Downsizing Defense in Development: Unpacking DOD’s Development Assistance

Sarah Rose

Abstract

The US Department of Defense (DOD) is not a development agency, but it does manage millions of dollars of development assistance. In the early 2000s, DOD took on a significantly expanded development role, prompting a number of concerns and creating a lingering perception of intensive US military involvement in development activities. In fact, lessons learned from this era drove a reconceptualization of the Pentagon’s role in development. Today, the military controls only a tiny portion of US development funds, most of which go toward health (mainly PEPFAR) and disaster relief activities. This paper provides a brief landscape analysis of DOD’s recent development aid-funded efforts, breaking down its engagement into six key thematic areas. It concludes with five considerations related to DOD’s role in development assistance: (1) DOD has comparative advantages that make it an important actor in US development policy; (2) civilian-military coordination is hard but critical for development policy coherence; (3) adequate resourcing of civilian agencies is critical for effective civilian-military division of labor; (4) increasing the flexibility of civilian agencies’ staffing, programming, and funding could complement the military’s rapid response capabilities; and (5) incomplete transparency and limited focus on results reduces accountability around DOD’s aid investments.

Thanks to Drew D’Alelio for research assistance. Thanks also to Erin Collinson, Judd Devermont, Kate Gough, Cindy Huang, Jeremy Konyndyk, Ryan McCannell, and Scott Morris for helpful comments on earlier drafts. All errors are the author’s alone.

## Contents

Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1

The Six Key Areas of DOD’s Current Development Assistance ....................................................... 3

About the Data ................................................................................................................................... 5

The Expansion—and Contraction—of DOD’s Role in Development .................................................. 6

The Six Key Areas of DOD’s Current Development Assistance ....................................................... 11

1. Conducting infectious disease surveillance, prevention, control, and response ...................... 12

2. Providing disaster relief and emergency humanitarian response .............................................. 14

3. Supporting stabilization and reconstruction activities in conflict-affected environments (Iraq and Afghanistan) ........................................................................................................ 15

4. Providing support to civilian populations and/or conducting governance efforts outside conflict- or disaster-affected areas ........................................................................... 16

5. Addressing environmental and governance issues around weapons of mass destruction .......... 19

6. Removing landmines ................................................................................................................... 19

A Regional Look at DOD’s Development Assistance .................................................................... 20

Considerations for DOD’s Role in Development Assistance ......................................................... 21

1. DOD has comparative advantages that make it an important actor in US development policy. .................................................................................................................. 21

2. Civilian-military coordination is hard but critical for development policy coherence. ............ 21

3. Adequate resourcing of civilian agencies is critical for the effective implementation of the hard-won lessons learned about the importance of civilian development expertise in stabilization efforts. ........................................................................................................ 23

4. Structuring civilian agencies’ staffing, programming, and funding to be more flexible and responsive could complement the military’s rapid response capabilities and reduce the need to rely on DOD’s surge capacity for efforts that should be civilian-led. ....... 24

5. Incomplete transparency and (to date) a weak commitment to managing for and measuring results adds up to limited accountability for DOD’s aid investments. ......... 27

Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 29

References ........................................................................................................................................ 30

Annex. Notes on the reclassification of data ...................................................................................... 37
Introduction

Since the beginning of organized government, militaries have contributed to social and economic development.¹ For perhaps equally as long, there have been questions about the role of armed forces in these kinds of endeavors. In the United States, over the last fifteen years, many of these questions have revolved around the role of the military in US development efforts overseas.

While the US Department of Defense (DOD) is not a development agency, it is responsible for a small portion of US government development assistance, alongside its much larger budget for security sector assistance. In keeping with its mandate, DOD deploys development assistance in pursuit of national security objectives via development-oriented means rather than pursuing development as an end in and of itself. Depending on the country and situational context, the objectives of DOD’s development assistance include improving intelligence work; building trust and goodwill to facilitate efforts to shape the security environment; reducing insurgency by creating alternative economic opportunities and mitigating the influence of extremist propaganda; controlling potentially destabilizing disease outbreaks; and strengthening partner country armed forces by controlling HIV among members.

DOD brings several unique strengths to the United States’ development efforts. These include its rapid response capacity; its massive airlift/sealift capabilities; its ability to work in low security environments where civilian agencies have trouble operating; its expertise in engineering and infrastructure; and its role as direct interlocutor with partner country militaries. These partner armed forces often play an important role with respect to governance, service provision, and public health, but the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is legally prevented from working with them.²

In the early 2000s, a significant expansion of DOD’s development role brought misgivings about the new scale and scope of its involvement. At its peak from FY2004 to FY2006, the military was implementing 18 percent of US development assistance. DOD’s significant role in US stabilization and reconstruction operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as, to a certain degree, initial uncertainty around a new regional combatant command in Africa (AFRICOM) prompted a number of concerns, including the diversion of time from the military’s main functions (“mission creep”); the subordination of long-term development objectives to the military’s shorter-term goals; military operators’ limited development expertise and lack of attention to cultural context and the broader political economy; limited transparency associated with DOD projects; and risks to staff safety and program effectiveness when civilian work is perceived as tied to a military operation.³

¹ De Pauw and Luz, 1990.
² Serafino, 2008; Anderson and Veillette, 2014.
³ Serafino, 2008; Anderson and Veillette, 2014; Iyengar Plumb, Shapiro, and Hegarty, 2017. The Defense Intelligence Agency and the combatant commands’ intelligence directorates put substantial resources toward
Fifteen years on from the peak of DOD’s development activity, the picture of military involvement in development has changed dramatically. Changing needs in Iraq and Afghanistan certainly contributed to this shift. But more importantly, DOD and its interagency partners have intentionally reconceptualized the Pentagon’s development role based on the lessons learned through experience and captured by a massive body of research and critical analysis. Though a lingering perception remains that DOD continues to undertake significant development interventions, over the past five years the Pentagon’s development assistance has made up less than two percent of total US development spending and has been directed mostly toward health (mainly PEPFAR) and disaster relief activities.4

Figure 1. DOD development assistance as a proportion of total US development assistance5

This paper begins by discussing the expanded development role that DOD briefly adopted beginning in the early 2000s. It then provides a brief landscape analysis of DOD’s more recent development efforts, looking at funding trends over the last several years. The picture that emerges is that of DOD as a supporting actor in development, rather than the major player it was fifteen years ago. Using a “cleaned up” dataset, this paper breaks down DOD’s understanding countries’ cultural context and political economy, but military operators on the ground have not often fully integrated these considerations into their approaches.

4 For this paper, development aid refers to economic assistance, or official development assistance, the portion of foreign aid that has a development or humanitarian objective.

5 Data were retrieved from USAID’s Foreign Aid Explorer (https://explorer.usaid.gov/aid-dashboard.html) and reflect economic assistance obligations. DOD data include the Department of the Army.
development engagement into six key thematic areas, briefly describing what each encompasses and illustrating where activities take place geographically.

**The Six Key Areas of DOD’s Current Development Assistance**

1. conducting infectious disease surveillance, prevention, control, and response;
2. providing disaster relief;
3. supporting stabilization and reconstruction activities in conflict-affected environments (Iraq/Afghanistan);
4. providing support to civilian populations and/or conducting governance efforts outside conflict- or disaster-affected areas;
5. addressing environmental and governance issues around weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and
6. removing land mines.

DOD’s aid interventions in each of these six thematic areas serve one or more of three main purposes:

1. leveraging DOD’s strengths in support of civilian-led strategies. The majority of DOD’s development assistance falls in this category.
2. shaping the security environment through preventive engagement: improving DOD’s access and influence and building partnerships, including by training foreign troops to better protect their citizens.
3. protecting US troops from specific, non-kinetic threats they face overseas.
While the State Department is the lead agency on stabilization efforts, in the past it was insufficiently resourced and empowered to fully play that role, as discussed below. In practice, civilian-military lines of authority have sometimes blurred.

Though this paper does not seek to answer the question of the optimal role for DOD as a provider of development assistance, it concludes with five considerations related to DOD’s role in US development policy:

1. **DOD has comparative advantages that make it an important actor in US development policy.**
2. **Civilian-military coordination is hard but critical for development policy coherence.**
3. **Adequate resourcing of civilian agencies is critical for the effective implementation of the hard-won lessons learned about the importance of civilian development expertise in stabilization efforts.**
4. **Structuring civilian agencies’ staffing, programming, and funding to be more flexible and responsive could complement the military’s rapid response capabilities and reduce the need to rely on DOD’s surge capacity for efforts that should be civilian-led.**
5. **Incomplete transparency and (to date) a weak commitment to managing for and measuring results adds up to limited accountability for DOD’s aid investments.**
About the Data

This paper focuses on the small portion of DOD’s foreign assistance classified as development assistance.6 By definition, the principal objective of this aid is economic development and enhanced welfare in developing countries. While development is not DOD’s primary objective, some of its activities serve a development purpose in pursuit of the department’s broader national security goals.

DOD spends considerable sums on foreign assistance ($14.5 billion in 2017), but development assistance makes up less than two percent of the total (just $221 million that same year).8 The vast majority of DOD’s aid is “military assistance,” or aid to enhance partner country armed forces.9 Its development assistance activities are part of the department’s “security cooperation” efforts, and they represent only a very small part of these engagements.10 Of the over 100 security cooperation authorities, only 24 were reported as foreign assistance (of any kind) in FY2017. And these 24 mostly focused on

---

6 For this paper, development assistance refers to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s term “official development assistance” (ODA). This is substantively the same as the US government’s “economic assistance” categorization, with the main difference being reporting timeframe—ODA uses calendar year while economic assistance is reported by fiscal year (ODA also excludes assistance to high income countries).

7 Data is from Foreign Aid Explorer and reflects 2017 obligations.

8 This figure is based on data retrieved from USAID’s Foreign Aid Explorer (https://explorer.usaid.gov/aid-dashboard.html), reflecting FY2017 obligations. It is an imperfect estimate, however, As the Security Assistance Monitor has documented, Foreign Aid Explorer does not capture many DOD-funded security assistance programs. Nevertheless, even with incomplete reporting, the point that development assistance is a tiny minority of DOD’s overall aid portfolio is uncontested.

9 DOD’s military assistance is provided through many security cooperation programs, as well as DOD’s execution of State Department-funded Title 22 security assistance programs like Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF).

10 DOD’s security cooperation efforts are outlined in Title 10, United States Code. The objectives of DOD’s security cooperation programming include developing partner countries’ defense and security capabilities, providing US forces with access to host countries, and building defense relationships that serve US interests. (Department of Defense, 2016.)
military assistance; only around a quarter include funds that are counted (either wholly or partially) as development assistance.\(^{11}\)

The data used in this paper come from the US government’s official submission to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s Creditor Reporting System and are available through calendar year 2016.\(^{12}\) To organize the data in a more useful way for this paper, new sector and category classifications were added to correct clear misclassifications in the original dataset, group some similar classifications together, and provide more granularity around broad categorizations (see Annex for more details).\(^{13}\) In addition, regions were redefined to match the US government’s regional classifications.

Because DOD is fundamentally not a foreign assistance agency, it does not have well developed systems for coding which of its funds count as foreign aid. This precludes comprehensive reporting on the department’s foreign aid activities, including its development assistance activities. The larger programs are thought to be captured relatively accurately at this point but there are some apparent gaps that—at a minimum—raise questions.\(^{14}\) There is less confidence that smaller programs with a possible development assistance component are fully captured.\(^{15}\)

**The Expansion—and Contraction—of DOD’s Role in Development**

For many, impressions of DOD’s involvement in development are rooted in the US government’s stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. And no wonder. The Pentagon invested massively in development activities—especially in Iraq—and assumed unprecedented levels of decision-making power around development-oriented interventions.

---

\(^{11}\) Thaler et al., 2016.

\(^{12}\) These are the same data available in USAID’s Foreign Aid Explorer database.

\(^{13}\) For instance, several line items pertaining to DOD’s Hiv programing under PEPFAR were classified as “water supply and sanitation” with purpose code “river basins development,” an apparent error. There were also several items originally classified as “Other, multisector” which could clearly be assigned a more specific categorization based on the description.

\(^{14}\) Author’s conversation with staff working on databases of US foreign assistance.

\(^{15}\) The fact that Foreign Aid Explorer sometimes captures a small program for just a year or two suggests that things like these may just not be submitted some years.
DOD has always had a role in stabilization activities because of the comparative advantages it brings. It can operate in contexts that are unsafe for civilian agencies, and its personnel and funds can often be deployed more rapidly to meet urgent needs. Typically, it has brought these capabilities to bear in support of a State Department-led strategy.

In theory, this was the arrangement governing the US government stabilization efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 2005 National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 had officially designated the State Department as the lead agency for stabilization and reconstruction. However, resource constraints, along with the way the mandate was presented and the powers were delegated, prevented it from decisively fulfilling that role. In practice, the lines of authority between the State Department and DOD were often parallel and not well-specified. State and other civilian agencies sometimes found themselves playing a subordinate role to DOD.

In addition, in the same year that NSPD 44 outlined interagency roles in stabilization, DOD issued its own new policy that codified an elevated role for itself in these efforts. It was a sea change. DOD Directive 3000.05: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations officially and explicitly broadened DOD’s core mission to include stability

---

16 Patrick and Brown, 2007.
17 The Coalition Provisional Authority, which was initially (2003-2004) in charge of all state-building and reconstruction decisions in Iraq, was a DOD entity whose head reported to the Secretary of Defense (Serafino, 2008; Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2009).
operations, giving it greater responsibility for the kinds of development activities and outcomes that had usually been under the purview of USAID or the State Department.18

“Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities…. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society…. The Department of Defense shall continue to lead and support the development of military-civilian teams [whose] functions shall include ensuring security, developing local governance structures, promoting bottom-up economic activity, rebuilding infrastructure, and building indigenous capacity for such tasks.”19

Under this expanded conception of its role, DOD’s stabilization efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan encompassed activities such as reconstructing roads and bridges, revitalizing the agribusiness sector, supporting the development of extractive and energy industries, repairing oil infrastructure (in Iraq), distributing school supplies, providing micro-grants to individuals or small businesses, offering consultancy services for mid-size businesses, repairing water and sanitation infrastructure (most of what’s coded as “Health” for Iraq), and training healthcare personnel.20 The underlying goals of these investments were typically to reduce insurgency and sympathy for insurgents by providing employment and “winning hearts and minds.”21 DOD pursued these activities through a proliferation of new programs, including the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) and the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (operational in both countries) and the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund.

18 The vision of DOD as a significant player in non-combat foreign assistance was similarly emphasized in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (Department of Defense, 2006).
19 Department of Defense, 2005 (p. 2-3).
20 Department of the Army, 2008; Department of the Army, 2013; Zimmerman, Egel, and Blum, 2016; Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction and the United States Institute of Peace, 2016; Brooks, 2016.
21 These activities are often based on an assumption that poverty is a driver of insecurity and insurgency, though there is a body of research that suggests this assumption is not well founded (Berman, Felter, and Shapiro, 2009; Berman, Shapiro, and Felter, 2011; Blair et al., 2012; Wilder, 2012).
Figure 5. DOD development assistance to Iraq, by sector, 2003-2016

- Energy generation, distribution & policy
- Health
- Oil industry & infrastructure
- Governance - rule of law/law enforcement
- Transportation infrastructure
- Civic/cultural infrastructure/rehabilitation/services
- Governance - rule of law/law enforcement (construction)
- Governance/public services (other/unspecified)
- Education
- Conflict, Peace & Security
- Information/communications tech, infrastructure, etc.
- Agriculture
- Reconstruction, relief, rehabilitation misc.
- Security/protective measures
- Other/unspecified

$US millions

Figure 6. DOD development assistance to Afghanistan, by sector, 2003-2016

- Transportation infrastructure
- Counternarcotics
- Business and industry
- Education
- Agriculture
- Energy generation, distribution & policy
- Health
- Reconstruction, relief, rehabilitation misc.
- Mineral resources/mining (non-oil)
- Governance - rule of law/law enforcement
- Civic/cultural infrastructure/rehabilitation/services
- Information/communications tech, infrastructure, etc.
- Governance/public services (other/unspecified)
- Other/unspecified

$US millions

22 Within the health sector, 71 percent of funds went to largely infrastructure-related water and sanitation activities.
While several factors contributed to DOD’s expansion into roles previously led by civilians, one important element stemmed from years of reduced funding and staffing cuts to State and USAID. The civilian agencies simply did not have adequate human and financial resources to address the massive needs in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2007, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said that “forced by circumstance,” (of under-resourced civilian agencies) “the Department of Defense has taken on many of these burdens that might have been assumed by civilian agencies in the past.”

Figure 7. USAID foreign service permanent workforce and USAID managed program dollars, 1970-2012

DOD’s prominent role in stabilization operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has been the subject of a large body of critical analysis. Exploring these lessons in detail goes beyond the scope of this paper, but many critiques revolved around the disconnect between objectives (sustained development via long-term, locally-owned approaches vs. enhancing security and addressing threats); very different timelines (working toward long term viability and sustainability vs. producing quick and visible dividends); and gaps in training (military

---

23 Patrick and Brown, 2007; Anderson and Veillette, 2014.
training produces technical competence in many key areas but, at least at that time, had typically focused less on development economics and cultural and political economy dynamics).\textsuperscript{26}

In response to well documented lessons learned that emerged from this body of evidence, DOD and its interagency partners reformulated their respective roles in stability operations. By 2009, DOD had reissued Directive 3000.05 with a greater emphasis on civilian-military cooperation and providing support to other US agencies.\textsuperscript{27} More recently, the Department of State, DOD, and USAID came together to create a new common framework to guide future stabilization efforts. The 2018 Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR) puts forth a clearer and collectively agreed vision that, among other things, defines the lines of authority between departments and agencies and outlines their respective roles in stabilization activities—the State Department serves as the overall lead, USAID leads the implementation of non-security assistance, and DOD supports their efforts through security provision and other reinforcement.\textsuperscript{28} In 2018, DOD reissued Directive 3000.05 once again to reflect the roles designated by the SAR.\textsuperscript{29}

In some ways, the massive scale of DOD’s development assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan created a lingering perception that significant military engagement in development had become a new norm. In reality, there’s been a sharp decline in DOD’s “development-like” stabilization activities over the last five to ten years, and the new policy frameworks that establish expectations for DOD’s role in stabilization efforts seek to limit the Pentagon’s involvement in future efforts.

The Six Key Areas of DOD’s Current Development Assistance

Though the specter of DOD’s involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan still lingers, what DOD has actually been doing with its development dollars over the past five to ten years looks very different than it did in the first decade of the 2000s.

DOD’s development assistance can be grouped into six major thematic categories. As Figure 8 depicts, infectious disease control—consisting mainly of PEPFAR activities, as well as the 2014-2016 Ebola response—is now the most prominent component, followed by disaster response.


\textsuperscript{27} Department of Defense, 2009.

\textsuperscript{28} Department of State, United States Agency for International Development and Department of Defense, 2018.

\textsuperscript{29} Department of Defense, 2018.
In recent years, the largest portion of DOD’s development assistance has gone toward infectious disease-related efforts. DOD sees its involvement in infectious disease control as important to national security because of the potentially destabilizing effect outbreaks can have on economic and even political stability. DOD plays a key part in the US government’s commitment to the Global Health Security Agenda, an international partnership that seeks to prevent, detect and respond to endemic and emerging infectious disease threats. DOD’s engagement in global health spans the range of prevention, detection, and response. The department supports vaccine development (to support the need to protect US forces); provides diagnostic and therapeutic products; builds partner country capacity to do
surveillance; works with military partners around the world to deal with outbreaks; and helps control the spread of infectious disease among partner country militaries. Typically, DOD's infectious disease work in done in support of other agencies’ efforts. It plays a lead role mainly with respect to its direct work with partner country militaries.

PEPFAR is DOD's largest continuous activity in this area (though it implements only around two percent of total PEPFAR funds). DOD’s PEPFAR programming focuses mainly on HIV prevention, treatment, care, and related capacity-building among partner country militaries, which are considered a high-risk group for HIV. DOD is also involved in HIV vaccine development and disease surveillance.

**Figure 9. DOD activities associated with infectious disease surveillance, prevention, control and response**

Because PEPFAR is such a significant component of DOD’s portfolio, nearly 90 percent of its funds for infectious disease control and response have gone to Sub Saharan Africa. The region also got a massive injection of funds with the 2014-2015 Ebola response, with DOD controlling over a quarter of total US Ebola response funds.

Reported data likely do not capture the full range of DOD efforts in infectious disease control. It is of note, for example, that data for the Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response program is reported only for 2011 even though the program has been around since at least the late 1990s and continues to be active today.

---

31 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, n.d.
2. Providing disaster relief and emergency humanitarian response

Disaster relief/emergency humanitarian response

Total DOD ODA, 2012-2016 (US$ millions)

Each year, the US government typically responds to around 70-80 natural disasters worldwide, plus additional humanitarian crises caused by conflict. USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance leads the US government response and coordinates contributions from interagency partners, as necessary. DOD is brought in just 10-15 percent of the time, typically only for large and complex crises. The military’s rapid mobilization capacity, sealift, airlift and other logistical capabilities; and ability to provide critical health and other services in austere conditions make it an invaluable first responder where critical infrastructure and services have been destroyed. DOD’s involvement in disaster relief and emergency humanitarian response typically involves providing transportation logistics, search and rescue, humanitarian daily rations or other relief supplies, security for relief operations, critical infrastructure repair, and expeditionary medical care, among other services.

---

32 Department of Defense, 2011.
33 USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has staff in each of the regional combatant commands to inform the decision about whether to involve DOD in a given emergency response. (Anderson and Veillette, 2014)
34 Department of Defense, 2011.
35 Department of Defense, 2011; Anderson and Veillette, 2014.
36 Disaster relief can be funded through Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA), Humanitarian and Civil Assistance (HCA), and the Combattant Commanders Initiative Fund (CCIF), as well as the President’s broad authority to provide emergency assistance (outside of DOD’s Title 10 authorities).
Key interventions like the responses to the early-2010 earthquake in Haiti, the mid-2010 floods in Pakistan, and the 2015 Nepal earthquake are apparent, but—in a significant reporting gap—DOD does not specify the recipient for much of its disaster response and preparedness funding.

3. Supporting stabilization and reconstruction activities in conflict-affected environments (Iraq and Afghanistan)

Stabilization activities in Iraq and Afghanistan are still a relatively prominent part of DOD’s development assistance portfolio, but these investments have declined precipitously since 2010/2011, partly due to shifts in context on the ground and partly due to the reconceptualization of DOD’s role in these kinds of activities. Over the past five years, investments in Iraq and Afghanistan make up only around a quarter of DOD’s total development assistance.

DOD’s development assistance to Iraq, in particular, has wound down. Since 2012 (through 2016), it has provided only $3.6 million in development assistance projects (down from nearly $6 billion in 2005 alone). Nearly three-quarters of that was for humanitarian supply drops.
Afghanistan has seen more recent activity, but DOD’s development presence there is also on the decline. In the five-year period 2012-2016, DOD’s development assistance totaled $570 million (an amount equal to the average annual investment of the preceding five-year period). And over half of this total was for 2012.

Looking beyond Iraq and Afghanistan to the United States’ engagement in more recent conflicts, there is no data so far (through 2016) suggesting DOD has had any role in the development side of stabilization activities. DOD reports no development assistance to Syria outside of a recent (2017) humanitarian intervention and only a small PEPFAR investment in Yemen.

4. Providing support to civilian populations and/or conducting governance efforts outside conflict- or disaster-affected areas

DOD has a number of programs that seek to help civilian populations overcome conditions, including poverty, disease, and hunger, that can threaten lives and property. These typically fall under the department’s “humanitarian” umbrella, which in DOD parlance refers broadly to development needs.\(^\text{37}\) DOD’s interventions in this area can include the provision of things like education support, basic healthcare and services, veterinary services, support for law enforcement and civic functions, and basic infrastructure activities. Examples include a maternity ward extension in Togo; medical and veterinary support in Uganda and Kenya; and the construction of a primary school in South Africa. These kinds of activities are sometimes conducted as part of US troops’ exercises with partner military personnel as part of training on counterinsurgency operations.\(^\text{38}\)

While DOD’s humanitarian programs for civilian populations seek to alleviate poverty and related conditions, development outcomes are not the key objective. Instead, the programs are intended to improve DOD access, visibility, and influence; allow better intelligence work by building trust in US forces among local actors; mitigate the influence of extremist propaganda; build the capacity and advance the legitimacy of the host government as service provider; and promote cooperation with foreign military and civilian counterparts.\(^\text{39}\)

\(^{37}\) DOD also talks about these efforts in terms of “stability” operations, designed with the goal of preventing future conflict or instability.

\(^{38}\) Serafino, 2008.

are intended as long-term preventive engagement and partnership building exercises which position DOD to help shape the security environment.

**Figure 11. Type of support to civilian populations in non-conflict/non-disaster areas, total 2006-2016**

This area of DOD engagement has drawn some criticism since it began to ramp up in the mid-2000s. Critics call it “mission creep” or express concern that the devotion of significant DOD resources to these efforts could overshadow (and perhaps undermine) civilian agencies’ development efforts and long-term development goals.40 On the other hand, many acknowledge that, done well, some aspects of DOD programming can complement and expand the reach of US civilian programs, for example, by making use of DOD’s comparative advantage in infrastructure or particular forms of support to promote rule of law.41 USAID missions in Africa, for example, have worked with AFRICOM to identify potential infrastructure projects that the partner country government and donors had already jointly identified as needing support.42 Successful complementarity hinges on effective interagency collaboration, coordination, and planning with respect to how interventions are chosen, how they link to (or might be at odds with) parallel civilian programming, how interventions will be branded, and who will deliver them. This kind of coordination is complicated and not always optimally achieved in practice, but it has improved in many places.43

Humanitarian support to civilian populations shows up as a relatively small portion of DOD’s total reported development assistance. But the patchy pattern of data suggests there

---

40 Patrick and Brown, 2007.
41 Anderson and Veillette, 2014.
42 McCannell, 2017.
may be gaps in reporting. The spike in 2013 does not correspond with a single or few large concentrated efforts, but rather significant new reporting for dozens of countries. It is less likely that this was a particularly active year and more likely that other years are underreported. Indeed, in 2012, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) found the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) program (one of the main programs funding civilian/governance support) suffered from weak reporting, noting, “DOD does not have complete information on the full range of humanitarian assistance projects it conducts, which creates uncertainty as to whether DOD is able to provide accurate, complete project information to other offices within the department, to interagency stakeholders, or to Congress. DOD does not know the status of all of its…OHDACA projects…or the actual costs of nearly one in three of [these] projects.” It is possible (though conjecture only) that the surge in reporting in 2013 was a one-off attempt by DOD to react to these findings.

Figure 12. Reported civilian support and/or governance support in non-conflict/non-disaster areas by year

Underreporting of DOD’s humanitarian support to civilian populations seems particularly problematic given the concerns around the possibility that DOD activities might overlap with, duplicate, or even undermine civilian agencies’ development work. These risks rise with incomplete information about the activities that are taking place.

That said, even though there are gaps in high level reporting, civilian agencies in the field typically have insight into—and often a planning role for—DOD’s humanitarian support activities. OHDACA and the Humanitarian and Civil Assistance (HCA) program are among the most prominent channels for this type of funding, and projects under both funding streams are often developed with input from (or even at the initiative of) USAID. DOD must also seek USAID concurrence for proposed projects. This type of close coordination, when done well, reduces the risk of duplication, overlap, and inconsistency.

44 Government Accountability Office 2012b (p. 15). The selected quote refers to OHDACA projects. GAO found the database not always updated with actual cost information at program completion, partly due to limited personnel who work on OHDACA.
45 Government Accountability Office 2012b.
46 McCannell, 2017.
5. **Addressing environmental and governance issues around weapons of mass destruction**

Environmental and governance issues around WMD

![Graph showing total DOD ODA, 2012-2016 ($US millions) for environmental and governance issues around WMD with $76 highlighted.]

This was a relatively large component of DOD’s development assistance in previous years (86 percent of reported funds for this objective over the last ten years were spent between 2007 and 2009); it is now much smaller. There are two primary channels of funding for this objective. The development-oriented efforts funded through the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program largely revolve around helping countries of the former Soviet Union address environmental, health, and other issues related to the management and reduction of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. It also supports the retraining of scientists and engineers for peaceful and commercial pursuits. On the governance side, DOD’s International Counterproliferation Program (joint with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Homeland Security) seeks to help deter, investigate, and respond to crimes involving WMD and terrorism by helping partner countries develop strategic trade control and border security—in particular by training border, customs and law enforcement personnel.

6. **Removing landmines**

Demining

![Graph showing total DOD ODA, 2012-2016 ($US millions) for demining activities with $38 highlighted.]

DOD includes demining within its humanitarian portfolio, but we separate it out in this paper since it has less conceptual overlap with traditional development activities than many of DOD’s other humanitarian interventions. DOD’s demining activities are mainly centered around training partner country military personnel on ordnance deactivation and removal, mine risk education, and victim assistance. While DOD does not report where many of its demining activities take place (62 percent of demining funds in the last five years go to unspecified locations), the remainder (38 percent) have taken place in Sub-Saharan Africa. The key program that funds demining activities is the Humanitarian Mine Action program (joint with the Department of State and USAID) under OHDACA.
A Regional Look at DOD’s Development Assistance

Sub Saharan Africa has been the biggest recipient of DOD’s development assistance over the last five years. Ninety five percent of aid to the region has gone toward infectious disease control—60 percent of this has been PEPFAR and 40 percent the 2014-2015 Ebola response.

Figure 13. Types of DOD development assistance by region, total 2012-2016

Figure 14. Percent breakdown of types of DOD development assistance by region, total 2012-2016
Considerations for DOD’s Role in Development Assistance

1. DOD has comparative advantages that make it an important actor in US development policy.

Responsible for less than two percent of US development assistance, DOD is a small player in US development assistance. However, it brings certain comparative advantages to select development and humanitarian efforts that will continue to make it an indispensable actor in US development policy. These include its capacity for rapid response; its massive airlift/sealift logistical capabilities; its engineering and construction expertise; its ability to work in low security conflict environments where civilian agencies have trouble operating; and its role as direct interlocutor with partner country militaries. There have been questions around DOD’s involvement where its comparative advantage is less obvious, in particular its support to civilian populations in areas not affected by conflict or disaster. Here the concern is that DOD activities could duplicate or even override civilian agencies’ development efforts. Though these “shaping” activities are a small portion of DOD’s reported development assistance, they are also probably underreported as part of DOD’s official foreign assistance.

2. Civilian-military coordination is hard but critical for development policy coherence.

Effective civilian-military collaboration is necessary to ensure strategy coherence, keep US government actors from working at cross purposes with one another, leverage relevant expertise, and avoid duplication and waste. While this paper focuses primarily on DOD’s development assistance, the imperative of coordination applies across both military and development aid tools.

Coordination has not always been easy or fully effective. Part of the challenge stems from philosophical differences. DOD uses its foreign aid tools, both military assistance and development assistance, to advance its security objectives. USAID typically employs aid in pursuit of longer-term development or humanitarian objectives. These two orientations may not always align. Unaligned objectives—or shared objectives with competing ideas about how to achieve them—have sometimes limited the coherence and effectiveness of the US government’s efforts.

There are structural challenges, too. Parallel chains of command are not always effectively linked by ambassadors and military commanders. US Embassies create Integrated Country Strategies that bring together all agencies’ efforts in a given country, but much of the

---

47 Serafino, 2008; Anderson and Veillette, 2014.
48 The process of and actors involved in interagency collaboration will vary depending on objective, country setting, and broader US government goals in the country or region.
individual agencies’ planning and budgeting takes place on different timelines and even in
different locations—DOD does significant planning at the regional combatant commands
while regional priorities for the State Department and USAID are often largely set in
Washington.50 And while DOD has been eager for more civilian participation in its planning
processes, State and USAID are often too under-resourced to meet DOD’s requests for
support.51 Furthermore, when State and USAID advisors participate in DOD planning and
strategy, they do not always have decision-making power or authority to make commitments
for their agency.52 Individual personalities and lack of common terminology can make it hard
to coordinate, too.53 And fault lines don’t only appear at an interagency level. Lack of
internal coordination within agencies contributes to coordination problems, as well.54 For
instance, insufficient collaboration between functional and regional bureaus at the State
Department can play out in the interagency process when DOD coordinates with one
bureau which then fails to coordinate with other relevant internal stakeholders.

While optimal coordination may always be elusive, interagency efforts—and their
outcomes—have improved over the last fifteen years. DOD, the State Department and
USAID have a number of processes in place to promote coordination, including interagency
task forces that focus on areas of common interest like fragile states. There are also
coordination mechanisms within agencies. The State Department established the Bureau of
Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) in 2011 to promote effective civilian efforts to
prevent and respond to conflict under State Department leadership. While CSO is less
focused on interagency planning and coordination than its predecessor, the Office of the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), one of its functions is to foster
partnerships with the military so that civilian expertise and ideas can be integrated into DOD
planning and operations.55 USAID established the Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation
(CMC) in 2005 to serve as the agency’s primary point of contact with DOD and provide
advice to military commands carrying out development activities in the field.56 And
improved coordination with DOD was elevated as a core part of USAID’s recent
“transformation” effort.57

Field level coordination has been particularly important. It is predominantly at the country
level that bilateral relationships are formed and managed and where strategies and programs
are developed. USAID has named military liaison officers in most missions, and DOD has

50 Anderson and Veillette, 2014. Furthermore, Integrated Country Strategies have sometimes been more of a
vehicle for justifying ongoing programs rather than an opportunity to set a new strategic direction (Watts, et al.,
2018).
52 Anderson and Veillette, 2014.
53 Government Accountability Office 2012b; Serafino, 2008; McCannell, 2016.
54 Kleinfeld, 2016.
55 S/CRS was established in 2004. While it developed some important groundwork, it also encountered a number
of obstacles, including limited funding and authority, bureaucratic turf battles, limited demand for services from
the field, and an unclear mandate (Serafino, 2012; McCannell, 2016; Adams, 2014).
56 The CMC was originally called the Office of Military Affairs.
57 Department of State, 2018.
representatives from the State Department and USAID at each combatant command. It also places its own liaisons at embassies and USAID offices.\textsuperscript{58} AFRICOM has pushed the needle on staff-to-staff interactions by creating civilian-staffed leadership positions within its own structure to directly include State and USAID decisionmakers in the areas where defense and civilian activities might overlap (e.g., humanitarian, defense institution building).\textsuperscript{59} This kind of cross-pollination appears to be beneficial. A 2006 report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee found that country teams in embassies with USAID presence were more capable of “ensuring sufficient review of military humanitarian assistance projects” than those without a USAID office.\textsuperscript{60} And in the last few years, interviewed staff from DOD, State, and USAID affirmed that working civilian-military relationships have improved noticeably in the last ten years.\textsuperscript{61}

Recent strategic-level efforts to promote better coordination include the 2018 Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR), which provides mutually agreed upon rules of the game for coordinating stabilization activities. In addition, both the House of Representatives and the Senate have introduced a Global Fragility Act that would establish a process for agencies to develop long-term interagency plans to stabilize conflict-affected countries or prevent violence in other fragile states. Both the SAR and the Global Fragility Acts identify agency roles and responsibilities to help facilitate coordination—the State Department is the overall lead, USAID is the lead development implementer, and DOD is a supporting actor.\textsuperscript{62} It is easier, however, to answer the question of who should lead than it is to lay out what leadership needs to look like in practice to be successful. Questions of budgetary, policy, and legal leverage remain to be fleshed out as do expectations for managing interagency dispute resolution. It will also be imperative to build upon the lessons learned about how to structure coordination—especially in the field—to work across different agency cultures and processes.

3. Adequate resourcing of civilian agencies is critical for the effective implementation of the hard-won lessons learned about the importance of civilian development expertise in stabilization efforts.

DOD’s massive involvement in stabilization activities in Iraq and Afghanistan was to a large extent tied to the underfunding of the State Department and USAID that started in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{63} Under Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, USAID’s funding levels rose and the agency made a concerted effort to rebuild the human capacity and functions

\textsuperscript{58} Government Accountability Office 2012b; McCannell, 2016.
\textsuperscript{59} McCannell, 2017.
\textsuperscript{60} Serafino, 2008.
\textsuperscript{61} McCannell, 2016. This seems to be especially true in Africa where AFRICOM and its civilian country team counterparts have—after some initial growing pains—developed fairly functional collaboration (McCannell, 2017).
\textsuperscript{63} Gates, 2007; Norris and Veillette, 2012.
that had been eroded, but it has taken time. In the interim, identified needs—including
development-oriented stabilization needs—were filled by those with the money and staff to
fill them.

The Trump administration has repeatedly demonstrated its eagerness to cut the budgets of
the State Department and USAID. This threat prompted a number of generals and senior
members of the military to urge Congress to take heed of the lessons of Iraq and
Afghanistan and recognize the importance of civilian development expertise in crafting
programs aimed at creating the governance and development outcomes that they assert can
reduce extremism and demonstrate the dividends of stability. Former Defense Secretary
James Mattis is well known for his 2013 remarks to Congress, saying, “If you don’t fund the
State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition ultimately.” Congress has so
far largely rejected the Trump administration’s proposed cuts.

4. Structuring civilian agencies’ staffing, programming, and funding
to be more flexible and responsive could complement the military’s
rapid response capabilities and reduce the need to rely on DOD’s
surge capacity for efforts that should be civilian-led.

One of DOD’s chief comparative advantages is its ability to mobilize money, personnel, and
supplies quickly. On the other hand, most of the US government’s civilian tools—especially
its development tools—are slow to deploy and fairly inflexible. The budgeting process for
USAID and the State Department takes a long time, beginning years before a situation that
requires quick response might emerge. And a substantial portion of USAID’s funds are tied
up in a complex web of spending directives. Many missions have discretion over only a
quarter or less of their overall budgets. And while the flexibility of different accounts
varies, it can be hard in practice to quickly move pots of money to address critical emergent

65 Breedlove, et al., 2017; Retired Military Leaders via the US Global Leadership Coalition, 2017. The argument
put forth does merit a critical view of the evidence around the extent to which achieving development outcomes
can reduce extremism and violence—and the types of development outcomes that are most closely linked to
those objectives. The link between poverty and extremism is tenuous. Research shows that poor countries are
less likely to produce terrorists and that terrorists and their sympathizers are less likely to be poor (Kruger, 2018;
discrimination and marginalization can increase the effectiveness of terrorist recruitment, these factors cannot be
isolated as a driving cause (Allan, et al., 2015). In Afghanistan, development gains (GDP per capita, health and
education outcomes, etc.) did not succeed in improving security (Pisa, 2017). There is a greater link between a
weak state-society social contract, exclusionary governance, and limited political rights and civil liberties and the
rise of violent extremism (Allan, et al., 2015; Piazza, 2011). This body of evidence does not negate the military
leaders’ broader point, but it suggests a need for more careful scrutiny about the root causes of state fragility and
violence. It also reveals an imperative to better target development aid accordingly.
66 Mattis, 2013.
health, governance, and other development issues. This is especially true when identified needs fall outside of the typical sectors to which development funds are allocated.

Increased flexibility of civilian funding streams can help alleviate the need for DOD to take on roles outside of its scope because it's the only one with the money to do so. Some development accounts do have flexibility built in. The International Disaster Assistance account allows flexible response to humanitarian crises or natural disasters. And Economic Support Funds are typically subject to fewer directives and can be somewhat easier to reprogram than other heavily earmarked accounts.

There has been a set of efforts to provide nimble civilian contingency funding to address urgent conflict-related needs. Section 1207 of the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act provided a temporary authority which allowed DOD to transfer up to $100 million per year to the State Department for stabilization and reconstruction activities, including those implemented by other agencies like USAID. While this upped the resources State and USAID could devote to these goals, civilian agencies had very limited leadership over the money, prompting concerns that the Pentagon’s influence over their use undercut the civilian agencies’ perspectives, methods, and goals. Section 1207 expired in FY2010 and Congress established the Complex Crisis Fund (CCF), a vehicle that provides emergency stabilization funds directly to State and USAID. Many argue, however, that it has been underfunded, with only $50 million at its peak and $30 million in FY2018.

Lawmakers continue to recognize the challenge of providing resources to address quick-to-evolve stabilization and violence prevention needs, particularly the tension between ensuring appropriate oversight of funds while providing for speed and flexibility of disbursement. Both the House of Representatives and the Senate versions of the Global Fragility Act would establish a “Stabilization and Prevention Fund.” This fund would provide stabilization- or violence prevention-focused resources for a set of priority countries that are exempt from directives around specified activities or sectors. In exchange for this flexibility, State and USAID would be required to present, among other things, a long-term plan for violence reduction, clear measurable objectives, performance metrics, and a strategy for learning-based adaptation.

In addition to funding flexibility for emergencies with a political/security component to them, there is also a need for greater flexibility for funds that can address global health security. The US government has turned to DOD to respond to public health crises when the civilian agencies which should have led were not able to mobilize money quickly. The

---

68 In FY2012, Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act was revised to create the Global Security Contingency Fund, a fund that pools resources from DOD (which contributes up to 80 percent of the total) and the State Department (which contributes no less than 20 percent). The goal is to create joint funding—while transferring some of DOD’s largesse to State—and set conditions that enable more effective joint planning. However, the types of coordination challenges noted above slowed its start-up and questions about how well State could exercise its leadership role when DOD provided most of the funds remained (Serafino, 2014).

69 Serafino, 2011.

2014-2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa provides a stark example. When the outbreak began to escalate in the summer of 2014, USAID and CDC were both at the end of their fiscal years with little funding left to reprogram or divert to the emerging crisis. DOD, however, had nearly a billion dollars of unspent overseas contingency operations funds, and Congress quickly allowed them to reprogram around half of that toward Ebola response. It was not until December, four months after the World Health Organization (belatedly) declared the outbreak an emergency, that Congress funded Ebola response capabilities at USAID and CDC through a supplemental appropriation.

In a clear acknowledgement of unmet need for flexibility, recent budget bills specify that money from several accounts, including CCF, can be transferred to address public health emergencies. A permanently funded contingency fund, as proposed by CGD’s Amanda Glassman, would enable more timely civilian response to the next outbreak.71

Tied to inflexible funding, USAID and the State Department are also typically less nimble than DOD in their ability to deploy staff resources according to emerging needs. While a number of quick-response civilian corps have been established to prevent, plan for, and respond to different types of crises, they’ve had mixed success.72

The Civilian Response Corps (CRC) (an interagency effort managed by State’s S/CRS and then CSO) was created in the mid-2000s to have on call quickly deployable staff who could bring to bear a wide range of non-military skills and expertise necessary for violence prevention, as well as stabilization and transition.73 It was quickly reduced in size and ambition and ultimately dissolved in 2012 due to a variety of factors, including its expense; difficulties getting the right people to the field; limited demand for its services; lack of a clear vision and mission; and insufficient long-term political support.74 Even though the CRC is defunct, State and USAID both maintain “bullpens” of deployable staff. State’s is still managed by CSO and is often co-deployed with the military to conduct research and design diplomatic strategies or programs. USAID’s former CRC contribution was transformed into the Office of Crisis Surge Support Staff which aims to provide quick staffing to missions to help address a range of urgent needs.

In addition to CRC-related efforts, USAID has two other, longer-standing civilian surge forces that are generally viewed as successful. The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) (established in 1994) is organized and resourced to provide fast, flexible, short-term assistance to address transition and stabilization needs. OFDA (established in 1964) leads the US government’s emergency humanitarian response/disaster relief efforts and coordinates other agencies’ contributions as needed. Its effectiveness is, in part, rooted in its well-defined and widely-accepted leadership role.

73 Serafin, 2012.
74 Courtney and Loustau, 2018; McCannell, 2016.
But beyond the short-term, priority crises that OTI and OFDA might tackle, it has been harder for USAID to surge staff and resources for crisis prevention efforts or for more medium-term efforts that bridge between crisis response and longer-term development. USAID’s organizational culture and accompanying staffing patterns tend to revolve around the agency’s responsibilities in steady-state operating environments, which hasn’t been conducive to maintaining effective non-emergency surge capacity.  

5. Incomplete transparency and (to date) a weak commitment to managing for and measuring results adds up to limited accountability for DOD’s aid investments.

Though DOD’s foreign assistance reporting has improved in recent years, it still struggles with transparency. The department’s various security cooperation activities were created by Congress at different times, for different reasons, on different timeframes, and with different reporting requirements, making it hard to aggregate disparate data into a cohesive set. DOD, which is not a development agency, has no way of tagging or coding in its own systems what elements of its programming are considered foreign assistance. The lack of interaction between program and financial record-keeping also poses challenges.

The Security Assistance Monitor, a non-governmental organization, was established primarily to do a better job of collecting and reporting DOD’s foreign assistance by tracking disparate public reports and obtaining information through the freedom of information process in order to augment the limited data contained in the main foreign assistance databases. But the Security Assistance Monitor looks primarily at military assistance. No similar effort focuses on development assistance.

In addition to transparency challenges, DOD’s attention to systematically managing for and evaluating the results of its investments has been limited. A GAO report looking at foreign assistance evaluations across agencies in FY2015 found that DOD’s evaluations were few and of comparatively low quality.

75 McCannell, 2016.
76 Publish What You Fund, n.d.
77 Goldenberg, et al., 2016. Assessment, monitoring, and evaluation functions had largely been carried out based on the initiative of specific program managers and at individual combatant commands (Ross, 2017). And the department’s own evaluation requirements were not always met. For instance, from FY2005 through FY2009, GAO found DOD had not completed 90 percent of required one-year post project evaluations for its OHDACA projects and half of its required 30-day evaluations (Government Accountability Office, 2012b).
78 GAO looked only at evaluations of DOD’s Global Train and Equip program.
Without regular, decent quality project evaluation, it is hard to understand whether programs are meeting their objectives, and whether they are a good use of resources; it is also hard to apply learning from previous programming when lessons are not well captured. And the roots of these gaps extend into program design. Good evaluation is predicated on good design with identified objectives and an articulated theory of change. DOD has largely been implementing security cooperation programs without first making these explicit and in the absence of guidance on how to do so.80

DOD has taken steps to address deficiencies in accountability and learning. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act added a new requirement for assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of security cooperation programs, and a 2017 DOD policy outlined roles and responsibilities for fulfilling these functions.81 It has also been working on making the objectives of country-specific security cooperation strategies smarter, more specific, time-bound, and measurable and then better aligning activities with these objectives. But in the end, policy is only as good as its implementation, and this one has been slow to get off the

---

79 Government Accountability Office, 2017. The number of evaluations GAO assessed for each agency was a sample of the total for FY2015. So while DOD did conduct more than four evaluations of its Global Train and Equip program, there were comparatively fewer relative to the other agencies.
80 Kleinfeld, 2016; Watts, 2015.
81 Department of Defense, 2017a.
ground with inconsistent take up across the defense agencies implementing relevant programs.82

**Conclusion**

Fifteen years ago, DOD occupied an outsized space in the US government’s development toolkit. Driven there partly by the long-term underfunding of the State Department and USAID, the military’s new role prompted concerns about mission creep, development effectiveness, and interagency policy coherence. Careful capture of lessons learned from that era prompted a reformulation of DOD’s role as a development actor. The Pentagon is now much less involved in delivering development assistance and brings its specific strengths to bear largely in support of civilian-led development and humanitarian strategies.

The experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan are gradually receding into the past, however, and the US government is increasingly adopting a new worldview based on great power competition—with attendant implications for the roles of development, diplomacy, and defense.

The considerations discussed above suggest several broadly-stated imperatives for continued attention: (1) Congressional appropriators should ensure adequate—and sufficiently flexible—resources for civilian agencies to respond to urgent needs more nimbly and in a more targeted way; (2) the State Department, USAID, and DOD, with support from Congress, must define in practice what the respective roles laid out for them in the SAR and the Global Fragility Acts will mean in terms of leadership authority and dispute resolution; (3) DOD should continue to address gaps in its foreign assistance reporting and strive for more comprehensive capture of its aid dollars; and (4) DOD should redouble its efforts to implement its assessment, monitoring, and evaluation policy to improve accountability for how funds are spent and generate learning that can be applied to future interventions. On many of these, there has been real forward momentum. This will provide a foundation upon which civilian and military actors can strive to advance a more coherent, flexible, responsive, and evidence-informed US development policy.

---

82 Goldenberg, et al., 2016.
References


Department of Defense. 2009. “Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05.” September 16,


http://modernizeaid.net/2017/01/pentagon-unveils-major-policy-evaluate-security-cooperation-programs/.


Annex. Notes on the reclassification of data

The data reported in this paper come from the OECD DAC’s Creditor Reporting System. The author modified region, category, and sector assignments in order to organize the data in a more useful way for the paper. Some recategorization decisions required judgement calls, so for full transparency, the dataset with both the original DAC classifications and the author’s classifications is available at this paper’s Center for Global Development landing page. This annex broadly describes the types of adjustments made. Examples are provided for illustrative purposes but are far from an exhaustive list.

Adjustment to regional designations: A new regional classification was added to align with the US Department of State’s regional definitions. The differences are small and include things like combining the OECD’s “North & Central America” with “South America” to create a single “Americas.”

Consolidation of classifications: In the original dataset, projects that were similar to one another sometimes received different classifications. The original dataset also sometimes separated components of several thematic areas into more than one sector. The revised dataset groups like items under the same categorical/sector designations. For instance:

- In addition to activities originally classified (general sector) as Health and Population, the recoded Health sector also includes several activities originally classified as Governance or Humanitarian but whose project title or description have a health focus.
- In addition to activities originally classified (general sector) as Education, the recoded Education sector also includes several activities originally classified as Governance or Humanitarian but whose project title or description have an education focus.
- Soccer field restoration activities in Iraq were variably classified as Governance (“Other Social Infrastructure & Services”) or Humanitarian (“Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation”). They were recategorized into Civic/cultural infrastructure/rehabilitation/services.

Separation of classifications: The author separated some of the original dataset’s broad sector categorizations into more granular categories that enable a more specified breakdown of DOD assistance. For instance:

- Activities that fell under the general sector of Governance were separated out into more specific redefined sectors, including Civic/cultural infrastructure/rehabilitation/services; Counternarcotics; Conflict, peace, and security; Demining; WMD; Rule of law/law enforcement; Energy generation, distribution & policy based on clues in the project name or description.
- Activities originally classified as Humanitarian (general sector) were separated into recategorized categories including Disaster response & preparedness; Infectious disease surveillance, prevention, control; Support to civilian populations and/or governance non-frontline/disaster areas based on clues in the project name or description.
- Activities originally classified as Infrastructure (general sector) were separated into recategorized categories including Iraq and Afghanistan; Disaster response & preparedness; Support to civilian populations and/or governance non-frontline/disaster areas; and WMD based on clues in the project name or description.
Correlation of misclassifications: Some classifications were clearly mis-specified. In these cases, the revised classifications better reflect the substance of the project, based on the title and description. The following are a few examples:

- Several entries related to PEPFAR were originally classified under the sector *Water Supply & Sanitation* with the purpose of *River basins development*. These were reclassified under *Health*.
- An entry described as “Agricultural Equipment for Ministry of Agriculture” was originally classified under *Governance* but was reclassified to *Agriculture*.
- Where activities with an original general sector classification of *Other* had descriptions that clearly suggested a particular sector, they were reclassified into those sectors.