Abstract

This paper maps the landscape of non-DAC cooperation providers with the view of understanding how they engage in development cooperation. This is done in three parts. First, using qualitative information compiled primarily from country sources, we map the current cooperation priorities of 54 non-DAC providers that were identified as having formal institutions for managing outward development cooperation. Our data provides a snapshot of the volumes, modalities, and sectoral and regional priorities of non-DAC providers, highlighting differences across cooperation providers at different levels of income. Second, we complement our mapping with five short case studies that provide a brief history of how the cooperation programs of five provider countries—Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates—developed over time, with a focus on mapping changes in cooperation priorities and understanding the contexts that inform shifting trends. These cases highlight the influence of political and economic contexts on how countries cooperate—including where cooperation is targeted and how much is provided—as well as the specific international spaces for development dialogue through which they engage. Third, we develop a simple framework for identifying differences in the degree to which providers are willing to partner through shared spaces and activities for development, identifying four broad groups of non-DAC cooperation providers that differ in terms of their openness to multi-partner cooperation for development and capacity to engage. We measure “openness” using a novel composite indicator that captures participation in international forums, reporting development data to shared repositories, participation in triangular cooperation, and contributions to multilateral and regional institutions. Our analysis shows that most non-DAC providers show openness to multi-partner engagement for development, however, whether and how such openness can be transformed into more active cooperation—if not deeper collaboration—for development, including between DAC and non-DAC actors, remains to be seen.
How Do Non-DAC Actors Cooperate on Development?

Rachael Calleja, Beata Cichocka, and Sara Casadevall Bellés

Center for Global Development

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Executive summary

Over the past years, the number of development co-operation actors has proliferated, particularly from countries outside of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD’s) Development Assistance Committee (DAC). These actors bring diverse skills, knowledge, and resources to support development challenges, presenting new opportunities to deepen progress towards the shared UN 2030 Agenda through learning from diverse cross-actor expertise. However, despite the global nature of development challenges, which extend beyond the capacities of any country working alone, collaboration across different cooperation providers—particularly across DAC and non-DAC countries—remains weak, raising questions around what potential barriers to cooperation exist, and how opportunities for deeper cross-actor cooperation for development can be created.

As a starting place for identifying shared priorities and opportunities for deepening cross-provider partnerships for development, this paper maps the landscape of non-DAC cooperation providers to understand how they cooperate. We begin by identifying the 54 non-DAC countries with institutions for managing outward or “dual” development cooperation and gather data on the modalities, sectors, and target regions of cooperation, giving particular attention to how patterns differ across providers by income level and region. To complement the breadth of this mapping, we draw on longitudinal insights from five case studies—Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates. Through both exercises, we observe that providers’ income levels tend to inform their choices of cooperation modalities, sectors, and partners, with middle and lower-income providers more likely to prioritize regional partners and utilize non-financial instruments than higher income countries, which tend to have a more global reach and provide both financial and technical resources. Despite fluctuations in regional priorities over time, our analysis revealed a primarily intra-regional pattern in current non-DAC cooperation, with 89% of non-DAC providers cooperating within their own region; although, sub-Saharan Africa remained the most frequently targeted region overall. Moreover, where available, time series analysis highlights the longer-term volatility in cooperation volumes for case study countries, suggesting a potential link with domestic economic performance and highlighting the inherent multidimensionality of cooperation which cannot be unstitched from domestic and regional geopolitics. The cases also reveal shifting preferences around partnerships over time, with involvement in multilateral development forums seeming to ebb and flow alongside the changing practical and political benefits of participation. Taken together, these findings could have implications for non-DAC providers’ willingness and ability to participate in development partnerships.

Our paper culminates in a simple and dynamic two-by-two framework for illustrating key differences between non-DAC providers along two axes, with the vertical axis representing financial capacity for cooperation as proxied by income per capita, and the horizontal axis representing willingness to partner with others through shared development spaces and joint activities. To assess the latter dimension, we develop a four-point composite indicator for proxying “openness”
to multi-partner engagements, which we conceptualize as a function of (1) participation in international development forums at both the OECD and UN, (2) reporting development cooperation spending to international repositories, (3) participation in triangular cooperation, and (4) voluntary contributions to multilateral or regional development bodies. We find that most non-DAC providers are willing to engage in beyond-bilateral partnerships for development, with 32 of the 54 non-DAC providers scoring at least two of the four possible points for “openness”. Mapping the “openness to multi-partner engagement” measure against providers’ “capacity” for cooperation reveals four main categories of non-DAC providers situated within the resulting scatterplot:

1. **Higher-income, higher-openness countries**: The providers participate actively in shared development forums and, in theory, have the financial resources to engage in a diverse array of cooperation activities and types of partnerships for development. This quadrant notably includes all the Gulf providers, which engage in forums for development dialogue, contribute to multilateral and regional development institutions, and report cooperation flows to international repositories.

2. **Lower-income, higher-openness countries**: This densely populated quadrant includes lower- or middle-income which are active in international spaces for development yet may have fewer financial or human resources available to dedicate to deepening partnerships for development cooperation. This category sees a strong showing of Latin American providers alongside counterparts from Central Asia and the Caucasus (Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan), North Africa (Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt), and East Asia (Indonesia and Thailand), as well as South Africa and Türkiye; Türkiye receives the highest openness score across all actors included in our sample.

3. **Lower-income, lower-openness countries**: These are lower- or middle-income countries that likely engage in development cooperation largely through bilateral channels rather than through shared forums for cooperation, or that engage in cooperation sporadically. This group is regionally, politically, and economically diverse, yet most are united facing domestic challenges contributing to institutional or social fragility (including Comoros, Iraq, Palestine, and Venezuela), or by low democratic qualities (including China, Cuba, Vietnam, and Russia).

4. **Higher-income, lower-openness countries**: These providers engage in and through specific cooperation forums. This group primarily includes EU member countries that have not joined the OECD-DAC (Croatia, Malta, and Cyprus), non-EU European city-states (Andorra, Monaco, and Liechtenstein), as well as two of the less populous but relatively prosperous East Asian providers (Singapore and Taiwan).

Overall, our findings suggest that although many non-DAC providers appear receptive to exploring cross-provider partnerships, it is unclear how their “openness” translates into successful collaborations in practice and ultimately accelerate action towards a more global development paradigm.
1. Introduction

The number of countries providing more visible and substantial levels of development cooperation has increased considerably in recent years. Termed a "silent revolution," the proliferation of development actors, particularly from countries outside of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD’s) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), has expanded the international constituency for development at a time when the global nature of development challenges requires broader engagement in response. Indeed, the skills, knowledge, and resources contributed by new—and long-standing—non-DAC providers bring differentiated approaches for tackling development challenges and provide deepening opportunities for leveraging and learning from the diverse cross-actor expertise to deepen progress toward the shared 2030 Agenda.

The challenge, however, is that the ability to learn from the wide-ranging experience and expertise found across DAC and non-DAC cooperation providers first requires development actors to have the willingness, capacity, and opportunity to engage in cooperation for development outcomes. So far, while there have been several bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral cooperation initiatives of various sizes and success, they have not become mainstream ways of working across older divides. Instead, it seems that DAC and non-DAC actors have tended to operate in largely separate international spaces, including in response to acute and global development challenges, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, with limited opportunities for engagement across actors both to build on each other’s strengths and utilize the knowledge available to support development outcomes. In this context, there are critical questions about why DACs and non-DACs still have such limited collaboration on development—including when working toward shared development goals—what potential barriers to cooperation exist, and how opportunities for deeper cross-actor cooperation for development can be created.

Part of the challenge facing cooperation between DAC and non-DAC actors is likely that the heterogeneity within either group makes it difficult to identify potential overlap of strategic interests or priorities, as well as differences in the willingness and capacity to collaborate on development issues. In particular, non-DAC providers encompass a diverse, and rapidly changing, range of countries, raising questions about how, on what, and to what degree collaboration might be possible. Such questions are amplified given that much of the current evidence on non-DAC cooperation is now dated, with many key cross-country studies of the non-DAC development landscape conducted

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in the early 2010s. In this context, and in light of the continued proliferation of non-DAC cooperation providers, re-examining questions of who non-DAC cooperation providers are and how they currently cooperate can provide a snapshot of the current development landscape and a starting place for considering opportunities for deeper collaboration across different types of development actors.

This paper explores how non-DAC cooperation providers cooperate on development to understand both what non-DAC actors do and the types of development partnerships they typically engage in with other providers. To do so, we adopt a three-pronged approach. First, we conduct a broad mapping exercise to identify the landscape of non-DAC cooperation providers—which we define as countries that are non-DAC members with an institution for managing outward development cooperation—and to analyze similarities and trends in the type of engagement they provide. Second, we conduct five short case studies designed to provide a longitudinal overview of the development of cooperation programs in Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates. We use these cases to contextualize and explain key findings from our mapping, by digging into the factors that contribute to the transformation of outward cooperation programs over time and the venues for collaboration on development that countries prioritized. Third, this paper culminates by developing a broad framework for understanding differences in a country’s capacity and openness to partnerships for development cooperation through shared spaces for development discourse and action. To do so, we develop a composite measure to proxy “openness” to multi-partner engagement for development, which captures participation in international forums for development dialogue, international repositories for development finance data, triangular cooperation, and voluntary contributions to multilateral and regional organizations.

Our study finds that across the 54 non-DAC providers included in our sample, there are some similarities in the types of cooperation provided by actors within the same income group and region. We find that both income and domestic political factors influence how countries cooperate, with income appearing as a particularly strong determinant of modality choice, while political and economic factors influence cooperation volumes and the forums utilized for mini-lateral or multilateral cooperation on development. Ultimately, our analysis shows that most non-DAC providers are open to cooperation; however, there remain questions about persistent barriers and whether current spaces for collaboration are equipped to both attract broad participation and meaningfully support better development action. Such questions are particularly acute in a global political context where deepening divides—including in response to the ongoing crisis in Ukraine—have once again made political factors an unavoidable element of global governance.

This paper is the second in a series that explores the role of non-DAC actors within a changing development landscape and asks how to foster deeper collaboration for development across DAC and non-DAC development cooperation providers. It builds on our first paper, which explored non-DAC responses to COVID-19 and the degree to which DAC and non-DAC members collaborated in response to this acute global challenge and found limited evidence of cooperation for development across these actors—although there are nonetheless important examples of some influence and success.\textsuperscript{4} The mapping exercise conducted in this study, provides the basis for our third paper, which will take a closer look at the barriers and opportunities for cooperation across DAC and non-DAC providers on issues of global development, and is expected to be published in Fall 2023.

\subsection*{1.1 Scope and key definitions}

For the purpose of this study, our population of interest is “non-DAC cooperation providers,” which we understand to be any non-DAC country that has institutionalized responsibility for outward, or inward and outward (i.e., “dual”), cooperation for development. While “non-DAC” is an imperfect term, we use it as a deliberate alternative to “emerging donor,” for which there is no single definition or clear boundary (Box 1). This means that inclusion in the group is based on the presence of some form of institution or organizational arrangement for managing outward cooperation, which assumes dedicated staff and some element of strategy and policy direction.

\textbf{BOX 1. Challenges defining “emerging” cooperation providers}

The academic literature presents at least two distinct definitions of “emerging” cooperation providers, each of which is limited in its ability to clearly articulate the countries included in the categorization.

\textit{Definition 1: “Emerging” providers as “new” cooperation providers}

The first understanding defines “emerging” providers by their supposed newness as cooperation providers.\textsuperscript{5} However, this definition both fails to provide clear parameters for inclusion (i.e. how “new” should cooperation providers be to be called “emerging”) and ignores long histories of outward cooperation from some countries—such as, China, Russia, or Kuwait—which began providing cooperation over half a century ago, around the same time as early DAC members.\textsuperscript{6}

\textsuperscript{4} Calleja et al., “A Global Development Paradigm for a World in Crisis”
Definition 2: “Emerging” providers as growing economic or political powers

The second understanding defines “emerging” providers based on their geopolitical and economic status as an emerging power or market. However, this definition lacks clarity concerning the level of growth or power sufficient to warrant inclusion within the “emerging” category and may overlook the contributions of smaller countries providing cooperation even at lower income levels, such as Cuba.

Due to this lack of conceptual clarity, we consider the term “emerging” to be functionally meaningless and refrain from its use.

We link our definition of non-DAC cooperation providers to institutionalization for both theoretical and practical reasons. Theoretically, institutionalization is a useful proxy for understanding a government’s commitment to engaging in development activity over the longer term. At the most basic level, institutionalizing development cooperation requires governments to invest in structures and staff to manage outward engagement, suggesting that there must be a high-enough government commitment to development to justify an investment in institutional capacity to design and implement development programs. Put differently, institutionalization signals both the government’s ongoing commitment to development as part of its regular function, as well as an expectation that this function will remain for the foreseeable future; if development were seen as an ad hoc or short-term engagement, the incentive to create institutions and hire staff to manage cooperation would be low. In this way, focusing on countries that have institutionalized capacities for development cooperation provides a sample that has shown a relatively substantive commitment to engaging in development and building cooperation over the long term.

In practice, this definition allows us to distinguish between countries that consider development a regular function of government and those that engage in cooperation on an ad-hoc basis (e.g., providing in-kind or financial support to neighboring countries in response to crises). While ad-hoc cooperation remains an important form of exchange, focusing on countries most actively engaged in outward cooperation, and which have an institutional arrangement for managing cooperation exchange, ensures that our analysis highlights findings relevant to countries that are the best placed—and perhaps most likely—to cooperate on development issues.

For the purpose of this exercise, we do not differentiate between different types of organizational structures for managing cooperation, and use the term ‘agency’ to cover all organizational forms including dedicated agencies (such as the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, TIKA), units within a government ministry that are responsible for managing outward cooperation.

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7 Walz and Ramachandran (2011), for example, define emerging donors as “growing nations with strong economies that are increasing their international footprint through many channels, including foreign assistance,” while Rowlands openly draws the link to “emerging markets.” See also: Dane Rowlands, “Emerging Donors in International Development Assistance: Synthesis Report.”
(such as Argentina’s Directorate General of International Cooperation within Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship), and agencies responsible for setting strategic direction and coordinating development action across other government actors (such as China’s International Development Cooperation Agency, CIDCA). While future work could seek to map and study the types of structures used by non-DAC providers, we view this analysis as beyond the scope of our current exercise. A full description of the method used to identify these agencies and a brief analysis of the population is available in Box 2.

BOX 2. Approach to mapping non-DAC development agencies

To identify the countries that have established an organizational structure for managing outward cooperation, we used a two-step approach.

First, we utilized pre-existing lists of countries with development institutions, drawing particularly from the work of Budjan and Fuchs (2021), who developed a database on “aid donorship” across 114 countries using data obtained through a survey that asked respondents to identify whether their country had an institution for managing cooperation and when it was established. Data compiled from this survey are public and provide the names of the organizations reported by responding agencies; as far as we are aware, this database provides the most complete picture of countries with development agencies currently available. To ensure that the agencies identified met our definition for inclusion, we reviewed agency websites to verify that they provide outward cooperation on a regular basis or have a mandate to provide or coordinate outward South–South cooperation. As a result of this secondary review, we dropped five countries—Angola, Djibouti, Iran, Mongolia, and South Sudan—from Budjan and Fuchs’ list of cooperation providers.

8 For DAC providers, there is extensive literature examining the different types of organizational arrangements for managing development cooperation across providers and over time (see Chang et al., 2000; Gulrajani, 2018; 2020), as well as on how different organizational arrangements affect cooperation (see Calleja et al., 2016; Gulrajani, 2012; 2018). Similar research across non-DAC actors is, to our knowledge, currently unavailable yet could provide an important extension of the analysis.

9 See Angelika Budjan and Andreas Fuchs, “Democracy and Aid Donorship,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 13, no. 4 (2021): 217–238. This survey identified 75 countries with institutions for managing development, including the 30 DAC members. Using the technical annexes for this paper, we sourced information for approximately 41 non-DAC cooperation providers.

10 In some cases, our secondary review could not verify that the agencies identified by Budjan and Fuchs survey were currently responsible for providing outward cooperation. For instance, while Budjan and Fuchs identified Angola, Djibouti, Mongolia, and South Sudan as having a development agency, we could not find evidence that in Angola (Cooperation and Partnerships Angola) and Djibouti (Ministry of External Affairs and International Cooperation) have a mandate or regular function for programming or managing outward development cooperation. Instead, both agencies appear to be responsible for managing relations with provider countries and coordinating inward action. Additionally, we exclude Mongolia from our analysis, as the International Cooperation Fund identified in Budjan and Fuchs’ work was closed in 2019 (see Unurzul, 2019), and South Sudan, as we could not find evidence to verify the function of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in outward cooperation. Additionally, we excluded Iran’s Organization for Investment, Economic, and Technical Assistance (OIEETA) from our sample due to a lack of information about the agency’s outward cooperation.
Second, to ensure that our list captured any new non-DAC cooperation agencies emerging since Budjan and Fuchs’ survey, or agencies not captured by their list, we conducted internet research covering all non-DAC countries to identify new or existing institutions for outward cooperation. We supplemented this search with a review of relevant secondary literature (academic literature, grey literature, and media sources) to identify potential institutions not captured through other means. Through this search, we identified several other non-DAC development agencies from countries including Algeria, Andorra, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Indonesia, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Palestine, Rwanda, and Vietnam. We also identified several countries where there was evidence of regular outward engagement and/or plans to institutionalize, but where we were unable to verify whether an institutional unit for outward cooperation had been established.

This method identified 54 non-DAC countries with an institution for managing outward development cooperation, spanning all regions and income groups (see Figures 1a and 1b, respectively; a full list of these countries and the names of their cooperation institutions is found in Annex 1). The non-DAC development agencies identified span all major regional groupings (using the World Bank classification). The largest group of non-DAC cooperation providers appear to reside in Latin America and the Caribbean (27%), followed by Europe and Central Asia (24%), and the Middle East and North Africa (22%). Smaller numbers of providers are identified from East Asia and the Pacific (15%), Sub-Saharan Africa (7%), and South Asia (4%). Most non-DAC development agencies were from upper-middle-income countries (37%) and high-income non-DAC members (33%), together accounting for 70% of the identified population. Of the remaining 30%, the bulk were from lower-middle-income countries, while Rwanda is the sole low-income country with a development agency (Rwanda Cooperation) identified in our list.

\[\text{In addition, we identified Technical Cooperation Directorates in both Guinea and Senegal, however, we could not find information to verify whether these agencies were responsible for outward cooperation. As a result, we did not include either in our list. Similarly, we excluded several other countries on the basis that we could not find clear evidence of an institutionalized development function (Bahrain, Bolivia, Botswana, Kenya, Panama, and Paraguay). In the case of Bahrain, while we found clear evidence that it engages in South–South cooperation, we could not determine the institutional focal point for these efforts. For Botswana, we excluded it on the basis that we could not verify that an institutional approach for managing SSC has been formalized, despite reports that institutionalizing the role of its Foreign Ministry would feature in its 2019 South–South cooperation Strategy (Calleja and Prizzon, 2019). Similarly, while Kenya has long engaged in SSC, it is excluded on the basis that a recent report noted that Kenya “needs technical and financial support to...establish an institution to manage SSC” (UNDP and NEPAD, 2019, p. 12). For Bolivia, Panama and Paraguay, while there is evidence that each provide some cooperation, we could not identify institutions with a mandate for managing outward flows, with relevant government websites noting that they manage inward cooperation.}\]
In line with our previous work, we use the terms DAC and non-DAC as a technical distinction between countries that are members of the OECD-DAC and those that are not. We acknowledge that the “DAC/non-DAC” terminology is problematic in two ways. First, this terminology functionally defines non-DAC countries by what they are not, and it implicitly sets the DAC as the “reference point” for comparison against non-DAC members, potentially normalizing the DAC’s power as a result. Second, the terminology falsely implies both a clear division between DAC and non-DAC members and a sense of commonality within either group. In practice, countries vary considerably in terms of their closeness with the DAC—countries with OECD membership, countries that are on the path to DAC membership, or those that report to the OECD-DAC but remain non-members, can be seen as more open to DAC engagement and standards than those which have remained outside such systems—and cannot be considered homogenous within either the DAC or non-DAC grouping. Despite these challenges, we rely on the DAC/non-DAC terminology due to its technical simplicity and clarity relative to alternative terms.

1.2 Structure of this paper

Our analysis will proceed in five parts. First, we define and identify the full spectrum of non-DAC development agencies to outline our data set and highlight the countries that engage in regular outward development cooperation. Second, we briefly describe the history of South–South cooperation to provide a broad overview of the long-term engagement by non-DAC actors as partners in development and to highlight major trends in non-DAC cooperation over time. Third, using a combination of desk and survey research, we map the cooperation landscape of non-DAC providers to understand how they cooperate (where, on what, and how). To further probe findings from the mapping exercise and identify the factors that contribute to openness to collaboration, the fourth...
section presents five short case studies that track the development of cooperation programs from five countries—Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates—over time. The fifth section presents our framework for understanding differences in a country’s capacity and openness to multi-partner engagements for development. A final section highlights main takeaways from the analysis, emphasizing implications for partnerships and opportunities for collaboration.

2. Background: A brief history of non-DAC cooperation

This section provides a brief historical overview of cooperation provided by non-DAC development actors, with a particular focus on the emergence and development of South–South Cooperation (SSC)—a key cooperation modality for non-DAC providers based on the common principle of mutual benefit and often understood as an alternative to the vertical relationships inherent in official development assistance (ODA). While we understand that the diversity of non-DAC cooperation providers means that SSC might not drive cooperation for all countries, and that some may identify (and act) in more similar ways to ODA providers, the SSC ethos remains a critical impetus for the cooperation efforts of many non-DAC countries. As such, exploring what SSC is and how it evolved provides a starting place for understanding the principles underlying non-DAC cooperation and how it shapes engagement on development issues. Broadly, our history of non-DAC cooperation covers three main periods: (1) emergence and early scale-up of cooperation (1950s–1970s); (2) stagnation and decline (1980s–1990s); and (3) re-emergence and rapid expansion (2000s–present).

We caution that this short history is necessarily unable to capture all aspects of SSC—which includes cooperation beyond direct development flows—such as favorable trade agreements and political engagement. Moreover, our main source of financial data on non-DAC cooperation is sourced from various OECD-DAC reporting, as it provides a compiled source of historical data on non-DAC cooperation not found elsewhere, making it useful for mapping changes in cooperation flows over time. However, this data necessarily fails to capture all SSC activity, some of which is not monetized and is limited to the countries that have flows reported to various DAC systems.14

Phase 1: Emergence of SSC and early scale-up of non-DAC cooperation (1950s–1970s)

Cooperation from non-DAC providers emerged when SSC was conceptualized as a movement designed to build solidarity across actors from the “South” and “challenge the vertical relations between colony and metropole” that were seen as undermining Southern autonomy and

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14 See Calleja et al. “A Global Development Paradigm for a World in Crisis” for a fuller description of the challenges of using DAC figures for non-DAC actors. See Annex 3 for data on which countries currently report development spending to the OECD-DAC.
international justice in the post-colonial period.\textsuperscript{15} Formulated during the 1955 Bandung Conference, which brought together leaders from 29 Asian and African countries to discuss pressing issues for these (primarily) newly independent states, the conference promoted SSC in the form of technical cooperation based on the principles of “mutual interest and respect for national sovereignty” as a way to strengthen state capacities.\textsuperscript{16} As a result, the “Bandung Spirit” came to represent the political anti-imperialist dimensions of SSC, which include policies of non-interference and nonalignment, as well as solidarity to challenge global inequality and lessen dependence on the global North.\textsuperscript{17}

In the years that followed, momentum continued to build behind South–South cooperation, which was further entrenched with the creation of the Group of 77 (G77) in 1964 and later with the 1974 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), both of which promoted economic and political cooperation with the aim of deepening self-reliance of newly independent states.\textsuperscript{18} Such momentum reached a peak during the 1978 Global South Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries held in Argentina, when 138 countries adopted the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA), which urged countries to strengthen SSC—primarily via technical cooperation—to support deepening links between national and collective self-reliance. In doing so, BAPA not only reinforced many of the principles of the Bandung Conference but also further refined the SSC concept by introducing the term “horizontal cooperation” to define SSC as cooperation between “developing” countries.\textsuperscript{19} This horizontal orientation also served to distinguish SSC from the “vertical” form of North–South cooperation undertaken by the OECD-DAC.

Alongside the emergence of SSC, this period also saw the rise of early programming from several groups of non-DAC cooperation providers. Notably, OECD Development Cooperation Reports from the 1970s highlight cooperation from four main groups of non-DAC providers active over the period: (1) members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); (2) “communist countries grouped in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance” (CMEA); (3) non-DAC countries that where OECD members but had not yet joined the DAC (e.g., Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain); and (4) LDC providers (at the time), including Argentina, Brazil, China, India, and Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{20}


\textsuperscript{16} Esteves and Assunção, “South–South Cooperation and the International Development Battlefield.”

\textsuperscript{17} Gray and Gills, “South–South Cooperation and the Rise of the Global South;” Esteves and Assunção, “South–South Cooperation and the International Development Battlefield.”


Of these provider groupings, OPEC actors—including Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela—collectively emerged as a large non-DAC cooperation bloc throughout the 1970s as a result of rising oil prices over the period. Collectively, this group contributed roughly 30 percent of total bilateral ODA flows between 1974 and 1979 (see Figure 2), most of which were geographically concentrated in the Arab region. The second largest non-DAC group—CMEA actors that supported other communist countries—provided roughly 10 percent of total bilateral flows over the decade, while smaller amounts were provided by non-DAC/OECD members and other LDC providers. While OPEC providers, CMEA actors, and non-DAC/OECD members provided financial cooperation to partner countries, LDC actors tended to engage via a mixture of modalities, with a heavier emphasis on technical assistance, food aid, and emergency assistance.

**FIGURE 2. Bilateral ODA flows by provider type, 1970–1979**

Source: Authors’ analysis is based on data from the OECD’s 1985 Development Cooperation Review, Table VI-2, p. 162. Data only includes figures referenced under the “Official Development Assistance” subcategory.

Note: The OECD cautions that figures for CMEA and LDC providers may lack comparability due in part to the understanding that their cooperation is based on “mutual benefit and not aid.” As a result, data in this figure should be considered illustrative of the proportional investment of non-DAC providers rather than perfect accounting.

**Phase 2: Decline and stagnation (1980s–1990s)**

The 1980s saw a marked shift in the international energy for cooperation—and SSC—that had dominated the prior decades, with enthusiasm for cooperation declining over the period. Driven in part by the 1980s debt crisis and the subsequent rise of neoliberalism, the period saw a decline in the "revisionist impetus" that had driven the rise of SSC as an alternative to North–South dynamics and instead witnessed the "consolidation of the international development field through the defeat

21 Of these actors, the largest providers appeared to be Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Kuwait.
23 This period also saw stagnating ODA flows from DAC members.
of the NIEO program.”²⁴ Practically, the economic crisis dominating the decade resulted in declining cooperation volumes from non-DAC providers, largely due to a significant drop in flows from OPEC providers alongside the declining price of oil.²⁵ Indeed, figures compiled from OECD Development Cooperation Reports show that ODA from OPEC countries fell from more than US$9 billion in 1980 to US$1.5 billion by 1989, with some providers (Nigeria, Venezuela, and Iran) cutting cooperation almost completely over the decade.²⁶ Yet despite this broad decline, some countries—notably Korea and Taiwan—established development agencies toward the end of the decade, while most countries—including China and India—maintained some cooperation over the period, albeit at reduced levels.²⁷

Similar trends continued throughout the 1990s, when development engagements from DAC and non-DACs alike seemingly stalled. On SSC, the 1990s saw international spaces that had previously been seen as “counter-hegemonic” institutions for supporting Southern solidarity, such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), become less confrontational toward North–South dynamics.²⁸ Similarly, while South–South cooperation continued during the period—Chile and Türkiye, for instance, both established agencies to engage in South–South cooperation throughout the decade²⁹—the momentum behind the agenda and its distinctive drive for independence from the DAC seemingly waned in the interim. More broadly, substantive political shifts in the global landscape—including the end of the Cold War—led to a further decline in cooperation from non-DAC countries, particularly from Eastern European providers, with DAC providers allocating a larger share of total reported cooperation flows by the end of the decade.³⁰

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²⁵ The OECD’s 1988 Development Cooperation Report notes that in 1987, flows from Iran became negative, while flows from Nigeria and Venezuela decreased sharply, meaning that “OPEC” resources were, from then onward, primarily provided by Arab OPEC members only.
²⁶ Data points were compiled manually from OECD Development Cooperation Reviews and, as such, are reported in current prices.
Phase 3: Re-emergence and rapid expansion (2000s–present)

By the 2000s, momentum returned to SSC during a third phase, marked by “new energy, new actors, and new practices”31 and an “unprecedented” rise in the scale of cooperation among non-DAC partners compared to the previous two decades.32 Driven by strong economic growth in many non-DAC countries throughout the 1990s, especially among the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and the G20, the early 21st century saw a renewed focus on SSC alongside the shifting global balance of wealth and influence, which was becoming increasingly polycentric.33 For instance, between 2000 and 2020, the number of non-DAC actors that established institutions to manage outward cooperation spiked, with 24 countries establishing development institutions over the period (see Figure 3). Similarly, while it is difficult to meaningfully assess the volume of SSC across countries, ODA-style spending disbursed by non-DACs that report to the OECD also increased over the period, from US$1.5 billion in 2000 to a peak of almost US$22 billion in 2014, fluctuating considerably in the years that followed and reaching US$17.2 billion in the most recent year (see Figure 4).34 Others have similarly pointed to increases in different types of South–South engagement over the period, noting sharp increases in intra-South trade, which grew from US$2.6 trillion in 2007 to US$4.5 trillion in 2017 (valued at more than a quarter of all global trade).35 Similarly, South–South foreign direct investment (FDI) has also increased, growing from an inward stock valued at US$2.5 trillion in 2009 to US$6.2 trillion by 2019, which represents almost half of the total inward investment stock in developing countries.36

34 Data sourced from OECD Creditor Reporting System DAC1 Table. Data reports net ODA disbursements in constant 2020 prices. Over this period, the number of countries reporting to the OECD DAC increased from six to 20 (excluding an “other donor countries” category that was blank throughout the entire period). While this means that the growth in ODA flows over the period could be driven by new reporting agencies, they appear to provide only a small share of the total flows ($504 million in 2018; roughly 3% of non-DAC total).
Alongside growing SSC volumes throughout the 2000s and 2010s, the visibility of non-DAC cooperation was also heightened. Perhaps most notably, the growing importance of SSC and development actors beyond the traditional DAC members was recognized in the 2011 Busan Agreement, which brought together for the first time a diverse group of development actors.

Figure 3. Number of non-DACs that established institutions to manage outward or “dual” cooperation, by year of first institutionalization

Source: Authors’ analysis based on the year of “first aid institution” reported by Budjan and Fuchs (2021) and updated using secondary sources to account for new cooperation providers. We only include dates of first institutionalization for the countries included in our sample.37

Figure 4. Net ODA disbursements from non-DAC countries reporting to the DAC, 2000–2021

Source: Data is sourced from the OECD’s DAC1 database, accessed February 2023.

37 Figure excludes Andorra, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Pakistan and Vietnam, for which we could not find dates of institutionalization.
including non-DAC countries, to discuss and agree to principles of effective cooperation. Indeed, the Busan Agreement broadened the scope and language of development effectiveness from one focused exclusively on “aid” to a broader agenda that covered diverse forms of “development cooperation,” including SSC. Above all, non-DAC participants demonstrated their agency by insisting on the voluntary nature of their agreements. In the years that followed, SSC became a normal part of development cooperation dialogues—some 115 international meetings over the 2010s included SSC on the agenda—and is “explicitly acknowledged as an important contributor to the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals.” As such, SSC has increasingly been included in new spaces for development dialogue, such as the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation and the UN’s Development Cooperation Forum, which were partly designed to create more inclusive spaces for development cooperation beyond the ODA-focused DAC. The growing prominence of SSC has also led to “ideational” growth in recent years, with some arguing that key narratives and principles of SSC—such as the logic of explicitly using cooperation for “win–wins” and “mutual interest,” and a growing focus on the value of infrastructure—have been adopted by DAC providers, bringing the groups closer together in terms of ideas around development actions, as well as through spaces for shared dialogue. Taken together, the material growth of SSC, its ideational transfer, and the growing legitimacy of SSC within development cooperation discourses demonstrate the prominence of non-DAC actors—and the cooperation they provide—as an increasingly mainstream part of the development cooperation landscape.

3. Mapping cooperation from non-DAC cooperation providers

This section presents a qualitative mapping of how non-DAC cooperation providers engage in development. The aim is to present an updated picture of the cooperation offered by non-DAC providers, with the view of highlighting key trends in how non-DACs cooperate across the current landscape. The value of this analysis is its breadth, which provides a snapshot of current non-DAC cooperation.  

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42 This, however, worked better in theory than in practice. See Debapriya Bhattacharya and Sarah Sabin Khan, “Rethinking Development Effectiveness: Perspectives from the Global South,” Southern Voice Occasional Paper Series no. 59 (Southern Voice, 2020). For some, the intent of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) was likely not to create new and equal spaces, but rather to coopt the non-DAC partners into new but essentially Northern-led forums (Abdenur and Fonseca 2013).
cooperation and a starting place for understanding the similarities and differences that currently exist across the diverse non-DAC group.

### 3.1 Mapping methodology

Our mapping exercise covers the population of non-DAC cooperation providers we have identified (see Box 2), and compiles information on three key questions related to bilateral cooperation: (1) How much do non-DAC countries provide and through which channels? (2) Where do non-DAC providers engage and in which sectors? and (3) Which cooperation modalities do non-DAC providers utilize?

To answer these questions for each non-DAC cooperation provider, we conducted a desk review utilizing two key types of sources. First, we reviewed the websites of each non-DAC development agency, as well as relevant strategy or policy documents to gather information on key cooperation priorities direct from provider sources. For information available in languages other than English, French, and Spanish, documents and webpages were translated using online translation tools. In rare cases where non-DAC development agencies did not have a website (such as Algeria), or where we could not find relevant information through the agency’s online materials, we conducted a broader search of news articles and secondary literature. Second, we examined the “Development Profiles” of the OECD’s 2022 Development Cooperation Report (DCR) for the 28 non-DAC providers for which data is available.

The development profiles include data on the country’s development policy, institutional arrangement, and estimates of cooperation flows reported to the DAC. As such, the development profiles provide a consistent source of information across many of the key dimensions included in our mapping, which is publicly available and accessible in English. A full list of the key sources and data used in our mapping exercise, by agency, is available in Annex 2.

As with any exercise that compiles and compares information across a broad group of actors, this qualitative mapping has several limitations:

1. **Incomplete data**: While we have attempted to be systematic in reviewing materials across all non-DAC development agencies, including by searching for documentation in provider languages, it is possible that some materials may have been missed. In particular, financial data on non-DAC cooperation is notoriously patchy due to a combination of factors, including difficulty defining, valuing, and accounting SSC, political resistance to SSC measurement, and some reluctance to reveal cooperation values to domestic constituents.  

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44 DCR data was sourced for: Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Brazil, Chile, China, Chinese Taipei, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, India, Indonesia, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Malta, Mexico, Qatar, Peru, Romania, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates.  
2. **Rhetoric versus reality:** By focusing our analysis on strategic documents and agency websites, we focus on how agencies say they cooperate. In reality, in-year resource allocations may be influenced by any number of factors, including the need to respond to external shocks, partner requests or other partner country-specific factors. While this means that how providers cooperate could differ from their strategic priorities, for the purpose of this study, understanding the medium-term priorities of agencies provides a clearer foundation for considering opportunities for collaboration than actual allocations.

3. **Breadth over depth:** By design, this exercise is better at highlighting key trends in the development landscape than explaining why such trends are occurring; in essence, the mapping is necessarily a mile wide and an inch deep. To account for this limitation in the explanatory power of our mapping, we complement this exercise case studies to provide additional narrative context.

### 3.2 How much do non-DAC countries provide and through which channels?

Across non-DAC cooperation providers, quantified values of development cooperation were available for 32 of 54 countries and show that volumes of cooperation vary considerable across actors (Figure 5; see Annex 3 for volumes of cooperation by country).

**FIGURE 5. Histogram of non-DAC provider countries by annual volume of cooperation**

![Histogram of non-DAC provider countries by annual volume of cooperation](image)

Source: Data compiled from a combination of OECD and country-reporting sources (see Annex 3). In all cases, data reflects the latest year for which information is available.

Of the countries for which data is available, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia were the largest providers in the most recent year (allocating $7.7 billion and $7.4 billion respectively in 2021; for Saudi Arabia, spending this high appears exceptional and driven by a $5 billion allocation to Egypt in 2021.)
In the two-years prior, Saudi Arabia’s spending has been closer to $2 billion, per year. In addition, four other non-DAC providers—China, India, Russia and the UAE—also allocated more than $1 billion in development cooperation in the most recent year for which data is available. Unsurprisingly, these large non-DAC cooperation providers are also among the biggest economic powers, with all (except the UAE) acting as G20 members. Amongst the rest of providers, eight allocated between $100 million and $1 billion, six had cooperation flows between $50 million and $100 million, eight reported cooperation volumes valued between US$10–50 million, three allocated between $1 and $10 million, while Andorra was the smallest provider, reporting a budget under $1 million.

Across non-DAC providers, the bulk of cooperation (roughly 83%) appears to be allocated bilaterally (Figure 6). However, average figures mask stark differences in the use of multilateral channels across actors. For instance, Eastern European providers typically report a much higher average use of the multilateral system, primarily due to mandatory contributions to the European Union (EU). In 2021, five Eastern European providers (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Romania) allocated less than 30% of reported cooperation via bilateral channels. By contrast, each of the four Arab providers—Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE—allocated 90% or more of their cooperation bilaterally in the same year. In between, Latin American providers—Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico—appeared to allocate the majority of flows multilaterally, albeit to different degrees. Of these countries, Brazil stands out, particularly in contrast to other BRICS actors which tend to engage proportionally more through bilateral channels. Indeed, the BRICS countries show substantial variation in terms of the channels utilized, with the largest providers (China, India and Russia) relying more heavily on bilateral channels than Brazil and South Africa. In the case of China, India and South Africa, a sizable share of multilateral cooperation was channelled to regional institutions or development banks, notably the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) for China and India, and the African Union for South Africa, while Brazil and Russia allocated multilateral cooperation primarily to UN agencies.

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46 Figures for Türkiye and Saudi Arabia are sourced from the OECD’s DAC1 dataset and reflect grant equivalents in current prices.
48 Estonia also reports high use of the multilateral system, yet to a lesser degree, allocating 59% of ODA multilaterally in 2021.
49 Mexico’s contributions to international organizations include those to the UNDP, which uses the funds to support institutional strengthening within AMEXCID (see Calleja and Prizzon, 2019).
FIGURE 6. Shares of cooperation from non-DAC providers by channel

Source: Authors’ analysis. Data for Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Thailand, Türkiye, and the UAE are sourced from the OECD’s DAC1 dataset and reflect 2021 allocation flows. Data for Chile, China, Costa Rica, India, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa were sourced from the OECD’s 2021 Development Cooperation Profiles and reflect 2019 data. Data for Brazil was taken from the IPEA’s 2019–2020 COBRADI report, which publishes data on Brazil’s development cooperation, and reports figures for 2020. Data for Mexico was sourced from “Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo otorgada por México en 2019”, available on the AMEXCID website.

Note: Non-DAC average reports the share of spending allocated by bilateral and multilateral channels based on the sum of total reported spending by non-DAC countries.

Where do non-DAC providers engage and in which sectors?

To understand the footprint of non-DAC development agencies, in terms of where they prioritize their bilateral cooperation, we mapped each provider’s priority partner regions. Figure 7 depicts the absolute number of countries prioritizing each region, while Figure 8 shows a matrix of the percentage of non-DAC providers, disaggregated by the region of provider, which target cooperation to their own region (in yellow) and to other regions (in blue).

50 We use 2021 DCR profiles, as the 2022 iteration does not consistently report spending by channel for non-DAC providers.
53 In cases where individual partner countries were listed instead of regions, we used the top regions represented in the priority partner country list. If only a single country was listed from a region, we did not include it in our count.
Across our sample of non-DAC providers, sub-Saharan Africa was the most listed priority region with half (27) of the non-DAC development agencies included in our sample identifying it as a priority, followed by the Middle East and North Africa (MENA, prioritised by 21 non-DAC agencies), and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC, prioritised by 18 non-DAC providers). Notably, the country’s most strongly prioritizing engagement in sub-Saharan Africa generally fall into two groups: high-income non-DAC countries, particularly from Europe and the Gulf states, which target development resources towards poverty, and lower or upper middle-income countries from the African continent that prioritize regional cooperation. In other cases, the bulk of the agencies selecting each region are themselves members of the regional grouping—i.e. most of the countries prioritizing Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are from the LAC region, and so on (see Figure 8).
Indeed, our results show a strong regional focus of cooperation from non-DAC providers, with 89% of countries included in our analysis listing their region as a priority for development engagement. This highlights the importance of geography as a factor determining the allocation of non-DAC cooperation flows, likely due to a combination of lower costs associated with acting regionally (versus globally), as well as the relative ease of working in countries with similar languages, cultures, and presumably, development challenges. However, it is worth noting that higher-income non-DAC providers tend to identify multiple priority regions, including and beyond proximate countries. In a handful of cases, we could not identify clear priority partners or regions, while in two cases—Brazil and Russia—partners are targeted based on non-regional characteristics. Brazil, for instance, targets cooperation to Portuguese-language countries including African Portuguese-speaking

countries and Timor-Leste alongside LAC partners, while Russia seemingly prioritizes “friendly” countries, including other communist states, alongside countries from the former Soviet bloc.

Across these regions, key sectoral priorities for non-DAC cooperation providers were mapped by summing the number of countries that listed each sector as a priority. This analysis showed that across non-DAC providers, most (49/54) identified social sectors as key priorities for their outward cooperation (see Figure 9). Education was the most common priority for countries engaged in social spending, with most countries including education as a priority for their outward cooperation. Other key social sectors include health and support to governance. Economic sectors were the second most common across our sample, followed by “multi-sector cross-cutting” sectors, with most agencies included in this category identifying environmental protection as a sectoral priority.

**FIGURE 9. Histogram of non-DAC cooperation providers by their sectoral priority**

![Histogram of non-DAC cooperation providers by their sectoral priority](image)

Source: Authors’ analysis based on data from OECD and non-DAC provider sources.


57 Given that the language used to describe sectoral priorities sometimes differs across countries, we coded priority sectors into broad categories in alignment with the sector classification used by the DAC’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS) purpose codes. A full list of DAC purpose codes is available through the OECD’s website at: [https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/purposecodessectorclassification.htm](https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/purposecodessectorclassification.htm).
We see some differences in terms of the outward sectoral priorities of countries across income groups and regions. For instance, while 75% of LIC & LMIC and UMIC providers identified production sectors as priorities for their cooperation, these sectors are prioritized by only 39% of non-DAC HIC providers (Figure 10). By contrast, while most HICs and UMIC identify cross-cutting sectors as a priority (mostly climate change) only 38% of LIC & LMIC mention it as a sectoral priority. Across income, it is notable that most providers include both social infrastructure and services and economic infrastructure and services as priorities. While social infrastructure is particularly high amongst HIC and UMIC, economic infrastructure is slightly higher across LIC & LMIC countries. To a degree, differing sectoral priorities could be linked to the comparative advantages of providers at different income levels; in particular, lower prioritization of cross-cutting priorities from LIC & LMICs could speak to lower domestic prioritization of such sectors (namely, environmental protection) versus sectors more directly targeted to supporting growth.58

58 Indeed, this finding could broadly align with similar observations from a recent survey of development agencies and partner countries, which showed that partners had a lower prioritization of using ODA to tackle global challenges—such as climate change—than higher-income countries, presumably due to the potential for climate-directed finance to reallocate spending away from sectors focused on economic or human development (see Calleja and Cichocka, 2022).
**3.3 Which co-operation modalities do non-DAC cooperation providers utilize?**

Our review showed that technical cooperation was the primary cooperation modality used by non-DAC providers, with 51/54 countries noting some form of technical exchange—including knowledge exchange, trainings, or sending consultants, volunteers, researchers, or other personnel—as part of their cooperation offer (Figure 11).\(^59\) Given the importance of horizontality and exchange as part of south-south cooperation, the emphasis of technical and knowledge-based exchanges is expected. Other key modalities include humanitarian assistance (provided by 40 countries),\(^60\) triangular cooperation (used by 32 providers), project-type cooperation with bilateral partners (provided by 27 countries) and scholarships (27 countries).\(^61\) While some countries also noted engagement in cultural cooperation, technological exchanges, debt relief, budget support and public awareness, these were less commonly reported in agency materials.

**FIGURE 11. Number of non-DAC providers using each co-operation modality**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co-operation Modality</th>
<th>Number of Providers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Technical Cooperation</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triangular Cooperation</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project-type Cooperation</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholarships</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Cooperation</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technological Cooperation</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt Relief</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget Support</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Awareness</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ analysis based on review of non-DAC provider strategy documents, websites, and other official sources.

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59 Given that the language used to describe cooperation modalities differed across providers, we coded the identified modalities into broad categories. For the purpose of this analysis, the “technical cooperation” label covers any technical or knowledge exchange, including trainings, or references to sending volunteers, researchers, or experts to recipient countries. Broadly, we categorized cooperation modalities using the “types” of cooperation used to categorize ODA by the OECD-DAC, and include key modalities of importance to non-DAC actors (i.e. triangular cooperation, cultural cooperation, and technological and scientific cooperation) which regularly appear in provider strategies or websites.

60 For the purpose of this exercise, we consider “humanitarian” spending to be a modality rather than a sector. This aligns with how humanitarian engagement is presented in documents of most non-DAC cooperation providers.

61 We do not count refugee support as an individual modality because it cannot always be separated from humanitarian assistance. Indeed, the OECD clarified that “assistance to refugees may be considered a form of humanitarian assistance.” [https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/refugee-costs-oda.htm](https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/refugee-costs-oda.htm).
There appear to be some differences in the modalities utilized by cooperation providers across both income groupings and regions. For instance, as depicted in Figure 12, higher-income countries are more likely to utilize financial transfers—including project-type interventions, debt relief and budget support—than lower-income counterparts. Conversely, both LIC & LMICs seemingly prioritize engagement that relies on human, rather than financial resources, such as technical exchanges, scientific and cultural cooperation, and triangular cooperation, while UMICs engage in a mix of technical and financial modalities. Moreover, humanitarian engagement is prioritized by almost all HIC and UMIC providers, and to a lesser degree by LICs & LMICs, while engagement in triangular cooperation appears more common across middle-income countries (both the LIC & LMIC and UMIC groupings) than by high-income providers, potentially due to the importance of triangular cooperation to build capacities and partnerships for cooperation. While the broad split between the type of modality used across income groups is unsurprising given that the ability to provide finance for development—versus knowledge or other transfers—likely increases alongside income, large economies present an important exception to this general rule. In particular, lower and upper-middle income countries that are also G20 members not only tend to use both technical and financial modalities, regardless of income level, but also use a larger absolute number of modalities than non-G20 members (average of 6 cooperation modalities used by non-DAC G20 members versus 3 for other non-DAC providers). This could suggest that larger economies are able to provide broader cooperation offers even at lower income levels.

**FIGURE 12. Percentage of non-DAC co-operation providers engaging in each modality of co-operation, by income levels**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modality</th>
<th>HIC</th>
<th>UMIC</th>
<th>LIC &amp; LMIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Technical Cooperation</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholarships</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project-type</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt Relief</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget Support</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Awareness</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technological Exchange</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Cooperation</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technological Exchange</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triangular Cooperation</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Authors’ analysis based on data from OECD and non-DAC provider sources. Income group based on the World Bank classification.*

Similarly, in alignment with the relationship between income and cooperation modality, almost all non-DAC providers from relatively higher income regions—such as ECA, and Middle East and
North Africa (MENA)—appear to engage in more financial based cooperation. While cooperation providers from other regions tend to prioritize technical exchanges most actively, there are some notable differences that we observe in the type of technical exchange used across regions. For instance, Latin American providers seemingly prioritize knowledge sharing and exchange based on their expertise, particularly with other countries within the region; indeed, several LACs have “offer catalogues” outlining key sectoral priorities for technical exchange. This stands somewhat in contrast to countries from East Asia, several of which engage via training programs or “courses” that aim to build capacities with partner countries and are often demand based and open to a broader range of countries beyond their region.\(^62\) While these differences are subtle, they could signal differing regional approaches to South-South engagement.

### 3.4 Key take-aways from our mapping exercise

Taken together, our mapping highlights three key findings related to how non-DAC development agencies cooperate.

1. **Income mediates how countries engage in development.** Practically, income levels may inform the scale of resources available for development engagement, which could facilitate or constrains the scope of potential action. For instance, the stronger use of technical cooperation, cultural cooperation, and scientific and technological cooperation modalities by LMICs could be linked to the relatively lower cost associated with such engagement. While technical exchanges involve time and travel-related costs, these modalities tend to draw on existing human resources available within government, requiring little additional investment beyond the costs of facilitating the knowledge exchange. To a degree, these types of technical and knowledge transfers align most clearly with the ethos of SSC, which views “no-cost cooperation activities” as the “rule” when implemented by middle-income countries.\(^63\) A similar logic could explain the higher identification of triangular cooperation as a modality of engagement by LMICs relative to other income groups as triangular relationships utilize the expertise of non-DAC providers while offsetting project costs, which are typically financed by higher-income partners or international organisations. Indeed, our review showed that 81% of LIC & LMIC providers engage through triangular partnerships, declining to 70% for UMICs and 28% for HICs, potentially matching declining need for third-party resources to support cooperation. By contrast, project type co-operation is most common amongst HIC providers—with many allocating (and reporting) grants and loans as ODA.\(^64\)

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\(^62\) Consider, for instance, Malaysia’s Technical Cooperation Program, which engages in “human resource development” via demand-driven trainings (Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: MTCP, 2023). Similarly, Singapore’s Cooperation Program also emphasizes “human resource development” and offers training programs to share Singapore’s development experience (Singapore Cooperation Programme, 2023).


\(^64\) Singapore is a notable exception, which seems to cooperate primarily through technical cooperation and trainings.
While differences in modality usage across income is likely indicative of the availability of finance, it may also be linked to domestic political factors that could make the provision of financial cooperation less politically palatable to home populations in middle income countries versus high income counterparts. At its core, the issue is related to whether domestic constituents are willing to accept the spending of domestic resources overseas in cases where inequality and poverty remain prevalent at home. Presumably, political conversations about the benefit of development engagement ease alongside rising income, assuming it translates into lower domestic poverty and inequality; UMICS or HICs with high inequality may also face challenges justifying overseas spend to citizens. This aligns with evidence that higher individual income increases support for development cooperation. Relatedly, the use of ODA-like modalities by higher-income providers—and the reporting of ODA flows to the OECD—could also speak to a higher willingness to adopt a “donor” role internationally; consider the Eastern European providers, for instance, which report ODA flows and have traditionally acted more like DAC members than Southern counterparts. Indeed, some countries—including large UMICS such as Brazil—have shown reluctance to cooperate through the donor-beneficiary relationship implied in ODA, partly because the ideas of “partnership”, rather than “donorship”, emphasizes burden-sharing and self-interest, making it easier to pitch to domestic audiences. In this way, differing use of cooperation modalities across non-DAC providers and income levels may not only be linked to available finance, but to the optics of cooperation and the willingness to adopt the “provider” role which is more prevalent in financial exchange.

2. Across non-DAC providers, the majority (89%) prioritize regional cooperation, with providers appearing more likely to cooperate beyond their region at higher levels of income.

Our analysis shows that while most non-DAC providers prioritize their own region regardless of their income group, higher income countries are more likely to engage in development efforts beyond their region. Broadly, prioritizing cooperation regionally is perhaps unsurprising due to both potential efficiencies gained from proximate action, as well as for geostrategic reasons. Pragmatically, regional engagement could be linked to efficiencies related to working in near-by contexts with a shared language, histories, and to a degree, common challenges, as well as to (presumably) lower costs from administering

67 Julie Walz and Vijaya Ramachandran, “Brave New World.”
68 Janis van der Westhuizen and Carlos R. S. Milani, “Development Cooperation, the International–Domestic Nexus and the Graduation Dilemma: comparing South Africa and Brazil.”
programmes closer to home. Such efficiencies could explain differences in the degree to which non-DAC providers engage beyond their region across income levels, with LMICs almost exclusively working within their region, UMICs prioritizing their region yet often expressing openness to engagement further afield, and HICs working the most globally. At the same time, regional cooperation has often been linked to provider aims to reduce negative spillovers from regional challenges, whereby cooperation is used to promote regional stability. Such a “targeted development” strategy is seemingly well aligned with South-South principles of “mutual interest”, whereby actions taken within a country’s region necessarily serve the provider interest if they reduce regional public “bads”, deepen relations or linkages with neighbours, or strengthen development outcomes within their region.

3. **The relative use of bilateral and multilateral channels varies considerably across countries, though the largest absolute actors continue to prioritize bilateral engagement.**

Our analysis showed no clear trend across the use of cooperation channels, with different groups of countries utilizing bilateral channels to varying degrees. Notably, EU countries that are not DAC members, several of which are HICs, stand out for having a high use of the multilateral system, as do Latin American providers, many of which seem to allocate to regional development banks—notably the Inter-American Development Bank—and the UN system. By contrast, many of the countries with the largest prioritization of bilateral flows are also the largest absolute non-DAC providers—namely the Gulf providers, Türkiye, China, India, and Russia—which could suggest a relationship between the relative use of multilateral channels and the size of cooperation programmes. It is possible, for instance, that the relative use of multilateral channels appears higher for smaller providers as assessed contributions to various multilateral agencies could account for a higher share of total cooperation flows. Indeed, this is likely the case, with non-DAC EU members, which show a high proportional use of the multilateral system due to mandatory payments to the EU; by contrast, assessed contributions likely account for a much smaller share of total flows in countries with large development budgets. However, beyond mandatory contributions to multilateral agencies, the relatively low multilateral shares from large non-DAC actors could also indicate a preference for bilateral—over multilateral—development

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69 OECD, “Boosting South–South Cooperation in the Context of Aid Effectiveness.”
engagement, potentially due to the greater ability to align bilateral flows with domestic—or “mutual”—interests. While prioritization of bilateral engagement clearly differs across countries—and likely over time—the seeming preference for bilateral action from the largest non-DAC providers raises questions about whether and to what degree multilateral spaces could be utilized for deeper cooperation for development.

4. How has non-DAC cooperation evolved over time?—analysis based on five case studies

While our mapping shows trends in how, with whom, and on what non-DAC providers cooperate, the static nature of this exercise raises questions about whether such trends hold over time, and what factors could explain observed findings. To further explore how non-DAC providers cooperate, this section presents short cases of the cooperation programs of five countries—Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, Türkiye, and United Arab Emirates—which trace the development of cooperation programs over time. To meaningfully build on our mapping exercise, the cases explore changes to the same key variables—notably volumes (and channel to the degree possible), modalities, partner regions, and sectors—across the historical development of cooperation programs. This approach allows us to further probe initial findings from the mapping exercise by focusing on how cooperation programmes evolved and under what conditions or contexts key priorities emerged. In addition, our cases aim to highlight key international development fora through which each country cooperates, and the rationale for using specific venues or types of partnerships for cooperation with other providers (such as triangular cooperation) more or less actively.

We selected our case countries to maximize variation in terms of region and income, and to ensure that different “models” of non-DAC donorship were represented across the cases (see Box 3 for more on different non-DAC cooperation models and limitations). The aim of this approach is to ensure that all major “types” of non-DAC providers are included in our case study analysis. Table 1 provides a broad overview of the differences in income, region, and donorship model across cases. However, we acknowledge that the heterogeneity of non-DAC providers means that the explanatory power of our case studies is necessarily limited.

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BOX 3. Models of non-DAC “donorship” in the literature

Broadly, several prior reviews of cooperation from non-DAC actors have identified three distinct models of cooperation used by non-DAC providers. These models include:

1. **“DAC” model (used by non-DACs):** typically used by countries that are members of the EU and report spending to the DAC but are not members of the OECD-DAC. These countries often act similarly to DAC members (providing “ODA” and complying with DAC cooperation norms) yet remain outside of the DAC system. Other countries that have been included in this category at various points in time include Israel, Russia and Türkiye.

2. **Arab model:** the Arab model of cooperation is used primarily to refer to the Gulf states, and is seen as being influenced by solidarity and religious ties, typically within the region. Cooperation from many Arab donors has been ongoing since at least the 1970s. Arab donors are also distinct due to the large volume of ODA-like finance provided.

3. **Southern model:** this model refers to all countries that provide South-South Cooperation and whose cooperation norms and practices remain outside of DAC processes and structures. Some within the literature have sought to further differentiate across providers in this category based on levels of economic clout—with some typologies separating out the BRICS countries or other “regional” powers from smaller SSC providers.

Yet the usefulness of this classification has also been called into question in terms of its ability to explain both the differences and potential similarities in cooperation patterns not only across but also within each non-DAC provider grouping, or indeed, with the DAC providers. Some suggest that the reliance of these typologies on region and historical proximity to the DAC alone make this

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model insufficient for understanding wider structural, material, and political factors which shape specific patterns of cooperation concerning the choice of modalities, cooperation activities and institutional set-ups, as well as the extent to which each provider supports wider international and collaborative frameworks surrounding development cooperation.\textsuperscript{77} While, despite these challenges, we utilize this typology as part of the rationale for our case selection approach as a simple way of capturing major differences in non-DAC archetypes, ultimately, our paper concludes with a proposal for an alternative classification framework.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GNI Per Capita (Atlas Method, USD)</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Donorship “Model”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>$4,180 (LMIC)</td>
<td>East Asia and Pacific</td>
<td>“Southern” model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>$9,590 (UMIC)</td>
<td>Latin America and Caribbean</td>
<td>“Southern” model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>$6,530 (UMIC)</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>“Southern” model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türkiye</td>
<td>$9,900 (UMIC)</td>
<td>Europe and Central Asia</td>
<td>“DAC” model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>$41,770 (HIC)</td>
<td>Middle-East and North Africa</td>
<td>“Arab” model</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Each case is divided in three parts. The cases begin with a brief overview of the country’s current cooperation programme, highlighting how much, where, and on what cooperation is targeted. This is followed by a brief historical overview of the development of each country’s cooperation programme, with the aim of answering two questions: 1) how has the way that countries cooperate—in terms of volumes, modalities, regions and sectors—changed over time, and 2) which forums are utilized for development partnership (i.e. UN, DAC, regional) over time, and how and why do they change? Each case closes with a summary analysis that draws out key changes in cooperation and highlighting factors influencing change.

4.1 Indonesia

In 2019, Indonesia’s contribution to international development cooperation was valued at US$ 219 million, most of which (US$157 million) was provided as “capital contributions to multilateral organisations”, contributions to other international organisations (US$55 million), and South-South and triangular cooperation (US$ 8 million).\textsuperscript{78} The country’s bilateral cooperation is primarily provided as technical cooperation, trainings and knowledge-sharing, though the Indonesian government has indicated plans to expand the use of export finance and blended finance in the


\textsuperscript{78} OECD, “Development Co-operation Systems of Six Countries in Southeast Asia,” Figure 2.1, 17.
In 2020, Indonesia reported training 886 participants from 22 countries as part of its SSC, with 50% of its SSC activities focused within Southeast Asia. Key sectoral priorities include “development” (including poverty reduction, education, agriculture), “economic issues” (including public financial management, micro-finance), and “good governance and peacebuilding”, with 70% of programming focused on “development” activities in 2020. Indonesia’s outward cooperation is coordinated by its National Coordination Team for South-South and Triangular Co-operation (NCT), which is comprised of the Ministry of National Development Planning, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance and the State Secretariat, and works to guide the country’s outward cooperation. In 2019, Indonesia also established a new Agency for International Development Cooperation (Indonesian AID) to support its cooperation activities.

**A brief history of Indonesia’s cooperation**

Indonesia’s cooperation emerged in the years following its independence in 1948, where outward cooperation was seen as an expression of solidarity with other post-colonial countries. Driven by then-president Sukarno’s ambition to “make Indonesia a true leader among other postcolonial countries”, Indonesia proposed and hosted 1955 Bandung Conference, positioning itself as an early SSC champion. In the years that followed, Indonesia’s leadership in SSC continued as it became one of the five countries that initiated the Conference for the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961, and in 1964, a founding member of the G77. While the 1968 election of President Suharto saw Indonesia turn away from SSC to focus on domestic developmental priorities, the country continued participating in diplomatic SSC initiatives, including the 1978 BAPA meeting.

Global economic turbulence through the 1980s and 1990s saw Indonesia’s cooperation stall and restart alongside economic cycles. While Indonesia’s cooperation slowed in the early 1980s following the debt crisis, the period saw the creation of the country’s first institution for outward cooperation—the Indonesian Technical Cooperation Program (ITCP)—which was created in 1981 to share Indonesia’s knowledge through training programmes and expert exchanges, particularly

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79 Ibid.
82 OECD, “Other Official Providers Not Reporting to the OECD.”
85 Ibid., 119.
86 In terms of concrete SSC projects, however, Engel could only find two concrete examples of SSC programs pre-dating the 1970s: an agreement with Guinea for the exchange of technical experts, and a sporting event between the “New Emerging Forces” held in Jakarta in 1963. See also: Susan Engel, ”6. South–South Cooperation Strategies in Indonesia: Domestic and International Drivers,” African–Asian Encounters: Creating Coordinations and Dependencies edited by Arndt Graf and Azirah Hashim, 155–182. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2017): 162.
87 Ibid., 224.
within its region. At the time, Indonesia emphasized cooperation with countries in the South Pacific as part of its broader geopolitical strategy to gain support from regional partners for its policy towards Timor-Leste.

Throughout the 1980s, Indonesia also engaged in triangular cooperation, with its activities partly co-funded by the UNDP, and by the 1990s, with Japan as a major partner.

By the 1990s, economic recovery prompted a revival of Indonesia's outward cooperation, driven by strong economic performance and Suharto's aims to highlight the skills and expertise that had supported Indonesia's rapid growth through SSC exchanges. A part of these efforts, a growing number of government ministries, including Bappenas, the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), and various line ministries began implementing their own via technical cooperation and capacity-building projects. Momentum continued throughout the decade with Indonesia establishing the NAM Centre for SSC in 1995 after its chairmanship of the NAM, with this becoming an importance avenue for Indonesian SSC delivery, focusing on projects in poverty alleviation, small and medium enterprises, health, agriculture, and the environment. Yet in 1997, Indonesia's SSC again stalled with the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis.

By the early 2000s, a robust economic recovery from the Asian Financial Crisis and Indonesia's emerging status as a middle-power, led to an expansion of its cooperation and partnership with SSC actors and DAC members, alike. Over the period, Indonesia's foreign policy emphasized development cooperation as important for advancing its international role as a "norm-setter, peacekeeper, bridge builder" and "representative of developing countries". While the modalities of Indonesia's cooperation remain broadly the same—focused on technical exchanges, trainings, and scholarships—the period saw some expansion of cooperation into non-regional partners (notably, to other Muslim countries including Afghanistan, Egypt, and Palestine). This period also saw

90 Engel, "South–South Cooperation Strategies in Indonesia," 163. The OECD notes that one of Indonesia's earliest triangular cooperation projects—on low-cost housing—took place in 1981 with support from Japan, see (OECD, 2022):19; OECD, "Development Co-operation Systems in Southeast Asia.”
91 Engel, "South–South Cooperation Strategies in Indonesia," 163.
94 Prabowo, "Indonesia’s Self Identity," 121, quoting President Yudhoyono in 2012.
95 Shimoda and Nakazawa, "Flexible Cooperation for Indonesia's Multi-dimensional Challenges for South–South Cooperation under a Shared Vision.”
96 Part of the broad geographic spread of Indonesia's cooperation is due to the nature of Indonesia's training programs, many of which are implemented in conjunction with faith-based organizations, making the regional emphasis of cooperation partners less clear than for other similar SSC providers. See also: Sato and Santikajaya, "Variety of Middle-Income Donors,” 25.
enhanced impetus for cooperation, with the government’s commitment to development featured, for the first time, in its 2005–2025 National Long-Term Development Plan (NLTP),

paving the way for new partnerships including Indonesia’s role as co-chair of OECD-DAC-hosted Task Team on South–South Co-operation, which it began in 2008. Similarly, in 2009, the same year that Indonesia became a G20 member, it signed onto the Jakarta Commitment which aimed to “reconfigure Indonesia’s relationship with traditional donors” to create deeper equality. Between 2000 and 2013, Indonesia contributed roughly US$50 million in SSC and triangular cooperation initiatives, with a sectoral focus on agriculture, maternal and child health, infrastructure, women’s empowerment and climate.

From the mid-2010s, Indonesia’s cooperation has grown not only in volume, but in the complexity and diversity of partnerships through which it engages. According to recent OECD estimates based on Indonesian government documents, Indonesia provided over $982 million in development cooperation between 2016 and 2019, most of which (96.6%) was allocated via international or multilateral organisations. Of multilateral contributions, most (79%) were channelled as capital contributions, with the AIIB receiving the bulk. While the bilateral portion of Indonesia’s cooperation remains smaller, the OECD indicates that this has increased from $5.3 million in 2016 to $7.8 million in 2019. In 2019, the government set up the new Indonesian Aid agency to enhance coordination of its SSC, with the new agency importantly being financed by revenues from an independently-managed and self-sufficient endowment fund, which was allocated IDR 3 trillion ($193 million) until 2021, and is expected to accumulate at least IDR 10 trillion ($642 million) by the end of 2024.

In 2020, the Indonesian Government’s new National Medium-Term Development Plan (NMTDP for 2020–2024) indicated intentions to further enhance its SSC and triangular engagements, particularly through “exchanging knowledge and expertise in the industrial sector” as well as increasing use of the cooperation budget towards export financing and blended finance approaches. According to the NMTDP, Indonesia aims to strengthen engagement beyond its region, with an increasing focus on cooperation in Africa. Meanwhile, the National Coordination Team (NCT) of South–South and Triangular Cooperation has indicated that under the current administration, key priority countries will also include Palestine, as well as a continued focus on Timor Leste and the South Pacific. Meanwhile, key sectors for Indonesian Aid include good governance, peace building, and economic development.

Sources:
98 Engel, “South–South Cooperation in Southeast Asia.”
100 OECD, “Development Co-operation Systems of Six Countries in Southeast Asia,” 16–17, Figure 2.1.
Alongside broadening outward cooperation, Indonesia has continued to deepen its partnerships with SSC providers, through active participation in SSC forums including the 2019 BAPA+40, as well as with the OECD through participation in the OECD Development Center, through TOSSD, and the Global Partnership Initiative on Effective Triangular Co-operation.104 Additionally, Indonesia also cooperates with several DAC members—including Australia, Germany, Japan, Korea, and the US—particularly for triangular activities. For instance, the US has partnered with Indonesia since 2016 to support its capacity to deliver “strategic and effective” development cooperation in third countries; Germany has provided assistance for Indonesia’s NCT in setting up the new Indonesian Aid agency; and there are plans for joint implementation of trilateral projects between Indonesia and Australia in the Pacific, as announced in the 2020–2024 Plan of Action for the Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.105 More recently, Indonesia sought to strengthen partnerships, including with domestic non-state actors, to support Indonesia’s development cooperation.106 In 2022, Indonesia held the G20 Presidency under the theme “Recover together, recover stronger”, with key pillars—including “enabling environment and partnership”, “ensuring sustainable and inclusive growth”, and “stronger collective global leadership”—highlighting the need for deeper cooperation for development.107

Key changes to Indonesia’s cooperation programme over time

Although Indonesia was an early entrant to the SSC space, the expansion of its cooperation programme primarily followed rapid economic growth from the 2000s onward, which saw Indonesia move to LMIC status in 2003. Over time, the major changes in Indonesia’s cooperation included rising financial volumes for international cooperation including SSC, which increased from $49 million in 2013, to $219 million in 2019.108 Notably, while Indonesia’s earliest engagement in SSC—via Bandung—included political engagement with countries beyond its region, by the 1980s, it appeared to prioritize regional cooperation for political reasons before expanding engagement beyond Southeast Asia and the Pacific since at least the 2000s, with further expansion planned under the NMTDP. While the scope and scale of Indonesia’s cooperation has grown, key sectors for cooperation have remained broadly static over time, with Indonesia prioritizing agriculture, poverty reduction, and the environment since the 1990s. Similarly, cooperation modalities thus far also appear largely unchanged, primarily focusing on knowledge exchange and triangular cooperation, although the

108 Both these figures are based on Indonesian government reporting to the OECD. The 2013 figure comes from footnote 1 in OECD, “Indonesia’s Development Co-operation” (2023), while the 2019 figure comes from the OECD, “Development Co-operation Systems of Six Countries in Southeast Asia,” 17, Figure 2.1.
NMTDP foresees an expansion in modalities with the planned use of export finance and blended finance approaches in the near future.

Indonesia is an active international partner on development. The expansion of Indonesia’s cooperation since the early 2000s has occurred against the backdrop of enhanced political emphasis on development as a part of Indonesia’s foreign policy, which has also provided continued impetus for expanding development partnerships with both DAC and non-DAC providers. Indonesia has long been an international leader in SSC and has contributed to a variety of international forums for development cooperation. Notably, Indonesia engages actively in both UN SSC spaces—including through BAPA processes—and with the OECD-DAC through the Development Center and dialogues on issues of interest. Indonesia is also a strong participant in triangular cooperation, with a recent report placing Indonesia amongst the 20 most active countries engaged in triangular programming, and with reported evidence of involvement in over 30 newly-initiated triangular projects since 2012. Overall, Indonesia’s openness to partnerships reflects the government’s current SSC vision, which calls for “enhanced partnership to achieve prosperity”.

### 4.2 Mexico

In 2019 (the latest year for which data is available), Mexico allocated roughly US$102.4 million in development cooperation, the largest share (84%) of which was allocated as contributions to international organisations, followed by scholarships (9%) and technical cooperation (7%). Mexico’s cooperation reporting notes financial cooperation and humanitarian cooperation as modalities for its engagement, although neither were used in 2019. The bulk of Mexico’s engagement is targeted to the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region, with a special focus on Central America. According to Mexico’s 2019 reporting, 99% of its technical cooperation was provided to the LAC region, with key sectors including statistical services, environmental protection, and agriculture, fisheries and forestry. Mexico’s outward cooperation is managed by AMEXCID, which was created in 2011 as part of Mexico’s Law on International Cooperation for Development (LCID).
A brief history of Mexico’s cooperation

Mexico began providing development cooperation in earnest in the 1970s against a backdrop of its growing oil wealth and relative economic and political stability.116 Partly aimed at diversifying Mexico’s international alliances away from its post-World War II dependence on the US, Mexico’s cooperation emerged from President Álvarez’s campaign to “expand Mexico’s prestige and influence” by re-aligning the country with “Third World countries and causes”.117 As a part of this reorientation, Mexico began engaging more heavily through the G77—of which it was a founding member already in 1964—which led to increased attention on SSC, and provided impetus for institutionalizing Mexico’s cooperation through the creation of the General Directorate of International Technical Cooperation (DGCTI) within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE) in 1971.118 The DGCTI was responsible for managing both inward and outward cooperation, with a mandate to negotiate and implement cooperation agreements, and coordinate scholarships and technical exchanges. Its creation precipitated a rapid expansion in Mexico’s outward cooperation throughout the decade, with a strong focus on Central America, the Caribbean, and South America.119

Amidst intensifying internal conflict within several neighbouring countries, Mexico’s cooperation in the 1980s and 1990s was driven by efforts to contain regional violence.120 This regional instability spurred the diversification of outward cooperation modalities from technical assistance to encompass financial cooperation—including in the form of concessional loans against its oil derivatives,121 as well as humanitarian assistance to refugees residing in Mexico.122 While the 1982 debt crisis prevented Mexico from scaling-up cooperation more broadly, by the 1990s, Mexico’s engagement was strengthened through its leadership role in regional cooperation initiatives, such as the 1991 Tuxtla Summit, which created a permanent mechanism for regional and bilateral cooperation to promote regional integration, peace, security and prosperity in Central America.123 Throughout the decade, Mexico’s cooperation was closely aligned with the biennial Tuxtla summits, with a focus on technical and scientific cooperation, especially for education and culture within the region.124 More broadly, the post-Cold-War period saw Mexico intensify engagement with countries from the global North, particularly as improving ties with trading partners became a key policy priority. This led Mexico to join the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994.
That same year, Mexico joined the OECD and became an observer to the DAC, which mandated it to leave the G77 and led to a shift in away from its identity as an SSC provider.\footnote{Rafael Velazquez-Flores, “Mexico’s Foreign Policy after the End of the Cold War: A New Neoliberal Economic Pragmatism, 1988–2000,” in Principled Pragmatism in Mexico’s Foreign Policy: Variables and Assumptions (New York: Springer International Publishing, 2022), 182–4.}

During the 2000s, Mexico deepened its regional cooperation, while demonstrating leadership in multilateral forums and strengthening engagement in triangular cooperation. Notably, regional cooperation over the period was strengthened following the 2001 launch of the Plan Puebla Panama (PPP)—a joint initiative which aimed to support infrastructure and socio-economic development across the Mesoamerican region, including provinces in southern Mexico.\footnote{Calleja and Prizzon, “Moving Away from Aid: The Experience of Mexico.”}

In the years that followed, the PPP—later renamed the Mesoamerica Project—became a key focus of Mexico’s outward cooperation. While projects within the Mesoamerica region continued to grow—especially with countries sharing a border with Mexico, and in areas of common concern, such as security, migration, or the fight against drug trafficking—ideological differences between Mexico’s right-wing government and tide of left-wing governments sweeping across Central and Latin America in some cases stymied broader cooperation.\footnote{Blomeier and Phillips, “Building Bridges between North and South?”}

Beyond its region, Mexico’s multilateral profile also grew throughout the 2000s, when engagement via the UN was prioritized as an avenue for fostering relationships with the global South following the country’s departure from the G77,\footnote{Arturo Sotomayor, “Growth and Responsibility: The Positioning of Emerging Powers in the Global Governance System,” Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive (2009): 37–38.} leading Mexico to host key UN forums including the first UN International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey in 2002,\footnote{Calleja and Prizzon, “Moving Away from Aid: The Experience of Mexico,” 18.} and the fifth ministerial meeting of the WTO in Cancun in 2003.\footnote{SEGIB. “Report on South–South Cooperation in Ibero-America 2010,” SEGIB Studies no. 5 (2010). https://www.segib.org/wp-content/uploads/sur-sur-ingles.pdf.} Mexico also expanded its triangular cooperation, becoming the second largest provider of regional triangular projects by the end of the decade, with Germany and Japan being its most frequent DAC partners.\footnote{Estimate for the 2009 cooperation budget taken from Blomeier and Phillips, “Building Bridges between North and South?” 6.}

The 2010s saw renewed focus on Mexico’s development engagement, with cooperation scaled-up following the approval of the LCID in 2011, which established AMEXCID with the aim of meeting global challenges by “building strategic alliances” and sharing technical, financial, and human resources with partner countries.\footnote{Blomeier and Phillips, “Building Bridges between North and South?” 6.} Over the period, the Peña Nieto administration sought to enhance Mexico’s standing as an actor of “global responsibility” and included development cooperation as a key policy objective in the National Development Plan for 2013–2018. By some estimates, Mexico’s outward cooperation saw a four–to–five–fold increase from 2009, reaching $548 million by 2013.\footnote{Estimate for the 2009 cooperation budget taken from Blomeier and Phillips, “Building Bridges between North and South?” 7.} Since 2011, the bulk of Mexico’s cooperation has been channelled via...
international organisations (Figure 13), while its bilateral cooperation continued to focus on Central America and the Caribbean, but also saw some expansion of projects in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, with key sectoral priorities including: social development, education, health, disaster prevention, economic cooperation, scientific and technological cooperation, infrastructure, and environment and climate.\textsuperscript{134} During this period, Mexico also sought to grow its role as a “bridge country” between “North” and “South”, by leveraging its presence at the OECD to raise awareness of the need to include “Southern” providers in discussions related to effectiveness, and later, through hosting the 2014 High-Level Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation in Mexico City.\textsuperscript{135} In 2016, Mexico also became one of the nine founding members of the Global Partnership Initiative on Effective Triangular Cooperation. In 2017, Mexico ranked as the top regional provider of triangular cooperation by number of projects, falling slightly to second place (behind Chile) by 2019, with 25 active trilateral projects.\textsuperscript{136}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig13}
\caption{AMEXCID’s annual expenditure by type of cooperation, 2011–2019}
\end{figure}

\textit{Source:} Figures for 2013 to 2019 taken from the AMEXCID Annual Report, 2019, figures for 2011 and 2012 taken from Calleja and Prizzon, p. 36; financial cooperation totals for 2013 include debt relief of over $300 million to Cuba.


\textsuperscript{136} SEGIB, ‘South–South and Triangular Cooperation and the Sustainable Development Agenda in Ibero-America: Critical Nodes and Horizons in the Response to COVID-19,’ 8.
Following the election of the left-wing populist López Obrador as president in 2018, Mexico’s policy priorities shifted after the president declared that the “best foreign policy is domestic policy.” The current administration has been sceptical of channelling development finance through international intermediaries, instead proposing that providing “direct aid”, i.e., through unearmarked cash transfers given directly to the population of bilateral partner countries could limit corruption and increase efficiency, and examples of this new approach can already be seen in Mexico’s recent development cooperation with Honduras, Guatemala or El Salvador. Despite the president’s initially sceptical rhetoric towards the multilateral system, Mexico has continued to engage on development issues through multilateral venues, and has played a leading role in negotiations on measurement and quantification of SSC during the BAPA+40 meetings in 2019, as well as participating in the third LAC-DAC Dialogue on Development Cooperation in 2021. Additionally, in 2021, Mexico’s President proposed a “World Plan for Fraternity and Well-Being” at the UN General Assembly, which proposed that each G20 member—including Mexico—contributes the equivalent of 0.2% of GDP to a UN administered fund to combat extreme poverty. The new medium-term plan on international cooperation (PROCID 2021–2024) outlines the five priorities for Mexico’s cooperation as: contributing to Mexico’s national objectives, prioritising the development of Central American and Caribbean partners, promoting Mexico’s cultural diplomacy, increasing effectiveness, and contributing to other regional and global development agendas, including the SDGs. Recently, AMEXCID has pursued a closer relationship with USAID, both for joint implementation of projects in Central America, and towards finding support to boost AMEXCID’s monitoring and evaluation capacities.

**Key changes to Mexico’s cooperation programme over time**

Mexico’s development cooperation has seemingly ebbed and flowed alongside its government administrations’ wider political and economic preferences. While cooperation volumes increased through the first half of the 2010s, they have been declining considerably in recent years following the election of López Obrador. Similarly, the use of certain modalities over others appears to be linked to such wider economic and political considerations—while technical cooperation and knowledge exchange have consistently been a key modality, Mexico had also provided some financial...

137 Blomeier and Phillips, “Building Bridges between North and South?” 8.
138 Ibid., 8.
139 Calleja and Prizzon, “Moving Away from Aid: The Experience of Mexico.”
engagement as concessional loans in the 1980s, as well as both lending and debt relief for some time in the early 2010s—yet has seemingly scaled back financial cooperation in recent years. Still, Mexico’s cooperation has **consistently prioritized regional engagement** since the outset, with the main thrust continually focused on regional stabilization and integration. Perhaps in line with its regional focus, Mexico has **prioritized a mix of social and economic sectors** for several decades, also responding to regional crises by pivoting to humanitarian assistance or security-related sectors where relevant circumstances arise.

Since the end of the Cold War, Mexico has been **keen to engage globally in partnerships for development**, using its membership to various international fora to enhance the visibility of SSC in international development discourse, and by being an active participant in trilateral, regional, and multilateral development partnerships. In the 1990s and 2000s, Mexico especially saw the UN and OECD as valuable fora not only to engage in development partnerships, but also to integrate itself within the political and economic system that emerged after the Cold War. Mexico is a particularly enthusiastic proponent of trilateral development partnerships as a founding member of the GPI, and with reported evidence of having participated in at least 90 newly-initiated triangular projects since 2012. However, towards the late 2010s—and especially since the new government administration took power—Mexico’s government has **adopted a rhetoric which is less open to partnerships**. Even so, in practice, Mexico has continued to engage in both high-level dialogues with both the OECD and other LAC countries, as well as through joint implementation of trilateral projects under the current administration.

### 4.3 South Africa

In 2019, (the latest year for which comprehensive estimates from the OECD are available), South Africa provided USD $106 million in international development cooperation, of which $34.9 million was provided bilaterally, and US$71.3 million was provided to multilateral organisations, with the bulk of this allocated to the African Union (37%), the African Development Bank (32%) and the UN (24%). The OECD reports that the majority of South Africa’s bilateral engagement is provided as technical co-operation, and its South-South and triangular cooperation efforts primarily target members of the South African Development Community (SADC). Although cooperation is provided by a range of ministries and bodies, primary responsibility for managing South Africa’s cooperation lies with the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), which also houses the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF)—a key vehicle for the delivery of South Africa’s bilateral programmes. In 2021/22, the ARF’s expenditure reached $20 million, while other development-relevant expenditure from DIRCO—primarily to international or multilateral organisations—amounted to a further $43 million (Figure 13).

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144 Triilateral projects data reports authors’ calculations from the OECD’s triangular cooperation repository of projects.  
145 OECD, “South Africa” in Development Cooperation Profiles 2021. Paris: OECD, 2021. See also Table 2 “Estimated development-oriented contributions to and through multilateral organizations, 2019”.  
146 Ibid.
**A brief history of South Africa’s cooperation**

South Africa’s development cooperation commenced in earnest in 1994, following the end of the apartheid regime, with development becoming an important foreign policy tool for mending international relations. Then-President Nelson Mandela emphasized the need for South Africa’s foreign and development policies to dispel links with its past, become a “progressive force” representing other developing countries on the world stage, and act as a “bridge-builder” between global South and North. To do so, South Africa’s early cooperation focused on sharing its experiences of negotiating a peaceful political transition, and engaging in multilateral diplomacy to display leadership in the development arena. Throughout the 1990s, for instance, South Africa re-joined the IMF and World Bank and contributed towards the successful negotiation of several international security conventions on issues which affect developing countries—such as mine bans or conflict diamonds.

While the ambitions of using development cooperation to re-integrate South Africa within the global community continued throughout the 2000s, the new Mbeki administration (1999–2008) increased the country’s regional cooperation. Mbeki proposed that South Africa should contribute towards the “African Renaissance”, viewing development cooperation as a vehicle for (re)establishing South Africa as an emerging regional actor. Notably, the Mbeki government enhanced South Africa’s role as a bilateral partner within its region through the creation of the African Renaissance Fund to promote democracy, good governance, socio-economic development, and conflict resolution in other African countries, primarily via bilateral technical support, capacity building, and sharing South Africa's own experiences. Throughout the decade, ARF allocations grew from roughly US$4 million in 2001/2 to US$58 million in 2008/9 (see Figure 14), before declining in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, reaching a low of US$1 million in 2010/11. Likewise, DIRCO’s transfers to international cooperation bodies (which are not channelled through the ARF) increased from $13 million in 2001 to a peak of $58 million in 2009/10. Notable examples of ARF projects have included technical assistance and training to support local, parliamentary, or presidential elections (including Zimbabwe and Comoros in 2007/8), as well as infrastructure projects to build roads, ports, and dams (especially in Lesotho and the DRC). Beyond the ARF—which by some estimates is responsible for less than 5% of South Africa’s cooperation—and other DIRCO transfers, this period also saw a growing role of other government departments and “parastatal” as active providers throughout the early 2000s.

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151 Mthembu, “South Africa as a Development Partner.”
using a range of modalities such as technical support, capacity building, and semi-concessional loans (mainly provided by Development Bank of Southern Africa or the Industrial Development Corporation). A notable example of cooperation which involves a range of actors is South African actors are its activities in post-conflict reconstruction and development in the Democratic Republic of Congo— involving multiple South African government ministries, as well as parastatal organizations, businesses, and civil society, and partly financed by development loans from the IDC and DBSA.

In addition, the 2000s also saw the Mbeki government’s regional leadership through its role in building new regional institutions for development, acting as a founding member the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), leading the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity to the African Union, creating the Pan-African Parliament, and transforming the South African Development Coordination Conference into the South African Development Community (SADC). Beyond its region, South Africa also played an important role in key OECD-DAC meetings, specifically high-level forums on development finance and effectiveness from Rome (2003) to Busan (2011).

**FIGURE 14. Cooperation transfers and expenditures from DIRCO and the African renaissance fund**

Source: Authors’ compilation based on ARF annual expenditure reports and DIRCO annual reports. The data for “Other DIRCO transfers to international organisations” are taken from Annex 1E, or sections on ‘Programme 5: International transfers to all organisations other than public entities’. Converted from South African Rands to US dollars using average annual exchange rates cited by the World Bank.


155 Sidiropolous, “South Africa in Global Development Fora.”
The 2000s also saw South Africa position itself as a strong supporter of triangular development partnerships, particularly to deepen its cooperation with African partners without politically or financially "overreaching". Politically, South Africa’s "prickly" relationship with the region, partly due to low trust and perceptions of the country as a regional hegemon, meant that efforts to scale-up development engagement were met with political concern that engagement could perpetuate "negative perceptions about South Africa as a colonial power". At the same time, persistent domestic challenges—including inequality and a shortfall in public service provision—financially limited the potential growth of South Africa’s outward engagement. In this context, triangular cooperation was viewed as a mutually beneficially arrangement that allowed South Africa to enhance its "bridging role" via deepened cooperation with DAC and African partners, which funding agencies—namely DAC members—were able to use "as a vehicle for providing assistance in countries where their presence would be politically unwelcome."159

From the late 2000s, and especially following Zuma’s election in 2008, South Africa’s cooperation has focused on deepening partnerships with other global actors, especially the BRICS group to which it was admitted in 2011. Indeed, the period was marked not only by further efforts towards institution-creating—with the creation of the India-Brazil-South Africa Facility for Poverty and Hunger Alleviation (IBSA Fund) and the BRICS-led New Development Bank serving as new spaces to support African development through new partnerships—but also by increased contestation in OECD and UN development fora as part of behaviours seen as "institution-shifting". For instance, as part of the 2017 UN Financing for Development Forum, where South Africa was the co-facilitator, South Africa opposed efforts to include Busan effectiveness principles into substantive text on financing for development. Similarly, while South Africa has engaged with the OECD, particularly on regional initiatives, and recognizes the technical value of the forum, it has resisted joining the DAC—or reporting cooperation volumes to it—viewing the space as the “bastion of Western-created rules” that should not apply to other actors. Enhanced engagement with other actors was also pursued through new triangular development cooperation projects with other global South countries, with South Africa initiating new projects with Cuban doctors in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau, and with Vietnamese agricultural experts in Guinea throughout the decade. Over this period, 160

157 Van der Westhuizen and Milani, "Development Cooperation, the International–Domestic Nexus and the Graduation Dilemma;" Braude et al. "Emerging Donors in International Development Assistance: The South Africa Case;" Mthembu, "South Africa as a Development Partner," 22.
158 Ibid.
161 Sidiropolous, "South Africa in Global Development Fora."
162 Ibid.
bilateral allocations remained broadly the same, maintaining a regional focus and prioritizing engagement on democracy and governance, human resource development, and humanitarian engagement. While cooperation volumes through the ARF especially have fluctuated considerably, from an exceptional peak of over $130 million in 2012/13—where more than half was allocated as humanitarian assistance and presumably responsive to crises in the region—to $4 million in the following year (Figure 14), the ARF’s expenditures seemingly increased over the last five years, reaching a recent high of $20 million in 2021/22.

Key changes to South Africa’s cooperation programme over time

Volumes of South Africa’s cooperation have been consistently inconsistent, with annual disbursements fluctuating widely over the past two decades. Such volatility is at least partly the result of the responsiveness of South Africa’s cooperation programme to regional demand for humanitarian assistance—in 2012/13, for instance, the ARF reports receiving “unprecedented” requests for humanitarian support. However, the sectoral and geographic emphasis of South Africa’s development cooperation has remained stable over time, maintaining a strong focus on regional development, and using South Africa’s experience with transition from apartheid to share lessons on peace-building and governance to deepen regional stability, primarily via technical exchanges, capacity-building programmes, and triangular cooperation. Indeed, the regional focus of South Africa’s development programme is deeply ingrained, with each government since the apartheid putting Africa at the centre of its foreign policy.

The regional focus of South Africa’s cooperation also means that most of its development partnerships are with regional entities such as the AU or SADC. Indeed, South Africa’s development leadership in its region is evident through its role in establishing and transforming key regional architecture, including its role in the creation of NEPAD. As regards extra-regional partnerships for development, South Africa’s early partnerships with the OECD in the 1990s and 2000s, which included participation in forums for development effectiveness seemingly waned during the Zuma administration in the 2010s, when emphasis was instead on cooperation with BRICS members. South Africa appears to see engagement in development partnerships with “traditional” development providers as a way of enhancing its “bridging” role on a strategic level. South Africa has also participated in at least 29 newly-initiated triangular cooperation projects since 2012, and, perhaps notably, appears to utilize triangular cooperation instrumentally to deepen its cooperation—and presumably strengthen relations with bilateral partners—without requiring heavy financial investment.

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164 Sidiropolous, “South Africa in Global Development Fora.”
165 Mthembu, “South Africa as a Development Partner.”
166 Van der Westhuizen and Milani, “Development Cooperation, the International–Domestic Nexus and the Graduation Dilemma.”
4.4 Türkiye

In 2021, Türkiye’s development cooperation—measured as ODA reported to the OECD—was valued at US$7.7 billion, equivalent to 1% of GNI, making it among the top 10 ODA providers in both absolute and relative terms. The bulk of Türkiye’s cooperation is provided bilaterally in the form of grants, primarily for humanitarian assistance, while multilateral engagement—valued at US$91 million in 2020—was provided as core support to UN agencies (65%), regional development banks (23%) and other multilateral institutions (9%). Türkiye’s bilateral cooperation is primarily implemented by the Turkish International Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), which now sits under the Ministry of Culture, and works in 150 countries through primarily providing technical assistance to support institutional capacity building, and scholarships. Key sectors for Türkiye’s cooperation include food security, employment, combating inequality, and supporting peace, the rule of law, and governance. The OECD also reports that TIKA finances infrastructure projects for irrigation, transport, sanitation, schools and hospitals and engages in triangular cooperation, including as a member of the Global Partnership Initiative of Triangular Cooperation, although it does not report on its triangular projects to TOSSD or the DAC, and has only recorded one new trilateral project to the relevant OECD database since 2018.

A brief history of Türkiye’s cooperation

Türkiye’s outward cooperation programme formally began in the 1980s, when the foreign policy of Özal’s government saw development cooperation as a tool for advancing Türkiye’s integration with the world economy. While Türkiye had previously participated in both the Bandung Conference of 1955 and the 1978 BAPA meeting, its close ties to the United States and NATO during the Cold War put it at odds with other participants’ ideas of mutual assistance under “non-alignment”. By the mid-1980s, Türkiye’s export-oriented economic strategy and growing wealth emboldened leaders to use ODA as a tool for promoting increased international visibility and exports to frontier markets, especially in Africa. In 1985, Türkiye initiated its first outward development cooperation project, providing $10 million in food aid to six African countries.

In the 1990s, continuation of Türkiye’s pro-Western foreign policy facilitated increased participation in DAC development fora—including becoming an observer to the OECD-DAC in 1991—while the breakdown of the USSR saw a shift in cooperation priorities from Africa to Central

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169 Ibid.
171 Musa Kulaklıkaya and Rahman Nurdun, “Turkey as a New Player in Development Cooperation,” Insight Turkey 12, no. 4 (2010): 133.
Asia and the Caucasus. The reorientation of Türkiye’s cooperation was formalized alongside the 1992 creation of TIKA, which was given a mandate to address the immediate needs of Eurasian countries, especially the “Turkic republics” in Central Asia, with which it shared cultural, linguistic, and historical ties. During the period, TIKA’s cooperation encompassed technical, economic, humanitarian, and cultural and scientific cooperation. Towards the late 90s, Türkiye scaled up its training and capacity building initiatives—especially focused on private sector development in transition economies—frequently delivering these activities in cooperation with multilateral agencies like the OECD Istanbul Private Sector Development Centre and World Bank Institute. Despite the creation of TIKA, Türkiye’s cooperation volumes remained relatively low over the decade—averaging approximately US$82 million per year between 1991–1999.

While economic crisis in the early 2000s shifted the focus of Türkiye’s cooperation increasingly toward a tool for enhancing regional security and boosting trade, which subsequently led to a prioritization of cooperation with the Middle East and Africa, rapid economic growth throughout the decade contributed to large increases in its cooperation spending alongside expanded participation in international development fora. Across the 2000s, Türkiye’s ODA increased from US$87 million in 2000 to US$436 million by 2009 (see Figure 15), most of which was allocated bilaterally and focused on a combination of capacity-building projects and infrastructure investments—especially the construction of schools and hospitals. Between 2002 and 2010, social infrastructure and services accounted for 50% of ODA disbursements; compared with 15% for humanitarian assistance and 5% for economic infrastructure and services. At the same time, growing flows were coupled with continued dialogue with other cooperation providers, including both DAC-led initiatives and wider fora. In 2005, Türkiye was party to the OECD’s Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, and in 2006, initiated a policy dialogue between DAC and non-DAC OECD members in Istanbul, which was followed by a second meeting hosted by Korea in 2007.

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177 Authors’ calculations based on data sourced from the OECD’s DAC1 dataset. Figures report net disbursements in constant 2020 prices.
179 Authors’ calculations based on OECD DAC Table 1 figures and reports net disbursements in constant prices.
180 See compilation of TIKA reporting from Turhan, “Turkey as an Emerging Donor in the Development Community” 6; OECD data on sectorial allocation for Turkey is available only from 2001 onward.
181 Based on OECD DAC Table 5 data. In the same period, finance “unallocated” to specific sectors accounted for 24% of Turkish ODA.
182 Kulaklıkaya and Aybey, “An Emerging Donor in the Mediterranean Basin.”
Türkiye also continued to cooperate with the UNDP under its “Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries” mechanism to promote the concept of regional SSC.¹⁸³

In the early 2010s, Türkiye further increased its development cooperation in response to regional instability in the Middle East caused by the Arab Spring and developed a strong humanitarian focus under the emblem of a new “humanitarian diplomacy”.¹⁸⁴ Whereas social infrastructure had been the primary sector in the prior decade, Türkiye’s humanitarian ODA increased from 16% to 91% of total flows between 2010 and 2020. Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya became important new cooperation partners, while ODA to existing partners in the Middle East—such as Syria, Yemen, and Palestine—saw large increases.¹⁸⁵ According to TIKA, the Middle East has consistently been the most significant region of cooperation between 2012 and 2019, although non-regional partners (i.e., Somalia, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan) are also within its top-ten recipients.¹⁸⁶ A substantial share of cooperation allocated to the Middle East, however, can be attributed to in-donor refugee costs, including for Syrian refugees.¹⁸⁷ Alongside “humanitarian diplomacy”, the “Turkish-Type Development Assistance Model” (TDAM) emerged as a leading concept in the mid-2010s, based a “non-hierarchical” and “human-oriented” vision of cooperation that prioritises local presence and bilateral engagements—indeed, TIKA maintains a large network of over 50 field offices, including in several fragile and conflict-affected states.¹⁸⁸ By 2019, Türkiye’s commitment to humanitarianism and the resulting ODA/GNI ratio of 1.2% made it the “most generous donor country in the world”.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁵ Altunisik. “Turkey as an ‘Emerging Donor’ and the Arab Uprisings,” 337; see also Table 1 on p. 347.
¹⁸⁶ Turhan. “Turkey as an Emerging Donor in the Development Community,” 7. Figure 2.
¹⁸⁷ Ibid., 12.
¹⁸⁸ Turhan. “Turkey as an Emerging Donor in the Development Community,” 8–9. TIKA maintains a large network of field offices—62 PCOs, covering 60 countries. See also: OECD. “Turkey Development Co-operation Profile.”
However, despite growing bilateral cooperation throughout the 2000s, Türkiye’s interest and involvement in global development partnerships since 2011 presents a mixed picture. On one hand, Türkiye’s relations with the DAC appear to have recently cooled, likely driven by increasing tensions with the EU and its member states (which form the bulk of DAC member countries) and a desire to strengthen ties with “rising powers” or Islamic political-economic institutions which sit outside of the DAC. Indeed, has shown ”no political desire” to upgrade its observer status to the OECD-DAC into full membership, despite fulfilling all the criteria since 2013, and has largely disengaged from post-Busan international processes on development effectiveness. On the other hand, Türkiye has remained active within the UN system, hosting the UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries in Istanbul—which led to the “Istanbul target” that encouraged countries to increase the share of ODA allocated towards the poorest countries, and in 2016, hosting the first World Humanitarian Summit alongside UN OCHA. More recently, Türkiye hosted the 2019 high-level DG forum on development cooperation with the UNOSSC, under the theme of “charting the post-BAPA+40 roadmap for South-South and triangular cooperation”. Türkiye also continues to prioritize bilateral and trilateral partnerships with a range of development actors. For instance, in 2023, TIKA signed a Memorandum

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192 Hausmann and Lundsgaarde, “Turkey’s Role in Development Cooperation.”

of Understanding with the Thai cooperation agency (TICA) and is pursuing further agreements on development cooperation with 14 bilateral and multilateral agencies, including the UK and Indonesia.¹⁹⁴

**Key changes to Türkiye’s development cooperation over time**

Major expansions or shifts to Türkiye’s development cooperation programme followed both its domestic economic context as well as significant geopolitical events within its region. The first “phase” of expansion in Türkiye’s cooperation programme in the 1990s followed the creation of new “Turkic republics” in Central Asia after the end of the Cold War, although slow economic growth towards the end of the decade prevented a more major scale-up. Further increases in the volume of Türkiye’s development cooperation throughout the 2000s were precipitated by strong GDP growth over the decade, which averaged 7% annually between 2002–2007, and led Türkiye to reach UMIC status in 2004.¹⁹⁵ Even more substantive increases in Türkiye’s cooperation volumes throughout the early 2010s followed regional instability caused by the Arab Spring. Indeed, the impetus to respond to regional crises also appears to drive shifts in sectors of assistance, with Türkiye becoming a major humanitarian provider especially in response to the emergencies in Syria and Yemen. Similarly, growing regional instability contributed to shifts in Türkiye’s prioritised partner countries, which moved from former Soviet bloc countries in the 1990s to neighbours in the Middle East by the 2010s.

In terms of partnerships with other development providers, **Türkiye’s engagement has fluctuated alongside its foreign policy priorities.** Throughout the 1990s, Türkiye’s engagement with the OECD as a nascent development actor was seemingly facilitated by its broader foreign policy alignment with the West and its government’s hopes of accession to the EU. This continued throughout the 2000s, with Türkiye remaining active in OECD–DAC development discussions, including around effectiveness. However, by the 2010s, efforts to deepen ties with “rising powers” outside the DAC as well as tensions with EU members saw Türkiye’s engagement on development cooperation shift towards the UN system. Türkiye also engages in triangular cooperation—having participated in 12 projects since 2012 in the last decade, and one when counting from 2018 onwards.¹⁹⁶ However, these relatively low numbers of projects indicate that Türkiye has been “reluctant” to engage in triangular projects.¹⁹⁷ When it does engage trilaterally, Türkiye tends to do so with “Eastern

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¹⁹⁵ World Bank historical data (2004 date refers to calendar year); growth rate taken from World Bank GDP growth data.

¹⁹⁶ Authors’ analysis based on OECD, “Triangular Co-operation Repository of Projects.”

development agencies and international organisations” rather than Western OECD DAC members, perhaps in line with its shifting focus away from the “West”.198

4.5 United Arab Emirates

In 2021, the UAE provided US$1.5 billion in ODA, equivalent to approximately 0.4 percent of its GNI, of which the bulk (almost 99 percent) was considered bilateral cooperation.199 Roughly 85 percent of this assistance was allocated to Africa and the Middle East.200 Perhaps notably, most of the UAE’s cooperation is provided as grants. The strategic direction of the UAE’s cooperation program is set out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MOFAIC), which was created in 2016 as a result of a merger between the foreign ministry and the Ministry of International Cooperation and Development.201 MOFAIC’s 2017 Foreign Assistance Policy identifies several priority themes, including transport and urban infrastructure, governance, and the empowerment and protection of women. The policy also highlights key intentions to build development partnerships with other donors and organizations, including through triangular and SSC modalities, as well as making the UAE’s ODA more “transparent, accountable and focused on results.”202

A brief history of the UAE’s cooperation

The UAE’s development cooperation program emerged as part of its foreign policy in 1971, the same year the country gained independence. The founder of the UAE, Sheikh Zayed, was a strong supporter of using development cooperation as a tool to strengthen regional and Arab solidarity, improve relationships with neighbors, and enhance the new federation’s legitimacy, security, and survival in the post-independence period.203 To help achieve these aims, the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Development (ADFD) was set up in 1971 as the first institution for outward cooperation, with full autonomy to provide grants, loans, and technical assistance to other Arabic countries and was granted initial capital of AED 2 billion.204

As the UAE’s wealth grew in the 1970s—and especially following the increase in oil prices in 1973 and 1974—it expanded both its engagement in regional development forums as well as the volume of its development cooperation. The scale-up in the UAE’s cooperation over this period was sizeable, with ODA increasing from approximately US$587 million to a peak of US$8.47 billion in 1976, equivalent to 13 percent of GDP (see Figure 16). While the UAE’s cooperation declined steadily throughout the

200 Authors’ own analysis using data from OECD’s Creditor Reporting System.
204 Almezaini, The UAE and Foreign Policy, 49.
rest of the decade, it remained relatively high, at US$4.59 billion by 1979. Throughout the decade, the bulk of the UAE’s ODA was provided bilaterally as budget support (grants) and loans to other governments and was primarily allocated to other Arab countries. At the same time—and in line with Sheikh Zayed’s strong focus on Arab regionalism and solidarity—the UAE established and participated in several coordination mechanisms with Arab providers. In 1975, for instance, the ADFD participated as a founding member of the Arab Coordination Group (ACG), which works to harmonize operational practice and encourage coordination and collaboration for development across four bilateral and six multilateral Arab agencies. The UAE also participated in the Arab Gulf program for the UN, which was established in 1981 to help coordinate Arab countries’ humanitarian contributions to fifteen UN bodies.

However, by the mid-1980s, the UAE’s ODA outflows had sharply declined following the collapse of the price of oil, beginning a period of stagnation that would last two decades (Figure 16). The effects of the “oil glut” on domestic revenues were compounded by high population growth rates, which—especially due to the rentier nature of the UAE economy—required more substantial expenditures on subsidies for citizens. While ODA volumes briefly rose in the 1990s as oil prices rebounded, geopolitical instability following the end of the Cold War contributed to a decade marked by significant volatility and high year-on-year fluctuations in ODA volumes. Cooperation continued to be provided primarily as bilateral government budget support, mainly to MENA countries—which received 76 percent of total Emirati ODA between 1983 and 1999.

205 Figures compiled from DAC Table 1 statistics on ODA, adjusted to 2020 constant prices; data on GDP taken from the World Bank.
206 Almezaini, *The UAE and Foreign Policy*, 112 and 156.
208 Almezaini, *The UAE and Foreign Policy*.
212 Based on calculations from figures in the OECD DAC Table 3a.
In the 2000s, the UAE began targeting new recipients, focusing on a broader group of Muslim, rather than Arab, cultural identities, and expanding the mandate for ADFD to include all developing countries. This diversification of development partners was driven by a combination of solidarity with Muslim countries and efforts to use cooperation as a tool to “counter negative sentiment” worldwide in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. While the volume of the UAE’s cooperation programs saw only “cautious increases” throughout the decade, even amidst soaring oil revenues during the “second oil boom” of 2003–2008, the growing diversity of UAE partner countries led to significant resources being channeled toward primarily Muslim countries, including Pakistan and Palestine. Toward the end of the decade, the UAE also began collecting relevant statistics on both governmental and nongovernmental cooperation programs to enhance its transparency and international profile as a cooperation provider, as well as improve the coordination of its humanitarian engagement. In 2009, the UAE began to report on its activities to the DAC, including retrospective analysis of data since 1971.

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214 Harmáček, Opršal, and Vítová, “Aid, Trade or Faith?” 775.


218 This was also tied to the creation of the Office for the Coordination of Foreign Aid (OCFA) in the same year; see also: Logan Cochrane, “The United Arab Emirates as a Global Donor: What a Decade of Foreign Aid Data Transparency Reveals,” *Development Studies Research* 8, no. 1 (January 1, 2021): 49–62.
The 2010s saw a marked expansion and refocus of the UAE’s cooperation, both in terms of ODA volumes and its openness to partnerships, largely in response to regional instability following the Arab Spring. The change of Egyptian governments in 2013 represented a crucial turning point, precipitating a six-fold increase in the UAE’s total ODA, which grew from US$736 million in 2012 to US$5.19 billion in 2013 (Figure 16), the bulk of which was allocated to MENA countries. At the same time, geopolitical shifts within the Gulf—including the Arab Spring and the 2017 Qatar blockade—led the UAE to explore relationships beyond the MENA region, as regional rivalries and divergent interests made collective action more difficult. Such efforts to diversify relationships are partly visible through a slight re-orientation of ODA to countries beyond MENA—Serbia and Sudan, for instance, have been among the UAE’s top five bilateral ODA recipients between 2012 and 2020—and an increase in the UAE’s multilateral engagement, with contributions to or through multilateral agencies making up 8 percent of the total portfolio across the decade (in contrast with 1 percent or less in prior decades; see Figure 16). In 2020, roughly half of the UAE’s ODA was committed as budget support, while of the sector-allocable ODA (i.e., excluding budget support or multilateral core contributions), the largest sectors were humanitarian assistance and social infrastructure and services, mainly targeting health, education, and civil society.

More clearly, however, the UAE has expanded the breadth of its international partnerships significantly over the last decade, participating in the annual Arab–DAC Dialogue on Development through the ACG from 2010 onward and, in 2014, joining the DAC as a participant. More recently, the UAE established a Global Council for the SDGs during the 2018 World Government Summit in Dubai, which aimed to create a multi-dimensional network of cooperation between local and national governments, international organizations, the private sector, and civil society. It also launched the Humanitarian Logistics Data Bank to enable the real-time exchange of information between actors on international crises. It has also expanded bilateral partnerships, signing a new agreement with the EU to develop more strategic cooperation, including in areas related to the SDGs.

221 Authors’ calculations based on CRS data.
222 All data is based on: OECD DAC. UAE Development Co-operation Profile, 2022. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/153f7558-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/153f7558-en#chapter-d1e58011
225 Krzymowski, “Role and Significance of the United Arab Emirates Foreign Aid.”
Key changes to the UAEs development cooperation over time

Over time, key changes to the UAE’s cooperation appeared in response to both its domestic economic circumstances—which have historically been especially dependant on global oil prices—as well as key geopolitical or regional challenges. In terms of financial cooperation volumes, the UAE’s cooperation was relatively high throughout the 1970s, against the backdrop of the high price of oil throughout the decade and at least partly motivated by the UAE’s desire to use cooperation as a tool to enhance its regional security and legitimacy as a newly established country. However, volumes declined throughout the 1980s alongside the collapse in the price of oil and remained low until the 2010s—even despite a rebound in oil prices throughout the early 2000s. While the UAE somewhat expanded the diversity of its cooperation partners beyond MENA countries in the 2000s following the September 11 attacks—since the 2010s, the bulk of the UAE’s cooperation has been focused on its own neighborhood. The scale-up and allocation of UAE cooperation since the 2010s have been driven by the need to respond to the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Despite fluctuating cooperation volumes, key modalities of support have remained relatively constant over time, with the UAE primarily allocating financial support (e.g., concessional loans and grants) largely within its region.

In its engagement with other development providers, the UAE’s openness to partnerships has seemingly expanded in recent years. In the early phases of cooperation, the UAE prioritized regional spaces, such as the ACG and Arab Gulf program for the UN, as key venues for coordination, especially with other Gulf donors. However, since 2009, the UAE has engaged more actively with the OECD—joining the DAC as a participant and re-engaging in the Arab–DAC dialogues—as well as reporting cooperation flows to the OECD’s database. The UAE also cooperates via triangular cooperation partnerships, although it is not a member of the GPI and its reported engagement in triangular cooperation is seemingly low, with just three new projects identified since 2012 and no new projects since 2018.²²⁶

4.6 Key takeaways from the case studies

Across the case studies, broad changes in cooperation over time both confirm findings from our mapping and add new insight into how and why non-DACs cooperate for development. Our four key findings are presented below.

1. The cases confirm that the modality of cooperation tends to change across income levels, highlighting the importance of nonfinancial technical or political cooperation at lower income levels.

In alignment with findings from the mapping exercise, the cases generally show a trend in terms of the cooperation modalities used by countries at different levels of income, with providers at lower-income levels typically prioritizing nonfinancial cooperation.

²²⁶ Authors’ analysis based on OECD, “Triangular Co-operation Repository of Projects.”
modalities—such as study visits, capacity-building programs, and technical and vocational trainings. Such forms of exchange were a primary component of both Mexico and Türkiye’s cooperation programs when they first gained momentum in the 1970s and 1990s, and technical cooperation continues to be an important modality for both Indonesia and South Africa today (as the two countries with the lowest income-levels within the case studies; see Table 1 above).\(^{227}\) Importantly, these modalities tend to rely on pre-existing capacities across government, meaning that at early phases of development engagement, most providers frequently draw from the knowledge and skills available across line ministries rather than investing heavily in developing centralized, coordinated, and dedicated capacities or institutions for cooperation. Indeed, across the cases, technical cooperation seems to be a common starting point, with the thematic focus of cooperation offers differing based on the expertise each country wants to highlight internationally. For example, South Africa hopes to share its expertise in peace-building and political transition based on its own post-apartheid experiences, while Indonesia’s training programs have historically focused on agriculture or economic development. Additionally, the cases show some non-DAC providers may also prioritize political cooperation at lower income levels, either by spearheading new development initiatives or by working through existing international forums like the UN to raise the profile of development issues.\(^{228}\) This was the case, for instance, with Indonesia’s political leadership at the Bandung Conference or NAM in the 1950s and 1960s, or South Africa’s engagement at the UN and AU in the 1990s. By contrast, higher-income economies—notably the UAE—tended to rely on ODA-like cooperation, including grant and loan financing, from early periods of development engagement, likely due to the greater availability of such financial resources.

The observed relationship between income level and the type of cooperation modality used—particularly lower preferences for financial cooperation at lower income levels—could have implications for how non-DAC providers are willing (or able) to collaborate for development with a broader array of partners. Specifically, it raises questions about the degree to which countries are likely to be open to partnerships that require an investment of either human or financial resources. For instance, LICs prioritizing technical exchanges may be unwilling or unable to participate in development cooperation that requires a financial or human resource commitment, whereby limited resources become a barrier to engagement. In such cases, partners hoping to engage with lower-income non-DAC actors

\(^{227}\) The only exception to this trend among the five case studies is the UAE, which began its cooperation program primarily by providing budgetary support against the backdrop of rapid economic growth during the oil boom in the 1970s.

\(^{228}\) Political cooperation, though it would not fit within the definition of ODA, is often included as a form of SSC and fits within the “Bandung spirit,” which hoped for broad solidarity and mutual support across economic, political, and cultural dimensions. Such development-relevant political cooperation is also evident from other non-DAC providers beyond the five countries studied in depth within this paper. Some notable examples include India’s initiation of the Delhi Process, Costa Rica’s leadership in initiating the COVID-19 Technology Access Pool (C-TAP) with the World Health Organization, and China’s efforts at setting up the Global Development Initiative.
may need to consider covering or subsidizing costs of participation when development resources are constrained, or at the very least, ensuring that the costs of participation are kept to a minimum. Going forward, understanding how resource availability affects participation in development engagement could provide a first step toward thinking about how to encourage deeper partnerships for collaboration on development.

2. **Over time, volumes of development cooperation from case study countries appear volatile and often linked to changes in the macroeconomic or political environments.**

Where time-series data is available, data from the case studies shows that volumes of reported development cooperation appear to fluctuate considerably over time. In the case of the UAE, for instance, high cooperation volumes throughout the 1970s were followed by much lower allocations throughout the 1980s and fluctuated throughout the 1990s and 2000s before rising again in the 2010s. Similarly, Türkiye’s early cooperation in the 1990s and early 2000s experienced significant year-on-year fluctuations before achieving more stable growth and overall higher volumes following the mid-2000s. While for the UAE, some of this variation can be explained by a well-established positive relationship between volumes of grants and loans from Arab providers and oil revenues, political events in the Gulf region—such as the 1991 Gulf War and the Arab Spring, seemingly correspond to large spikes in cooperation from both Türkiye and the UAE. Similarly, Mexico and South Africa show significant year-on-year variation across periods where data is available. While in Mexico, large spikes can be explained by exceptional debt relief in 2013, for South Africa, large spikes in spending appear to be linked to responses to humanitarian demand, rather than as part of planned scale-ups. Indeed, data from all non-DAC providers reporting to the DAC shows similar fluctuations in cooperation volumes (see Figure 3), though this was primarily driven by cooperation from Arab providers.

To a degree, the volatility of non-DAC cooperation volumes—at least as evidenced by the available data—raises questions about the reliability of such flows in response to global events and shocks. Indeed, recent evidence from responses to COVID-19 show declines in cooperation volumes from non-DAC actors, including major BRICS providers, in the first year of the pandemic. This stands in contrast to cooperation from DAC members, which is now commonly viewed as a countercyclical resource during periods of crisis.


230 More broadly, however, it is perhaps notable that the narrative cases point to a similar cooperation trajectory, with clear “lulls” for all cases throughout the 1980s and 1990s, with a deepening focus on cooperation—and scale-up of resources—seemingly visible from the 2000s onward.

231 Calleja et al., “Global Development Paradigm for a World in Crisis.”

While cooperation from non-DAC providers is often nonfinancial (e.g., technical or in-kind exchanges)—and indeed, there is evidence that such cooperation continued, if not expanded, in response to the COVID-19 crisis—the volatility of available development financing from non-DAC providers raises important questions about how and whether ability and willingness to cooperate could fluctuate alongside broader changes in the global economic and political context.

3. **The regional focus of development engagements and partnerships is informed by security concerns and income levels.**

Perhaps most clearly, the cases highlight the importance of regional cooperation for non-DAC providers, pointing to two main trends. First, it is clear that over time, countries tend to focus—and refocus—on their region to support regional stability, with regional crises seemingly precipitating a scale-up in cooperation volumes as a response and presumably to prevent potential spillovers at the border. Consider, for instance, that Mexico’s cooperation with Central America expanded throughout the 1980s and 1990s in response to internal conflict in neighboring countries, where cooperation—including humanitarian aid for refugees—was seen as a way to support regional stability. More recently, both Türkiye and the UAE scaled-up cooperation in their regions during the 2010s in response to the Arab Spring. In both cases, regional prioritization over the 2010s marked a refocus of cooperation in their region, following more global allocations in the prior decade to advance trade linkages (Türkiye) and support non-regional Muslim countries in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks (UAE).

Second, the cases show some evidence of countries prioritizing regional cooperation at lower levels of income. Indonesia, for instance, which primarily focused its early cooperation within its region, rising incomes since the 2000s have led to increasing cooperation flows outside of Asia and the Pacific—especially with other Muslim countries and Africa, with the new administration targeting Palestine as a key partner. Similarly, in the 2010s, Mexico’s cooperation, though still heavily focused within its region, has expanded to Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. While the regional focus of non-DAC cooperation is not surprising—particularly at lower income levels where shared languages, cultures, and geographic proximity should make regional cooperation more feasible—it is also notable that the regional focus of cooperation appears the strongest at the early phases of cooperation in all cases, raising questions about how and whether institutional capacity may also contribute to the regional focus of non-DAC engagement, particularly in the years following institutionalization.

Mirroring the regional focus of their development cooperation, most of the case countries also choose to partner with other cooperation providers through regional development institutions. Most notably, South Africa stands out as a strong participant in regional cooperation efforts, engaging most actively through the AU, NEPAD, and SADC and often
taking a leading role in the creation of regional spaces for development engagement. Across other cases, Mexico also displays a strong propensity for cooperation through regional spaces, leading to the creation of the Tuxtla mechanism in 1991, and contributing to a range of regional mechanisms designed to monitor and report South-South flows, including the annual SEGIB report. 233 Similarly, Indonesia and the UAE cooperate through regional forums or organizations such as the AIIB or ASEAN, and ACG, respectively. By contrast, the regional focus of Türkiye’s bilateral cooperation is not clearly matched through regional channels of cooperation for development, though this may partly be driven by the country’s location at the intersection of several major regions. For instance, while the bulk of the Türkiye’s reported multilateral cooperation was allocated to regional development banks in each year from 2016 to 2019, the specific receiving organization differed over time, with large contributions provided to the African Development Fund in 2017 (52 percent of Türkiye’s total reported multilateral spending that year) and the AIIB in 2016, 2018, and 2019 (valued at 71 percent, 50 percent, and 45 percent of reported multilateral flows each year, respectively). The relatively clear prioritization of regional cooperation highlights the role of regional forums for cooperation on development and suggests that deepening development dialogues could be supported through engaging via regional forums.

4. **The cases show that non-DAC countries are willing to engage in extra-regional partnerships for development, but how, with whom, and through which forums countries cooperate with other development providers is a function of the practical and political benefits of such partnerships.**

Across the case studies, we see two key types of extra-regional cooperation—namely, triangular and diplomatic engagements. In both cases, the specifics of how non-DAC providers engage are linked to both practical—including financial—considerations, as well as political and strategic priorities. In terms of triangular cooperation, practical considerations are most clearly seen through the use of triangular partnerships by middle-income case countries—notably Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, and to a more limited extent, Türkiye—which appeared to leverage triangular engagements to support their South-South cooperation either through accessing co-financing (primarily in the case of South Africa in the 2000s or Indonesia throughout the 1980s and 1990s) or leveraging the expertise or technical capacity in other provider countries (evident in both Indonesia and Mexico’s recent trilateral engagements). In line with these practical motivations, the decreasing use of triangular cooperation in recent years by Türkiye has been attributed to dwindling demand “for this type of know-how from DAC donors,” given that TIKA has

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already been advised by the UNDP for many years and has “institutionally come of age within the traditional donor regime.”

In addition, openness to triangular engagement and the choice of triangular cooperation partners is also a function of countries’ broader political priorities and the strategic benefits they expect to achieve through strengthening cooperation structures and improving relations with other providers involved. Whereas OECD DAC actors have historically used triangular cooperation in the hopes of diffusing cooperation norms, openness to participation in triangular partnerships from non-DAC providers is also intended as a signal of interest in broader cooperation. Perhaps importantly, the use of triangular cooperation by middle-income providers—with the UAE, as a high-income country, seemingly showing the lowest prioritization for triangular engagement across the five case study counties—is also unsurprising given the importance of triangular engagement as a way for DAC members and middle-income providers to continue working together after bilateral ODA is phased out, providing a space and forum for partners to maintain and strengthen policy dialogue. Indeed, with inward ODA flows often declining as income increases, triangular cooperation can become an important modality not only for maintaining development relations but also to help “transform the donor-recipient relationship to one based on partnership for national, regional, and global development” as countries near graduation from ODA. Indeed, our finding that both practical and strategic benefits of trilateral cooperation are important aligns with the findings from a 2015 OECD survey of countries engaged in triangular cooperation, which found that the main motivations for engagement across Southern partners included sharing experiences with SSC partners, receiving support from other providers to build capacities for engaging in development cooperation, and strengthening relations with both other providers and SSC partners, as well as sharing cooperation costs.

In terms of diplomatic partnerships for development, all case study countries showed some willingness to participate in development dialogues hosted at the international level, primarily through the UN—which has historically served as a key venue for the South–South paradigm via

234 Tüyloğlu, “Turkish Development Assistance as a Foreign Policy Tool and Its Discordant Locations.”
235 See also Marcus Kaplan, Dennis Busemann, and Kristina Wirtgen, “Trilateral Cooperation in German Development Cooperation” (Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, 2020), 11.
238 OECD, “Dispelling the Myths of Triangular Co-operation;” Calleja and Prizzon, “Moving Away from Aid: The Experience of Mexico.”
the G77, UNCTAD, and, most recently, the UNOSSC—and the DAC. The latter serves as the body responsible for creating norms around development cooperation, yet for “structural, historical and political reasons,” has often struggled to engage non-DAC providers. 241 Between these spaces, how and through which forums countries cooperate shift alongside political prioritization of relations with the DAC members versus other non-DAC providers, often based on wider perceived economic and trade benefits of engagement.

The Mexican case provides one of the clearest examples. While Mexico’s early cooperation for development utilized UN-based forums, participating in the G77 and BAPA initiatives. By the 1990s, Mexico’s emergence as a global “model reformer” in alignment with Washington Consensus ideals and participation in NAFTA to improve economic relationships with global North trading partners led it to join the OECD as an observer in 1994. For Mexico, its admission to the OECD meant rescinding its G77 membership, functionally positioning Mexico closer to the DAC—and DAC-led dialogues—than with key UN spaces for South–South engagement. In the years that followed, Mexico remained active in both forums, hosting the Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development through the UN and participating in OECD development effectiveness discourses—including hosting the first High-Level Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) in Mexico City in 2014—and participating in LAC-DAC dialogues from 2019 onward. In the case of Türkiye, which is a founding member of the OECD and became a DAC observer in the 1990s, a “cooling” of relations with the West, partly due to tensions with EU members, weakened engagement through DAC systems, with Türkiye instead prioritizing development discourse via the UN system in an effort to deepen ties with “rising powers.” South Africa saw a similar “turning away” from the DAC in favor of cooperation with BRICS actors through “South-led” initiatives (e.g., NDB, IBSA) during the Zuma administration. By contrast, Indonesia has seemingly maintained participation through UN forums while expanding OECD-DAC engagement alongside the growth of its cooperation program, for instance, through joining the OECD’s Development Center, while the UAE has also cooperated actively through both UN and OECD forums.

Broadly, the ebb and flow of engagement via UN and OECD development spaces can be—at least partially—linked to their perceived legitimacy as forums for development dialogue. In particular, the OECD-DAC has faced challenges as a “donor forum” due to both the growth of non-DAC cooperation (and their rejection of DAC norms), and the exclusiveness of its membership, which represents only a small portion of development actors. 242 Indeed, OECD-DAC has typically been seen as talking “about,” rather than “to,” non-DAC providers or partner countries. 243 The DAC has since initiated

reforms aimed at creating more space for collaboration with non-DAC actors, including through the 2006 organization of the OECD Global Forum on Development together with the Development Center, the creation of the GPI in 2016, and the organization of the first LAC–DAC dialogue that same year. Still, there remain concerns about the legitimacy of the “Northern” dominated DAC as a space for development dialogue, particularly alongside UN alternatives—notably the Development Cooperation Forum (DCF)—which is seen by some as a more inclusive forum. At the same time, however, DCF is hardly a cooperation panacea, with its broad inclusivity matched by its perception as a “talk shop” rather than a forum for effectively tackling development challenges. Indeed, while the engagement of most of the case countries in both DAC and UN cooperation forums could be seen as openness to utilizing the relative strengths of each for development partnerships, there are questions about whether such openness is matched across the broader landscape of cooperation providers.

5. Which countries are most open to multi-partner engagement for development?

This section explores differences in how non-DAC providers participate in international spaces for dialogue or shared action on development issues. To do so, we develop a novel composite indicator that captures openness to multi-partner engagements for development by measuring non-DAC participation in triangular, regional, or multilateral fora for development discourse, action, or reporting. We map this “openness” variable, against the income per capita of provider countries to identify how, and whether, country openness to multi-actor partnerships changes across the theoretical capacity for countries to dedicate financial and human resources for development.

By mapping openness to partnerships for development, our framework aims to identify countries that appear most open to collaborating with other providers on development issues. Based on the findings from our prior work, which showed that collaboration for development between DAC and non-DAC providers was limited in responses to COVID-19, our aim is to capture and visualize variation in the degree to which providers participate in activities or forums that allow for exchanges on development issues. While this is necessarily an imperfect exercise, our modest aim is to provide a starting place for deeper consideration of which countries participate in collaborative development spaces, as well as and how partnerships across DAC and non-DAC actors can be strengthened in the years ahead. This exercise should be considered a snapshot of the current landscape, the results of which are likely to change over time as countries seek different forms or degrees of participation in multi-provider partnerships alongside changing priorities.

245 Verschaeve and Orbie, “The DAC is Dead, Long Live the DCF?”
246 Calleja et al., “A Global Development Paradigm for a World in Crisis.”
5.1 Indicators and methodology

To understand differences in non-DAC provider openness to multi-partner engagements for development, we create a simple framework that maps two key variables:

1. **Capacity**: measured as income per capita (Atlas method, World Bank Data). Based on our findings, which show that the income level of a country tends to mediate how it engages in development cooperation—with HICs able to engage in more diverse development offers than lower-middle-income counterparts—we assume that income per capita could also impact how and to what degree countries are able to participate in partnerships or international forums for development. As such, we see income per capita as a simple proxy for countries’ capacity to engage in development partnerships, with higher income countries more likely to have more staff dedicated to actively pursuing development partnerships and engagements through a wider variety of forums than lower income countries, which may have fewer staff or smaller budgets available for participating in development forums. We also visually represent the absolute scale of each country’s economy through the size of the “bubble” representing it within our framework visualization (see Figure 17).

2. **“Openness” to multi-partner engagements for development**: composite indicator measuring four types of engagement for development—(A) participation in international development forums; (B) reporting on cooperation; (C) trilateral cooperation; and (D) engagement in multilateral organisations or regional development banks. We selected these dimensions to cover key spaces or activities through which non-DAC and DAC members cooperate for development under the forums currently available. In all cases, we try to include development forums that are both relevant to DAC and non-DAC actors and could act as spaces for engagement across these groups, as well as spaces designed to foster deeper collaboration and engagement across diverse non-DAC providers.

For each of the four dimensions, we calculate a simple average of the sub-indicator scores to obtain a score out of 1 for each country on each dimension. These scores are then summed to obtain a total indicator score out of a maximum score of 4.

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247 This is done on the understanding that, in some cases, it could be the absolute scale of the country’s economy that mediates capacity to participate in international forums for development. For instance, evidence from the participation in multilateral meetings on disarmament shows that the number of meetings that countries attend increases alongside absolute GDP; those with larger economies are seen as more likely to have the human and financial resources to support participation in international forums (see Norwegian People’s Aid, 2020). Consider the difference between India—a middle-income country but G20 economy with a permanent mission of 40 staff in New York—versus Andorra—a high-income country with a much smaller economy and a permanent New York delegation of 4 officials—where India’s human resources likely facilitate participation in a larger number of official meetings and forums than Andorran counterparts (UN Bluebook, no year).
A. **Participation in international development forums** captures whether countries engage in typical international forums for discourse on development cooperation. This dimension is measured as the average of scores on two sub-indicators that capture participation in OECD and UN development-related forums:

A1: **Membership in the OECD’s Development Center’s Governing Board**

Countries receive a score of 1 if they are members of the OECD Development Center’s Governing Board, OECD members (who can attend DAC meetings) or DAC “participants”, and a score of 0 if they are not members or participants. This indicator rewards countries for the presumed willingness to engage in key OECD-DAC forums on development issues. All data for this indicator was sourced from the OECD website.

A2: **Participation in the 19th and 20th meetings of the UN’s High-level Committee for South-South Cooperation**—countries receive a score of 1 if they participated in either the 19th or 20th meeting of the UN’s High-Level Committee for South–South Cooperation and a score of 0 if they did not attend either forum. The High-Level Committee on South–South Cooperation is “the main policymaking body on South-South Cooperation in the United Nations system” and is open to representatives of UN member states and observers, and other multilateral, regional and non-governmental organizations, making it a key forum for discussion.

248 The OECD’s Development Center provides a forum for policy dialogue on development issues that is open to both OECD and non-OECD members, making it a unique space for countries to share knowledge and discuss development issues. The Development Center currently has 53 member countries. [https://www.oecd.org/dev/governing-board/](https://www.oecd.org/dev/governing-board/).

249 While we recognize that the OECD has a mandate beyond development, OECD members can take part in official DAC meetings and thematic work. Indeed, there is evidence that non-DAC OECD members adopt some development related recommendations and participate in select DAC forums. For instance, the 2022 OECD Development Cooperation Profiles note that Costa Rica routinely participates in Senior and High-level DAC meetings, while Costa Rica, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico participate in LAC-DAC dialogues. The cooperation profiles also note that other OECD members, including Estonia, Israel, Latvia, and Türkiye appear to adhere to some OECD development recommendations. Moreover, as of 2022, Estonia had submitted a formal request to join the DAC (see OECD, 2022).

250 We also considered indicators looking at Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) participation or participation in UN DCF High-Level Meetings. However, we were prevented by data limitations in both cases. The GPEDC did not publish a participants list for the 2022 meeting and does not have a list of member countries, and the data it produces is reported by partner countries, meaning that it cannot be used as a proxy for GPEDC participation. We also could not find a list of participants for recent DCF meetings; a list is available for 2019, but not for meetings since. Lastly, we considered awarding countries for attending the 2019 BAPA+40 meeting and tested versions of this indicator that awarded countries accordingly. Doing so primarily rewarded nine countries that have not participated in recent HLC SSC meetings, namely Andorra, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Kuwait, Palestine, and Singapore, most of which provide “ODA” rather than SSC and are typically less engaged in SSC forums. As a result, including BAPA+40 risks rewarding countries that typically do not participate in SSC policy-making spaces for attending a major SSC event.

indicator was sourced from Annex 1 of the Report of the High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation, for the 19th and 20th sessions.252

B. **Reporting on cooperation** captures openness to reporting cooperation efforts through shared platforms. The indicator is measured as the average of two sub-indicators that capture whether countries reported development cooperation data to the OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System and the TOSSD database:253

B1: **Reporting to the OECD Creditor Reporting System.** Countries receive a score of 1 if they reported to the OECD’s CRS in either 2020 or 2021 and a score of 0 if they did not report in either year.254

B2: **Reporting of Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD).** Countries receive a score of 1 if they reported to TOSSD in 2020 or 2021, and a score of 0 if they did not report data in the most recent years.255

C. **Joint financing and implementation through participation in triangular cooperation** aims to capture whether countries participate in development partnerships through triangular cooperation or engagement in key spaces for discourse on triangular cooperation. The indicator is measured as the average score of two sub-indicators:

C1: **Membership to the Global Partnership Initiative (GPI) on Effective Triangular Cooperation.** Countries receive a score of 1 if they are members of the GPI on effective trilateral cooperation or a score of 0 if they are not members. The GPI is a key platform for exchange on triangular cooperation and has been working to develop tools and standards for effective triangular cooperation.256

C2: **Participation in triangular projects** is measured using the OECD’s Triangular Cooperation repository of projects. Countries receive a score of 1 if they have participated in five or more new triangular cooperation projects since 2018,257 a score of 0.5 if they have participated in at least one but not more than four projects, so countries receive a full score for above average participation in triangular activities.

252 Available from the UN’s digital library at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/833241?ln=zh_EN.
253 While there is necessarily some correlation between the countries that report to each platform, we treat TOSSD and CRS reporting separately on the basis that they require separate reporting efforts and measure distinct concepts. Of the two, TOSSD is the most broadly applicable across sample countries, while CRS reporting is more relevant for countries that identify more closely with DAC members or as “ODA” providers. We tested several variations of this indicator, including rewarding points only for reporting to TOSSD. Doing so would penalize three countries that report to the CRS only—Bulgaria, Israel and Taiwan—and would reward countries that only report to TOSSD—Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Indonesia, Nigeria and Peru. In this iteration all countries remain in their current quadrants except Israel and Nigeria, which would move to the upper-left and lower-right quadrants, respectively.
254 Data for 2020 and 2021 reflected the most recent available at the time of writing. Data was sourced from the OECD’s Statistics database at: https://stats.oecd.org/.
255 Data for 2020 and 2021 reflected the most recent available at the time of writing. Data was sourced from the TOSSD database at: https://tossd.online/.
256 A full list of GPI members is available at: https://triangular-cooperation.org/members/.
257 Over the sample period, non-DAC countries that reported triangular projects were involved in an average of four projects, so countries receive a full score for above average participation in triangular activities.
triangular projects since 2018, and a score of 0 if they have not participated in any triangular cooperation projects newly reported in the database since 2018.258

D. **Engagement in multilateral or regional development organizations** aims to capture willingness to support and participate in regional development finance organizations as well as through UN multilateral agencies and bodies.

D1: **Cumulative voluntary contributions to the UN system and World Bank International Development Association (IDA) replenishments between 2019 and 2021 as a share of GNI.** We award countries scores between 0 and 1 based on how the volume of their contributions scaled to the size of their economy compares to the other non-DAC providers within our sample range.259 We focus exclusively on voluntary contributions, which provides an indication of how countries utilize multilateral forums beyond mandatory contributions (i.e., our indicator only captures spending that providers choose to allocate to or through multilateral channels). Countries whose relative cumulative contributions place above the upper quartile of the range of 54 non-DAC providers received 1 point; countries whose contributions place between the median and upper quartile of the range received 0.75 points; countries whose contributions placed between the first quartile and the median received 0.5 points; countries whose contributions placed below the first quartile received 0.25 points, and countries with no contributions to the UN between 2019 and 2021 received 0 points. Data on the UN was taken from the UN System Chief Executive Board for Coordination and includes both core and non-core voluntary contributions to ODA-eligible UN agencies and bodies for which

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258 While the Triangular Cooperation Repository remains the best database available for mapping triangular engagement across countries, the data suffers from several problems. Most notably, the data reported on the OECD’s Triangular Repository website is inconsistent across downloadable versions labeled “full database” versus data downloadable from a project map. For the purpose of this exercise, we use data downloaded from the “full database” (as of January, 2023). While the “map” data seems to have more recent reporting, it is unclear whether the data has been updated uniformly across all countries or whether it shows partial country updates. As a result, the full database appears the most consistent option. We also tested the “map” data and found that using this source would have limited effects on the results, with all countries remaining in the same quadrant except Ecuador and Guatemala which would shift from the mid-point to the lower-right quadrant. We also considered scaling this indicator to country GNI based on the understanding that larger economies may have greater capacity to engage more actively in triangular programming. Doing so would primarily penalize countries with larger economies, notably non-DAC G20 members, with India shifting off the mid-point to the lower-left quadrant as a result. All other countries remain in their current quadrants. Scores for the GNI scaled data were also highly correlated with current scores at 90%, suggesting that both versions capture similar variation.

259 We understand that some countries contribute to the multilateral system with spending earmarked for allocation in their own countries. (Mexico, for instance, pays the UNDP to hire contractors that then staff most of AMEXCID). While it could be argued that this use of multilateral contributions does not necessarily demonstrate support for “multilateralism” given that money returns to the provider country, we see the choice to engage with the multilateral system as the provider of a particular service as an indication of a willingness to engage with and utilize the mandate/expertise of multilateral organizations.
data was available.\textsuperscript{260} Data on IDA replenishments was taken from the World Bank and includes figures for the 19th and 20th replenishment cycles.\textsuperscript{261}

D2: **Share capital subscribed to major Regional Development Banks (RDBs) as a proportion of GNI.** Like multilateral contributions, we award countries scores between 0 and 1 based on the volume of their shareholder capital subscriptions in RDBs, scaled to the current size of their economy compared to the other non-DAC providers within the sample range. Countries whose capital subscribed in RDBs (as a proportion of their GNI) place above the upper quartile of the range received 1 point; countries whose subscribed capital as a share of GNI places between the median and upper quartile of the range received 0.75 points; countries whose capital subscriptions placed between the first quartile and median received 0.5 points; countries whose subscribed share of capital placed below the first quartile received 0.25 points, and countries with a subscribed share of capital in “major” RDBs received 0 points.\textsuperscript{262}

**Limitations**

The composite “openness” measure is necessarily a limited exercise which lends itself to further unpacking and development.

Notably, we recognize that there are three main limitations to our openness proxy:

- **This approach is unable to capture countries that might be diplomatically or bilaterally proactive but less visible in international forums.** This means that countries that operate primarily through bilateral diplomatic or development-oriented channels will not be rewarded for such engagement and may receive a lower openness scores than others with

\textsuperscript{260} List of ODA-eligible UN agencies was sourced from OECD-DAC’s CRS code-list available at: https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/dacandcodelists.htm. For some agencies, the OECD applies a coefficient to contributions that match the share of each organization’s activities which are development-related. For this exercise, we only include agencies with a coefficient of 50% or more as identified in the CRS code-list.


\textsuperscript{262} For the purposes of our analysis, the sample of “major” RDBs was based on those institutions that either had an overall subscribed capital worth over $4 billion or that have more than 15 member countries. It, therefore, includes the African Development Bank (and African Development Fund), Asian Development Bank (and Asian Development Fund), AIIB, EBRD, IADB, Islamic Development Bank, NDB, Central American Bank for Economic Integration, Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank (ESAT), Eurasian Development Bank (EDB), and ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID). Additionally, data for capital subscriptions to the European Investment Bank (EIB) were scaled by the proportion of EIB funds that are invested outside the EU, or 12.7% in 2022. The data was taken from annual reports and financial statements of each RDB.
more active engagements in multilateral or trilateral development forums. While our point is not to suggest that active bilateral cooperation does not have value, such engagement is both difficult to meaningfully measure across countries and not well suited to understanding provider openness to partnerships for development through shared spaces for dialogue on development.

- **Our approach only captures partial participation in multilateral and regional forums, and is unable to measure or capture nonfinancial participation.** For simplicity, we focus on capturing financial participation to major multilateral and regional bodies where data was readily available. As a result, we do not capture full participation in multilateral or regional forums, which could include nonfinancial engagement. We are also unable to reward countries for participation in other small or exclusive “clubs,” such as the G20, IBSA, BRICS, or the MIKTA Group (Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Türkiye, Australia). While these groups may provide important forums for development discourse, methodological challenges related to identifying relevant groups and measuring participation in a meaningful and uniform way prevented the inclusion of such clubs in this limited exercise. Our inability to capture engagement through smaller multilateral forums and the spectrum of regional organizations—financial or otherwise—is necessarily a weakness.

- **Our approach captures differences in engagement across actors but is unable to explain the source of variation in terms of a provider openness to multi-partner development engagements.** While we understand that unpacking the reasons why countries show different openness to partnering is critical, the breadth of this mapping exercise is not designed for an exploration of the broader contexts and socioeconomic or political factors that likely influence country willingness to engage in shared discourse and action on development. A deeper exploration of the reasons why countries do or do not engage in collaborative spaces for development will be explored further in our forthcoming work.

### 5.2 Framework results

We map the results from this approach in a simple scatterplot with income per capita on the y-axis and our proxy for openness to cooperation on the x-axis; the results are found in Figure 17, below (see Annex 4 for a list of scores by country). To identify different “groups” of actors within this framework, we divide the plane into four quadrants, adding a horizontal line to cut the y-axis at the point where countries reach “high-income status” (i.e., US$13,205 or more), while the vertical line crosses the x-axis at the mid-point of the “openness” variable (i.e., 2 out of 4). In essence the quadrants amount to a simple 2x2 square showing different combinations of high/low capacity and high/low openness to partnerships for global development.

A description of robustness checks on the “openness” measure can be found in Annex 5.

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263 The average score across our sample is 2.03, suggesting that the mid-point sits at the actual data average as well as the theoretical middle score.
How do non-DAC actors cooperate on development?

Figure 17. Framework illustrating non-DAC providers’ capacity for cooperation and openness to multi-partner engagements.

Note: The size of the bubbles represents the absolute size of each country’s economy, based on GNI figures from the World Bank. In the absence of World Bank data, alternative sources for GNI and GNI per capita were used for Venezuela, Taiwan, Monaco, and Liechtenstein.

5.3 Main findings

The results of this exercise show four quadrants occupied by countries with distinct, yet often shared characteristics.

Higher-income, higher openness (upper-right quadrant)

At the upper ranges of the capacity axis, this quadrant includes the Gulf cooperation providers, non-DAC EU members (Romania, with Estonia and Latvia on the border), and Israel, while at the lower-end of the capacity spectrum, it includes several Latin American countries which have graduated to high-income status within the last decade (Chile and Uruguay). Most countries in this quadrant score well on participation in international forums and reporting on cooperation. While the Gulf providers also show relatively high contributions to multilateral and regional development finance, none of the four high-income Gulf providers are members of the GPI on triangular cooperation, and they have not participated in any new reported triangular projects since 2018. EU countries in this region show similarly low engagement in triangular cooperation. This stands in contrast to the Latin American countries in this quadrant—Chile and Uruguay—which are both actively engaged in triangular cooperation, yet have more limited reporting on cooperation volumes through OECD or TOSSD. Meanwhile, Israel scores well on participation in international development forums, reports spending to the OECD-DAC and score points for GPI membership, though it has not reported new triangular projects since 2018. Romania appears as the most “open” Eastern European cooperation provider across the sample, scoring well on participation in international cooperation forums and reporting of development flows, but it does not appear actively engaged in triangular cooperation.

Overall, all countries in this quadrant share a high degree of openness to multi-partner engagement—including with OECD DAC members—and a high-income status, which makes them potential allies in building collaborative spaces for development discourse.

Lower-income, higher openness (lower-right quadrant)

While this is the most densely populated quadrant, including a range of countries from different regions, the group is notably dominated by Latin American cooperation providers. Like Chile and Uruguay—which place in the quadrant above—this group of Latin American providers are generally engaged in international development forums and triangular cooperation, and use the multilateral system as well as regional development finance institutions. Despite this, almost none (excluding Brazil) report development spending to the OECD DAC either as ODA or as part of the TOSSD measure. Instead, several Latin American providers regularly report development engagement through national or regional reporting mechanisms. Data on cooperation from a range of LAC providers is

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265 Romania became an HIC in 2020, while Chile and Uruguay graduated in 2013.
266 Consider for instance, that both Gulf and Latin American countries have been open to participating in OECD-led development forums, including the “LAC–DAC Dialogue” and “Arab–DAC Dialogue”, while Estonia and Israel are OECD members and Romania is a DAC participant.
HOW DO NON-DAC ACTORS COOPERATE ON DEVELOPMENT?

Beyond LAC providers, this quadrant consists of countries within Central Asia and the Caucasus (Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan), North Africa (Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco), and East Asia (Indonesia and Thailand), as well as South Africa and Türkiye; notably, Türkiye is the highest scoring country on our openness metric, with consistently high scores across all four measures. While these countries may not participate uniformly in all forums and modalities where multi-partner engagement is possible, there are some commonalities within the regional groupings. The North African providers, for instance, generally score well across each dimension except reporting on cooperation. By contrast, the Central Asia and the Caucasus countries receive full scores on reporting for cooperation, while the East Asian countries have relatively lower scores on financial support to multilateral organisations and regional development banks. Moreover, several countries in this category—including India and Nigeria—fall on the boundary line for openness to engagement, displaying a somewhat ambivalent stance toward engagement through certain channels but perhaps leading in engagement via other types of partnerships. While India is an active participant in international cooperation forums, it does not report development spending to international repositories and engages in triangular cooperation projects without being a member of the GPI. Meanwhile, Nigeria engages with regional development institutions through the African Development Bank (including through the Nigeria Trust Fund), and reports TOSSD, but it does not engage with the OECD in any other way. More broadly, both countries seemingly engage in development through regional channels and processes not well captured in this exercise—consider India’s leadership through the Delhi Process, which convenes Southern development actors to discuss issues related to SSC and triangular cooperation, and Nigeria’s focus on regional engagement through the AU and NEPAD.

As with their high-income counterparts, the relatively strong openness to multi-provider engagement exhibited by countries in this quadrant suggests that there may be strong opportunities for engagement with such actors. Still, their relatively lower financial capacities for engagement opposite higher-income counterparts may place some barriers on certain types of partnerships.

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including those which require a significant co-financing commitment. For countries falling "on the line" between low and high openness, a key question is how these countries could be further engaged in cross-actor development dialogues and actions.

**Lower-income, lower openness (lower-left quadrant)**

While the countries situated in this quadrant are perhaps the most regionally, politically, and economically diverse, many are united in facing domestic challenges contributing to institutional or social fragility (including Comoros, Iraq, Palestine, and Venezuela), while others (such as China, Cuba, or Russia) are known for low democratic qualities. This quadrant notably contains many of the poorest countries across our sample of non-DAC agencies, with all six non-DAC providers with income per capita levels below US$2,400 situated here. These internal contexts likely affect how such countries engage in multilateral spaces. Whether due to a lack of capacity or the de-prioritization of transparency by their governments, the clearest trend across the agencies located in this quadrant is the absence of international reporting on financial contributions to development, with Bulgaria as the only country reporting its development spending to the OECD in the latest years. On other dimensions of openness, we see mixed performance across countries, which may selectively engage in certain forms of partnerships but not others. Notably, Palestine emerges as a leader in trilateral cooperation, being both a GPI member and participating in a high number of trilateral projects in recent years. While participation in recent triangular cooperation seems mixed across this group, Comoros is the only other GPI member. Notably, most of these countries (except for Comoros and Palestine) still sent representatives to participate in either the OECD or UN SCC forums for development cooperation, and some countries participated in both (China, Rwanda, and Vietnam). Contributions to multilateral development institutions and subscriptions to regional development finance bodies are likewise mixed across the group.

Strikingly, this quadrant encompasses several countries that have long engaged in development cooperation (including Malaysia, China, and Russia) yet seemingly remain less open to partnerships for development cooperation beyond bilateral channels, presumably for various political or capacity reasons. For some of the largest economies in this quadrant (i.e., China, India, which is on the border with the adjacent quadrant, and Russia), which have sizeable cooperation budgets and likely face lower constraints to participation in international forums, lower openness scores could reflect

274 Budjan and Fuchs, “Democracy and Aid Donorship.”
275 Norwegian People’s Aid, “Patterns of Participation in Multilateral Disarmament Forums.”
a lower prioritization of engagement with others via existing forums relative to leading the creation of new or “alternative” platforms for cooperation (such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative or Global Development Initiative), which may not be covered by this exercise. In other cases—such as Cuba and Palestine—low openness scores may be driven by active bilateral relations that are likewise not well represented in our approach.

Regardless of the driving factor, the relatively low openness to multi-partner engagement for countries in this quadrant, alongside their lower capacity—particularly for countries facing continued domestic challenges—means that opportunities for partnering with these providers are likely the smallest. Despite such challenges, it remains important to seek ways to engage these countries in broader forums for development cooperation and partnership to strengthen the legitimacy and inclusiveness of potential cooperative spaces.276

**Higher-income, lower openness (upper-left quadrant)**

The countries in this quadrant are primarily EU member countries that have not joined the OECD-DAC (Croatia, Cyprus and Malta, with Estonia and Latvia on the border); non-EU European city-states (Andorra, Monaco, or Liechtenstein); as well as two of the less populous but relatively prosperous East Asian providers (Singapore and Taiwan). None of the countries in this quadrant currently participate in the UN High-Level Committee (HLC) on SSC—in the case of the Europeans in this grouping, likely because they generally do not identify as part of the global “South”277—while Latvia and Estonia (on the boarder with the higher-openness quadrant) are the only countries in this group to participate in OECD forums, although Croatia is currently “in process” to become an OECD member.278 Moreover, none of the countries in this quadrant appear to have engaged in triangular development cooperation in the most recent years.279 The European providers in this quadrant, however, perform well on data reporting, with most reporting ODA and TOSSD flows to the OECD in recent years, while Taiwan280 also reports spending to the OECD-DAC. Across the group, the scale of voluntary financial contributions to multilateral agencies and subscriptions to regional development finance institutions appears mixed, with each provider concentrating on a different “selection” of organizations: Andorra, Cyprus, Monaco, and Liechtenstein each appear to have a high level of multilateral contributions to the UN and World Bank/IDA but low capital subscriptions to regional

276 Consider, for instance, the legitimacy challenges facing the GPEDC following the withdrawal of participation from China and other middle-income countries (see Li, 2017).
279 There is some evidence that countries in this quadrant utilize triangular cooperation as a modality. For instance, Croatia’s National Strategy for Development Cooperation (2017–2021) notes that the country will “encourage cooperation in… Triangular Cooperation…[which] will diversify the global development paradigm and open up a new space for exchanging our own experiences…” (p. 14). However, the triangular cooperation database shows no recent engagement in triangular projects by Croatia.
280 Data for Taiwan is reported to the OECD-DAC under the name “Chinese Taipei”.

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and subregional development banks; Taiwan does not engage very strongly through either the UN and IDA or RDBs, only being a member of the Asian Development Bank and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI); and the Eastern Europeans in this quadrant engage in both multilateral and regional development finance only to a limited extent, usually with intra-regional development banks, such as the EBRD and EIB.

The inclusion of high-income EU members in this quadrant raises questions about the reasons underpinning lower openness to multi-provider partnerships for development. To a degree, it is possible that these providers engage in development partnerships indirectly via the EU’s participation in development dialogues. Recall, for instance, that Eastern European countries reporting to the OECD-DAC show a very high share of development funding allocated to EU institutions, potentially limiting the incentive to invest more limited bilateral resources in broader partnerships given representation through the EU. However, deeper exploration is needed to understand the challenges facing openness to cooperation across such countries and to identify how—or whether—there are opportunities to broaden their engagement in cooperation partnerships.

### Across the quadrants

Taken together, our mapping highlights three key trends in openness to multi-partner engagement for development across countries. First, this exercise shows that more than half of the non-DAC providers included in our study (32/54) score at least 50 percent (or 2/4 points) on our “openness” measure, suggesting that most non-DAC providers are at least somewhat engaged in forums for discussing, reporting or acting collaboratively for development. While there are clear differences across countries in terms of the venues of cooperation and the degree of participation through various channels, broad openness across providers suggests that there could be opportunities to deepen collaboration for development. However, given differences in how countries prioritize current development forums—namely through the DAC or UN—and the challenges associated with both forums, a key question facing the future of cooperation for development is whether current spaces for collaboration are equipped to both attract broad participation and meaningfully support better development action.

Second, our mapping shows similarities in openness to cooperation across regions, with non-DAC providers from similar regional groupings tending toward the same quadrants—Gulf countries, Latin American countries, and Eastern European providers, for instance, each occupying similar spaces across our scatter plot. This suggests that regional factors—such as shared histories and geographies—affect how and to what degree countries may be willing to participate in multi-actor partnerships for development, or potentially, to the types of forums for cooperation through which countries prefer to operate (consider, for instance, Eastern European providers’ preference for engagement via the DAC given their identity as “Northern” rather than “Southern” providers). Indeed, regional similarities in the types of partnerships countries tend to prioritize—such as recent limited triangular engagements from Gulf providers and low data reporting through international development forums.
transparency systems by Latin Americans—amplifies the point. In line with broader findings of the regional focus of non-DAC cooperation, building partnerships for development could seek to engage regional “champions” in global efforts or could work through regional cooperation forums as a starting place for deeper engagement.

Third, above a certain threshold, income does not appear to inhibit openness to multi-actor development partnerships, with countries across income groupings scoring in the top half on our “openness” variable. In line with previous findings that income mediates how countries provide development cooperation, it could be expected that openness to engagement in partnerships with other development actors might be similarly affected by income—this, however, was not the case. Instead, similar levels of “openness” across LMICs and UMICs could be partly explained by the type of cooperation through which they engage. For instance, 13/15 LMICs and 15/20 UMICs have engaged in triangular partnerships either through recent activities or GPI membership, which aligns with earlier findings that triangular cooperation appears as a key modality for middle-income providers. Similarly, while the bulk of middle-income cooperation providers (13/15 LMICs and all UMICs) had some engagement with either OECD or UN development forums, far fewer report spending on ODA or TOSSD to the OECD (just 9/35 across LMICs and UMICs). To a degree, this openness to specific types of partnerships by middle-income countries suggests that efforts to engage could target different partnership offers to actors based on the type of engagement considered most useful at different income levels.

5. Conclusions

In the context of a rapidly changing development landscape, we mapped and analyzed how 54 non-DAC cooperation providers engage in development, focusing on how, where, and on what bilateral cooperation flows are spent, as well as how they partner with others on development issues. To do so, we conducted a broad mapping exercise of the non-DAC provider landscape, which provides an overview of action from non-DAC cooperation providers. This mapping was complemented by five short case studies that mapped the trajectory of cooperation in select cases. Ultimately, this study culminates in the development of a new framework for mapping differences in how non-DAC actors cooperate with other providers on development issues. This provides a starting place for thinking about which countries may be most willing to strengthen partnerships for development—including between and across different types of providers—as well as the practical barriers to cooperation that exist across different levels of income and how these could be overcome to support deeper global collaboration for development outcomes.
While the variation in approaches and priorities across the diverse group of non-DAC actors is undeniable, we broadly find that differences in how non-DACs cooperate is driven by three key factors:

- First, our analysis consistently shows a relationship between provider income levels and the types of cooperation and partnerships through which they engage, with MICs prioritizing nonfinancial cooperation modalities more frequently than higher-income non-DAC counterparts. Indeed, the role of income as a mediating factor for the modalities, scale, and geographic scope of cooperation was visible throughout our study and suggests that efforts to deepen partnerships for development with non-DAC providers must consider the differentiated domestic constraints facing such cooperation providers across income levels.

- Second, the broader political, economic, and security contexts within which non-DAC countries operate also influence both how they cooperate—such as where cooperation is targeted and how much is provided—as well as the specific forums through which they engage in dialogue and partnerships for development. While this finding is not surprising, it suggests that building development partnerships may require awareness of partner priorities; to this end, regional partners, which could face similar or shared challenges, may be best placed to expand cooperation and deepen partnerships in the first instance.

- Third, our framework for measuring openness to partnerships for development shows that most non-DAC cooperation providers are willing to engage with other cooperation providers through shared cooperation spaces and activities. The question, however, is whether and how such openness can be transformed into more active cooperation—if not deeper collaboration—for development, including between DAC and non-DAC actors.

Taken together, these findings suggest that while there are opportunities to deepen partnerships for development cooperation, a diversity of approaches and forums will likely be needed to accommodate differentiated constraints. Going forward, there remain unanswered questions, not the least of which is whether “openness” to partnerships for development can translate into meaningful cooperation to address shared challenges or create more collaborative spaces for development discourse and action in pursuit of a more global development paradigm.
References


Prado, Juan Pablo, Rafael Velázquez, and Luis Antonio Huacuja. “La política exterior de México y la cooperación internacional para el desarrollo a diez años de su ley y la AMEXCID.” Revista Española de Desarrollo y Cooperación, no. 47 (June 2021): 87–97.


**Annex 1: List of non-DAC cooperation agencies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Agency Responsible for Outward Cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Agency of International Cooperation for Solidarity and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andorra</td>
<td>Department of Multilateral Affairs and Cooperation within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Institutional Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Directorate General of International Cooperation within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship; Fondo Argentino de Cooperación Sur-Sur y Triangular (FO.AR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Azerbaijan International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Brazilian Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>International Cooperation for Development Department within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Chilean Agency for International Cooperation for Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>China International Development Cooperation Agency; Ministry of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Presidential Agency for Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>Comoros Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Directorate General for International Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the International Cooperation Area of MIDEPLAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Secretariat or directorate within the Ministry of Planning or other ministries: Directorate for Economic Collaboration, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment (MINCEX)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs; CyprusAid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Vice Ministry of International Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Undersecretariat for International Cooperation, Directorate of International Cooperation Strategy and Policy within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt, Arab Rep.</td>
<td>Egyptian Agency of Partnership for Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>El Salvador International Cooperation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Estonian Center for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Directorate of Alliance for Development, Planning and Programming Secretariat of the President’s Office, Ministry of Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation; Dirección General de Cooperación Internacional</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Development Partnership Administration within the Ministry of External Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Indonesian Agency for International Development Cooperation; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of National Development Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Iraqi Fund for External Development</td>
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<td>Israel</td>
<td>MASHAV division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>Kazakhstan Agency for International Development (KazAID); Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Mexican Agency for International Development Cooperation</td>
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<td>Monaco</td>
<td>Public Aid for Development and International Cooperation</td>
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<td>Morocco</td>
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<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Directorate of Technical Aid Corps, Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>Pakistan</td>
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<td>Palestine</td>
<td>Palestine International Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>Peru</td>
<td>Peruvian Agency for International Cooperation</td>
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<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Technical Cooperation Council of the Philippines</td>
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<td>Qatar</td>
<td>Qatar Fund for Development; Department of International Cooperation</td>
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<td>Romania</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Romanian Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Finance</td>
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<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Rwanda Cooperation</td>
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<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>KSRelief, Saudi Fund for Development, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Singapore Cooperation Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>African Renaissance Fund and International Cooperation, Department of International Relations and Cooperation</td>
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<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Taiwan International Cooperation and Development Fund</td>
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<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Thailand International Cooperation Agency and Neighboring Countries Economic Development Cooperation Agency (NEDA)</td>
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<td>Tunisia</td>
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<td>Türkiye</td>
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<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation; Abu Dhabi Fund for Development</td>
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<td>Uruguayan Agency for International Cooperation</td>
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<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>General Directorate or Undersecretariat within the Ministry of People’s Power of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Foreign Economic Relations Department in the Ministry of Planning and Investment</td>
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</table>

Source: Authors’ analysis based on Budjan and Fuchs (2021) and own research.
### Annex 2: Non-DAC providers mapping sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Partner Regions</th>
<th>Priority Sectors</th>
<th>Types of Cooperation</th>
<th>Key Sources</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Andorra</td>
<td>HIC</td>
<td>Europe and Central Asia</td>
<td>East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>Social Infrastructure and Services, Multi-sector Cross-cutting</td>
<td>Project-type Cooperation, Public Awareness, Humanitarian Assistance</td>
<td>Ministry of External Affairs website: <a href="https://www.exteriors.ad/en/multilateral-affairs-and-cooperation/international-cooperation-for-development">https://www.exteriors.ad/en/multilateral-affairs-and-cooperation/international-cooperation-for-development</a></td>
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281 While Argentina’s website notes that its presence in Africa and Asia have increased in recent years, the LAC region appears the main priority.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Partner Regions</th>
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<th>Types of Cooperation</th>
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<td>Priority Sectors</td>
<td>Types of Cooperation</td>
<td>Key Sources</td>
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282 While China’s “International Development Cooperation in the New Era” notes that the country gives high priority to cooperation with “least developed countries in Asia and Africa”, it also notes prioritizing “developing countries participating in the Belt and Road Initiative”, which appears to include countries from all regions.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Partner Regions</th>
<th>Priority Sectors</th>
<th>Types of Cooperation</th>
<th>Key Sources</th>
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</thead>
</table>

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283 Croatia lists “Developing countries: Afghanistan, Colombia, and Tanzania” as one of three geographic priorities. For this exercise, we count this group as “other, non-regional” as these three countries do not fit into a single region.

284 Croatia’s intention to engage in triangular cooperation is mentioned in its development strategy (p. 14), however, no current projects reported to the OECD Triangular cooperation repository of projects.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Partner Regions</th>
<th>Priority Sectors</th>
<th>Types of Cooperation</th>
<th>Key Sources</th>
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²⁸⁵ While Cuba’s official documents do not list priority sectors, the last two SEGIB reports note that the majority of cooperation offered by Cuba was in the field of health.
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Region</th>
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<th>Priority Sectors</th>
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<td>Priority Sectors</td>
<td>Types of Cooperation</td>
<td>Key Sources</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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286 While the Egyptian Agency for Partnership for Development mentions the promotion of Triangular cooperation, it has no current projects reported to the OECD Triangular Cooperation repository of projects.
### How Do Non-DAC Actors Cooperate on Development?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Partner Regions</th>
<th>Priority Sectors</th>
<th>Types of Cooperation</th>
<th>Key Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Income</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Partner Regions</td>
<td>Priority Sectors</td>
<td>Types of Cooperation</td>
<td>Key Sources</td>
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<tr>
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<td>UMIC</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>Economic Infrastructure and Services, Production Sectors</td>
<td>Project-type Cooperation, Technical Cooperation</td>
<td>Iraqi Fund for External Development website: <a href="https://ifed.gov.iq/">https://ifed.gov.iq/</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Income</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Partner Regions</td>
<td>Priority Sectors</td>
<td>Types of Cooperation</td>
<td>Key Sources</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Latvia    | HIC    | Europe and Central Asia | Europe and Central Asia                              | Social Infrastructure and Services, Economic Infrastructure and Services, Multi-sector Cross-cutting  

**HOW DO NON-DAC ACTORS COOPERATE ON DEVELOPMENT?**
## How Do Non-DAC Actors Cooperate on Development?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Partner Regions</th>
<th>Priority Sectors</th>
<th>Types of Cooperation</th>
<th>Key Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Income</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Partner Regions</td>
<td>Priority Sectors</td>
<td>Types of Cooperation</td>
<td>Key Sources</td>
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<td>Mexico</td>
<td>UMIC</td>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>Social Infrastructure and Services, Economic Infrastructure and Services, Production Sectors, Multi-sector Cross-cutting</td>
<td>Project-type Cooperation, Technical Cooperation, Scholarships, Triangular Cooperation, Technological &amp; Scientific Cooperation, Cultural Cooperation, Humanitarian Assistance</td>
<td>Mexican Agency for International Development Cooperation websites, accessed February 2023. <a href="https://www.gob.mx/amexcid/que-hacemos">https://www.gob.mx/amexcid/que-hacemos</a></td>
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<td>Pakistan</td>
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<td>South Asia</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>Scholarships</td>
<td>Government of Pakistan website: <a href="https://www.ead.gov.pk/">https://www.ead.gov.pk/</a></td>
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<td>Partner Regions</td>
<td>Priority Sectors</td>
<td>Types of Cooperation</td>
<td>Key Sources</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and the Caribbean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OECD. “Other official providers not reporting to the OECD”. In Development Cooperation Profiles 2022, Paris: OECD, 2022. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1787/2dcf1367-en">https://doi.org/10.1787/2dcf1367-en</a></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Qatar Fund for Development website: <a href="https://qatarfund.org.qa/goals/">https://qatarfund.org.qa/goals/</a></td>
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<td>Country</td>
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<td>Region</td>
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<td>Key Sources</td>
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rossotrudnichestvo website: [https://rs.gov.ru/deyatelnost/](https://rs.gov.ru/deyatelnost/)  
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Region</th>
<th>Partner Regions</th>
<th>Priority Sectors</th>
<th>Types of Cooperation</th>
<th>Key Sources</th>
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<td>LIC</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>Social Infrastructure and Services, Economic Infrastructure and Services, Production Sectors, Multi-sector Cross-cutting</td>
<td>Technical Cooperation, Triangular Cooperation</td>
<td>Rwanda Cooperation website: <a href="https://cooperation.rw/">https://cooperation.rw/</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Singapore cooperation programme website: https://scp.gov.sg/startpublic/#!/home |

288 We report “Production Sectors” for Rwanda as its website mentions work on “land management” as an area of expertise.
289 The Ministry of Education oversees Saudi Arabia’s scholarship programmes.
290 While Singapore has no recent triangular cooperation programmes reported to the OECD’s Triangular cooperation repository of projects, its website notes a Third Country Training Programme, the details of which appear akin to triangular engagement.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Partner Regions</th>
<th>Priority Sectors</th>
<th>Types of Cooperation</th>
<th>Key Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

291 We report “Production Sectors” for South Africa as the strategy mentions “trade” as part of the country’s socio-economic integration objectives and efforts to promote “sustainable food production” and enhance food security.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Partner Regions</th>
<th>Priority Sectors</th>
<th>Types of Cooperation</th>
<th>Key Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Türkiye      | UMIC   | Europe and Central Asia | Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa | Social Infrastructure and Services, Economic Infrastructure and Services, Production Sectors | Project-type Cooperation, Technical Cooperation, Scholarships, Triangular Cooperation, Humanitarian Assistance | OECD. “Turkey”. In Development Cooperation Profiles 2022, Paris: OECD, 2022. [https://doi.org/10.1787/2dcf1367-en](https://doi.org/10.1787/2dcf1367-en)  
| United Arab Emirates | HIC | Middle East and North Africa | Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa | Social Infrastructure and Services, Economic Infrastructure and Services | Project-type Cooperation, Technical Cooperation, Scholarships, Debt Relief, Budget Support, Humanitarian Assistance | Abu Dhabi Fund for Development website: [https://www.adfd.ae/english/Pages/Home.aspx](https://www.adfd.ae/english/Pages/Home.aspx)  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Partner Regions</th>
<th>Priority Sectors</th>
<th>Types of Cooperation</th>
<th>Key Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Annex 3: Volumes of cooperation from non-DAC cooperation providers in most recent year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Reporting Year</th>
<th>Scale of Cooperation</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>US$44.4 million</td>
<td>DAC1 dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>US$91.2 million</td>
<td>DAC1 dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>US$2.9 billion</td>
<td>“Other official providers not reporting to the OECD,” Development Cooperation Profiles 2022.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

292 Figure represents budget, not expenditure.


294 The OECD’s 2022 DCR Profiles reports that in 2021 AGCID had a total budget of $9.9 million, of which $4.3 million was allocated to its South-South and Triangular Cooperation Programme (including scholarships) and $5.6 million was allocated for “Continuous Professional Development.” The figure does not include multilateral contributions, which are mostly managed by the Ministry of Finance.


296 Figure does not include assessed contributions to the multilateral system.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Reporting Year</th>
<th>Scale of Cooperation</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>US$87.8 million</td>
<td>DAC1 dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>triangular cooperation projects.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>US$20.5 million</td>
<td>DAC1 dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>triangular cooperation projects.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>triangular cooperation projects.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt, Arab Rep.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>triangular cooperation projects.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>US$60.2 million</td>
<td>DAC1 dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>US$409 million</td>
<td>DAC1 dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>US$43.6 million</td>
<td>DAC1 dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>US$466.7 million</td>
<td>DAC1 dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>US$47.6 million</td>
<td>DAC1 dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liechtenstein</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>US$26.6 million</td>
<td>DAC1 dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>US$53.8 million</td>
<td>DAC1 dataset</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

297 Figure does not include contributions to the multilateral system.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Reporting Year</th>
<th>Scale of Cooperation</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monaco</td>
<td>2021</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>US$676.6 million</td>
<td>DAC1 dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>US$417.3 million</td>
<td>DAC1 dataset</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>US$7.4 billion</td>
<td>DAC1 dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa(^{300})</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>US$32.6 million</td>
<td>OECD, <em>Development Co-operation Profiles 2022</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>US$320.97 million</td>
<td>DAC1 dataset</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>US$69.80 million</td>
<td>DAC1 dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türkiye</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>US$7.7 billion</td>
<td>DAC1 dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>US$1.5 billion</td>
<td>DAC1 dataset</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{298}\) Contributions to multilateral organizations only.  
\(^{299}\) Russia’s reported data at the aggregate level to the OECD is available only until 2019.  
\(^{300}\) Figure does not include contributions to the multilateral system.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Reporting Year</th>
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<th>Sources</th>
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<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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</table>

Notes: Includes bilateral and multilateral unless specified otherwise. Figures sourced from the OECD’s DAC1 dataset report net ODA disbursements, in current prices. DAC1 data was downloaded in March 2023. Figures from SEGIB reports reflect the sum of SSC and triangular cooperation projects where countries were listed as “providers”.

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**How Do Non-DAC Actors Cooperate on Development?**

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## Annex 4: Scores on “openness” to multi-partner engagement by country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Income Group</th>
<th>GNI Per Capita</th>
<th>Openness Score Out of 4 (= Sum A,B,C,D)</th>
<th>Participation in International Development Forums</th>
<th>Reporting on Cooperation to Shared Repositories</th>
<th>Joint Financing and Implementation via Triangular Projects</th>
<th>Contributions to Multilateral and Regional Organisations</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A. Score</td>
<td>OECD Engagement (OECD Member, DAC Participant or Member of OECD Development Centre Governing Board)</td>
<td>Participation in UN Forums on SSC (19th and 20th UN HLC)</td>
<td>Reports to the OECD-DAC (2020 or 2021)</td>
<td>Reports TOSSD (2020 or 2021)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>LMIC</td>
<td>$3,660</td>
<td>1.25</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Andorra</td>
<td>HIC</td>
<td>$46,530</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Argentina</td>
<td>UMIC</td>
<td>$9,960</td>
<td>3.00</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>UMIC</td>
<td>$4,900</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>0.50</td>
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<td>Brazil</td>
<td>UMIC</td>
<td>$7,740</td>
<td>2.88</td>
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<td>1.50</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>Chile</td>
<td>HIC</td>
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<td>3.00</td>
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<td>China</td>
<td>UMIC</td>
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<td>1.63</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>3.00</td>
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<td>$1,580</td>
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<td>Cuba</td>
<td>UMIC</td>
<td>$8,920</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>UMIC</td>
<td>$8,100</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>UMIC</td>
<td>$5,960</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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<td>Egypt</td>
<td>LMIC</td>
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<td>2.38</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>LMIC</td>
<td>$4,260</td>
<td>2.75</td>
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<td>HIC</td>
<td>$26,460</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>0.50</td>
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<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>UMIC</td>
<td>$4,940</td>
<td>2.00</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>LMIC</td>
<td>$2,150</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>LMIC</td>
<td>$4,180</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>UMIC</td>
<td>$4,760</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.50</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>Israel</td>
<td>HIC</td>
<td>$49,290</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>UMIC</td>
<td>$8,880</td>
<td>2.75</td>
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<td>GNI Per Capita</td>
<td>Openness Score Out of 4 (= Sum A,B,C,D)</td>
<td>OECD Engagement (OECD Member, DAC Participant or Member of OECD Development Centre Governing Board)</td>
<td>Participation in International Development Forums</td>
<td>Reporting on Cooperation to Shared Repositories</td>
<td>Joint Financing and Implementation via Triangular Projects</td>
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<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>LMIC</td>
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<td>1.63</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.25</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**How do non-DAC actors cooperate on development?**

- **Participation in International Development Forums**: A. Score
- **OECD Engagement**: OECD Member, DAC Participant or Member of OECD Development Centre Governing Board
- **Openness Score Out of 4**: Sum A,B,C,D
- **Participation in UN Forums**: Participation in UN Forums (19th and 20th UN HLC)
- **Reports to the OECD-DAC**: Reports to the OECD-DAC (2020 or 2021)
- **Reports TOSSD**: Reports TOSSD (2020 or 2021)
- **GPI membership**: Contributions to Multilateral and Regional Organisations
- **Triangular projects since 2018**: Contributions to Multilateral and Regional Organisations
- **Regional development finance (share capital in RDBs)**: Contributions to Multilateral and Regional Organisations
Annex 5: Robustness checks

We analyzed the correlation between the scores of each dimension to test whether we were capturing new/non-duplicative information. A simple correlation matrix of the dimensions is presented in Figure 18 below. Across the dimensions, correlations between the indicators measuring participation in international development forums and participation in triangular cooperation show the strongest correlation at 49 percent, followed by a negative correlation of 35 percent between engagement in triangular programs and reporting on cooperation. We consider the results of our correlation tests to show that each dimension contributes unique information to the overall openness score, with should not be undermined by high multicollinearity. We also tested correlations between the sub-indicators within each dimension. This analysis showed that sub-indicators are positively correlated, with the strongest correlation at 65 percent between reporting to OECD-DAC and TOSSD. While this relatively strong correlation suggests that these sub-measures do not capture fully unique information (i.e. countries that report to one reporting platform are likely to report to the other), removing either sub-indicator risks penalizing some countries. The next strongest correlation is at 51 percent between triangular cooperation sub indicators, while all other sub-indicators are correlated at or below 50 percent, suggesting that the sub-indicators are measuring conceptually similar phenomena (i.e., the data is pulling in the same direction) but that each indicator captures some unique features of the concept.

FIGURE 18. Correlation of scores of each dimension in “openness” measure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participation in International Development Forums</th>
<th>Reporting on Cooperation to Shared Repositories</th>
<th>Joint Financing and Implementation via Triangular Projects</th>
<th>Contributions to Multilateral and Regional Organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation in international development forums</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on cooperation to shared repositories</td>
<td>-15%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint financing and implementation via triangular projects</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>-35%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions to multilateral and regional organizations</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>-6%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We also ran tests to see how country scores change when each dimension is removed from the overall score, with the view of understanding whether specific dimensions are driving the scores for different groups of actors. In each scenario, we assume that the mid-point is equal to the average possible score across the sample (1.5/3). The results of this test are described below:

1. Results without “participation in international development forums”: With this dimension excluded, thirteen countries shift across the mid-point on openness. In this case, Cyprus
and Liechtenstein would move forward from low to high “openness”, Monaco and Palestine would sit at the mid-point, while Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Israel, Mexico, Morocco, Romania and Tunisia, would slip into the lower-openness categories. At the top of the “openness” measure, Türkiye and Azerbaijan would tie as the most “open” actors.

2. **Results without “reporting on cooperation”:** Removal of this measure would result in twelve countries crossing the mid-point line. Notably, removing this measure would reward China, Ecuador, Guatemala, India, Rwanda, Pakistan, and Vietnam, which do not report development spending but participate in other spaces for multi-partner engagement. These countries would move into higher-openness quadrants, while Palestine would move up to the mid-point. Conversely, Estonia, Latvia, Kuwait and Romania would be penalised, with Kuwait moving to the mid-point, while the three European providers which actively report spending would move to lower-openness quadrants. Under this scenario, the top providers would be Argentina and Colombia, with many Latin American providers, which report development spending through own channels rather than OECD repositories, scoring well in this iteration.

3. **Results without “triangular engagement”:** Under this scenario, twelve countries would shift across the openness mid-point. Notably, European providers which appear less engaged in triangular cooperation would benefit from the removal of this dimension, with Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, and Liechtenstein moving to higher-openness quadrants, while Bulgaria and Monaco would move to the mid-point line. Other countries benefiting from this scenario include Ecuador, Guatemala, Nigeria, and Rwanda, which would move to higher openness, and Honduras and Tunisia which would score at the mid-point. By contrast, Mexico would be penalized under this scenario as the only country to shift into the lower-openness quadrant. Under this scenario, the top openness score would be held by Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, with Gulf providers and those from Central Asia and the Caucasus benefitting from the change.

4. **Results without “contributions to multilateral and regional organizations”:** This scenario results in the fewest overall changes to the scores, with just six countries switching quadrants as a result. Notably, Egypt and Kuwait would fall back to the mid-point under this scenario, while Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nigeria would move into the lower-openness quadrant. Presumably, the lower overall affect on the scores following the removal of this dimension is due to the quartile scoring approach, which means that countries may experience smaller overall shifts in scores from this indicator than those scored on a binary. Under this scenario, Türkiye would maintain the top spot.