation goals agreed by the international community in the context of the Paris and Glasgow Agreements, including:

- The global goal of keeping the increase in the global average temperature to below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.
- The global goal on adaptation of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change, with a view to contributing to sustainable development and ensuring an adequate response in the context of the abovementioned temperature goal.

This work may lay the basis of national resilience plans proposed by Hicklin (2021) and describing the expected economic impact of climate change and the associated policy response.

Optimizing the contribution of country platforms to GPG delivery will require a paradigm shift in the development community’s way of doing business, notably multilateral financial and development institutions as well as the private sector. In relation to climate targets, IFIs, MDBs, and the private sector should be encouraged to develop coherent and comparable Paris alignment approaches. The G20 has repeatedly called on the IFIs to do so.

We believe that the global community should assign a strong GPG delivery mandate to multilateral institutions, while defining a clear division of responsibilities among them based on their specific expertise and core areas of competence. An obvious choice may consist in mandating MDBs to coordinate technical assistance and the IMF to help mobilize and allocate funding for GPG delivery, including through its catalytic role. For efficiency purposes, actions undertaken by all involved actors should be coordinated under relevant country platforms (Figure 2). In many developing countries, there are generally few embodiments of formal multi-stakeholder partnerships other than these platforms.

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13 This includes nine MDBs forming the MDB Paris Alignment Working Group.
14 See UN climate press release (November 13, 2021): COP26 Reaches Consensus on Key Actions to Address Climate Change (https://unfccc.int/news/cop26-reaches-consensus-on-key-actions-to-address-climate-change)
15 According to the UN, at least 125 of 154 developing countries are formulating and implementing such plans. See: https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal13
17 Article 7 of the Paris Agreement. See United Nations (2015).
Moreover, because of the specific nature of GPGs, successful initiatives to increase their delivery are likely to require a central role for the State. Yet this requirement is typically met by most platforms which are by design placed under the leadership of country officials. In this light, there is in our view ample scope for country platforms to be mandated with identifying the country’s technical and financing needs and harmonizing the respective contributions of MDBs and IFIs along with other domestic and bilateral partners.

Box 2. Adaptation and mitigation outcomes

Climate change adaptation refers to measures taken to reduce harm, or risk of harm, associated with climate change. These could include actions to reduce the risk of natural disasters, coastal erosion, food insecurity, and water scarcity triggered by climate change. Adaptation outcomes—which can be expressed in monetary terms—thus refer to the reduction in harm, the reduction in the risk of harm, arising from the implementation of measures to combat change (UKCIP 2004). They can reflect the climate change adaptation goal that is to be achieved through the implementation of these measures. According to the UN, at least 125 of 154 developing countries are formulating and implementing national climate adaptation plans (NAPs). In line with global commitments under the Paris Agreement, adaptation actions should be developed based on country-driven, gender-responsive, participatory, and transparent approach.

Climate change mitigation refers to efforts to reduce or prevent emission of greenhouse gases. This could be achieved through various ways, including switching to low-carbon energy sources, increasing energy efficiency, and altering management practices or consumer behavior. Under the Paris Agreement, each country committed to prepare and maintain successive nationally determined contributions (NDCs) which describe national efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. As of July 30, 2021, a total of 164 NDCs were communicated to the UNFCCC by the 191 Parties to the Paris Agreement. In line with the global agreement, internationally transferred mitigation outcomes can be used to achieve nationally determined contributions subject to specific conditions.

Footnotes:

2 NDCs are to be submitted every five years to the UNFCCC Secretariat. Many NDCs also include adaptation information.
3 See UNFCCC (2021).

The need for IFI’s technical support

As part of Paris alignment of finance, we thus see merit in building on developing country platforms to develop a coordinated framework for mobilizing financial and technical assistance from the international community. On the technical front, this assistance could include support for the formulation and implementation of NDCs and NAPs. This is an area in which MDBs should be expected to play a leading role.
Concretely, MDBs could be called upon to facilitate the preparation of the national resilience planning document, building on NAP- and NDC-based outcomes. As suggested by Hicklin (2021), MDBs such as the World Bank could be tasked with assessing the countries’ resilience planning documents along with the IMF. As part of these joint assessments, the IMF would focus on the adequacy of the macroeconomic/fiscal and financial regulatory framework, while the other institution would cover the relevance of the proposed adaptation and mitigation policies.

The case for an IMF global resilience fund

Developing countries have called for the international community to financially support their energy transition efforts under the Paris and Glasgow agreements. IFIs such as the IMF could play a pivotal role in helping respond to this call. As proposed by Hicklin (2021), the national resilience planning document could be used by countries requesting access to an IMF-managed global resilience trust fund as the basis for their policy program.\(^\text{18}\) Vulnerable low- and middle-income countries would be eligible to access this fund to mobilize part of the resources needed to implement their own resilience plans. Besides providing direct balance-of-payments support for a country’s transition effort, access to this fund could be used to measure and coordinate financing from developing partners, consistent with the IMF’s usual role of assessing finance gaps and identifying finance sources to fill them, thus linking it directly to the country’s GPG platform.

Financing for effective delivery of GPGs for climate could be tied to the commitment by developed countries to mobilize US$100 billion annually for developing countries from public and private sources in the context of mitigation actions.\(^\text{19}\) In 2019, the OECD estimated that total climate finance provided and mobilized by developed countries for developing countries was USD 79.6 billion, with loans representing over two-third of total public climate finance provided (71 percent) and grants (27 percent).\(^\text{20}\) Another financing option could consist in allocating recycled SDRs to the proposed IMF-managed fund. Members of the G7 and the G20 could spearhead this effort in line with their plan to reallocate $100 billion of new SDRs to most vulnerable countries.

The importance of private sector involvement

Besides IFIs and MDBs, it would be essential to lay the foundations for the private sector to contribute to GPG delivery efforts. Its representatives should be invited to be active

\(^{18}\) Hicklin (2021) proposes that these “National Resilience Plans” (NRPs) be discussed in the context of IMF surveillance and published.

\(^{19}\) This pledge was originally formulated at the 15th Conference of Parties (COP15) of the UNFCCC in Copenhagen in 2009. At the time, developed countries committed to collectively contribute $100 billion each year by 2020 to assist developing countries in their efforts to cope with the impact of climate change.

\(^{20}\) However, an Oxfam study published in 2020 reported that the value of climate finance reported by developed countries for previous years was significantly inflated.
participants of relevant country platforms. At the global level, there has already been welcome initiatives to coordinate private sector’s efforts to achieve the Paris and Glasgow Agreement goals, including the establishment of the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ) by the United Nations and the COP26 presidency. As part of GFANZ, over 160 firms with $70 trillion in assets have committed to steer the global economy towards net-zero emissions. This includes mobilizing capital to finance decarbonization in emerging and developing countries.

However, private sector participation in country platforms raises several challenging issues that need to be addressed. These include not only the practical challenges related to the inclusion and the representation of private sector representatives within the platform, but also the potential constraints to their effective involvement and concerns about giving the private sector a role in public finance decisions. Still overcoming these challenges is critical to allow the private sector to play a positive role in the delivery of GPGs, including through its investment decisions. In this regard, the EPG Report called for coherent and complementary operations between development partners to help increase private sector investment, while advocating the adoption of common core standards to facilitate collaboration with the private sector. While private sector involvement in country platforms is generally encouraged, some authors also made the case for placing some limitations on it, arguing that “some discussions are more properly held with just the official sector in the room”.21 Some country platform models, such as the MCC country compact model, make use of intensive consultative processes with private actors—both business and civil society—to help shape overall objectives, but leave decision-making on public funding to public actors.

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5. Conclusion

This paper discusses three potential requirements for country platforms to facilitate effective delivery of GPGs. First, we propose that existing country platforms be repurposed to coordinate the contribution of domestic and external stakeholders to GPG delivery efforts at the country level. For this proposed approach to be successful, an explicit link must be introduced between country-level efforts and global initiatives to provide GPGs. There is also merit in setting up country and global coordination mechanisms, with relevant agencies assigned to operate them both at the national and international levels.

Using relevant country platforms, IFIs such as the IMF and MDBs should be mandated with helping developing countries meet the financing needs associated with the provision of GPGs. For instance, a global resilience fund could be established at the IMF in the case of climate GPG, setting a pathway for vulnerable countries to mobilize financial support their energy transition efforts under the Paris and Glasgow agreements.

In addition, technical support from the IFIs should be put on the table to improve the effectiveness of developing countries’ contribution to GPG delivery. In this regard, MDBs can and must play a central role in developing capacities in these countries as part of their own contribution to GPG delivery. At the same time, securing the contribution of civil society and the private sector to GPG delivery efforts is essential given the magnitude of potential financing needs.

The main challenge is to ensure adequate alignment and coherence between global and local partnerships aimed at delivering GPGs. Consistent with our proposal, a global coordinating agency preferably under the auspices of the United Nations with the assistance of the IFIs
should be designated and tasked with linking explicitly country-level efforts to global net-zero initiatives. Key among the responsibilities of this coordinator would be to make sure that public and private finance mobilized as part of net-zero initiatives ultimately benefits developing and emerging countries in a timely manner. This reinforces our call for the need to embed these initiatives into an appropriate framework that guarantees accountability at the national and international levels.
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