

Europe Beyond Aid: Europe's Commitment to International Security

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Abstract

Security and development are closely interlinked. War and political violence do not concentrate exclusively on governmental targets – they also harm civilians and their homes and livelihoods, and they exacerbate inter-ethnic and inter-social conflict. Furthermore, the destruction of public capacities affects not only the high political institutions of a state but all kinds of institutions framing economic and social daily life. And this causal link also works the other way around: poverty and institutional weakness make it easier for both challengers and incumbents to gain support for political violence and war. The link between security and development is so obvious that it needs no further explanation; it is a point of general consensus among both security and development actors, at the European as well as the global level.

The Commitment to Development Index (CDI) assesses the policies of wealthy nations from development perspective, and monitors their commitment to security and development by scoring positively those countries that contribute to international peace missions and sea lane control, and scoring negatively those that export arms to militaristic and totalitarian regimes, or that do not comply with international disarmament conventions. These measures do not cover the whole range of possible actions in support of security and development, but they are indicators that can facilitate comparison among countries and years.

Europe Beyond Aid Consultation Report Series

Europe Beyond Aid uses the Commitment to Development Index (CDI) to examine European countries' collective commitment to development on seven cross-border issues: aid, trade, finance, migration, environment, security, and technology. We calculate a consolidated score for the 21 European countries included in the CDI to track their pursuit of development-friendly policies.

In 2014 the Center for Global Development launched a series of discussion papers for public consultation. Our goal is to press for a broader and more informed

discussion about how European policies can improve. By summer 2015, we will synthesize the expert consensus on the seven themes of the CDI into a comprehensive and specific policy agenda for European countries setting out practical, evidence based conclusions on how they can improve their policies which affect development and global poverty.

Please, share your comments, suggestions and ideas by email to pkrylova@cgdev.org. We will be looking forward to hearing from you.

Introduction

Security and development are closely interlinked. War and political violence do not concentrate exclusively on governmental targets – they also harm civilians and their homes and livelihoods, and they exacerbate inter-ethnic and inter-social conflict. Furthermore, the destruction of public capacities affects not only the high political institutions of a state but all kinds of institutions framing economic and social daily life. And this causal link also works the other way around: poverty and institutional weakness make it easier for both challengers and incumbents to gain support for political violence and war.

The link between security and development is so obvious that it needs no further explanation; it is a point of general consensus among both security and development actors, at the European as well as the global level. The EU Security Strategy states that “security is a precondition of development” (EU, 2003:2), and the EU consensus on development holds that “without development and poverty eradication no sustainable peace will occur” (EU, 2006:46).

The Commitment to Development Index (CDI), an index assessing the policies of wealthy nations from a development perspective, keeps track of their commitment to security and development by scoring positively those countries that contribute to international peace missions and sea lane control, and scoring negatively those that export arms to militaristic and totalitarian regimes, or that do not comply with international disarmament conventions. These measures do not cover the whole range of possible actions in favor of security and development, but they are indicators that can facilitate comparison among countries and years.

In *section one*, we look at the different dimensions of security, the definition of the development-security nexus, and the way this is operationalized in the CDI. In *section two*, we address the main goal of the paper: assessing Europe’s performance on those aspects of security having an impact on development by using CDI data. This index gives Europe a very negative score in comparison to other countries, and in comparison to its own performance viv-à-vis other components of the CDI. In *section three*, we complement CDI data with some qualitative information that is not captured by the index and that examines Europe’s profile as a security actor. Based on both analyses, we conclude that the EU contribution to security and development is relevant but unbalanced (*section four*). In other words, we consider that the overall EU contribution to development through security is not so mediocre as suggested by its score in the CDI, which is focused on military contributions to global security. Finally, we make some recommendations on how to assess other contributions to global security, and how to improve specific contributions by Europe to the defense dimension of security.

1. How are security and development interlinked?

The close link between security and development is not subject to debate, but a precise description of how both concepts are interlinked may help countries to better plan their interventions when pursuing both goals. Such a definition is also needed in order to rigorously analyze how countries are actually contributing to development through security, and vice versa. How can we assess a country’s commitment to development by way of its security policies?

The way this is accomplished in the CDI is by looking at countries’ compliance with international agreements and norms on global security. The index rewards contributions to internationally condoned military interventions (peacekeeping operations, humanitarian interventions, and sea lane protection), and their participation in international security treaties, while it penalizes arms exports to undemocratic and militaristic governments. So, the index focuses on security as a prerequisite for development.

The above-mentioned indicators are synthesized into a security component that makes up part of a composite index ranking rich countries according to their global responsibility, in seven policy areas: finance, trade, environment, aid, technology, migration, and security. Some of these policies also have

a security dimension that is captured by the index – for instance, the finance component includes a subcomponent on financial transparency which indicates a country’s commitment to fighting against illicit financial flows; the migration component rewards countries for hosting refugees, etc. The security component, however, adheres to a narrow concept of security focusing on the defense aspects of security policy.

In order to usefully employ CDI data on security, two main caveats must be considered. First, non-military contributions to security which may directly affect developing countries (e.g., intelligence support in counter-terrorist operations) are not taken into account. Second, despite the name of the index, it does not amount to an operationalization of the concept “security-development nexus”.

Since these two conceptual aspects weigh heavily in current debates about global security, we attempt to develop both in the following paragraphs, also suggesting some ways to complement CDI data when assessing a country’s commitment to security and development¹.

The security-development nexus

Conceptual work by the UN International Peace Academy (Tschirgi, 2003) considers peace-building to be the link between security and development, framing under this term the “diverse and overlapping international agendas for peace”: conflict prevention, conflict management, and post-conflict reconstruction. Peace-building would include normative developments, policy developments, operational responses, institutional reform, and new institutional agreements. Military operations therefore represent just one of five classes of peace-building interventions.

Hurwitz and Peak (2004) have a similar view of the security-development nexus, but they provide a different classification for peace-building interventions: governance support, security sector reform, and the establishment of the rule of law. This classification does not include military interventions, and this probably better reflects the way the international community uses the term “development nexus”.

Amer *et al.* (2013) understand that the 9/11 attacks and the distinct evolutions of East Asia and Africa will unavoidably provoke reflection on the relationship between development and security (and vice versa), but they are very critical of the way in which the connection has been integrated into policy papers of the most influential actors (UN, OECD, EU, US, etc.). They feel that the conceptualized nexus lacks clarity and credibility, and that in practice this has resulted in the securitization of development aid, which may be counterproductive as it poses challenges for any long-term engagements necessary for sustainable peace².

Although the term “security-development nexus” should frame (in theory) the specific interconnections between both phenomena, it refers (in practice) to an approach in international security interventions that (1) emphasizes the importance of national state capacities to ensure long-term stability, and (2) includes specific measures to reinforce such capacities. In this paper, we will use the term in this sense. We will look at how Europe has integrated this approach into its security policies, assuming that a capacity-building dimension in security policies does more than make security sustainable (in fact, the results of the capacity-building component have been rather limited, both in the latest complex military interventions (e.g. Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan) as well as in more limited training missions in Guinea, Somalia, or Mali) – it also complements socio-economic development.

¹ See EU (2013) EU (2014b) and EU 2015.

² Boonstra, J, and N. Shapovalova (2012) provide clear examples of the limitations of the rhetoric on security-development nexus by analyzing EU policies towards Tajikistan. Thinking security, doing development? The security-development nexus in European policies towards Tajikistan

Non-military dimensions of global security

Global security, regardless of how it contributes to long-term development, is also going through a redefinition in the international community. During the Cold War it mostly referred to armament and armed conflicts, while today it frames a more complex and diverse set of risks. Beyond armed conflicts, global security involves non-military interventions around border control, anti-terrorist activities, maritime security, the fight against organized crime and human trafficking, etc.

The broad meaning of security is often expressed as “human security” following the UNDP Report (1994) which shifted attention away from military threats to “chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression”, along with “protection from sudden and hurtful disruption in the patterns of daily life”³. In order to integrate this vision in our analysis, we will gather some information on international missions whose functioning appears similar to those accounted for by the CDI, but which are not military missions in a strict sense (e.g., civilian missions).

Avoiding vague concepts and broad definitions is understandable when building a composite index, but this obviously limits the scope of the ultimate assessment. As explained in Box 1, most indicators in this policy area provided by research institutions focus on a very specific dimension, and the CDI is probably the most comprehensive. However, as we shall see, understanding the role of Europe in global security requires looking at the interventions that are being deployed from a comprehensive security approach but that are not covered by the CDI.

³ For a comprehensive review of conceptualizations of human security, see Taylor (2004).

Box 1: Monitoring global security through quantitative indicators

Indicator	Description	Source
Arms Transfers Database	The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database contains information on all transfers of major conventional weapons from 1950. Its latest edition showed that the USA and Russia accounted for more than half of global arms trade.	The Stockholm International Peace research Institute (SIPRI)
Military Expenditure Database	The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database contains time series on the military spending of 171 countries since 1988 and since 1949 for NATO founders. Its latest edition shows that global military expenditure fell in 2013 by 1.9 percent in real terms, to \$1.747 trillion.	The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Multilateral Peace Operations Database	The SIPRI database on Multilateral Peace Operations provides comprehensive, reliable, and authoritative data on all multilateral peace operations (both UN and non-UN) conducted around the world.	The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Global Terrorism Index	The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) is the first index to systematically rank and compare 162 countries according to the impact of terrorism.	Institute for Economics and Peace
The Nuclear Threat Index	The NTI Index was created to assess the security of nuclear materials around the world, and to encourage governments to take actions and provide assurances about the security of the world's deadliest materials. It has sparked international discussions about priorities required to strengthen security.	Nuclear Threat Initiative
Global Peace Index	The Global Peace Index ranks 162 countries (covering 99.6 percent of the world's population) based on three dimensions of peace. The 2014 edition found that peace has deteriorated since 2008 in 111 countries, while it has improved in only 51.	Institute for Economics and Peace
Military Global Presence	A component of the Elcano Global Presence Index, this measures countries' military presence in the world, taking into account both troop deployment and equipment projection. Its latest edition shows that the US has more than four times Europe's military global presence.	Elcano Royal Institute
Cluster Munition Monitor	The CMM monitors signatories of the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions. A total of 116 states had signed or acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions as of 25 March 2015.	Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor
Landmine Monitor	The LM monitors signatories of the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction. There were 162 party states and one signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty as of November 2014.	Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor

2. Key findings: Europe’s performance in the CDI - security component

Security is the policy area where Europe performs worst, according to the CDI. The index shows that Europe is a generous donor, and a responsible actor in environmental issues, but that it has much room for improvement in security and technology. It can also do more in trade, finance, and migration policies.

Table 1. Europe’s commitment to development, CDI 2013

Standings/Europe as a single entity

	<i>Country</i>	<i>Aid</i>	<i>Trade</i>	<i>Finance</i>	<i>Migration</i>	<i>Environment</i>	<i>Security</i>	<i>Technology</i>	<i>Overall</i>
1	New Zealand	3.4	8.1	4.2	6.7	6	7.1	4.4	5.7
2	Australia	3.8	7.1	5.7	6.9	3.8	5	4.7	5.3
3	Canada	3.7	6	5.3	7.6	2.6	5.6	5.3	5.2
4	Europe	4.8	5.1	5.3	5.1	7	3.9	4.9	5.1
5	United States	3	7.1	5.1	3.6	4.3	4.6	4.7	4.6
6	Japan	1	1.6	3.9	2.3	3.8	4.5	6.2	3.3
6	South Korea	1.1	-1.2	4.9	5.7	4.3	1.3	6.8	3.3

Source: CGD

When comparing Europe with other countries, its commitment to global security is also very low. It is the second-worst performer in the security ranking, above only South Korea, which performs below average in almost all the policy areas examined by the CDI. The European score in security is especially negative considering that the security component registers one of the widest ranges of variation in the CDI (New Zealand, 7.1 - South Korea, 1.3).

Table 2. Security Component Ranking, CDI 2013

<i>Rank</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Overall score</i>
1	New Zealand	7.1
2	Canada	5.6
3	Australia	5.0
4	United States	4.6
5	Japan	4.5
6	EU	4.0
7	Europe	3.9
8	South Korea	1.3

Source: CGD

An indicator-by-indicator analysis of Europe’s performance shows that Europe actually has a medium-level commitment in all measures. In a ranking of seven countries, Europe stands in the fourth position in each of the three security indicators of the CDI: military spending, arms exports, and arms convention ratification. Paradoxically, it ranks sixth when the three indicators are aggregated into one single score. The reason for this is that other countries register negative scores in some indicators and very positive scores in others. The US, for instance, is the country that has refuted the greatest number of conventions⁴ but has made the highest contributions to international

⁴ The following conventions monitored by the CDI have not been ratified by the US: the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Mine Ban Treaty, the International Criminal Court Convention, and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. At the same time, the US is party to many non-CDI listed arms control and disarmament treaties. See: www.state.gov/t/avc/trt

military missions, both in absolute and relative terms. Conversely, Japan’s contributions to military missions are very low, but the country has ratified all the conventions, and (so far) remains a minor arms exporter⁵.


Table 3. Security Ranking, CDI 2013: component breakdown

Rank	Country	Military spending Score	Arms Exports Score	Ratifications Score	Overall score
1	New Zealand	6.5	10.0	5.4	7.1
2	Canada	4.1	9.5	4.7	5.6
3	Australia	7.4	0,0	5.4	5.0
4	United States	8.0	-0.3	2.7	4.6
5	Japan	1.2	10.0	5.4	4.5
6	Europe	5.3	0.4	4.8	3.9
7	South Korea	0.6	0.0	4.1	1.3
	<i>Europe’s rank</i>	#4	#4	#4	#6
	<i>Weight</i>	50%	25%	25%	

Source: CGD

Furthermore, Europe shows a very negative trend. As per the following graph, most countries’ scores are worsening, but Europe’s negative trend is more pronounced than others’ and sharpens in the final years of the series, 2012 and 2013. According to the CDI tables, this corresponds almost entirely to changes in the arms exports score. Eastern EU countries were incorporated into this series in those same years, but only the Czech Republic registers a significantly negative score in this indicator. The countries having a major influence in this result are actually Sweden (-2,46 from 2011 to 2012), Belgium (-1,91), the UK (-1,78), France (-0,53) and Spain. (-0,42). We go into detail about the issue of arms exports in section 3.2.

Figure 1. CDI Security Component, trends



Source: CGD

No matter what the baseline (other countries, other components, other years), Europe does not evince a strong commitment to global security in the CDI. This might seem contradictory, given its reputation in the defense of international law and multilateralism. In the following paragraphs, we

⁵ According to recent decisions by the Abe government, this will probably change in the coming years.

will provide a detailed description of Europe’s score in each indicator based on micro-data provided by CGD, with the aim of explaining this paradoxical score.

2.1. European participation in security regimes

Despite its normative approach to international security, the EU does not obtain the maximum score in the security regimes indicator but stands in fourth position, behind New Zealand, Japan, and Australia (which do meet the totality of the criteria considered by the CDI).

This indicator takes into account the ratification of eight international norms, seven of which regulate the proliferation of different types of armament (nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and conventional weapons), with the eighth convention establishing the International Criminal Court. These are all global initiatives and therefore do not include the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which is the only agreement in the conventional weapons field that has shown reduction in the most offensive categories of military weaponry in Europe.

Table 4. Security conventions monitored in the CDI

Topic	Convention	Year	# signatories
Nuclear Weapons	- Non-Proliferation Treaty	1968	191
	- Comprehensive Nuclear Test- Ban Treaty	1996	183
Chemical and Biological Weapons	- Chemical Weapons Convention	1997	190
Conventional Weapons	- Biological Weapons Convention	1972	173
	- Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons	2001	119
	- Convention on Cluster Munitions	2008	116
Justice	- International Criminal Court	1998	123

Sources: Own elaboration based on CGD micro-data and sources

The majority of countries included in the CDI have ratified the majority of conventions taken into account by the index. In other words, the scores in this indicator are close to the maximum, the US being the only remarkable exception. However, four EU countries (Slovakia, Poland, Finland, and Greece) have ratified only seven of eight treaties. This has a relatively big impact on this indicator, which may actually have no impact on international security and development.

The four missing points in Europe’s score all relate to the same convention: the convention on cluster munitions. According to the Cluster Muniton Campaign⁶, European countries that have not completely banned cluster munitions argue that they cannot join the convention due to national security reasons, and that they maintain their production and stock capacities for defensive purposes only. Poland, for instance, participated in the Oslo process that led to the convention, but it has not ratified the convention because Polish companies continue to produce cluster munitions exclusively for the Polish armed forces.

In conclusion, the reluctance of Slovakia, Poland, Finland, and Greece to cease domestic provision of cluster munitions would seem to have no impact on global security, although it does impact the EU’s score. Still, the EU’s score is relatively high when compared to that of the US, which as a

⁶ www.the-monitor.org is a web resource edited by the International Campaign to Ban Land Mines and the Cluster Muniton Coalition that monitors progress by states in the signature and ratification of conventions on land mines and cluster munitions.

relevant arms producer and exporter has signed only four of the seven arms conventions and refuses to join the International Criminal Court. Indeed, the most significant difference in whether a country accepts international norms on security issues can be found between the CDI countries and emerging powers like China or India.

2.2. Global responsibility of the European arms industry

The arms export indicator of the CDI penalizes arms exports to totalitarian and militaristic regimes by weighting major conventional weapons by the recipient's Voice and Accountability⁷ score and by its military spending. Some European countries like Sweden score worse than the US (-13.4 versus -0.3) in this indicator. The European aggregated score (4.8) is also disappointing and is far below that of New Zealand (10), Japan (10), or Canada (9.5).

This result is counterintuitive, for several reasons. The international arms market is controlled by the US and Russia, which account for more than half of its volume (SIPRI, 2015). Furthermore, European countries have voluntarily adopted a Code of Conduct on Arms Export which is motivated by “the special responsibility of arms-exporting states” and Europe’s determination “to prevent the export of equipment which might be used for internal repression or international aggression or contribute to regional instability” (EU, 1998: 1 and 2). Furthermore, the EU Institutions have explicitly declared their “aim of avoiding that EU-manufactured weaponry be used against civilian populations or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in developing countries” (EU, 2006). Finally, some of the most irresponsible arms exporters according to the CDI, such as Sweden, enjoy a very positive reputation in terms of development issues.

Regarding the first remark, it must be said that exports to authoritarian/militaristic countries are expressed in the CDI in terms of the exporter’s gross domestic product (in order to capture policy commitment rather than industrial capacities), and therefore relatively small countries (like Sweden) can obtain a very negative score in this indicator. As a matter of fact, according to the SIPRI (2015), Sweden’s armament industry is among the world top ten, as are France’s and the UK’s.

So the European arms industry is somewhat relevant and can have a relatively negative impact in developing countries, if it is not well regulated. In fact, the CDI is questioning the effectiveness of the EU code of conduct in regulating arms exports. This voluntary norm states only a few criteria about the awarding of an export license by member states, including the respect of human rights in the country of destination, or that country’s relative levels of military and social expenditure, with a view to avoiding excessive diversion toward armaments of scarce human and economic resources.


In theory, the criteria of the EU code of conduct should hinder exports to the type of recipient countries that are penalized in the CDI; but in practice, license awards are decided by each Member State, which can lead to different interpretations around potential consequences in the supply of arms to non-democratic countries. Furthermore, the EU Member States and Institutions can perceive in less-than-fully democratic countries important allies for purposes of global security, thus authorizing arms exports to said countries. Such an action would be penalized by the CDI, although it may not respond to a lack of responsibility and control.

The countries signaled by the CDI based on aggregated data on arms exports, accountability, and military expenditure have also been criticized by various NGOs for specific sales operations. For instance, the Campaign against Arms Trade has denounced the use of UK weapons for repression in

⁷ The Voice and Accountability Indicator captures perceptions of citizen participation, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and freedom of press and media. It is part of the Worldwide Governance Indicator and is used by the CDI to identify exports to totalitarian regimes, which should be penalized according to the CDI security component rationale. <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc>

Egypt, Hong Kong, Bahrain, and Kuwait, and against the people of Gaza, while Svenska Freds has denounced the supply and technical assistance of Swedish companies to the Saudi Arabian regime⁸.

Figure 2. European countries in the arms export ranking⁹



Source: CGD

In addition to the reporting system framed under the EU Code of Conduct on arms exports which makes it possible for civil society organizations to highlight controversial operations, most European countries will shortly publish annual reports on arms exports following to the signature of the UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) (UN, 2013). All EU member states but Cyprus and Greece have ratified the Treaty. With regard to NATO, Norway has ratified the treaty but neither United States nor Turkey have ratified it (though both have signed), and Canada has not even signed it.

The first reports to be published upon the basis of the ATT are due by May 31, 2016, and they should include all advanced conventional weapons, including tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery systems, military aircraft, military helicopters, naval vessels, missiles, missile launchers, small arms and light weapons, and combat support equipment. It should also include parts, components, and/or technology to manufacture, modify, or repair the covered items. The ATT will cover all kinds of international transfers: imports, exports, transit, transshipment, or brokering of conventional arms,

⁸ See www.caat.org.uk and <http://www.svenskafreds.se/>. According to recent news, Sweden will limit arms exports to Saudi Arabia in the following years following to advocacy from civil society organizations. This should have a significant and positive impact on its score. However, unlike most of the CDI indicators which are based on yearly performance and are very sensitive to positive and negative changes, this indicator is based on a five-year average and may not have an immediate effect on Sweden's rank.

⁹ As per Figure 2, Sweden and France have the two worst scores in Europe. The report on the implementation of the EU Code of Conduct confirms that both export a large quantity of weapons to countries that carry a large arms-transfer penalty in the CDI: Pakistan (-12.73) and Algeria (13.31) are two important importers from Sweden (€68M and €19M, respectively) and from France (€254M and €26M, respectively) (EU, 2014a).

whether the transfers are state-to-state, state-to-private end-user, commercial sales, leases, or loans/gifts.

2.3. Europe's military contributions to international missions

Again, Europe's involvement in global security seems insufficient according to the CDI indicator measuring military contributions to international missions motivated by humanitarian or global security concerns. Contributions from the United Kingdom, France, and Finland do seem to be in line with their financial capacity, but other European countries that are wealthy and influential actors in the international arena do not contribute to international military missions as much as they could. How is it that Germany ranks as the 19th contributor to international military missions¹⁰?

This indicator faces certain methodological constraints that must be taken into account when interpreting its data. First, contributions to official UN Peace Keeping Operations (PKOs) do not depend on a given country's commitment around each specific crisis, but on a complex quota system adopted by the UN Assembly and based on parameters including the relative economic wealth of Member States, membership in the Security Council, etc. Thus only a few European countries (group A on the official scale) can actually make an outstanding contribution to UN PKOs; most European countries stand in group B, while other relatively low contributors appear in other groups: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland.

Secondly, although the CDI includes non-UN PKOs, this poses additional problems as the recognition of legitimate international interventions can be subject to question. According to methodological papers of the CDI, international missions scored positively only when mandated by a legitimate international body, such as the UN Security Council, or NATO in the case of the former Yugoslavia, but excluding international coalitions such as in the case of Iraq post-Saddam Hussein¹¹. This suggests that regional organizations (such as NATO) not subordinated to the UN Security Council may legitimize a PKO, but international *ad hoc* coalitions cannot, even if they have the same composition.

A similar question arises when measuring contributions to sea-lane protection: which maritime operations are to be considered necessary to global security, and which are not. The current scoring system probably underestimates Japan's or Australia's contributions to Asian maritime security, as it attributes scores to nations without navies (e.g., Austria).

Thirdly, financial budgetary support to the various donor committees that reinforce most international security missions is not taken into account. This excludes most maintenance and operational costs that clearly exceed those reimbursed by the UN, therefore failing to give a full picture of financial commitments. These excluded expenditures can be huge in Afghanistan-type operations and are distributed according to the rule 'costs lie where they fall' – meaning that intervening countries will not be reimbursed, and costs will not be reallocated to Member States in the framework of the UN quota system. The CDI criterion therefore penalizes countries (like those in Europe) that have invested in power-projection capabilities (including expeditionary armed forces, advanced equipment, rapid-reaction forces, and command and control).

Fourthly, while the indicator penalizes maintenance and equipment expenditures, it rewards personnel contributions. By monetizing individuals in order to integrate them into a military contribution indicator, the CDI may underestimate commitment by richer countries that contribute with financial resources, while others contribute only manpower, which reduces national expenditure

¹⁰ According to CDI data (military contributions as a percentage of GDP), five rich countries stand out as relatively significant contributors to international military missions: the US (0.153%), Norway (0.151%), UK (1.50%), France (1.47%), and Austria (1.42%). Despite the fact that three European countries are on this list, Europe's overall average is at 1.01%

¹¹ See the CGD methodological note on this component of the CDI: O'Halon and de Albuquerque (2004).

to minimum and may even produce certain financial returns (as in some cases the UN per diem may exceed nationally standard salaries).

Finally, as explained in the following section, the CDI does not measure preventive contributions to global security such as technical assistance packages, some of which are specifically tailored to meet the needs of the security and development nexus¹².

Despite such methodological considerations, the indicator raises what is probably the most relevant question regarding Europe's involvement in global security: is Europe's contribution to military missions in line with its economic and political capacities? Probably not.

On the one hand, and according to a FRIDE report using NATO data (Keohane, 2012), while the US spent \$785 billion on defense in 2010, NATO-Europe spent only \$275 billion. Furthermore, Europeans can scarcely manage to deploy and sustain 100,000 soldiers for external operations, while the US can deploy around 400,000. On the other hand, the strategic culture of the EU member nations is less prone to military operations than other CDI-assessed countries, with the exception of Japan. As many global polls show (e.g., Transatlantic Trends of the German Marshall Fund), EU countries are reluctant to deploy troops for combat missions. Both factors, capacity and willingness, explain the low EU profile in military affairs.

3. European-like contributions to global security

The limits of PKO interventions from a development approach

Contributions to PKOs and humanitarian intervention is the most important indicator in the security component of the CDI, but its value is actually decreasing in terms of the international agenda, and this has much to do with the security-development nexus approach. First, PKOs do not address interim structural reforms, while cooperation on Security Sector Reform (SSR) does. Also remarkable is that SSR requires longer-term activities and a greater means for capacity-building than is usually the case for peace-keeping operations¹³.

Second, military operations can assist nation/governance-building programs, but they cannot replace them. Peace-keeping operations may include development measures alongside military planning, but these tend to focus on rapid amelioration of the population where military forces are operating, in order to provide active troops with a friendly environment. Long-term security and development require specific planning and civilian leadership in order to integrate security into broader governance planning.

Third, PKOs tend to be reactive rather than preventive and thus become operational in the worst scenarios: following armed conflicts, amid internal divisions, rivalry, and poor governance. Preventive international contributions (for instance, all the EU civilian missions framed under the Common Security and Development Policy) can also reinforce the security-development nexus.

Civilian missions, genuinely European contributions to security

Currently, EU civilian missions are probably the best example of a genuinely European contribution to security that cannot be captured by military indicators. The EU has long been approving and

¹² The CDI measures inputs rather than outputs, which is consistent with the concept of policy commitment, but which may yield positive scores for ineffective interventions that demand more and more resources (Iraq, Libya, Mali, Guinea, Afghanistan).

¹³ According to the EU definition, capacity building activities include, inter alia, access to international instruments, political dialogue, technical cooperation (including joint research and innovation), training (knowledge transfer) and skills development (management and governance) and the provision of essential equipment and material. With regard to funding, the EU has channeled through the African Partnership Facility more than EUR 1.2 billion to African peace-building efforts (EU Treaties forbid common funding for operations having military and defence implications but for SSR programs including military forces).

carrying out civilian missions devoted to improving that nexus on several continents. Some of these missions have been designed as a contribution to post-conflict missions (EUPOL in Afghanistan, EUJUST LEX in Iraq) while others have been manifested to reinforce governance in failing states (EUCAP Sahel in Mali and Niger, EUSEC in RD Congo), or to promote the rule of law in third countries (EUJUST Themis in Georgia). The EU has also dedicated several military missions to training armed forces in those countries whose future security depends on the reliability and preparedness of their military forces (EUSSR Guinea Bissau), or to empowering local maritime forces against piracy (EUCAP Nestor in Seychelles, Djibouti, Tanzania, Yemen, and Somalia). These missions are not taken into account in the CDI component¹⁴.

Security Sector Reform, a key area of the security-development nexus

Security Sector Reform, which involves both military and non-military tools, is a key area of the security-development nexus, as explained in section one. It offers a strong proof of commitment to development, as it consists in reinforcing a country's capabilities for ensuring its own security. In order to provide greater security, EU SSR seeks to enable developing countries to manage and oversee national forces and institutions in a more accountable, affordable, and sustainable manner.

Local ownership is a precondition for security and development, in line with the consensus on development cooperation effectiveness; thus EU missions must be tailored to every specific intervention, in order to include the proper combination of EU security tools. The EU experience shows that SSR missions demand not only military expertise (as in the past) but also civilian expertise. The EU teams are composed of practitioners, logisticians, planners, trainers, and all kinds of experts relevant to SSR functions. Enlargement of the dimensions, actions, and timing of EU missions is now being perceived through a comprehensive approach that exceeds traditional civil-military cooperation.

¹⁴ EU capacity building can take the form of training, mentoring and support. Equipment provided to partners may range from communications hardware, life support and field amenities, medical, transport and other facilities to force protection equipment.

Box 2: EU Civil Missions

Type	Name	Year	Description
Police Missions	EUPOL Afghanistan	2007-2016	Building a civilian police service that operates within an improved rule-of-law framework and in respect of human rights.
	EUPOL COPPS	2006-2015	Reforming and developing the Palestinian police and judicial institutions with a view to increasing the security of the population, in line with the establishment of the rule of law.
Justice Missions	EUJUST LEX-Iraq	2005-2013	Supporting and training judges, prison officials, and other justice-sector workers in Iraq, to improve the rule of law and protection for human rights.
	EUJUST THEMIS/Georgia	2004-2005	Supporting the Georgian authorities in addressing urgent challenges in the criminal justice system, and assisting the Georgian government in developing a coordinated overall approach to the reform process.
Capacity Building Missions	EUCAP Nestor	2012-?	Assisting host countries in developing a self-sustainable capacity for continued enhancement of maritime security, including counter-piracy and maritime governance.
	EUCAP Sahel Niger	2012-?	Helping establish an integrated, coherent, sustainable, and human rights-based approach among the various Nigerien security actors in the fight against terrorism and organized crime.
	EUCAP Sahel Mali	2014-2015	Supporting the Malian state to ensure constitutional and democratic order and the conditions for lasting peace, as well as to maintain its authority throughout the entire territory.
Common Security and Defense Policy Missions	EUSEC RD Congo	2005-?	Providing practical support for security sector reform in the DRC by giving advice and assistance directly to the competent Congolese authorities.
	EU SSR Guinea-Bissau	2008-?	Providing advice and assistance on reform of the security sector in Guinea Bissau in order to contribute to creating the conditions for implementation of the National Security Sector Reform Strategy.
Unarmed Missions	EUAM Ukraine	2014-2016	Supporting the elaboration of revised security strategies and the rapid implementation of reforms, in coordination and coherence with other EU efforts, as well as with the OSCE and other international partners.
Border Assistance Missions	EUBAM Rafah	2005-2015	Keeping the crossing-point open and properly functioning in accordance with the Agreement on Movement and Access. Also intended to build trust between the Israeli government and the Palestinian authorities
	EUBAM Libya	2013-2015	Advising, training and mentoring Libyan authorities in strengthening the border services in accordance with international standards and best practices, and advising on the development of a national Integrated Border Management (IBM) strategy.
Law Missions	EULEX Kosovo	2008-2016	Monitoring, mentoring, and advising whilst retaining some executive responsibilities in specific areas of competence, such as war crimes, organized crime, and corruption.
Monitoring Missions	EUMM Georgia	2008-2013	Monitoring and analyzing the situation as it pertains to the stabilization process, normalization building, and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, and contributing to the reduction of tensions through liaison, facilitation of contacts between parties, and other confidence-building measures.

The EU's SSR activities comprise several actors, including armed and security forces and judiciary, penitentiary, customs, and safety agencies. They also include non-state actors such as militants, guerrillas, insurgents, and private security forces. SSR features advice and training to legislative and executive members, and to both government and non-government institutions.

Europe, a key player in global security?

The above-explained activities, along with aid programs for humanitarian action and post-conflict reconstruction, demand significant financial commitment, and Europe's relatively low involvement in international military missions has been more than compensated by these types of contributions. This situation has often been described as: "Europe doesn't play, but they pay". This notion reflects the perception that countries leading in terms of military intervention deserve more visibility and credit than those behind the scenes, making the military leadership possible through their support.

In recent history, there has been an obvious division of labor in global order issues: the US has specialized in armed interventions and accumulated hard power, while Europe has specialized in international cooperation and accumulated soft power. This is changing slowly, though probably too slowly to effectively address today's security challenges, specifically in the European neighborhood. In Mali, for instance, it became evident that Europe could not rely on other players, and still did not intervene jointly. Some experts believe that US involvement in the *Tax Justice Network* (IJN), current crises in the Mediterranean countries will probably not be as intense and prolonged as needed, and the way in which European interventions can be compensated for this is not clear (Arteaga 2013, 2014).

For European countries, it is easier to mobilize public opinion and financial support for non-military interventions. For the EU Institutions, military interventions are not even an option. The first EU comprehensive strategy for Sahel, for instance, did not even have a military component, and for the European Parliament this was among the factors that favored Northern Mali's takeover by Al Qaeda. Currently, the EU approach to this region does have a security component, but not a military component. Vice-president Mogherini has appointed security experts with a police background to the different EU delegations in the region, but no intelligence or military advisor currently forms a part of EU capacities in the field. A similar assessment could be made of the EU approach in the Horn of Africa.

Today, the EU as a whole has neither its own military capacities nor a military budget, so it is contingent upon Member States to involve themselves in military interventions. However, the EU has been developing a modest capability for crisis management, in order to promote and coordinate European interventions. The EU has developed its own military command structure and a force of Battle Groups, which are battalion-type units that rotate duty as stand-by rapid-reaction forces. So it could be said that the EU not only pays, but it also enables the 'play' of other countries in military solutions.

Nevertheless, such developments are merely ready for planning and advising functions, not for carrying out complex coalitions and to commit national forces and operational headquarters. Thus, European countries remain at the core of the decision-making process and have the final say on military interventions. The more limited, peaceful, and proximate the mission in question, the easier it becomes to speed the decision-making process, recruit human and material resources, and advance the deployment schedule.

Finally, it should be noted that EU common funds cannot be earmarked for military operations. Thus, the burden of the contributions lay on the participant countries through a negotiation mechanism (Athena) that may delay the operation (with prior authorization by national parliaments also adding time and complexity to the decision making).

4. So, is Europe a responsible actor in global security or not?

Europe's military contributions are not in line with its economic capacity, according to the CDI. This explains its mediocre score in the military expenditure indicator, which is the most relevant in terms of weight, and it is the main reason why Europe does not rank a showing of strong commitment to development in security policies.

In our view, Europe has been responsibly contributing to security in recent decades in a way that is genuinely European, complementing in this way the US military contributions to security. Furthermore, this sort of contribution has been in line with the current consensus on the security-development nexus.

In 2003, the European Union fixed the nexus between security and development in its European Security Strategy, where it recognized that 'security is a precondition for development'. A specific declaration of the EU Council (EU, 2007) on the security-development nexus advocated increased policy coherence and international actor coordination, and it identified SSR as a priority area. We consider that the EU has been consistent to this vision and has significantly contributed with civilian missions, with technical assistance, and with financial contributions to post-conflict reconstruction, preventive missions, and SSR.

In other words, we could say that what the CDI is highlighting Europe's unbalanced – rather than low – contribution to security. But at the same time, this justification has one main weakness that ought to be overcome by the European institutions and countries. The US-EU division of labor in security matters is no longer valid, specifically within the European 'neighborhood'. Europe's bias towards non-military missions, and toward non-personnel contributions to military missions will probably not be taken up by other contributors. The case of Sahel, as explained in the previous section, is a good example of this.

So, three main recommendations can be drawn from our analysis: two addressed to policy-makers in Europe and one to policy analysts in Europe and elsewhere.

4.1. Enlarging the scope of the analysis when assessing countries' contributions to development.

As explained in section one, it is difficult to capture in one single figure a given country's performance around an issue which is undergoing conceptual enlargement/refinement, but we find that indicators such as the CDI security component should attempt to capture other dimensions of security, and to keep track of specific commitments in the security-development nexus. We feel that cooperation in the field of SSR, both in military and non-military capacities, could be an indicator for both. Also, if data are available, the military expenditure indicator could be enlarged and renamed as a *security* expenditure indicator, including civilian missions.

4.2. Increasing the autonomy of the EU to conduct civil-military operations in its extended neighborhood.

In the end, the debate on Europe's contribution to development through security is linked to the debate on the integration of EU defense policies. And while such integration may seem fairly reasonable, it is simply not going to happen.

Integration seems reasonable because the best way for national governments to obtain political support for financial and personnel contributions to military interventions is by relying on the legitimacy of a joint EU decision and then assuming a share of its cost, as is the case when providing for any other common good. But this is clearly not in the cards, because this idea has been around for decades. The European political environment does not seem to favor integrationist agendas in current times, and in this specific policy area, we have recently experienced several critical junctures

at the European periphery (Libya, Mali, Syria, Ukraine) that ought to have allowed political leaders to make determinant decisions.

So, given this lack of momentum around maximalist plans for integration, the EU Institutions can only follow an incremental strategy of pursuing closer cooperation. Under this approach, the next step would be to put in place the financial instruments to cover military expenditures, as well as the achievement of common civil and military capabilities. Such a fund could increase the amount and scope of EU funding of military costs incurred by Member States in operations mandated by the EU.

As in other non-common EU policies (e.g., transport policy), these funds could incentivize the reinforcement of certain national capacities that are key to the Union as a whole in responding to international crises, thus co-financing national military expenditures which are in line with EU diagnoses and plans (as in the case of the Trans-European Transport Networks).

With an instrument of this kind, the leadership in military interventions would still belong to European Member States, and the logic of the EU as paying and enabling (rather than playing) entity would remain the same; the only difference would be that the destination of such funds would include peace-keeping and stabilization operations.

An increase in the EU's financial capacities for military action should be accompanied by two complementary actions. First, a review by the EU Institutions of the decision-making processes, in order to identify and remove bottle-necks for common actions, as in the case of Battle Group mobilization. Second, the promotion of a large-scale debate on Europe's responsibility in global security and its consequences on military (personnel and financial) contributions by Member States.

4.3. Reviewing arms exports codes and index.

Given the gap between CDI indicators and EU export codes, it is worth analyzing in depth the reasons for such discrepancy. Most EU societies and parliaments are very sensitive about arms exports, and EU standards are quite reasonable. From that perspective, CDI scores appear to be rather counter-intuitive. From the perspective of the CDI Index and several NGOs, the EU Code of Conducts may be insufficient for preventing arms exports to non-democratic countries. This might be due to the fact that the application of every criterion to a specific transaction relies on every Member State, but also to the fact that certain countries that rate a negative accountability score may actually be allies in global security issues for European countries, as they see it. Thus, such a review could be useful to help identify and compare, case by case, those countries and exports that contribute to widening the gap between CDI outputs and the EU perceptions.

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