CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT

HOW TO FIX GLOBAL EDUCATION

A Survey of National Policymakers in Developing Countries

Lee Crawfurd,
Susannah Hares, Thi Le,
and Justin Sandefur

CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT
2055 L Street, NW Fifth Floor
Washington, DC 20036
www.cgdev.org

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Acronyms

CGD	Center for Global Development
DG	Director General
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
FDC	Forum for Democratic Change (Uganda)
ISEP2	International Survey of Education Policymakers
MMAP	Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (Pakistan)
MOE	Ministry of Education
MoECRT	Ministry of Education, Culture, Research, and Technology (Indonesia)
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MP	Member of Parliament
NDC	National Democratic Congress (Ghana)
NPP	New Patriotic Party (Ghana)
NRM	National Resistance Movement (Uganda)
NUP	National Unity Platform (Uganda)
OLS	Ordinary least squares
PML-N	Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz)
PPPP	Pakistan Peoples Party Parliamentarians
PTI	Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf

Executive Summary

Across the developing world, decades of growth in primary and secondary school enrolment have begun to taper off. Millions of kids who are enrolled nevertheless fail to acquire basic literacy. And millions more are subjected to physical or sexual violence at school.

Global action may be warranted, but education is fundamentally a domestic policy affair. So how do policymakers in low- and middle-income countries think education can be fixed? What do they perceive as their biggest challenges and the most effective solutions?

This report summarises a survey of 601 legislators and senior officials in ministries of education (MOEs) and finance (MOFs) in 12 low- and middle-income countries: Bangladesh, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ghana, Indonesia, Laos, Mongolia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Uganda, and Vietnam. Here are a few key takeaways:

Policymakers significantly underestimate the learning crisis.

Policymakers vastly overestimate students' reading levels. By age 10, only half as many children can read a sentence as policymakers think are able to. They attribute poor learning more to poverty (38 percent) than to poor instruction (15 percent).

Respondents support much higher spending but don't think it will raise test scores.

Policymakers think poor learning outcomes are more constrained by implementation capacity (52 percent) than by funding (26 percent). By contrast, for policies such as school meals, funding is the primary concern (68 percent). Overall, policymakers support a large increase in education spending, from the current average of 15 percent to 24 percent. Most (56 percent) also support international borrowing to finance education.

Broad support for girls' education coexists with regressive gender views.

Respondents think there are high returns to investment in girls' schooling. Almost all think that schools should promote gender equality. At the same time, 40 percent think "when mothers work, children suffer," and 25 percent believe that men should have a priority over women when jobs are scarce.

Policymakers perceive high levels of sexual abuse in schools, and most believe it's acceptable for teachers to beat children, at least sometimes.

Across countries, respondents believe anywhere from 20 percent to 60 percent of girls experience sexual violence at school. Only one in five believe it's never justified for teachers to beat children. Policymakers estimate that six months after an official directive to eliminate corporal punishment is issued, only 66 percent of targeted teachers will comply.

Introduction

The global goal of universal, free, high-quality, public education remains far off. Outcomes remain poor: across the developing world, about 10 percent of school-age children aren't enrolled, and roughly half of those who do attend fail to reach basic literacy targets. Free, public schooling is in retreat: in major cities from Delhi to Lagos, half of children opt out of public schools and spend money they can scarcely afford on low-cost, low-quality private schools. And schools are failing in their most basic task of keeping children safe: surveys suggest that as many as 29 percent of teenage girls in Africa report experiencing sexual or physical violence (Evans et al. 2021).

While these types of statistics are commonly debated in the United Nations or World Bank, they are primarily shaped by domestic policy decisions in developing countries. So how do policymakers in low- and middle-income countries think education should be fixed? What are their key policy priorities and preferences?

This report introduces data from the second round of the Center for Global Development (CGD) International Survey of Education Policymakers (ISEP2). We survey representative samples of 601 senior officials from 12 low- and middle-income countries: Bangladesh, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ghana, Indonesia, Laos, Mongolia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Uganda, and Vietnam. Respondents include senior directors or their equivalent from both MOEs and MOFs, as well as members of parliament (MPs).[1]

1 See Appendix 1 for full details on our survey methodology.

1. Should Governments Spend More on Schools?

Perhaps the most basic, and hotly contested, global policy debate on education is whether money can fix the crisis. Advocates make repeated calls for more funding, while sceptics warn that spending isn't always effective. The World Bank and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) captured this tension in their *2023 Education Finance Watch*, writing both that "spending increases were far from sufficient to even make a dent in the large learning gap," and that "more education spending does not necessarily lead to better education outcomes." Most finance for education comes from national governments—so what matters in this debate is what those governments think.

The survey identifies fairly nuanced views on education finance, including broad support for higher spending even through international borrowing, and a majority belief that bigger budgets can address certain education challenges, but that implementation capacity limits the ability of money to raise key metrics like test scores.

Most respondents think spending on education should be higher than it currently is—and that it should increase from 15 to 24 percent of government spending. Knowledge of the current share of the budget spent on education is generally accurate. However, this average masks substantial variation: In Nigeria, policymakers think education spending is over 15 percent, while the true figure reported in World Bank statistics is only 5 percent (Figure 1). MOF officials prefer higher spending than MOE officials and MPs. And around a third of respondents think more spending won't improve outcomes.

Most think that governments should borrow internationally to finance education. There is an important debate about how the social sector should be financed and whether borrowing

FIGURE 1 Policymakers support more spending on education



Note: Policymakers were asked for their views on what share of the government budget is spent on education and what percent should be spent on education.
Source: Data for the actual share is from the World Bank Development Indicators.

FIGURE 2 Most think governments should borrow for education



Note: Respondents were asked, "Of these statements, which is closer to your view? Option 1: Government should borrow internationally to finance education spending just like any other kind of spending; Option 2: Government should borrow to spend only on investments that have a short-term fiscal return, which would exclude education; or Option 3: Government should not borrow internationally."

can or should contribute. A common view is that governments should borrow only to invest in projects with short-term fiscal returns to repay loans, while others argue that government budgets are fungible and that borrowing should finance all spending. We find that the majority of government officials (56 percent) agree that governments should borrow for education just like any other kind of spending (Figure 2). Laos is an exception to this trend: the majority (86 percent) think governments should *not* borrow to spend on education.

SPENDING ON WHAT?

What do governments think money should be spent on to improve education? **Our respondents' most preferred new policy was giving teachers structured lesson plans.** We drew out preferences over different spending types using a discrete choice experiment: we offered a choice between two alternative budget allocations, with different dollar values, different policy areas, and different timelines, to see results. The most preferred policy area was giving teachers structured lesson plans, followed by training teachers while they are in service, hiring specialist teachers for students with disabilities, removing fees for secondary school, providing free lunch in primary school, and, finally, providing laptops to schools. This ordering of preferences is consistent across different ministry officials and MPs: the recent global focus by aid donors on foundational literacy and numeracy may be filtering down to national policymaker preferences, and the new evidence on the limitations of providing IT infrastructure to schools may also be at play.

Money can fix some but not all problems. One answer to the question of whether education is underfunded or whether money doesn't work to solve problems in education is that both are true—but for different interventions. Money can solve logistical problems like a lack of teachers, books, or classrooms. It's much harder for money to solve the implementation challenge of ensuring that effective pedagogy is being used in all schools. Policymakers in our sample recognise this distinction: 52 percent agree that the main barrier to improving learning is implementation capacity rather than money (26 percent). Likewise, ending corporal punishment is seen as a matter of implementation capacity rather than money. Conversely, most (68 percent) think that the main barrier to delivering school meals is money (Figure 3). These beliefs are consistent with a framework containing two types of policies: those that are inexpensive but hard to scale (such as curriculum changes), and those that are expensive but easy to scale, such as school meals (Crawfurd et al. 2022). While reform to improve the quality of pedagogy in primary school is an obvious priority in pursuing higher learning levels, the track record of many such policies—for example, structured pedagogy programmes for early grade reading and literacy (Graham and Kelly 2019) and "teaching at the right level" (Banerjee et al. 2017)—is somewhat mixed when taken to scale by governments in developing

FIGURE 3 Officials see money as a solution to some education challenges, but not all



Note: Respondents were asked, "Which of the following is the most important barrier to this policy outcome?"

countries. Running a foundational learning programme at scale tends to require teachers, principals, and government officials to adopt new behaviours that are difficult to monitor and difficult to adhere to consistently. We asked respondents to predict the chance that an MOE directive aiming to raise learning levels and involving teacher implementation of a new curriculum would succeed. On average, policymakers predict that only 57 percent of targeted teachers would implement the new approach.

Some policymakers do believe that money matters most. In DRC, more than two thirds of officials cite money as the biggest barrier to better learning. Overall, more officials from MOEs believe that money is the bigger barrier to learning (39 percent) than in MOFs (19 percent).

Policymakers consider reducing corporal punishment in schools challenging. Few (3 percent) believe that money is the greatest barrier to making schools safer, while most (50.5 percent) believe that implementation capacity is the reason corporal punishment continues. However, most respondents (60 percent) believe that a ministry directive to reduce corporal punishment would be successful, with policymakers in Vietnam, Laos, Bangladesh, and Indonesia particularly optimistic about their chances of success. Notably, across the sample of countries, fewer MPs (58 percent) than MOE (72 percent) or MOF (67.5 percent) officials believe the directive would be implemented successfully.

Most policymakers believe that money is the greatest barrier to providing meals in school. More than two thirds of individual policymakers, and a majority in every country except Peru, share this belief. This view aligns with available evidence: Governments are pretty good at supplying school meals, and their provision can also increase enrolment and retention, particularly of girls (Gelli et al. 2007). Multiple examples—from India to Mozambique—suggest that even weak states can deliver school meals programmes at scale. In other words, they are more resilient in the face of weak implementation (Crawfurd et al. 2022). Providing school meals is, perhaps, a less complex intervention to deliver: it does not require a lot of high-skilled technical staff to design or implement, and doesn't make big demands of teachers' time or require hard-to-monitor changes in their behaviour. Two thirds of policymakers (including 72 percent of MOE officials) believe that a ministry directive to run a school meals programme would be implemented successfully. Across all three policy areas, very few respondents believe that teacher unions are barriers to reform.

Our theory that implementation constraints play a large role in poor education outcomes also gains support from policymakers' answers to questions about the likelihood that different policies might be implemented. On average, policymakers think that a newly announced school meals policy would actually be implemented in 69 percent of schools, whereas a

FIGURE 4 School meals are viewed as easier to scale than new curricula



Note: Respondents were asked, "Question 1: Imagine the Department/Ministry of Education issues an official guideline/directive for a major change in how to teach early grade reading. After six months, what percentage of targeted teachers do you think would be implementing this new approach? Question 2: After six months, what percentage of targeted teachers do you think would abide by the new rules and refrain from using corporal punishment as the result of a new policy? Question 3: After six months, what percentage of schools do you think would be feeding children as the result of a new policy?"

new curriculum would be implemented only by 54 percent of targeted teachers. A policy to end corporal punishment falls in between, at 66 percent of schools (Figure 4).

In the rest of this report, we discuss the question of why children aren't learning (section 2), the role of elitism in public schools (section 3), policymaker prioritisation of girls' education (section 4), school violence (section 5), and the role of private schools (section 6).

2. Why Aren't Children Learning?

The World Bank estimates that 7 in 10 children in low- and middle-income countries can't read by age 10 (World Bank Group 2022). One of the most striking findings from our surveys is how much decision makers underestimate the scale of this learning crisis. On average across our sample in 12 countries, policymakers think that 58 percent of children are at the expected reading level—compared with the 30 percent that the World Bank data suggests.[2] This huge discrepancy between policymakers' beliefs and reality does not apply to other parts of education systems, such as enrolment rates and spending levels, where policymakers have much more unbiased views. The largest gap between policymakers' beliefs about learning and reality is found in Laos and the Philippines. By contrast, policymakers in Peru much more accurately predicted low levels of foundational learning (Figure 5). Overall, therefore, an important explanation for why learning levels remain so low is that policymakers are simply unaware of how bad the problem has become.

Aside from the fact that the problem is not sufficiently acknowledged, many policymakers think that poor learning is more of a family responsibility than a school one. Respondents are evenly split between those who think that the family or the school is the most significant barrier to learning. Respondents in poorer countries are more likely to view poverty as the main reason for poor learning.

Those who think that poverty is the main reason for low learning levels are 11 percentage points more likely to also believe that government spending does not improve outcomes. If you think schools cannot overcome family disadvantage, then you might imagine that spending more on schools would lead to little improvement (Figure 6). Upon further questioning on the reasons why policymakers think learning levels are low, overwhelmingly, the most common response from all groups of policymakers was poverty, chosen by 38 percent of respondents. This answer was followed by poor instruction (15 percent) and poor school facilities (11 percent). Poor instruction was much more likely to be identified as the most significant reason for low learning levels in middle-income countries such as Indonesia, Vietnam, Pakistan, and Peru.

Do policymakers think education pays? Support for additional investments in education or for specific reform priorities may hinge on perceptions of whether schooling is delivering tangible economic benefits to students. Even where there is consensus that education pays, policymakers may disagree about the returns to improving education quality versus increasing the number of students passing through the system.

Respondents see expanding access as a bigger economic priority than raising test scores. Most officials feel that for the economy to grow faster, the most important thing their country could do in education would be to "increase the number of children finishing secondary school," compared with roughly a quarter of officials who feel it would be more effective to "improve the test scores of children already in school." If anything, this preference for quantity over quality is strongest among officials from MOEs.

Policymakers also perceive fairly high individual economic returns to schooling. To draw out these beliefs, we asked respondents to predict how much a boy or girl in their countries would earn at age 30 if they complete only primary school

2 This number is the inverse of the World Bank's Learning Poverty indicator, which is based on actual student assessments.

FIGURE 5 How well do policymakers know their education systems?



Source: Data on spending is from the World Bank Development Indicators, on enrolment from UNESCO Institute for Statistics, on learning from the World Bank Learning Poverty indicator, and on sexual violence from Demographic and Health Surveys. The units for the first subfigure (spending per child) are dollars per year, and for the others are all percentages.

FIGURE 6 Officials who see poverty as the main cause of low learning levels tend to be fatalistic about the effect of new spending



Note: Panel A respondents were asked, "What do you think is the most important reason for low levels of learning? a) Lack of books and learning materials, b) Poor instruction, c) Malnutrition, d) Poor school facilities, e) Poverty, f) Lack of internet connectivity, g) Other." Panel B shows the percentage of respondents who agree that spending does not matter, by views on the main cause of low learning levels.

versus secondary school, a technical or vocational degree, or a university degree. We then used these responses (expressed in raw monetary terms) to calculate an economic return to each level of schooling. For instance, the return to secondary schooling is the simple percentage point gain that respondents perceived in the future earnings of a child who completed secondary school compared with one who stopped after primary school.

Overall, respondents anticipate a roughly 50 percent boost in earnings for both girls and boys from completing secondary school. They also anticipate an additional return of roughly 40 percent for both boys and girls from getting a technical or vocational degree, and an additional 40 to 50 percent from getting a university degree. On the whole, they predict similar or slightly higher returns for girls than for boys. Are these expectations accurate? We compared policymakers' expectations to estimates of the wage returns in a standard Mincerian specification cited in Montenegro and Patrinos (2021). On average, policymakers' guesses match empirical estimates reasonably well, albeit with a few exceptions. Policymakers in Ghana, Peru, and the Philippines are somewhat too optimistic about the returns to secondary schooling for boys (Figure 7), while Ugandan policymakers are too pessimistic about the returns for both girls and boys (if empirical estimates are accurate). Overall, policymaker estimates of employment levels are unbiased; however, beliefs and data on employment levels for university graduates diverge significantly.

FIGURE 7 Policymakers have accurate beliefs about labour market returns to schooling



Source: We calculated beliefs about labour market returns to schooling following Jensen (2010). Data on labour market returns to schooling are estimates based on household survey reports by Montenegro and Patrinos (2021). Data on employment are from the World Development Indicators.

3. Are Policymakers Interested Only in Elites?

MANY, BUT NOT ALL, POLICYMAKERS FOCUS ON ELITES OVER THE MASSES

One reason for the poor performance of many education systems is their focus on a narrow class of elites. Inflexible curricula are tailored to the best performing students rather than to the average student, with little opportunity for students to catch up. Do policymakers agree with this focus? We first ask for views on curricula: whether they should be a) "ambitious and set to international standards, even if this means they are too difficult for most students," or b) "adjusted to the level of the students, so that all children learn basic literacy and numeracy skills." Here we see wide variation across countries: the majority in Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Ghana prefer international standards, while almost all respondents from Indonesia and Uganda prefer a focus on the level that students can reasonably achieve (Figure 8).

Should teachers pay most attention to students performing well or those lagging behind? Here a majority think both should be treated equally. Only around

FIGURE 8 Many think curricula should target elites at the expense of the masses



Note: Respondents were asked whether they thought that a) "Our curriculum should be ambitious and set to international standards, even if this means it is too difficult for most students," or b) "Schools should adjust the difficulty of the curriculum to the level of the students, so that all children learn basic literacy and numeracy skills (we abbreviate this in the figure as FLN for "foundational literacy and numeracy")."

4 percent of respondents said that teachers should prioritise high-performing students (Table A3.33).

Respondents place a high value on outcomes for poorer children. In a discrete choice experiment, we found that respondents place a high priority on outcomes for poorer children: specifically, more than five times the value of increasing the exam pass rate for poor kids as for the overall exam pass rate. Policymakers were offered the choice between two different, hypothetical outcomes for a school system. In each case, half of the students come from poor households and half from nonpoor households. What distinguished the two hypothetical outcomes was how well the poor kids performed compared with the nonpoor kids. With this framing, we posed an "efficiency-equity" trade-off: the underlying question is whether policymakers feel it is justified to sacrifice average performance to help children from disadvantaged backgrounds. The result here suggests a clear priority on poorer students.

There is significant variation in this "inequality aversion" across countries. In Ghana and DRC, respondents chose their responses based solely on the benefits for children from poor households. In Indonesia and Vietnam, respondents chose their answers based more on the average performance for poor and nonpoor children alike. There are no large differences in inequality aversion between other subgroups. MOF officials place slightly higher weight on average performance (rather than on the performance of the poor) compared with other respondents. This emphasis is perhaps consistent with the stereotype that economists care more about efficiency than equity.

POLICYMAKERS SUPPORT INCLUSION FOR CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES

Often the most marginalised children in any education system are those with physical or mental disabilities. We tested policymakers on their knowledge of the education status of children with disabilities in their countries. We also polled them about their support for mainstreaming children with disabilities in school classrooms.

There is strong support in our sample for the idea that children with disabilities deserve the same level of access to public schooling as children without disabilities. This support is also found across all subgroups: overall, over 50 percent of respondents strongly agree, and an additional 39 percent "agree," with only 4 percent in opposition. Similarly, over 90 percent of respondents agree or strongly agree that "in most cases, accommodations should be made so that children with disabilities can be included in regular classrooms with children who do not have disabilities." Respondents, however, estimated that on average, just 18 percent of children with disabilities are enrolled in junior secondary school, compared with 59 percent of all children. Cross-country data on actual enrolment rates of disabled children are not readily available, and these enrolment rates vary widely by the specific type of functional difficulties children have, but overall enrolment rates are significantly lower for children with disabilities (UNICEF 2022).

4. Is Girls' Education Really a Priority?

MANY POLICYMAKERS THINK THAT SCHOOLS SHOULD PROMOTE GENDER EQUALITY, WHILE HAVING REGRESSIVE VIEWS THEMSELVES

Most policymakers state support for gender equality. Promoting girls' education is a mainstay of donors' work in global education, and is likewise a stated policy priority of many MOEs around the world. But to what extent do individual policymakers share these views about the importance of girls' education? Officials in our sample overwhelmingly state "schools should try to promote gender equality." Only about 4 percent of respondents disagree, with uniform support across all subsamples.

However, many do not think that girls face additional challenges in accessing education. Overall, just over 50 percent of respondents agree that "girls face additional challenges in accessing and completing their education compared with boys in this country." This rate is highest among MPs, as well as in DRC (over 90 percent), and lowest in Mongolia (with just 3 percent in agreement; Figure 9).

FIGURE 9 Policymakers are divided on whether girls face additional challenges



Note: Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement "Girls face additional challenges in accessing and completing their education compared to boys in this country."

There is also considerable heterogeneity in underlying gender norms across countries. More than 40 percent of respondents agree that "when a mother works for pay, the children suffer" (Table A3.40). But this rate is 100 percent in Pakistan and just 3 percent in DRC. These norms carry over into beliefs about the labour market: about a quarter of respondents agree that "when jobs are scarce, men should have more of a right to a job than women" (Table A3.41). About 45 percent of respondents in Vietnam subscribe to this belief, but only 5 percent in DRC do.

Attitudes towards sexual education are also highly varied across countries. Early marriage and pregnancy are significant barriers to girl's education. A strong majority agrees that "children should be taught about contraception in secondary school" (Table A3.42), but 85 percent of respondents in Pakistan disagree, as well as about a third of respondents in DRC, Ghana, and Nigeria.

5. Do Policymakers Recognise the Extent of Violence in Schools?

ONE IN FOUR POLICYMAKERS THINK IT IS ALWAYS JUSTIFIED FOR TEACHERS TO BEAT CHILDREN

School violence is a global challenge. Its prevalence is highest in low- and middle-income countries, where nearly a third of children suffer physical or sexual violence at school. Schools should provide a safe and nurturing environment where children are able to learn and thrive. But children are often harmed in schools by teachers, other school staff, and fellow students.

Policymakers perceive sexual violence as a real problem. On average, policymakers estimate that 32 percent of girls and 24 percent of boys experience sexual violence by age 18. In Pakistan, this estimate extends to 58 percent for girls and 45 percent for boys. Finding reliable data to cross-check this issue is challenging, due to a significant lack of information on violence, especially among children (Smarrelli et al. 2024). The Demographic and Health Survey provides data only for girls and women age 15 and older, while the Violence Against Children and Youths Survey (VACS) focuses on children age 13 and up. Nigeria's 2014 VACS data indicate that 25 percent of girls and 11 percent of boys experience sexual violence before age 18. In Uganda, these rates are 35 percent for girls and 17 percent for boys. It is important to consider that sexual violence is almost certainly underreported in household surveys due to its sensitive nature (Cullen 2023; Peterman et al. 2024), suggesting that actual figures are likely higher. Despite these challenges, it is clear that policymakers acknowledge sexual violence as a significant issue, which presents a crucial opportunity to implement measures that improve safety in schools.

There is very low tolerance for sexual abuse by teachers, but more mixed views on corporal punishment: 97 percent of respondents agree that "teachers found to have a sexual relationship with a secondary school student should be suspended" (Table A3.43). Views are more mixed on corporal punishment: half think it is sometimes justified for parents to beat children, and around a third believe it justified for teachers to beat children (Figure 10). In most countries the majority of respondents believe corporal punishment is never justified, while in Pakistan, Uganda, and Nigeria, many believe corporal punishment is always justified. Officials from an MOE are slightly less likely to believe that corporal punishment is justified (16 percent) than MPs or MOF officials (19 percent).

FIGURE 10 One in four think teachers can be justified in beating children



Note: Respondents were asked, "Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between … Parents beating children … Teachers beating children."

6. Should Governments Embrace Private Schools?

Private schools in developing countries are a controversial and emotive topic. Some think that private schools undermine public education and increase inequality, while others think they play a vital role where public provision is inadequate. Evidence suggests that although private schools are often of a slightly better quality than public schools, government efforts to subsidise spots at private schools have been less effective (Crawfurd et al. 2024). The question remains: how (if at all) should governments engage with the private sector? Globally, almost 1 in 5 primary school students attended a private school in 2019, an increase from 1 in 10 in 2000 (World Bank World Development Indicators). In low- and middle-income countries, one in four secondary school students attended a private school in 2019, and the share of private school students exceeds 50 percent in many urban centres. Enrolment in private schools is growing alongside a renewed global policy focus on school effectiveness, so understanding the effectiveness of private schools in helping to reach education goals is important. What do national policymakers think? And do they think that government should pay private schools to educate children?

Respondents are divided on whether private schools are of better quality than public schools. More respondents think that private schools are of better quality than public schools (33 percent) than of worse quality (21 percent). Officials at MOFs are more likely to think private schools are better (52 percent) than MOE officials (39 percent) and MPs (25 percent; Figure 11). There is also large cross-country variation: less than 10 percent in Uganda, Nigeria, Pakistan, Mongolia, and Bangladesh think public schools are better than private schools. Empirical evidence from these countries suggests that children at private schools do better on examinations, but part of this advantage is due to factors other than school quality (Andrabi et al. 2022; Crawfurd 2017; Crawfurd et al. 2024).

Respondents are divided on the question of support for government subsidies of private schools. If people think private schools are better, do they also think that government should subsidise spots at private schools? There is a lot of variation. Even in countries where there is a strong belief that private schools perform better, respondents do not always support government subsidies for private schools: 47 percent agree that the government should fund private schools, while 50 percent disagree. In some countries, such as Bangladesh and DRC, the majority think that the government should subsidise places.

FIGURE 11 Policymakers are divided on private school quality



Note: The survey question was, "In your opinion, when private schools operate on the same budget as public schools, do you think they provide higher quality education, lower quality, or about the same?"

By contrast, in Pakistan and Ghana, the majority disagree (Figure 12). This disagreement is notable, given that Pakistan has some of the largest and longest-standing public-private partnership programmes. Similarly, in Ghana, there was public debate over a controversial pilot of a new partnership programme in 2019, with vocal opposition from teacher unions. Bangladesh is an outlier, with 85 percent of respondents agreeing that governments should provide private schools with subsidies. In addition to Pakistan, the Philippines also already has an extensive public-private partnership in place, in which large numbers of children attend privately run schools funded by the government.

Most policymakers send their own children to private schools. Given the belief that private schools perform better, it is perhaps unsurprising that only one in five policymakers send their own children to public schools: very few policymakers have "skin in the game." Among the MPs in our sample, just 8 percent send their children exclusively to public schools (Figure 13).

FIGURE 12 Policymakers are divided on public funding for private schools



Note: Respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed that "government should provide subsidies to allow more children to attend private schools."

FIGURE 13 Most policymakers send their own children to private schools



Note: Respondents were asked, "If you have school-age children, do they attend public or private school?"

WHAT EXPLAINS DIFFERENCES IN SUPPORT FOR PUBLIC SUBSIDIES FOR PRIVATE SCHOOLS?

People who think that private schools are of better quality are more likely to support public subsidies, as are those whose own children attend private schools. To explore the correlates of support for public subsidies, we defined a binary indicator for whether someone supports subsidies—this was our outcome variable. We then estimated the correlation between this and a set of possible explanatory variables, including binary indicators for whether the respondent thinks private schools are more effective and whether they send their own children exclusively to private schools. We also included the weight that respondents put on the welfare of poor students (estimated through a discrete choice experiment). We also included some basic characteristics of the respondent—their gender and their organisational role. We then estimated a simple linear probability model. The results show that people who think private schools are more effective are 10 percentage points more likely to support subsidies (Figure 14), as are people who send their own children exclusively to private schools. Those who care more about poor students are less likely to support subsidies for private schools. Other demographic factors make little difference—including sex, age, or organisational role (i.e., whether the official works in an MOF, MOE, or is an MP). These results are intuitive if somewhat problematic. Support for private school subsidies should rest on evidence about the effectiveness of these subsidies, not on the quality of unsubsidised private schools. Even if unsubsidised private schools were better, public subsidy for these schools could worsen outcomes. On this question, the jury is still out.

FIGURE 14 What explains support for subsidies?



Note: This figure shows coefficients from an OLS/linear probability model regression on correlates of supporting (1) subsidies to private schools or not (0). It omits controls for respondent age, country-fixed effects, and the constant. Thick lines indicate 90 percent confidence intervals, and thin lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. The welfare weight on poor students is the output of a separate discrete choice model in which respondents chose between outcomes for the average student and outcomes for the average poor student.

Conclusion

Global education remains in crisis. The solutions to this crisis must come primarily from national governments. For global policy debates to be most useful, they should be informed by data on the views of policymakers in national governments. In this paper, we present data from a unique survey of 601 senior officials from 12 low- and middle-income countries. We discuss their attitudes to public spending, the learning crisis, inclusion and gender, violence in schools, and private schools. While policymakers recognise barriers to education apart from money, they do support more spending on education and identify some policy areas where lack of spending is the primary barrier to improvement.

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Appendix 1. Methods

In this project, we survey senior policymakers from 12 low- and middle-income countries: Bangladesh, DRC, Ghana, Indonesia, Laos, Mongolia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Uganda, and Vietnam. These countries were purposely selected to represent a range of sizes, geographies, and income levels, as well as a diversity of political systems and educational outcomes. We make three key departures from the first survey in this second round of the survey (Crawfurd et al. 2021). First, we expand our sample to include MOFs and MPs, thereby allowing us to consider the views of those policymakers involved in decisions about allocating spending. Second, we use systematic random sampling to ensure that our results are fully representative of all relevant officials and decision makers. Third, we ensure a large enough sample from each country to allow us to report results for individual countries without compromising the anonymity of individual respondents. We sample from three different populations: MOEs, MOFs, and MPs (we also sample from adjacent government agencies, as detailed in Table A1.1).

Sample frames

In order to generate representative samples, we first compile sampling frames consisting of the universe of potential respondents. In the case of MOEs and MOFs, this list consists of all senior staff, defined as deputy or assistant director and upwards. For parliament, the sample consisted of the full list of MPs.

Within each ministry (MOE and MOF), the respondents are stratified into three tiers by seniority, with Tier 1 including ministers down to director generals, Tier 2 the director level, and Tier 3 the deputy director level. We aimed to sample approximately 25 respondents spread across these three categories, although there was some variation in countries that had a total population in these categories below these target samples.

The process for sampling varied slightly by country, as we developed sample frames for each target population. In each country, consultants first drew up a sample frame listing of all potential respondents. We then sampled individuals, stratified by seniority level in government agencies (according to Table A1.2), as well as by geography and/or by party affiliation for MPs.

MPs

We sample MPs in 8 of our 12 countries: namely, Bangladesh, DRC, Ghana, Laos, Mongolia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, and Uganda. For most countries, we sample MPs stratified by party, with probability in proportion to size. For members of very small parties, we group MPs together as an "other" category. Specifically, in Bangladesh, we stratify MPs by Awami League, Jatiya Party, or any other party; in Ghana, we stratify by NDC and NPP; in Mongolia, by Mongolian People's Party, Democratic Party, or any other party; in Pakistan, by PTI, PML-N, PPPP, MMAP, or other; and in Uganda, by NRM, Independent, NUP, FDC, or other. In Nigeria, we sample constituencies randomly from Ekiti State and Lagos State. For the more contested Bauchi State and Kano State, we stratify by the All Progressives Congress and Peoples Democratic Party. In Peru, we sample randomly. In DRC, we first stratify geographically by province, randomly sampling five constituencies in Kinshasa, and one each from 12 other provinces, selected randomly in proportion to the number of constituencies per province.

Consultants conducted the interviews either in person or by phone between April and November 2022.

TABLE A1.1 Sampled organisations

COUNTRY	MINISTRY OF EDUCATION	MINISTRY OF FINANCE	MPs
Bangladesh	MOE, Ministry of Primary & Mass Education	MOF, Ministry of Planning	Yes
DRC	MOE	MOF	Yes
Ghana	MOE, Ghana Education Service	MOF	No
Indonesia	MOECR&T, Ministry of Religious Affairs	MOF	No
Laos	MOE	MOF	No
Mongolia	MOE	MOF	No
Nigeria	MOE (Bauchi, Ekiti, Kano, & Lagos)	MOF (Bauchi, Ekiti, Kano, & Lagos)	Yes
Pakistan	Punjab School Education Department, Federal MOE	Federal MOF	Yes
Peru	MOE	MOF	Yes
Philippines	Department of Education, Commission on Higher Education, Technical Education & Skills Authority, Professional Regulation Commission	Dept of Budget Management, National Economic Development Authority	Yes
Uganda	MOE, National Council for Children, Business & Technical Exams Board	MOF, National Planning Authority	No
Vietnam	MOE, Ministry of Primary & Mass Education	MOF, Ministry of Planning	No

Note: Though our focus is on the MOE and MOF, in some countries, we sampled from independent government ministries or agencies that share some core functions and responsibilities, as detailed here.

TABLE A1.2 Sample per ministry

	MOE			MOF			MP	TOTAL
	MINISTER TO DG	DIRECTOR LEVEL	DEPUTY DIRECTOR	MINISTER TO DG	DIRECTOR LEVEL	DEPUTY DIRECTOR		
Target	7	10	8	7	10	8	25	75
Actual								
Bangladesh	2	12	15		7	13	30	79
DRC	1	11	8	1	12	7	21	61
Ghana	2	6		1	8		26	43
Indonesia	7	9	16			15		47
Laos	4	10	11	3	11	11		50
Mongolia	5	5		3	3		14	30
Nigeria	6	13	7	7	15	3	40	91
Pakistan	4	7	9	5	11	4	19	59
Peru	7	13		13	9	1	17	60
Philippines	5	12	8	15	10	1		51
Uganda	1	2	5		2	6	4	20
Vietnam			21			5		26
Total	37	98	93	48	88	66	171	601

Our full sample frame consists of 2,521 potential respondents. Of these, we sampled 861 respondents for interviews. Of these 861, we successfully interviewed 601 respondents, or 69.8 percent.

Weights

We calculated post-stratification weights based on sampling strata (which were based on country, organisation group, and seniority level). The weight is the ratio of the share of each stratum in the population to the share of the same strata in the sample. To illustrate: individuals from a stratum that represented 10 percent of the population, but 20 percent of the sample would have a weight of 0.1/0.2 = 0.5.

Appendix 2. COVID-19 and School Closures

Looking back at the COVID-19 pandemic, we see a roughly even split between those who think schools were closed for too long or for the right amount of time. School systems around the world closed their doors in 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, some for a few weeks and others for nearly two years. On the health side, research is mixed on whether closing schools helped contain the spread of disease (Donohue and Miller 2020; Walsh et al. 2021). On the education side, there is a large body of evidence that student learning suffered during the pandemic (Moscoviz and Evans 2022). While nearly all respondents recognise the impact of school closures on learning, policymakers are split in their views about the health risks to children. Respondents are optimistic about the role of "EdTech" (educational technology) in sustaining learning during school closures.

Policymakers are divided on whether, in retrospect, they feel COVID-19 school closures were justified. Overall, the survey responses are evenly split between those who feel that schools were "closed for about the right about of time" (48 percent) and those who feel schools were "closed for too long" (47 percent). Only 5 percent of respondents feel schools were not closed long enough. This split is consistent among officials in MOEs and MOFs, as well as MPs, with perhaps a slightly higher level of regret for school closures in MOFs.

Policymakers are divided on the health risks posed to children but united on the educational impacts of closures. An obvious possible explanation for differing views about the wisdom of closing schools is that individuals may disagree about either (a) the health risks COVID-19 poses to children or (b) the educational consequences of school closure. In practice, disagreement appears to occur on questions about health—where officials are evenly divided on the risks posed to children—but not on the education side, where there is near unanimity about the consequences for student learning. The perceived health risk of children becoming "seriously ill with COVID-19" roughly follows a bell curve, with the largest group of respondents (24 percent overall) reporting a "moderate" risk, and smaller shares reporting "very low" (19 percent) or "very high" risks (10 percent). There is no marked difference in perception between MOE and MOF officials or between them and MPs. Results across countries are also fairly similar, with slightly higher perceptions of risk in a couple of countries, such as Laos and Nigeria.

No such division was found when asking officials how the COVID-19 pandemic has affected student learning. The majority (87 percent) perceive negative impacts, including 62 percent who see a "major negative impact." This trend is similar across ministries and countries, apart from a handful of responses in, for example, Ghana, Nigeria, and Pakistan, where officials perceived major learning gains during the pandemic.

Respondents display similar views on how to address COVID-19 learning loss across both ministries and countries. Roughly half of respondents feel the best option is to "provide extra in-class enrichment, that is, special programmes during the regular school day," compared with just over a third supporting "remedial education such as summer school programmes." Almost nobody supports having children repeat grades, and a small minority (about 5 percent) feel no remedial action is necessary.

Despite their general pessimism about learning outcomes, respondents are optimistic about the role of "EdTech"—for example, internet, TV, radio, or mobile phone

programmes—in supporting learning during the pandemic. Roughly 80 percent said they agree or strongly agree that these programmes were effective, with the highest level of optimism among MPs. There are some notable differences across countries, however, with most of the respondents in Uganda and a large minority in Pakistan doubtful about EdTech's performance. Among the EdTech sceptics, the main reasons listed for its ineffectiveness were children's lack of access to a computer or other device, and a lack of access to internet.

Appendix 3. Cross-Tabs for All Survey Questions

3.1 COVID-19 AND SCHOOL CLOSURES

TABLE A3.1 During the current pandemic, do you think primary schools were... (Ratio/Observations)

	RATIO		
	TOO LONG	RIGHT AMOUNT OF TIME	NOT LONG ENOUGH
Gender			
Male	48.6	46.2	5.2
Female	59.8	36.5	3.7
Organization			
MOE	45.6	48.7	5.7
MOF	56.5	40.6	2.9
MP	52.7	42.2	5.1
Country			
Bangladesh	30.9	60.9	8.3
DRC	30.5	60.5	9.0
Ghana	19.1	76.9	4.0
Indonesia	29.5	70.5	0.0
Laos	68.1	31.9	0.0
Mongolia	56.5	43.5	0.0
Nigeria	36.4	56.8	6.8
Pakistan	39.6	51.7	8.7
Peru	80.0	20.0	0.0
Philippines	65.7	31.4	2.9
Uganda	100.0	0.0	0.0
Vietnam	87.9	10.3	1.7
Total	51.6 [280]	43.6 [287]	4.8 [29]

TABLE A3.2 In your view, how high is the risk of children becoming seriously ill with COVID-19? (Ratio/Observations)

	RATIO		
	LOW	MODERATE/ HIGH	DON'T KNOW/NA
Gender			
Male	57.0	40.2	2.9
Female	59.8	38.3	1.8
Organization			
MOE	54.9	41.8	3.3
MOF	43.3	54.1	2.6
MP	65.0	32.8	2.2
Country			
Bangladesh	65.5	33.0	1.6
DRC	50.9	34.1	15.0
Ghana	34.0	66.0	0.0
Indonesia	36.5	63.5	0.0
Laos	31.0	69.0	0.0
Mongolia	17.2	82.8	0.0
Nigeria	37.9	61.7	0.4
Pakistan	90.4	9.3	0.4
Peru	49.8	50.2	0.0
Philippines	29.3	67.8	2.9
Uganda	72.3	27.7	0.0
Vietnam	57.2	39.3	3.4
Total	57.5 [293]	39.9 [290]	2.6 [18]

TABLE A3.3 "How do you think the COVID pandemic has affected student learning?" (Ratio/Observations)

	RATIO		
	NEGATIVE IMPACT	NO EFFECT/ POSITIVE IMPACT	DON'T KNOW/NA
Gender			
Male	87.7	12.0	0.4
Female	94.3	5.7	0.0
Organization			
MOE	87.1	12.8	0.1
MOF	91.4	7.4	1.2
MP	89.7	10.3	0.0
Country			
Bangladesh	92.3	7.6	0.1
DRC	93.4	4.9	1.7
Ghana	88.4	11.6	0.0
Indonesia	87.3	12.7	0.0
Laos	94.9	5.1	0.0
Mongolia	98.9	1.1	0.0
Nigeria	83.8	16.2	0.0
Pakistan	90.0	10.0	0.0
Peru	100.0	0.0	0.0
Philippines	90.9	7.2	1.9
Uganda	78.1	21.9	0.0
Vietnam	82.1	17.9	0.0
Total	89.4 [537]	10.3 [60]	0.3 [4]

TABLE A3.4 "Children have lost valuable face-to-face learning time. Which of the following do you think is the best approach to help children in your country who have fallen behind?"

Option 1: Provide extra in-class enrichment, i.e. special programs during the regular school day
Option 2: Provide remedial education such as summer school programs
Option 3: Have children repeat grades
Option 4: Nothing special needs to be done. Students will bounce back to normal in a few years
Option 5: Don't know/refused to answer
Option: Other [Specify]
(Ratio/Observations)

	RATIO				
	OPTION 1	OPTION 2	OPTION 3	OPTION 4	OPTION 5
Gender					
Male	56.9	33.0	0.0	5.0	5.1
Female	46.0	34.1	1.2	6.1	12.5
Organization					
MOE	57.3	28.8	0.1	6.0	7.8
MOF	37.6	46.9	0.2	7.6	7.7
MP	59.8	29.6	0.5	3.9	6.2
Country					
Bangladesh	73.5	19.6	0.0	6.8	0.1
DRC	32.5	53.7	0.0	5.2	8.6
Ghana	49.8	39.0	3.6	7.2	0.3
Indonesia	61.2	9.0	0.0	0.0	29.8
Laos	24.7	62.9	0.0	4.7	7.7
Mongolia	71.0	21.0	0.0	2.2	5.9
Nigeria	58.1	38.7	0.4	2.3	0.4
Pakistan	48.4	48.8	0.0	2.4	0.4
Peru	57.8	10.5	0.3	0.0	31.4
Philippines	37.5	50.5	1.0	6.2	4.8
Uganda	74.1	22.7	0.0	1.2	2.0
Vietnam	13.8	30.7	0.0	32.4	23.1
Total	54.2 [322]	33.2 [184]	0.3 [4]	5.3 [36]	7.0 [55]

TABLE A3.5 "EdTech (e.g. Internet, TV, radio, or mobile) was effective in supporting student learning during COVID-related school closures." (Ratio/Observations)

	RATIO				
	A) STRONGLY AGREE	B) AGREE	C) DISAGREE	D) STRONGLY DISAGREE	E) DON'T KNOW/ NO ANSWER
Gender					
Male	24.2	44.0	28.6	2.2	1.1
Female	32.9	42.8	24.0	0.2	0.0
Organization					
MOE	32.5	43.6	23.7	0.3	0.0
MOF	44.1	43.7	9.1	1.9	1.2
MP	16.2	43.4	37.0	2.2	1.1
Country					
Bangladesh	43.9	22.4	32.3	1.4	0.0
DRC	12.2	76.8	4.9	0.2	5.9
Ghana	12.2	72.2	15.5	0.0	0.0
Indonesia	56.4	36.5	7.1	0.0	0.0
Laos	40.4	33.3	26.3	0.0	0.0
Mongolia	19.9	51.1	23.1	5.9	0.0
Nigeria	56.5	41.6	1.8	0.0	0.0
Pakistan	0.0	90.0	10.0	0.0	0.0
Peru	29.2	40.0	20.3	10.2	0.3
Philippines	45.2	51.0	1.0	1.9	1.0
Uganda	0.0	1.8	95.7	2.6	0.0
Vietnam	81.1	18.9	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total	26.7 [181]	43.5 [293]	27.3 [110]	1.6 [12]	0.8 [5]

TABLE A3.6 "Why do you think ed tech was not effective?"

Option 1: "Lack internet access"
Option 2: "Lack device access"
Option 3: "Teachers' inability to teach remotely"
Option 4: "Lack of parent's supervision"
Option 5: "Other/Don't know"
(Ratio/Observations)

	RATIO				
	INTERNET	DEVICE	TEACHER	PARENTS	OTHER/ DON'T KNOW
Gender					
Male	42.5	31.6	3.9	1.1	20.9
Female	3.6	14.7	1.6	4.6	75.6
Organization					
MOE	48.1	24.4	1.5	1.1	24.8
MOF	9.2	43.5	11.2	8.4	27.7
MP	32.7	27.3	3.0	1.3	35.7
Country					
Bangladesh	77.9	22.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
DRC	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Ghana	27.8	23.3	23.3	23.3	2.2
Indonesia	91.3	0.0	8.7	0.0	0.0
Laos	0.0	31.1	5.6	17.4	45.9
Mongolia	0.0	88.8	0.0	0.0	11.2
Nigeria	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Pakistan	38.7	28.8	28.8	3.7	0.0
Peru	15.6	19.8	3.1	0.0	61.5
Philippines	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Uganda	22.4	30.8	1.2	0.0	45.7
Total	34.2 [31]	28.0 [39]	3.4 [11]	1.8 [6]	32.6 [35]

TABLE A3.7 "EdTech (e.g. Internet, TV, radio, or mobile) helps all children learn equally." (Ratio/Observations)

	RATIO				
	A) STRONGLY AGREE	B) AGREE	C) DISAGREE	D) STRONGLY DISAGREE	E) DON'T KNOW/ NO ANSWER
Gender					
Male	7.0	25.9	55.0	11.1	1.1
Female	10.0	22.8	51.0	14.1	2.1
Organization					
MOE	12.9	33.7	48.7	3.7	1.0
MOF	9.8	30.7	57.0	2.0	0.6
MP	4.8	18.0	55.0	20.3	1.9
Country					
Bangladesh	3.8	8.1	82.4	5.7	0.0
DRC	5.8	85.1	2.3	0.2	6.5
Ghana	3.6	4.0	66.0	26.4	0.0
Indonesia	33.5	45.8	20.7	0.0	0.0
Laos	18.0	39.1	25.9	12.7	4.2
Mongolia	7.0	4.3	76.9	5.9	5.9
Nigeria	21.7	43.6	29.7	4.5	0.4
Pakistan	0.2	14.3	79.8	5.8	0.0
Peru	14.9	6.3	71.4	6.3	1.0
Philippines	1.9	43.3	45.7	7.2	1.9
Uganda	0.0	0.0	56.8	43.2	0.0
Vietnam	28.3	42.8	29.0	0.0	0.0
Total	8.1 [69]	25.0 [169]	53.7 [306]	11.8 [45]	1.3 [12]

3.2 SUPPORT FOR SPENDING

TABLE A3.8 "Please estimate, roughly how much does the government spend each year per child in primary school in your country (in US dollars)." (Ratio/Observations)

	RATIO					
	UNDER 100	100–250	251–500	501–750	OVER 750	DON'T KNOW/ NA
Gender						
Male	48.3	25.6	14.9	2.5	2.0	6.7
Female	49.6	29.7	8.0	2.2	1.3	9.2
Organization						
MOE	38.7	27.4	17.5	1.6	3.4	11.4
MOF	55.4	19.4	9.7	1.6	1.5	12.4
MP	50.9	29.2	12.7	3.1	1.1	3.0
Country						
Bangladesh	27.7	26.2	35.4	4.4	0.0	6.3
DRC	78.9	6.5	0.2	0.0	0.0	14.4
Ghana	32.1	56.0	11.2	0.3	0.3	0.0
Indonesia	13.9	52.9	13.9	0.0	2.5	16.7
Laos	37.1	17.0	12.8	5.2	18.6	9.3
Mongolia	15.1	44.6	19.4	9.2	5.9	5.9
Nigeria	6.5	48.9	23.8	9.5	1.4	9.8
Pakistan	90.7	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.1
Peru	25.4	47.6	7.9	5.7	7.3	6.0
Philippines	22.6	53.8	7.7	1.0	0.0	14.9
Uganda	76.3	21.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8
Vietnam	38.3	28.3	31.7	0.0	0.0	1.7
Total	48.6 [217]	26.5 [169]	13.3 [109]	2.4 [28]	1.8 [28]	7.3 [50]

TABLE A3.9 "Now thinking about the overall government budget, roughly what percentage do you think is spent on education? and What percentage of the total government budget do you think should be spent on education?" (Ratio/Observations)

	PERCEIVED SHARE	DESIRED SHARE
Gender		
Male	13.0	21.7
Female	11.1	18.4
Organization		
MOE	13.8	21.3
MOF	13.5	21.0
MP	11.6	21.0
Country		
Bangladesh	7.8	10.7
DRC	16.3	30.3
Ghana	15.4	31.5
Indonesia	19.3	21.6
Laos	24.1	35.6
Mongolia	16.1	25.0
Nigeria	18.4	28.4
Pakistan	2.7	16.3
Peru	7.1	13.1
Philippines	15.9	22.1
Uganda	16.0	21.1
Vietnam	17.0	23.0
Total	12.6 [571]	21.1 [569]

TABLE A3.10 "Education is important, but if government spends more money on it this won't improve outcomes." (Ratio/Observations)

	RATIO				
	A) STRONGLY AGREE	B) AGREE	C) DISAGREE	D) STRONGLY DISAGREE	E) DON'T KNOW/ NO ANSWER
Gender					
Male	14.8	16.3	41.8	26.4	0.8
Female	3.5	17.5	41.9	33.5	3.7
Organization					
MOE	17.1	16.3	44.2	21.4	1.1
MOF	13.4	14.7	55.9	15.8	0.2
MP	8.7	17.8	34.2	36.9	2.3
Country					
Bangladesh	18.7	26.5	51.9	0.0	2.9
DRC	5.1	2.1	19.1	73.7	0.0
Ghana	14.5	0.3	45.5	39.3	0.3
Indonesia	7.1	34.0	44.6	13.6	0.6
Laos	60.2	13.1	22.5	0.0	4.2
Mongolia	0.0	24.2	57.0	7.0	11.8
Nigeria	21.2	22.5	34.0	22.3	0.0
Pakistan	12.3	19.0	62.9	5.8	0.0
Peru	6.0	39.7	38.7	10.2	5.4
Philippines	1.0	34.1	46.6	17.3	1.0
Uganda	0.0	0.0	30.2	69.8	0.0
Vietnam	0.0	17.9	53.1	29.0	0.0
Total	12.0 [82]	16.7 [127]	41.7 [250]	28.1 [131]	1.5 [11]

TABLE A3.11 "Of these statements, which is closer to your view:"

Option 1: Government should borrow internationally to finance education spending just like any other kind of spending
Option 2: Government should only borrow to spend on investments with a short-term fiscal return, (which excludes education)
Option 3: Government should not borrow internationally
Option 4: Don't know/refuse to answer
(Ratio/Observations)

	RATIO			
	OPTION 1	OPTION 2	OPTION 3	OPTION 4
Gender				
Male	63.5	15.7	11.9	8.9
Female	63.9	10.6	20.8	4.8
Organization				
MOE	61.9	18.8	10.6	8.7
MOF	67.3	18.7	11.1	2.9
MP	62.4	10.8	17.4	9.4
Country				
Bangladesh	75.8	11.3	2.9	10.1
DRC	45.1	16.2	24.9	13.7
Ghana	57.4	11.6	31.0	0.0
Indonesia	70.6	19.8	9.6	0.0
Laos	8.2	82.8	9.0	0.0
Mongolia	62.4	24.7	12.9	0.0
Nigeria	58.7	29.0	12.3	0.0
Pakistan	57.2	13.3	29.5	0.0
Peru	66.3	1.0	25.7	7.0
Philippines	79.3	14.9	2.9	2.9
Uganda	77.4	0.0	0.0	22.6
Vietnam	86.2	3.4	8.6	1.7
Total	63.4 [335]	14.7 [131]	14.2 [105]	7.8 [30]

TABLE A3.12 The Department/Ministry of Finance is considering an additional allocation for education to one of two policy areas. Which one of the following would you choose?

	MOE	MOF	MP	TOTAL
50 — *millionproject*	–0.2	–0.2	–0.2	–0.2
100 — *millionproject*	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
150 — *millionproject*	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Giving teachers structured reading lesson plan	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.9
In-service teacher training	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.6
Providing laptops to schools	–0.6	–0.6	–0.6	–0.6
Providing free lunches in primary school	–0.0	0.1	0.2	0.1
Removing fees for secondary school	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.2
Hiring teachers for students with disability	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3
Building hospitals	–1.5	–1.4	–1.4	–1.5
2 years	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
5 years	–0.1	–0.1	–0.1	–0.1

	BANGLADESH	DRC	GHANA	INDONESIA	LAOS	MONGOLIA	TOTAL
50 — *millionproject*	–0.2	–0.1	–0.4	–0.1	–0.2	–0.1	–0.2
100 — *millionproject*	0.1	0.0	0.1	–0.0	0.0	–0.0	0.0
150 — *millionproject*	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Giving teachers structured reading lesson plan	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.2	0.9	0.6	0.9
In-service teacher training	0.7	0.6	0.3	0.7	0.5	0.6	0.6
Providing laptops to schools	–0.6	–0.6	–0.7	–0.6	–0.6	–0.8	–0.6
Providing free lunches in primary school	0.1	0.3	0.3	–0.5	0.0	0.2	0.1
Removing fees for secondary school	–0.1	0.0	0.8	0.2	0.5	–0.5	0.2
Hiring teachers for students with disability	0.4	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.3
Building hospitals	–1.4	–1.2	–1.9	–1.4	–1.5	–0.4	–1.4
2 years	–0.0	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.1	–0.1	0.1
5 years	0.0	–0.3	–0.2	–0.0	–0.1	0.1	–0.1

TABLE A3.12 Continued

	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	PHILIPPINES	UGANDA	VIETNAM	TOTAL
50 — *millionproject*	–0.3	–0.3	–0.1	–0.2	–0.2	–0.5	–0.3
100 — *millionproject*	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	–0.1	0.1	0.0
150 — *millionproject*	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.2
Giving teachers structured reading lesson plan	0.9	0.8	0.9	1.1	1.0	0.9	0.9
In-service teacher training	0.5	0.3	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.6
Providing laptops to schools	–0.5	–0.9	–0.5	–0.5	–0.8	–0.6	–0.6
Providing free lunches in primary school	–0.0	0.3	0.1	0.1	–0.4	–0.2	0.0
Removing fees for secondary school	0.5	0.8	–0.7	–0.0	–0.2	0.8	0.2
Hiring teachers for students with disability	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.2	0.6	0.3	0.4
Building hospitals	–1.6	–1.7	–1.2	–1.6	–0.8	–1.7	–1.5
2 years	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.1	–0.1	0.1	0.1
5 years	–0.1	–0.2	–0.0	–0.1	0.1	–0.1	–0.1

Note: The table reports the implied utility weights from econometric analysis of discrete choice experiment.

3.3 BARRIERS TO REFORM

TABLE A3.13 "What is the single biggest barrier to improve learning outcomes?" (Ratio/Observations)

	MOE	MOF	MP	TOTAL
Money	32.9 (75)	21.8 (44)	23.4 (40)	26.5 (159)
Lack of interest from government	5.7 (13)	7.4 (15)	18.7 (32)	10.0 (60)
Political resistance from others (specify)	1.3 (3)	2.0 (4)	1.2 (2)	1.5 (9)
Political resistance from teacher unions	1.3 (3)	4.5 (9)	1.2 (2)	2.3 (14)
Implementation capacity	47.8 (109)	50.5 (102)	51.5 (88)	49.8 (299)
Other [specify]	7.5 (17)	6.9 (14)	1.8 (3)	5.7 (34)
There is no need to	0.4 (1)	0.0 (0)	0.6 (1)	0.3 (2)
Don't know/no answer	3.1 (7)	6.9 (14)	1.8 (3)	4.0 (24)
Total	100.0 (228)	100.0 (202)	100.0 (171)	100.0 (601)

	INDONESIA	LAOS	MONGOLIA	PHILIPPINES	VIETNAM	TOTAL
Money	3.2 (1)	50.0 (25)	33.3 (10)	19.6 (10)	15.4 (4)	26.6 (50)
Lack of interest from government	3.2 (1)	2.0 (1)	10.0 (3)	5.9 (3)	0.0 (0)	4.3 (8)
Political resistance from others (specify)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	3.9 (2)	0.0 (0)	1.1 (2)
Political resistance from teacher unions	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	3.3 (1)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.5 (1)
Implementation capacity	74.2 (23)	36.0 (18)	50.0 (15)	58.8 (30)	57.7 (15)	53.7 (101)
Other [specify]	19.4 (6)	6.0 (3)	3.3 (1)	11.8 (6)	11.5 (3)	10.1 (19)
Don't know/no answer	0.0 (0)	6.0 (3)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	15.4 (4)	3.7 (7)
Total	100.0 (31)	100.0 (50)	100.0 (30)	100.0 (51)	100.0 (26)	100.0 (188)

TABLE A3.13 Continued

	BANGLADESH	DRC	GHANA	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	UGANDA	TOTAL
Money	29.1 (23)	65.6 (40)	20.9 (9)	31.9 (29)	6.8 (4)	1.7 (1)	15.0 (3)	26.4 (109)
Lack of interest from government	2.5 (2)	4.9 (3)	7.0 (3)	22.0 (20)	20.3 (12)	15.0 (9)	15.0 (3)	12.6 (52)
Political resistance from others (specify)	0.0 (0)	4.9 (3)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	3.3 (2)	10.0 (2)	1.7 (7)
Political resistance from teacher unions	1.3 (1)	0.0 (0)	4.7 (2)	2.2 (2)	0.0 (0)	13.3 (8)	0.0 (0)	3.1 (13)
Implementation capacity	49.4 (39)	19.7 (12)	67.4 (29)	40.7 (37)	72.9 (43)	45.0 (27)	55.0 (11)	47.9 (198)
Other [specify]	0.0 (0)	1.6 (1)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	21.7 (13)	5.0 (1)	3.6 (15)
There is no need to	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	2.2 (2)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.5 (2)
Don't know/no answer	17.7 (14)	3.3 (2)	0.0 (0)	1.1 (1)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	4.1 (17)
Total	100.0 (79)	100.0 (61)	100.0 (43)	100.0 (91)	100.0 (59)	100.0 (60)	100.0 (20)	100.0 (413)

TABLE A3.14 "What is the single biggest barrier to end corporal punishment in school?" (Ratio/Observations)

	MOE	MOF	MP	TOTAL
Money	3.5 (8)	3.5 (7)	1.8 (3)	3.0 (18)
Lack of interest from government	11.0 (25)	8.4 (17)	20.5 (35)	12.8 (77)
Political resistance from others (specify)	2.6 (6)	6.4 (13)	2.3 (4)	3.8 (23)
Political resistance from teacher unions	3.9 (9)	5.9 (12)	2.3 (4)	4.2 (25)
Implementation capacity	50.0 (114)	48.0 (97)	52.6 (90)	50.1 (301)
Other [specify]	15.8 (36)	12.4 (25)	9.4 (16)	12.8 (77)
There is no need to	6.1 (14)	4.0 (8)	5.8 (10)	5.3 (32)
Don't know/no answer	7.0 (16)	11.4 (23)	5.3 (9)	8.0 (48)
Total	100.0 (228)	100.0 (202)	100.0 (171)	100.0 (601)

	INDONESIA	LAOS	MONGOLIA	PHILIPPINES	VIETNAM	TOTAL
Money	0.0 (0)	8.0 (4)	3.3 (1)	2.0 (1)	7.7 (2)	4.3 (8)
Lack of interest from government	3.2 (1)	20.0 (10)	10.0 (3)	2.0 (1)	3.8 (1)	8.5 (16)
Political resistance from others (specify)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	11.8 (6)	0.0 (0)	3.2 (6)
Political resistance from teacher unions	0.0 (0)	6.0 (3)	0.0 (0)	3.9 (2)	0.0 (0)	2.7 (5)
Implementation capacity	83.9 (26)	50.0 (25)	60.0 (18)	39.2 (20)	53.8 (14)	54.8 (103)
Other [specify]	6.5 (2)	10.0 (5)	20.0 (6)	21.6 (11)	23.1 (6)	16.0 (30)
There is no need to	6.5 (2)	0.0 (0)	3.3 (1)	13.7 (7)	3.8 (1)	5.9 (11)
Don't know/no answer	0.0 (0)	6.0 (3)	3.3 (1)	5.9 (3)	7.7 (2)	4.8 (9)
Total	100.0 (31)	100.0 (50)	100.0 (30)	100.0 (51)	100.0 (26)	100.0 (188)

TABLE A3.14 Continued

	BANGLADESH	DRC	GHANA	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	UGANDA	TOTAL
Money	2.5 (2)	1.6 (1)	2.3 (1)	6.6 (6)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	2.4 (10)
Lack of interest from government	10.1 (8)	8.2 (5)	7.0 (3)	27.5 (25)	20.3 (12)	13.3 (8)	0.0 (0)	14.8 (61)
Political resistance from others (specify)	3.8 (3)	1.6 (1)	23.3 (10)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	1.7 (1)	10.0 (2)	4.1 (17)
Political resistance from teacher unions	3.8 (3)	3.3 (2)	4.7 (2)	9.9 (9)	0.0 (0)	6.7 (4)	0.0 (0)	4.8 (20)
Implementation capacity	40.5 (32)	42.6 (26)	55.8 (24)	51.6 (47)	78.0 (46)	25.0 (15)	40.0 (8)	47.9 (198)
Other [specify]	7.6 (6)	11.5 (7)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	48.3 (29)	25.0 (5)	11.4 (47)
There is no need to	2.5 (2)	26.2 (16)	2.3 (1)	1.1 (1)	1.7 (1)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	5.1 (21)
Don't know/no answer	29.1 (23)	4.9 (3)	4.7 (2)	3.3 (3)	0.0 (0)	5.0 (3)	25.0 (5)	9.4 (39)
Total	100.0 (79)	100.0 (61)	100.0 (43)	100.0 (91)	100.0 (59)	100.0 (60)	100.0 (20)	100.0 (413)

TABLE A3.15 "What is the single biggest barrier to provide free lunch in schools?" (Ratio/Observations)

	MOE	MOF	MP	TOTAL
Money	70.6 (161)	69.8 (141)	60.8 (104)	67.6 (406)
Lack of interest from government	9.2 (21)	8.4 (17)	14.6 (25)	10.5 (63)
Political resistance from others (specify)	0.9 (2)	0.0 (0)	0.6 (1)	0.5 (3)
Political resistance from teacher unions	0.4 (1)	0.5 (1)	0.6 (1)	0.5 (3)
Implementation capacity	13.2 (30)	14.4 (29)	18.7 (32)	15.1 (91)
Other [specify]	2.6 (6)	3.5 (7)	2.9 (5)	3.0 (18)
There is no need to	1.8 (4)	2.0 (4)	1.2 (2)	1.7 (10)
Don't know/no answer	1.3 (3)	1.5 (3)	0.6 (1)	1.2 (7)
Total	100.0 (228)	100.0 (202)	100.0 (171)	100.0 (601)

	INDONESIA	LAOS	MONGOLIA	PHILIPPINES	VIETNAM	TOTAL
Money	61.3 (19)	76.0 (38)	76.7 (23)	68.6 (35)	53.8 (14)	68.6 (129)
Lack of interest from government	12.9 (4)	10.0 (5)	13.3 (4)	3.9 (2)	3.8 (1)	8.5 (16)
Political resistance from others (specify)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	2.0 (1)	0.0 (0)	0.5 (1)
Implementation capacity	12.9 (4)	8.0 (4)	3.3 (1)	21.6 (11)	23.1 (6)	13.8 (26)
Other [specify]	6.5 (2)	0.0 (0)	3.3 (1)	3.9 (2)	7.7 (2)	3.7 (7)
There is no need to	6.5 (2)	2.0 (1)	3.3 (1)	0.0 (0)	7.7 (2)	3.2 (6)
Don't know/no answer	0.0 (0)	4.0 (2)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	3.8 (1)	1.6 (3)
Total	100.0 (31)	100.0 (50)	100.0 (30)	100.0 (51)	100.0 (26)	100.0 (188)

TABLE A3.15 Continued

	BANGLADESH	DRC	GHANA	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	UGANDA	TOTAL
Money	77.2 (61)	70.5 (43)	81.4 (35)	53.8 (49)	86.4 (51)	33.3 (20)	90.0 (18)	67.1 (277)
Lack of interest from government	10.1 (8)	1.6 (1)	9.3 (4)	24.2 (22)	10.2 (6)	10.0 (6)	0.0 (0)	11.4 (47)
Political resistance from others (specify)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	1.1 (1)	0.0 (0)	1.7 (1)	0.0 (0)	0.5 (2)
Political resistance from teacher unions	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	2.3 (1)	2.2 (2)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.7 (3)
Implementation capacity	11.4 (9)	21.3 (13)	7.0 (3)	17.6 (16)	3.4 (2)	36.7 (22)	0.0 (0)	15.7 (65)
Other [specify]	0.0 (0)	3.3 (2)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	13.3 (8)	5.0 (1)	2.7 (11)
There is no need to	1.3 (1)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	3.3 (2)	5.0 (1)	1.0 (4)
Don't know/no answer	0.0 (0)	3.3 (2)	0.0 (0)	1.1 (1)	0.0 (0)	1.7 (1)	0.0 (0)	1.0 (4)
Total	100.0 (79)	100.0 (61)	100.0 (43)	100.0 (91)	100.0 (59)	100.0 (60)	100.0 (20)	100.0 (413)

TABLE A3.16 "In your opinion, should the government provide free universal public education at pre-school/early-childhood?" (Ratio/Observations)

	RATIO	
	NO	YES
Gender		
Male	42.6	57.4
Female	24.5	75.5
Organization		
MOE	33.8	66.2
MOF	43.0	57.0
MP	37.9	62.1
Country		
Bangladesh	58.4	41.6
DRC	24.0	76.0
Ghana	15.2	84.8
Indonesia	29.4	70.6
Laos	43.2	56.8
Mongolia	31.7	68.3
Nigeria	25.6	74.4
Pakistan	99.0	1.0
Peru	0.3	99.7
Philippines	2.9	97.1
Uganda	23.9	76.1
Vietnam	3.4	96.6
Total	37.9 [208]	62.1 [393]

TABLE A3.17 "In your opinion, should the government provide free universal public education at primary level?" (Ratio/Observations)

	RATIO	
	NO	YES
Gender		
Male	27.1	72.9
Female	23.6	76.4
Organization		
MOE	18.8	81.2
MOF	38.0	62.0
MP	25.5	74.5
Country		
Bangladesh	21.7	78.3
DRC	4.9	95.1
Ghana	14.8	85.2
Indonesia	2.5	97.5
Laos	56.1	43.9
Mongolia	8.1	91.9
Nigeria	1.7	98.3
Pakistan	94.7	5.3
Peru	0.3	99.7
Philippines	1.0	99.0
Uganda	24.9	75.1
Vietnam	25.5	74.5
Total	26.5 [119]	73.5 [482]

TABLE A3.18 "In your opinion, should the government provide free universal public education at secondary level?" (Ratio/Observations)

	RATIO	
	NO	YES
Gender		
Male	34.3	65.7
Female	26.8	73.2
Organization		
MOE	31.3	68.7
MOF	42.1	57.9
MP	29.2	70.8
Country		
Bangladesh	39.7	60.3
DRC	2.3	97.7
Ghana	34.7	65.3
Indonesia	10.2	89.8
Laos	67.2	32.8
Mongolia	12.4	87.6
Nigeria	5.2	94.8
Pakistan	70.8	29.2
Peru	0.3	99.7
Philippines	3.8	96.2
Uganda	26.5	73.5
Vietnam	85.5	14.5
Total	32.6 [184]	67.4 [417]

TABLE A3.19 "In your opinion, should the government provide free universal public education at Vocational level?" (Ratio/Observations)

	RATIO	
	NO	YES
Gender		
Male	54.6	45.4
Female	49.9	50.1
Organization		
MOE	57.3	42.7
MOF	62.7	37.3
MP	46.9	53.1
Country		
Bangladesh	72.2	27.8
DRC	14.6	85.4
Ghana	18.8	81.2
Indonesia	23.8	76.2
Laos	57.7	42.3
Mongolia	59.2	40.8
Nigeria	43.3	56.7
Pakistan	88.0	12.0
Peru	7.0	93.0
Philippines	7.7	92.3
Uganda	72.3	27.7
Vietnam	100.0	0.0
Total	53.2 [269]	46.8 [332]

TABLE A3.20 "In your opinion, should the government provide free universal public education at university level?" (Ratio/Observations)

	RATIO	
	NO	YES
Gender		
Male	68.0	32.0
Female	78.5	21.5
Organization		
MOE	85.6	14.4
MOF	73.6	26.4
MP	61.5	38.5
Country		
Bangladesh	88.6	11.4
DRC	92.6	7.4
Ghana	96.0	4.0
Indonesia	81.4	18.6
Laos	82.4	17.6
Mongolia	93.0	7.0
Nigeria	63.2	36.8
Pakistan	47.5	52.5
Peru	17.5	82.5
Philippines	21.2	78.8
Uganda	53.4	46.6
Vietnam	100.0	0.0
Total	70.6 [428]	29.4 [173]

TABLE A3.21 "Imagine the Department/Ministry of Education issues an official guideline/directive for a major change in how to teach early grade reading/eliminate corporal punishment/provide universal free school meals. After six months, what percentage of teachers/schools do you think would be implementing the new policy?" (Mean/Standard deviation/Observations)

	APPLY NEW CURRICULUM	REDUCE CORPORAL PUNISHMENT	PROVIDE SCHOOL MEALS
Gender			
Male	52.3 (23.9)	62.7 (25.3)	66.7 (27.9)
Female	54.9 (24.6)	67.5 (25.6)	69.1 (29.8)
Organization			
MOE	57.4 (26.9)	72.1 (23.1)	72.1 (28.1)
MOF	54.0 (25.8)	67.5 (26.3)	69.5 (25.5)
MP	50.2 (21.2)	58.3 (24.9)	64.1 (29.4)
Country			
Bangladesh	65.1 (22.3)	72.6 (13.5)	85.3 (13.3)
DRC	46.2 (18.2)	64.0 (17.9)	35.3 (18.4)
Ghana	50.4 (14.5)	50.4 (12.6)	73.0 (24.6)
Indonesia	70.3 (24.6)	82.7 (21.9)	69.9 (35.1)
Laos	52.1 (20.5)	70.4 (25.0)	64.9 (29.3)
Mongolia	49.1 (21.5)	55.0 (22.6)	73.1 (29.5)
Nigeria	48.8 (24.0)	51.4 (26.6)	65.9 (28.0)
Pakistan	35.8 (15.9)	42.8 (21.0)	55.4 (26.4)
Peru	27.7 (16.6)	45.8 (28.9)	51.6 (26.9)
Philippines	67.1 (25.2)	74.4 (24.6)	77.3 (23.2)
Uganda	63.5 (17.9)	77.4 (23.8)	80.0 (22.9)
Vietnam	64.2 (34.0)	83.2 (34.4)	84.8 (20.6)
Total	53.0 (24.0) [596]	64.0 (25.4) [593]	67.4 (28.4) [599]

TABLE A3.22 "What is the most important reason for low-levels of learning?" (Ratio, observations)

	MOE	MOF	MP	TOTAL
Poverty	42.1 (96)	32.7 (66)	37.4 (64)	37.6 (226)
Malnutrition	1.3 (3)	0.5 (1)	2.3 (4)	1.3 (8)
Poor instruction	19.3 (44)	16.8 (34)	9.4 (16)	15.6 (94)
Lack of books and learning materials	4.4 (10)	5.4 (11)	13.5 (23)	7.3 (44)
Poor school facilities	7.5 (17)	11.9 (24)	15.2 (26)	11.1 (67)
Lack of internet connectivity	2.6 (6)	8.9 (18)	5.8 (10)	5.7 (34)
Other [specify]	21.1 (48)	18.3 (37)	15.2 (26)	18.5 (111)
Don't know/refused to answer	1.8 (4)	5.4 (11)	1.2 (2)	2.8 (17)
Total	100.0 (228)	100.0 (202)	100.0 (171)	100.0 (601)

	INDONESIA	LAOS	MONGOLIA	PHILIPPINES	VIETNAM	TOTAL
Poverty	16.1 (5)	68.0 (34)	3.3 (1)	31.4 (16)	7.7 (2)	30.9 (58)
Malnutrition	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	7.8 (4)	0.0 (0)	2.1 (4)
Poor instruction	41.9 (13)	4.0 (2)	0.0 (0)	17.6 (9)	53.8 (14)	20.2 (38)
Lack of books and learning materials	0.0 (0)	4.0 (2)	3.3 (1)	9.8 (5)	0.0 (0)	4.3 (8)
Poor school facilities	12.9 (4)	4.0 (2)	0.0 (0)	2.0 (1)	0.0 (0)	3.7 (7)
Lack of internet connectivity	3.2 (1)	4.0 (2)	0.0 (0)	3.9 (2)	0.0 (0)	2.7 (5)
Other [specify]	25.8 (8)	14.0 (7)	90.0 (27)	27.5 (14)	38.5 (10)	35.1 (66)
Don't know/Refused to answer	0.0 (0)	2.0 (1)	3.3 (1)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	1.1 (2)
Total	100.0 (31)	100.0 (50)	100.0 (30)	100.0 (51)	100.0 (26)	100.0 (188)

TABLE A3.22 Continued

	BANGLADESH	DRC	GHANA	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	UGANDA	TOTAL
Poverty	44.3 (35)	83.6 (51)	27.9 (12)	61.5 (56)	6.8 (4)	5.0 (3)	35.0 (7)	40.7 (168)
Malnutrition	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	6.7 (4)	0.0 (0)	1.0 (4)
Poor instruction	7.6 (6)	0.0 (0)	2.3 (1)	2.2 (2)	37.3 (22)	40.0 (24)	5.0 (1)	13.6 (56)
Lack of books and learning materials	3.8 (3)	0.0 (0)	51.2 (22)	6.6 (6)	3.4 (2)	1.7 (1)	10.0 (2)	8.7 (36)
Poor school facilities	24.1 (19)	13.1 (8)	9.3 (4)	25.3 (23)	5.1 (3)	1.7 (1)	10.0 (2)	14.5 (60)
Lack of internet connectivity	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	2.3 (1)	1.1 (1)	45.8 (27)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	7.0 (29)
Other [specify]	2.5 (2)	3.3 (2)	4.7 (2)	3.3 (3)	1.7 (1)	45.0 (27)	40.0 (8)	10.9 (45)
Don't know/refused to answer	17.7 (14)	0.0 (0)	2.3 (1)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	3.6 (15)
Total	100.0 (79)	100.0 (61)	100.0 (43)	100.0 (91)	100.0 (59)	100.0 (60)	100.0 (20)	100.0 (413)

3.4 ACCURACY OF BELIEFS

TABLE A3.23 "Now thinking about primary school, roughly what percentage of 10 year old boys/girls in your country do you think have reached the expected reading level for their age?" (Mean/Standard deviation/ Observations)

	BOYS	GIRLS
Gender		
Male	59.8 (27.3)	55.5 (29.3)
Female	62.8 (21.9)	56.0 (31.1)
Organization		
MOE	69.1 (25.2)	66.5 (26.5)
MOF	73.1 (17.1)	67.0 (27.9)
MP	49.4 (25.8)	44.8 (28.1)
Country		
Bangladesh	81.7 (12.3)	82.2 (13.5)
DRC	33.0 (9.3)	32.2 (16.6)
Ghana	31.9 (16.8)	36.6 (11.2)
Indonesia	88.4 (14.0)	86.0 (12.2)
Laos	65.8 (12.9)	74.7 (18.3)
Mongolia	92.7 (7.5)	88.2 (8.0)
Nigeria	45.3 (21.0)	35.4 (21.9)
Pakistan	62.4 (20.8)	57.9 (27.5)
Peru	37.8 (13.3)	30.1 (17.7)
Philippines	61.2 (13.2)	65.5 (25.2)
Uganda	31.5 (5.5)	21.8 (6.1)
Vietnam	84.7 (13.4)	96.8 (5.8)
Total	60.5 (26.1) [251]	55.6 (29.6) [257]

3.5 RETURNS TO SCHOOLING

TABLE A3.24 "For the economy to grow faster, the most important thing your country could do in education would be to... " (Ratio/Observations)

	MOE	MOF	MP	TOTAL
Increase Secondary School Completion	55.6 (70)	52.1 (50)	51.1 (48)	53.2 (168)
Improve Test Scores	20.6 (26)	20.8 (20)	27.7 (26)	22.8 (72)
Don't Know	5.6 (7)	12.5 (12)	4.3 (4)	7.3 (23)
Other	18.3 (23)	14.6 (14)	17.0 (16)	16.8 (53)
Total	100.0 (126)	100.0 (96)	100.0 (94)	100.0 (316)

	INDONESIA	LAOS	MONGOLIA	PHILIPPINES	VIETNAM	TOTAL
Increase Secondary School Completion	53.8 (7)	58.6 (17)	21.1 (4)	69.7 (23)	35.7 (5)	51.9 (56)
Improve Test Scores	7.7 (1)	24.1 (7)	57.9 (11)	24.2 (8)	7.1 (1)	25.9 (28)
Don't Know	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	14.3 (2)	1.9 (2)
Other	38.5 (5)	17.2 (5)	21.1 (4)	6.1 (2)	42.9 (6)	20.4 (22)
Total	100.0 (13)	100.0 (29)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (33)	100.0 (14)	100.0 (108)

	BANGLADESH	DRC	GHANA	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	UGANDA	TOTAL
Increase Secondary School Completion	71.1 (27)	36.1 (13)	63.2 (12)	55.8 (29)	74.1 (20)	27.6 (8)	42.9 (3)	53.8 (112)
Improve Test Scores	26.3 (10)	5.6 (2)	15.8 (3)	34.6 (18)	25.9 (7)	13.8 (4)	0.0 (0)	21.2 (44)
Don't Know	2.6 (1)	38.9 (14)	0.0 (0)	9.6 (5)	0.0 (0)	3.4 (1)	0.0 (0)	10.1 (21)
Other	0.0 (0)	19.4 (7)	21.1 (4)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	55.2 (16)	57.1 (4)	14.9 (31)
Total	100.0 (38)	100.0 (36)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (52)	100.0 (27)	100.0 (29)	100.0 (7)	100.0 (208)

TABLE A3.25 "For young men/women (aged 15-24), roughly what percentage would you say are employed (i.e. have a job, whether formal or informal)?" (Mean/Standard deviation/Observations)

	MALE	FEMALE
Gender		
Male	32.5 (19.9)	29.5 (17.7)
Female	35.6 (22.5)	38.7 (20.6)
Organization		
MOE	32.1 (21.8)	33.4 (23.4)
MOF	47.5 (24.6)	39.5 (17.9)
MP	29.7 (16.8)	26.7 (14.9)
Country		
Bangladesh	35.7 (19.3)	26.4 (10.8)
DRC	24.1 (11.2)	17.7 (8.3)
Ghana	27.1 (11.8)	28.3 (13.6)
Indonesia	40.7 (19.4)	53.6 (19.5)
Laos	45.6 (20.2)	58.8 (15.3)
Mongolia	43.2 (23.2)	40.3 (15.5)
Nigeria	28.4 (17.0)	19.7 (9.9)
Pakistan	26.2 (8.6)	26.6 (10.2)
Peru	47.1 (24.4)	43.6 (21.8)
Philippines	63.1 (22.9)	47.5 (28.3)
Uganda	21.9 (5.0)	31.9 (11.4)
Vietnam	78.8 (21.6)	57.1 (25.4)
Total	33.2 (20.5) [298]	32.2 (19.0) [273]

TABLE A3.26 "What do you think is the employment rate for male/female university graduates (of any age)?" (Mean/Standard deviation/Observations)

	MALE	FEMALE
Gender		
Male	41.5 (22.1)	38.2 (19.8)
Female	58.6 (24.7)	44.2 (17.6)
Organization		
MOE	47.7 (21.9)	45.1 (22.6)
MOF	60.3 (25.3)	44.1 (20.1)
MP	38.7 (21.2)	34.1 (14.9)
Country		
Bangladesh	61.2 (24.2)	43.6 (14.9)
DRC	35.9 (13.5)	28.5 (7.3)
Ghana	25.9 (12.4)	23.9 (11.1)
Indonesia	57.7 (18.8)	62.3 (17.7)
Laos	44.4 (17.5)	46.3 (26.9)
Mongolia	58.3 (16.1)	56.1 (11.2)
Nigeria	32.8 (17.8)	30.6 (16.8)
Pakistan	38.4 (9.4)	30.8 (8.5)
Peru	54.7 (20.5)	51.4 (21.7)
Philippines	74.3 (13.2)	64.5 (21.8)
Uganda	26.5 (15.9)	18.6 (13.4)
Vietnam	86.3 (10.4)	66.6 (8.4)
Total	44.7 (23.5) [292]	39.9 (19.4) [269]

TABLE A3.27 "What is the main cause of youth unemployment (male), in your opinion?" (Ratio/Observations)

	MOE	MOF	MP	TOTAL
Lack of schooling	4.0 (5)	2.1 (2)	1.1 (1)	2.5 (8)
Low quality education	21.4 (27)	28.1 (27)	27.7 (26)	25.3 (80)
There aren't enough jobs	55.6 (70)	51.0 (49)	55.3 (52)	54.1 (171)
Don't know/no answer	0.8 (1)	3.1 (3)	3.2 (3)	2.2 (7)
Other [specify]	18.3 (23)	15.6 (15)	12.8 (12)	15.8 (50)
Total	100.0 (126)	100.0 (96)	100.0 (94)	100.0 (316)

	INDONESIA	LAOS	MONGOLIA	PHILIPPINES	VIETNAM	TOTAL
Lack of schooling	0.0 (0)	3.4 (1)	0.0 (0)	9.1 (3)	0.0 (0)	3.7 (4)
Low quality education	46.2 (6)	41.4 (12)	31.6 (6)	24.2 (8)	14.3 (2)	31.5 (34)
There aren't enough jobs	38.5 (5)	37.9 (11)	31.6 (6)	42.4 (14)	28.6 (4)	37.0 (40)
Don't know/no answer	0.0 (0)	3.4 (1)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.9 (1)
Other [specify]	15.4 (2)	13.8 (4)	36.8 (7)	24.2 (8)	57.1 (8)	26.9 (29)
Total	100.0 (13)	100.0 (29)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (33)	100.0 (14)	100.0 (108)

	BANGLADESH	DRC	GHANA	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	UGANDA	TOTAL
Lack of schooling	0.0 (0)	5.6 (2)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	6.9 (2)	0.0 (0)	1.9 (4)
Low quality education	31.6 (12)	38.9 (14)	10.5 (2)	25.0 (13)	0.0 (0)	17.2 (5)	0.0 (0)	22.1 (46)
There aren't enough jobs	63.2 (24)	47.2 (17)	73.7 (14)	65.4 (34)	96.3 (26)	37.9 (11)	71.4 (5)	63.0 (131)
Don't know/no answer	5.3 (2)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	5.8 (3)	0.0 (0)	3.4 (1)	0.0 (0)	2.9 (6)
Other [specify]	0.0 (0)	8.3 (3)	15.8 (3)	3.8 (2)	3.7 (1)	34.5 (10)	28.6 (2)	10.1 (21)
Total	100.0 (38)	100.0 (36)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (52)	100.0 (27)	100.0 (29)	100.0 (7)	100.0 (208)

TABLE A3.28 "What is the main cause of youth unemployment (female), in your opinion?" (Ratio/Observations)

	MOE	MOF	MP	TOTAL
Lack of schooling	4.9 (5)	1.9 (2)	2.6 (2)	3.2 (9)
Low quality education	16.7 (17)	21.7 (23)	29.9 (23)	22.1 (63)
There aren't enough jobs	54.9 (56)	60.4 (64)	59.7 (46)	58.2 (166)
Don't know/no answer	2.0 (2)	1.9 (2)	2.6 (2)	2.1 (6)
Other [specify]	21.6 (22)	14.2 (15)	5.2 (4)	14.4 (41)
Total	100.0 (102)	100.0 (106)	100.0 (77)	100.0 (285)

	INDONESIA	LAOS	MONGOLIA	PHILIPPINES	VIETNAM	TOTAL
Lack of schooling	0.0 (0)	14.3 (3)	0.0 (0)	5.6 (1)	0.0 (0)	5.0 (4)
Low quality education	22.2 (4)	38.1 (8)	45.5 (5)	16.7 (3)	8.3 (1)	26.2 (21)
There aren't enough jobs	50.0 (9)	42.9 (9)	9.1 (1)	55.6 (10)	25.0 (3)	40.0 (32)
Don't know/no answer	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	8.3 (1)	1.2 (1)
Other [specify]	27.8 (5)	4.8 (1)	45.5 (5)	22.2 (4)	58.3 (7)	27.5 (22)
Total	100.0 (18)	100.0 (21)	100.0 (11)	100.0 (18)	100.0 (12)	100.0 (80)

	BANGLADESH	DRC	GHANA	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	UGANDA	TOTAL
Lack of schooling	4.9 (2)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	7.7 (3)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	2.4 (5)
Low quality education	12.2 (5)	48.0 (12)	20.8 (5)	15.4 (6)	9.4 (3)	35.5 (11)	0.0 (0)	20.5 (42)
There aren't enough jobs	75.6 (31)	36.0 (9)	79.2 (19)	69.2 (27)	90.6 (29)	29.0 (9)	76.9 (10)	65.4 (134)
Don't know/no answer	7.3 (3)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	2.6 (1)	0.0 (0)	3.2 (1)	0.0 (0)	2.4 (5)
Other [specify]	0.0 (0)	16.0 (4)	0.0 (0)	5.1 (2)	0.0 (0)	32.3 (10)	23.1 (3)	9.3 (19)
Total	100.0 (41)	100.0 (25)	100.0 (24)	100.0 (39)	100.0 (32)	100.0 (31)	100.0 (13)	100.0 (205)

TABLE A3.29 Rate of return to education (Men) (Mean/Standard deviation/Observations)

	MOE	MOF	MP	TOTAL
Secondary to primary	50.1 41.5 (111)	44.0 40.4 (94)	52.4 44.3 (88)	48.8 42.0 (293)
Secondary-level TVET to secondary	51.2 47.1 (112)	42.3 39.3 (94)	48.7 35.3 (87)	47.6 41.4 (293)
University to secondary-level TVET	45.8 61.1 (110)	79.0 77.0 (94)	59.4 54.0 (87)	60.6 66.0 (291)

	INDONESIA	LAOS	MONGOLIA	PHILIPPINES	VIETNAM	TOTAL
Secondary to primary	52.5 23.4 (11)	43.8 46.0 (24)	33.8 55.4 (16)	56.5 49.6 (33)	37.0 25.8 (7)	47.2 46.0 (91)
Secondary-level TVET to secondary	56.2 55.5 (11)	31.0 33.4 (24)	31.6 31.5 (16)	42.4 44.7 (33)	28.1 21.8 (8)	38.0 40.0 (92)
University to secondary-level TVET	69.2 76.3 (11)	27.7 23.0 (24)	40.1 36.3 (16)	87.0 95.3 (32)	48.0 34.0 (8)	57.6 69.6 (91)

	BANGLADESH	DRC	GHANA	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	UGANDA	TOTAL
Secondary to primary	36.9 26.1 (38)	65.6 46.9 (35)	67.3 35.9 (19)	50.6 42.0 (51)	28.0 22.2 (27)	50.5 48.4 (26)	62.9 38.5 (6)	49.5 40.2 (202)
Secondary-level TVET to secondary	74.5 36.0 (38)	61.3 44.2 (35)	35.5 21.0 (19)	40.1 45.7 (50)	48.5 31.7 (27)	44.3 46.1 (26)	56.4 21.8 (6)	52.0 41.4 (201)
University to secondary-level TVET	29.6 34.9 (38)	115.3 76.9 (35)	46.0 28.6 (19)	54.8 71.0 (49)	44.7 45.3 (27)	76.3 55.8 (26)	79.9 79.8 (6)	61.9 64.5 (200)

Note: This table presents the rate of return implied by the responses, e.g., the mean ratio of anticipated earnings for someone with secondary schooling compared to someone with only primary schooling, in percentage terms.

TABLE A3.30 Rate of return to education (Women) (Mean/Standard deviation/Observations)

	MOE	MOF	MP	TOTAL
Secondary to primary	57.5 51.0 (95)	41.9 38.0 (102)	56.3 29.5 (74)	51.3 41.7 (271)
Secondary-level TVET to secondary	62.3 68.3 (95)	57.6 66.6 (102)	62.2 46.7 (74)	60.5 62.3 (271)
University to secondary-level TVET	44.7 50.4 (94)	70.5 74.7 (102)	62.7 65.0 (72)	59.4 65.1 (268)

	INDONESIA	LAOS	MONGOLIA	PHILIPPINES	VIETNAM	TOTAL
Secondary to primary	73.6 52.4 (17)	41.5 52.7 (20)	41.8 53.3 (11)	59.4 63.2 (18)	37.2 28.2 (9)	52.6 53.7 (75)
Secondary-level TVET to secondary	26.2 35.5 (17)	37.0 33.4 (20)	44.0 28.2 (11)	80.0 125.8 (18)	86.9 92.2 (9)	51.9 76.1 (75)
University to secondary-level TVET	87.7 86.7 (17)	32.4 23.8 (19)	49.3 37.6 (11)	40.8 50.3 (18)	32.9 17.7 (9)	49.7 55.4 (74)

	BANGLADESH	DRC	GHANA	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	UGANDA	TOTAL
Secondary to primary	48.9 23.0 (41)	71.8 42.2 (25)	61.3 27.2 (23)	49.6 38.7 (39)	29.8 22.8 (32)	43.5 33.6 (27)	77.0 67.4 (9)	50.8 36.1 (196)
Secondary-level TVET to secondary	106.1 50.8 (41)	83.7 53.2 (25)	49.5 45.1 (23)	33.0 37.8 (39)	44.5 46.0 (32)	59.0 62.1 (27)	68.7 69.2 (9)	63.8 56.0 (196)
University to secondary-level TVET	14.7 23.2 (41)	133.4 81.5 (25)	48.8 59.1 (22)	65.1 70.6 (38)	59.3 57.2 (32)	91.0 62.4 (27)	43.2 32.0 (9)	63.0 68.3 (194)

Note: This table presents the rate of return implied by the responses, e.g., the mean ratio of anticipated earnings for someone with secondary schooling compared to someone with only primary schooling, in percentage terms. (mean/standard deviation/observations)

TABLE A3.31 "Which statement you agree with more:"

Option 1: Our curriculum should be ambitious and set to international standards, even if this means it is too difficult for most students
Option 2: Schools should adjust the difficulty of the curriculum to the level of the students, so that all children learn basic literacy and numeracy skills
Option 3: Don't know/no answer
(Ratio/Observations)

	RATIO		
	OPTION 1	OPTION 2	OPTION 3
Gender			
Male	46.9	50.3	2.8
Female	42.1	55.2	2.7
Organization			
MOE	53.4	45.9	0.7
MOF	42.6	50.7	6.8
MP	43.0	54.9	2.1
Country			
Bangladesh	62.9	34.3	2.9
DRC	45.9	48.5	5.6
Ghana	67.9	24.8	7.2
Indonesia	2.5	97.5	0.0
Laos	28.7	71.3	0.0
Mongolia	53.7	46.3	0.0
Nigeria	30.5	68.2	1.3
Pakistan	70.1	29.9	0.0
Peru	47.9	50.5	1.6
Philippines	68.8	31.2	0.0
Uganda	1.4	98.6	0.0
Vietnam	60.7	24.8	14.5
Total	45.7 [278]	51.6 [303]	2.8 [20]

TABLE A3.32 "Suppose two candidates in your country, A and B, are competing for a teaching job in the capital city"

Option 1: Candidate A has good test scores, but is not well-connected politically
Option 2: Candidate B does not have good test scores, but is well-connected politically
Option 3: Equal chance
Option 4: Don't know/no answer
(Ratio/Observations)

	RATIO			
	OPTION 1	OPTION 2	OPTION 3	OPTION 4
Gender				
Male	48.2	23.5	24.0	4.3
Female	37.1	32.8	23.5	6.7
Organization				
MOE	55.8	12.2	29.6	2.3
MOF	43.6	21.3	28.1	6.9
MP	40.3	35.1	19.2	5.4
Country				
Bangladesh	41.9	21.8	29.7	6.6
DRC	63.6	6.9	6.5	22.9
Ghana	69.7	19.5	10.9	0.0
Indonesia	72.2	2.5	25.4	0.0
Laos	11.9	33.8	52.8	1.5
Mongolia	31.2	41.9	15.1	11.8
Nigeria	42.2	37.7	19.6	0.4
Pakistan	82.9	0.0	16.9	0.2
Peru	50.2	37.8	11.4	0.6
Philippines	54.8	7.7	37.5	0.0
Uganda	6.6	68.3	23.9	1.2
Vietnam	1.7	25.5	72.7	0.0
Total	45.2 [276]	26.0 [132]	23.9 [162]	4.9 [31]

3.6 EQUITY

TABLE A3.33 "It's hard for teachers to give equal attention to all students in a class. If they must choose, do you think teachers should give the most attention to students performing well in class or those lagging behind?" (Ratio/Observations)

	RATIO			
	A) THOSE PERFORMING WELL	B) THOSE LAGGING BEHIND	C) TREAT BOTH EQUALLY	D) DON'T KNOW/ NA
Gender				
Male	3.8	47.1	48.7	0.3
Female	7.3	43.2	49.4	0.0
Organization				
MOE	0.6	46.7	52.6	0.2
MOF	12.9	64.1	22.7	0.3
MP	3.3	38.5	57.9	0.3
Country				
Bangladesh	7.1	73.1	19.7	0.0
DRC	4.0	11.8	84.0	0.2
Ghana	0.0	77.9	22.1	0.0
Indonesia	0.0	50.8	48.0	1.2
Laos	11.3	12.9	75.8	0.0
Mongolia	0.0	19.9	74.2	5.9
Nigeria	1.7	34.9	63.4	0.0
Pakistan	0.0	64.6	35.4	0.0
Peru	0.0	41.3	58.4	0.3
Philippines	1.0	60.6	37.5	1.0
Uganda	0.0	36.2	63.8	0.0
Vietnam	40.0	23.1	36.9	0.0
Total	4.7 [21]	46.3 [266]	48.7 [308]	0.3 [6]

TABLE A3.34 "Imagine a national school system where half the students come from poor backgrounds. Which outcome do you think is preferable?"

	MOE	MOF	MP	TOTAL
Passing rate for all is 60	0.7	1.1	0.7	0.8
Passing rate for all is 50	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Passing rate for all is 40	−0.8	−1.1	−0.8	−0.9
Poor chilren's passing rate is 40	3.8	3.9	3.8	3.8
Poor chilren's passing rate is 30	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Poor chilren's passing rate is 20	−4.3	−4.4	−4.3	−4.3

	INDONESIA	LAOS	MONGOLIA	PHILIPPINES	VIETNAM	TOTAL
Passing rate for all is 60	1.9	1.0	1.2	−0.1	1.6	1.1
Passing rate for all is 50	0.0	−0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Passing rate for all is 40	−2.0	−1.0	−1.2	0.1	−1.6	−1.1
Poor chilren's passing rate is 40	4.9	2.5	2.4	3.8	4.4	3.5
Poor chilren's passing rate is 30	0.4	0.7	0.8	0.4	0.4	0.5
Poor chilren's passing rate is 20	−5.3	−3.2	−3.2	−4.2	−4.8	−4.1

	BANGLADESH	DRC	GHANA	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	UGANDA	TOTAL
Passing rate for all is 60	0.7	−0.2	0.0	1.7	1.1	1.4	−1.4	0.8
Passing rate for all is 50	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1
Passing rate for all is 40	−0.8	0.1	−0.2	−1.8	−1.2	−1.4	1.3	−0.9
Poor chilren's passing rate is 40	4.0	4.3	3.8	2.8	4.6	4.7	5.0	3.9
Poor chilren's passing rate is 30	0.5	0.4	0.6	0.8	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.5
Poor chilren's passing rate is 20	−4.5	−4.7	−4.3	−3.6	−4.9	−5.0	−5.2	−4.4

Note: This table reports the implied utility weights from econometric analysis of discrete choice experiment.

3.7 PRIVATE SCHOOLS

TABLE A3.35 "In your opinion, when private schools operate on the same budget as public schools, do you think they provide higher quality education, lower quality, or about the same?" (Ratio/Observations)

	RATIO			
	A) HIGHER QUALITY	B) ABOUT THE SAME	C) LOWER QUALITY	D) DON'T KNOW/ NO ANSWER
Gender				
Male	34.9	40.5	22.2	2.4
Female	33.5	40.7	22.0	3.8
Organization				
MOE	38.7	28.9	29.4	3.0
MOF	51.7	21.5	24.2	2.6
MP	24.7	54.9	17.3	3.0
Country				
Bangladesh	58.9	32.7	1.6	6.8
DRC	0.0	14.1	85.9	0.0
Ghana	16.2	46.2	34.0	3.6
Indonesia	43.0	43.1	13.9	0.0
Laos	30.1	26.2	38.2	5.6
Mongolia	41.9	54.8	1.1	2.2
Nigeria	41.7	50.2	7.2	0.8
Pakistan	52.8	39.1	8.1	0.0
Peru	50.5	25.1	13.7	10.8
Philippines	25.5	39.4	33.2	1.9
Uganda	9.3	90.7	0.0	0.0
Vietnam	43.5	10.3	44.5	1.7
Total	34.4 [199]	40.6 [248]	22.1 [130]	2.9 [24]

TABLE A3.36 "Government should provide subsidies to allow more children to attend private schools." (Ratio/Observations)

	RATIO				
	A) STRONGLY AGREE	B) AGREE	C) DISAGREE	D) STRONGLY DISAGREE	E) DON'T KNOW/ NO ANSWER
Gender					
Male	11.0	40.9	41.4	6.3	0.4
Female	8.2	33.5	49.9	5.3	3.0
Organization					
MOE	11.7	44.7	35.7	6.7	1.3
MOF	6.9	29.7	56.1	5.6	1.8
MP	11.2	39.8	42.3	5.9	0.7
Country					
Bangladesh	15.5	69.9	14.7	0.0	0.0
DRC	11.3	50.7	27.0	9.1	1.9
Ghana	4.0	18.5	54.1	23.4	0.0
Indonesia	26.1	33.1	38.3	2.5	0.0
Laos	21.3	20.5	44.6	12.7	1.0
Mongolia	0.0	32.3	48.9	17.7	1.1
Nigeria	14.7	12.5	49.3	23.4	0.0
Pakistan	0.0	12.9	87.1	0.0	0.0
Peru	19.4	26.0	41.6	7.0	6.0
Philippines	11.5	65.9	13.5	3.8	5.3
Uganda	0.0	47.4	52.6	0.0	0.0
Vietnam	16.2	18.9	59.7	1.7	3.4
Total	10.4 [65]	38.9 [218]	43.6 [249]	6.0 [55]	1.1 [14]

TABLE A3.37 If you have school age children, do they attend public or private school? (Ratio/Observations)

	MOE	MOF	MP	TOTAL
1. Don't have school-age children	29.8 (68)	25.2 (51)	19.9 (34)	25.5 (153)
2. Public schools	25.4 (58)	8.9 (18)	8.2 (14)	15.0 (90)
3. Private schools	28.9 (66)	40.6 (82)	42.1 (72)	36.6 (220)
4. Mix of both	13.6 (31)	13.9 (28)	18.1 (31)	15.0 (90)
5. Don't know/no answer	2.2 (5)	11.4 (23)	11.7 (20)	8.0 (48)
Total	100.0 (228)	100.0 (202)	100.0 (171)	100.0 (601)

	INDONESIA	LAOS	MONGOLIA	PHILIPPINES	VIETNAM	TOTAL
1. Don't have school-age children	16.1 (5)	18.0 (9)	10.0 (3)	49.0 (25)	15.4 (4)	24.5 (46)
2. Public schools	12.9 (4)	20.0 (10)	13.3 (4)	5.9 (3)	61.5 (16)	19.7 (37)
3. Private schools	38.7 (12)	38.0 (19)	33.3 (10)	33.3 (17)	15.4 (4)	33.0 (62)
4. Mix of both	32.3 (10)	22.0 (11)	13.3 (4)	3.9 (2)	7.7 (2)	15.4 (29)
5. Don't know/no answer	0.0 (0)	2.0 (1)	30.0 (9)	7.8 (4)	0.0 (0)	7.4 (14)
Total	100.0 (31)	100.0 (50)	100.0 (30)	100.0 (51)	100.0 (26)	100.0 (188)

	BANGLADESH	DRC	GHANA	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	UGANDA	TOTAL
1. Don't have school-age children	29.1 (23)	24.6 (15)	37.2 (16)	3.3 (3)	49.2 (29)	35.0 (21)	0.0 (0)	25.9 (107)
2. Public schools	8.9 (7)	14.8 (9)	0.0 (0)	24.2 (22)	10.2 (6)	13.3 (8)	5.0 (1)	12.8 (53)
3. Private schools	22.8 (18)	39.3 (24)	30.2 (13)	42.9 (39)	40.7 (24)	46.7 (28)	60.0 (12)	38.3 (158)
4. Mix of both	15.2 (12)	19.7 (12)	11.6 (5)	28.6 (26)	0.0 (0)	1.7 (1)	25.0 (5)	14.8 (61)
5. Don't know/no answer	24.1 (19)	1.6 (1)	20.9 (9)	1.1 (1)	0.0 (0)	3.3 (2)	10.0 (2)	8.2 (34)
Total	100.0 (79)	100.0 (61)	100.0 (43)	100.0 (91)	100.0 (59)	100.0 (60)	100.0 (20)	100.0 (413)

3.8 GENDER NORMS

TABLE A3.38 "Girls face additional challenges in accessing and completing their education compared to boys in this country." (Ratio/Observations)

	RATIO				
	A) STRONGLY AGREE	B) AGREE	C) DISAGREE	D) STRONGLY DISAGREE	E) DON'T KNOW/ NO ANSWER
Gender					
Male	23.5	56.7	17.8	1.9	0.1
Female	55.8	21.7	19.8	0.9	1.9
Organization					
MOE	20.9	54.9	22.3	1.5	0.3
MOF	31.4	32.7	33.9	1.7	0.3
MP	37.4	50.1	10.1	1.7	0.7
Country					
Bangladesh	21.7	78.2	0.1	0.0	0.0
DRC	66.9	32.8	0.4	0.0	0.0
Ghana	12.2	83.8	3.6	0.3	0.0
Indonesia	20.2	8.6	65.6	5.6	0.0
Laos	11.3	27.9	60.2	0.0	0.5
Mongolia	0.0	1.1	59.2	38.7	1.1
Nigeria	32.8	55.4	9.1	2.7	0.0
Pakistan	37.3	26.9	35.8	0.0	0.0
Peru	45.4	39.4	10.2	0.0	5.1
Philippines	2.9	18.3	70.7	8.2	0.0
Uganda	41.7	58.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
Vietnam	0.0	24.8	70.0	3.4	1.7
Total	31.7 [143]	47.5 [269]	18.6 [160]	1.7 [24]	0.5 [5]

TABLE A3.39 "Schools should try to promote gender equality." (Ratio/Observations)

	RATIO				
	A) STRONGLY AGREE	B) AGREE	C) DISAGREE	D) STRONGLY DISAGREE	E) DON'T KNOW/ NO ANSWER
Gender					
Male	33.7	63.4	2.7	0.1	0.0
Female	46.3	50.0	2.3	0.0	1.5
Organization					
MOE	41.4	56.5	2.0	0.1	0.0
MOF	38.7	60.1	0.9	0.0	0.2
MP	33.9	61.6	3.6	0.2	0.7
Country					
Bangladesh	31.9	64.9	3.2	0.0	0.0
DRC	46.2	53.8	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ghana	28.1	71.9	0.0	0.0	0.0
Indonesia	53.6	39.8	6.5	0.0	0.0
Laos	73.7	22.7	3.6	0.0	0.0
Mongolia	30.1	51.1	18.8	0.0	0.0
Nigeria	47.7	42.0	8.9	1.4	0.0
Pakistan	4.3	95.7	0.0	0.0	0.0
Peru	52.4	37.5	4.8	0.0	5.4
Philippines	77.4	22.6	0.0	0.0	0.0
Uganda	22.7	77.1	0.0	0.2	0.0
Vietnam	68.3	28.3	3.4	0.0	0.0
Total	37.0 [278]	59.9 [297]	2.6 [21]	0.1 [2]	0.4 [3]

TABLE A3.40 "When a mother works for pay, the children suffer." (Ratio/Observations)

	RATIO				
	A) STRONGLY AGREE	B) AGREE	C) DISAGREE	D) STRONGLY DISAGREE	E) DON'T KNOW/ NO ANSWER
Gender					
Male	12.8	34.1	41.4	10.1	1.6
Female	7.5	32.5	37.0	17.3	5.8
Organization					
MOE	9.3	32.0	40.2	15.6	2.9
MOF	16.7	53.1	19.0	7.3	3.9
MP	10.5	26.3	49.2	12.0	2.0
Country					
Bangladesh	4.3	73.7	22.0	0.0	0.0
DRC	0.0	3.4	38.5	56.0	2.1
Ghana	0.0	18.1	50.9	30.7	0.3
Indonesia	0.0	15.5	51.0	27.0	6.5
Laos	40.7	14.3	32.0	0.0	13.1
Mongolia	1.1	7.0	84.9	7.0	0.0
Nigeria	8.6	45.3	38.7	7.4	0.0
Pakistan	45.7	54.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
Peru	4.8	30.2	40.6	8.3	16.2
Philippines	26.9	9.6	57.7	4.8	1.0
Uganda	0.0	3.2	95.5	0.2	1.2
Vietnam	23.1	61.4	15.5	0.0	0.0
Total	11.6 [71]	33.7 [179]	40.1 [240]	11.9 [95]	2.6 [16]

TABLE A3.41 "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women." (Ratio/Observations)

	RATIO				
	A) STRONGLY AGREE	B) AGREE	C) DISAGREE	D) STRONGLY DISAGREE	E) DON'T KNOW/ NO ANSWER
Gender					
Male	2.4	18.7	55.8	22.5	0.6
Female	1.5	19.8	34.9	42.6	1.2
Organization					
MOE	1.2	22.0	53.6	22.0	1.2
MOF	4.9	24.4	46.5	23.5	0.7
MP	1.7	15.0	50.5	32.2	0.6
Country					
Bangladesh	2.9	25.2	70.5	0.0	1.4
DRC	0.2	2.3	18.8	78.7	0.0
Ghana	0.3	7.9	64.7	26.7	0.3
Indonesia	0.0	35.9	35.5	28.5	0.0
Laos	19.5	31.1	41.0	4.1	4.2
Mongolia	2.2	8.1	66.1	23.6	0.0
Nigeria	7.8	45.8	37.3	6.8	2.3
Pakistan	0.0	43.3	56.7	0.0	0.0
Peru	0.0	0.0	50.5	49.2	0.3
Philippines	4.3	3.8	53.4	38.5	0.0
Uganda	0.2	0.0	56.2	43.6	0.0
Vietnam	1.7	30.0	28.3	38.3	1.7
Total	2.3 [26]	18.9 [122]	50.4 [288]	27.6 [159]	0.8 [6]

TABLE A3.42 "Children should be taught about contraception in secondary school." (Ratio/Observations)

	RATIO				
	A) STRONGLY AGREE	B) AGREE	C) DISAGREE	D) STRONGLY DISAGREE	E) DON'T KNOW/ NO ANSWER
Gender					
Male	16.8	45.7	33.7	2.5	1.2
Female	30.1	50.2	17.8	0.4	1.5
Organization					
MOE	24.1	53.4	17.9	3.8	0.8
MOF	28.7	37.1	29.1	1.5	3.6
MP	14.8	47.7	35.8	1.2	0.6
Country					
Bangladesh	9.4	81.7	7.5	0.0	1.4
DRC	19.2	26.7	41.5	8.9	3.7
Ghana	15.2	33.1	51.4	0.3	0.0
Indonesia	22.6	60.4	14.5	0.0	2.5
Laos	58.5	27.9	9.3	4.2	0.0
Mongolia	43.0	50.0	7.0	0.0	0.0
Nigeria	30.5	32.2	27.8	9.5	0.0
Pakistan	0.0	4.5	95.5	0.0	0.0
Peru	47.3	47.6	4.8	0.0	0.3
Philippines	17.3	63.0	14.4	1.0	4.3
Uganda	0.0	77.9	20.8	0.0	1.4
Vietnam	82.8	15.5	0.0	0.0	1.7
Total	20.3 [157]	46.9 [266]	29.5 [147]	2.0 [20]	1.3 [11]

TABLE A3.43 "Teachers found to have a sexual relationship with a secondary school student should be suspended." (Ratio/Observations)

	RATIO				
	A) STRONGLY AGREE	B) AGREE	C) DISAGREE	D) STRONGLY DISAGREE	E) DON'T KNOW/ NO ANSWER
Gender					
Male	82.8	15.4	1.6	0.0	0.2
Female	89.7	7.9	1.0	1.2	0.2
Organization					
MOE	82.3	14.3	2.0	1.0	0.4
MOF	80.3	18.9	0.3	0.2	0.2
MP	87.3	11.0	1.7	0.0	0.0
Country					
Bangladesh	75.4	20.3	4.3	0.0	0.0
DRC	95.1	4.9	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ghana	76.9	22.8	0.3	0.0	0.0
Indonesia	86.1	13.9	0.0	0.0	0.0
Laos	59.0	30.6	9.9	0.0	0.5
Mongolia	84.9	15.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Nigeria	80.5	18.2	0.8	0.4	0.0
Pakistan	89.9	10.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Peru	93.3	6.0	0.3	0.0	0.3
Philippines	71.2	26.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Uganda	94.0	4.2	0.0	1.8	0.0
Vietnam	82.1	16.2	0.0	0.0	1.7
Total	84.4 [488]	13.6 [93]	1.5 [13]	0.3 [3]	0.2 [4]

3.9 DISABILITIES

TABLE A3.44 "Children with disabilities deserve the same level of access to public schooling as children without disabilities." (Ratio/Observations)

	RATIO				
	A) STRONGLY AGREE	B) AGREE	C) DISAGREE	D) STRONGLY DISAGREE	E) DON'T KNOW/ NO ANSWER
Gender					
Male	45.1	49.8	5.0	0.1	0.1
Female	53.9	37.6	8.3	0.2	0.0
Organization					
MOE	58.6	38.7	2.6	0.2	0.0
MOF	45.5	42.8	11.2	0.2	0.2
MP	42.2	52.2	5.5	0.0	0.0
Country					
Bangladesh	35.4	53.2	11.4	0.0	0.0
DRC	78.2	17.8	3.8	0.0	0.2
Ghana	24.5	71.6	4.0	0.0	0.0
Indonesia	59.8	28.7	11.5	0.0	0.0
Laos	72.7	17.5	9.8	0.0	0.0
Mongolia	79.0	21.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Nigeria	53.2	45.9	0.0	0.8	0.0
Pakistan	9.6	80.1	10.4	0.0	0.0
Peru	88.9	10.8	0.0	0.0	0.3
Philippines	89.4	7.7	1.0	1.9	0.0
Uganda	25.1	74.9	0.0	0.0	0.0
Vietnam	65.9	21.4	12.8	0.0	0.0
Total	47.3 [336]	46.5 [232]	6.0 [26]	0.1 [4]	0.0 [2]

TABLE A3.45 "In most cases, accommodations should be made so that children with disabilities can be included in regular classrooms with children who do not have disabilities." (Ratio/Observations)

	RATIO			
	A) STRONGLY AGREE	B) AGREE	C) DISAGREE	E) DON'T KNOW/ NO ANSWER
Gender				
Male	41.4	54.1	3.3	1.2
Female	48.6	36.0	14.5	0.9
Organization				
MOE	49.0	41.8	6.9	2.3
MOF	40.8	45.8	13.2	0.2
MP	41.3	55.1	2.8	0.8
Country				
Bangladesh	36.7	60.2	1.7	1.4
DRC	97.9	2.1	0.0	0.0
Ghana	38.6	50.5	10.9	0.0
Indonesia	52.1	47.9	0.0	0.0
Laos	51.2	17.4	23.0	8.5
Mongolia	74.7	19.4	0.0	5.9
Nigeria	46.0	44.2	9.9	0.0
Pakistan	1.8	88.1	10.1	0.0
Peru	63.2	31.4	4.8	0.6
Philippines	67.3	28.4	0.0	4.3
Uganda	24.1	74.7	1.2	0.0
Vietnam	23.1	46.2	29.0	1.7
Total	43.3 [298]	49.5 [263]	6.2 [32]	1.1 [8]

TABLE A3.46 "Please estimate, roughly what percentage of boys/girls/children with disabilities are enrolled in junior secondary school in your country." (Mean/Standard deviation/observations)

	BOYS	GIRLS	CHILREN WITH DISABILITIES
Gender			
Male	62.2 (23.7)	53.9 (22.7)	16.4 (21.4)
Female	69.2 (21.8)	57.4 (20.3)	22.4 (21.9)
Organization			
MOE	72.5 (18.0)	64.8 (21.6)	21.7 (25.0)
MOF	71.6 (20.8)	58.4 (17.7)	26.7 (22.5)
MP	54.6 (24.1)	48.0 (21.4)	12.4 (17.2)
Country			
Bangladesh	70.3 (16.3)	62.4 (18.3)	4.1 (9.9)
DRC	60.3 (3.2)	49.5 (10.2)	16.9 (6.3)
Ghana	54.6 (5.5)	46.2 (11.9)	13.8 (13.1)
Indonesia	71.0 (19.9)	79.8 (15.7)	50.6 (30.2)
Laos	80.5 (18.7)	76.3 (22.8)	37.4 (28.4)
Mongolia	92.9 (11.3)	88.2 (15.7)	62.0 (19.2)
Nigeria	49.4 (14.3)	35.6 (16.4)	14.4 (15.6)
Pakistan	58.1 (32.9)	34.8 (28.9)	7.9 (11.0)
Peru	62.7 (18.1)	54.9 (21.3)	25.1 (21.9)
Philippines	62.7 (16.3)	67.4 (16.4)	31.7 (23.1)
Uganda	20.0 (8.7)	51.9 (7.1)	1.9 (2.2)
Vietnam	95.6 (2.0)	72.0 (32.0)	30.4 (23.9)
Total	63.5 (23.4) [238]	54.9 (22.1) [259]	17.8 (21.6) [409]

3.10 VIOLENCE

TABLE A3.47 "Now I want to ask you some questions about corporal punishment. Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between:" Parents beating children (Ratio/Observations)

	RATIO			
	ALWAYS BE JUSTIFIED	NEVER BE JUSTIFIED	SOMETHING IN BETWEEN	DON'T KNOW/ NO ANSWER
Gender				
Male	12.8	44.2	42.0	0.9
Female	12.9	46.0	40.8	0.3
Organization				
MOE	11.2	45.5	42.0	1.3
MOF	16.8	56.7	26.2	0.2
MP	11.9	39.5	47.9	0.7
Country				
Bangladesh	16.9	64.8	18.3	0.0
DRC	3.8	40.3	55.9	0.0
Ghana	18.5	11.2	70.3	0.0
Indonesia	0.0	58.8	41.2	0.0
Laos	4.2	49.5	45.8	0.5
Mongolia	7.0	79.0	12.9	1.1
Nigeria	29.0	33.1	38.0	0.0
Pakistan	32.9	56.8	9.3	1.0
Peru	4.8	69.8	20.0	5.4
Philippines	1.0	79.3	19.7	0.0
Uganda	4.5	6.1	89.3	0.0
Vietnam	5.2	35.9	55.5	3.4
Total	12.8 [85]	44.9 [306]	41.5 [201]	0.8 [9]

TABLE A3.48 Teachers beating children (Ratio/Observations)

	RATIO			
	ALWAYS BE JUSTIFIED	NEVER BE JUSTIFIED	SOMETHING IN BETWEEN	DON'T KNOW/ NO ANSWER
Gender				
Male	23.9	55.4	20.5	0.2
Female	28.7	57.8	13.3	0.2
Organization				
MOE	11.9	63.8	23.8	0.5
MOF	29.1	53.2	17.4	0.2
MP	30.1	53.2	16.6	0.0
Country				
Bangladesh	13.9	67.9	18.2	0.0
DRC	0.0	89.0	11.0	0.0
Ghana	14.8	49.5	35.7	0.0
Indonesia	0.0	83.6	16.4	0.0
Laos	1.0	70.7	28.3	0.0
Mongolia	7.0	90.8	1.1	1.1
Nigeria	19.6	34.6	45.3	0.4
Pakistan	96.1	2.7	1.2	0.0
Peru	4.8	89.2	5.4	0.6
Philippines	1.9	88.5	9.6	0.0
Uganda	47.2	27.1	25.7	0.0
Vietnam	1.7	60.7	35.9	1.7
Total	25.0 [106]	56.0 [368]	18.7 [122]	0.2 [5]

TABLE A3.49 I want to ask you a question about the prevalence in your country of sexual violence - that is when as a person is forced into unwanted sexual acts. Please estimate, roughly what percentage of boys/girls do you think experience sexual violence by age 18? (Ratio/Observations)

	BOYS	GIRLS
Gender		
Male	26.6 (18.7)	35.9 (26.4)
Female	34.6 (20.5)	31.3 (22.2)
Organization		
MOE	23.3 (15.8)	33.6 (25.7)
MOF	35.7 (19.7)	37.2 (28.7)
MP	27.3 (19.9)	34.2 (24.6)
Country		
Bangladesh	24.1 (23.5)	28.1 (33.5)
DRC	19.9 (9.7)	40.9 (13.1)
Ghana	29.1 (15.6)	35.4 (25.4)
Indonesia	27.7 (16.7)	15.3 (18.7)
Laos	19.0 (14.8)	17.1 (17.6)
Mongolia	10.6 (5.0)	16.6 (6.2)
Nigeria	24.4 (12.5)	27.3 (17.7)
Pakistan	48.2 (8.0)	64.8 (12.8)
Peru	16.9 (15.8)	42.0 (26.8)
Philippines	14.8 (13.9)	15.7 (14.8)
Uganda	15.0 (.)	18.2 (7.2)
Vietnam	15.0 (7.0)	15.0 (.)
Total	28.8 (19.5) [194]	34.5 (25.6) [199]

3.11 RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS AND POST-INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

TABLE A3.50 Is your position politically appointed? (Ratio/Observations)

	RATIO		
	YES	NO	DON'T KNOW/ NO ANSWER
Gender			
Male	32.3	57.3	10.4
Female	40.4	51.1	8.4
Organization			
MOE	10.7	85.8	3.5
MOF	38.2	59.7	2.1
MP	44.9	38.3	16.8
Country			
Bangladesh	24.3	64.3	11.4
DRC	14.8	85.2	0.0
Ghana	1.4	98.6	0.0
Indonesia	0.6	99.4	0.0
Laos	26.9	60.6	12.6
Mongolia	19.4	6.5	74.1
Nigeria	46.4	53.2	0.4
Pakistan	81.4	13.9	4.7
Peru	18.1	19.0	62.9
Philippines	34.6	65.4	0.0
Uganda	64.7	35.3	0.0
Vietnam	12.8	87.2	0.0
Total	34.3 [224]	55.7 [318]	10.0 [59]

TABLE A3.51 How did you do this survey? (Ratio/Observations)

	MOE	MOF	MP	TOTAL
In person	47.8 (109)	41.1 (83)	50.9 (87)	46.4 (279)
By phone	21.5 (49)	21.3 (43)	35.7 (61)	25.5 (153)
By email	5.3 (12)	7.9 (16)	1.2 (2)	5.0 (30)
By zoom/video call	22.8 (52)	27.2 (55)	7.0 (12)	19.8 (119)
Other (specify)	2.6 (6)	2.5 (5)	5.3 (9)	3.3 (20)
Total	100.0 (228)	100.0 (202)	100.0 (171)	100.0 (601)

	INDONESIA	LAOS	MONGOLIA	PHILIPPINES	VIETNAM	TOTAL
In person	48.4 (15)	0.0 (0)	100.0 (30)	33.3 (17)	11.5 (3)	34.6 (65)
By phone	3.2 (1)	10.0 (5)	0.0 (0)	7.8 (4)	88.5 (23)	17.6 (33)
By email	0.0 (0)	52.0 (26)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	13.8 (26)
By zoom/video call	48.4 (15)	38.0 (19)	0.0 (0)	58.8 (30)	0.0 (0)	34.0 (64)
Total	100.0 (31)	100.0 (50)	100.0 (30)	100.0 (51)	100.0 (26)	100.0 (188)

	BANGLADESH	DRC	GHANA	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	UGANDA	TOTAL
In person	69.6 (55)	14.8 (9)	100.0 (43)	78.0 (71)	35.6 (21)	8.3 (5)	50.0 (10)	51.8 (214)
By phone	30.4 (24)	50.8 (31)	0.0 (0)	19.8 (18)	64.4 (38)	0.0 (0)	45.0 (9)	29.1 (120)
By email	0.0 (0)	1.6 (1)	0.0 (0)	1.1 (1)	0.0 (0)	1.7 (1)	5.0 (1)	1.0 (4)
By zoom/video call	0.0 (0)	1.6 (1)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	90.0 (54)	0.0 (0)	13.3 (55)
Other (specify)	0.0 (0)	31.1 (19)	0.0 (0)	1.1 (1)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	4.8 (20)
Total	100.0 (79)	100.0 (61)	100.0 (43)	100.0 (91)	100.0 (59)	100.0 (60)	100.0 (20)	100.0 (413)

TABLE A3.52 What is this person's gender? (Ratio/Observations)

	MOE	MOF	MP	TOTAL
Male	69.3 (158)	63.9 (129)	81.3 (139)	70.9 (426)
Female	29.8 (68)	35.1 (71)	18.7 (32)	28.5 (171)
Non-binary/third gender	0.4 (1)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.2 (1)
Don't know/no answer	0.4 (1)	1.0 (2)	0.0 (0)	0.5 (3)
Total	100.0 (228)	100.0 (202)	100.0 (171)	100.0 (601)

	INDONESIA	LAOS	MONGOLIA	PHILIPPINES	VIETNAM	TOTAL
Male	77.4 (24)	74.0 (37)	66.7 (20)	39.2 (20)	50.0 (13)	60.6 (114)
Female	22.6 (7)	20.0 (10)	33.3 (10)	60.8 (31)	50.0 (13)	37.8 (71)
Don't know/no answer	0.0 (0)	6.0 (3)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	1.6 (3)
Total	100.0 (31)	100.0 (50)	100.0 (30)	100.0 (51)	100.0 (26)	100.0 (188)

	BANGLADESH	DRC	GHANA	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	UGANDA	TOTAL
Male	78.5 (62)	78.7 (48)	69.8 (30)	82.4 (75)	89.8 (53)	46.7 (28)	80.0 (16)	75.5 (312)
Female	21.5 (17)	21.3 (13)	27.9 (12)	17.6 (16)	10.2 (6)	53.3 (32)	20.0 (4)	24.2 (100)
Non-binary/third gender	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	2.3 (1)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.2 (1)
Total	100.0 (79)	100.0 (61)	100.0 (43)	100.0 (91)	100.0 (59)	100.0 (60)	100.0 (20)	100.0 (413)

TABLE A3.53 What is the respondent's approximate age? (Ratio/Observations)

	MOE	MOF	MP	TOTAL
20–35 years	1.8 (4)	7.9 (16)	1.2 (2)	3.7 (22)
36–50 years	48.2 (110)	47.0 (95)	36.8 (63)	44.6 (268)
51–67 years	46.1 (105)	43.6 (88)	53.8 (92)	47.4 (285)
More than 67 years	2.6 (6)	0.5 (1)	8.2 (14)	3.5 (21)
Don't know/no answer	1.3 (3)	1.0 (2)	0.0 (0)	0.8 (5)
Total	100.0 (228)	100.0 (202)	100.0 (171)	100.0 (601)

	INDONESIA	LAOS	MONGOLIA	PHILIPPINES	VIETNAM	TOTAL
20–35 years	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	13.3 (4)	3.9 (2)	7.7 (2)	4.3 (8)
36–50 years	35.5 (11)	64.0 (32)	66.7 (20)	41.2 (21)	88.5 (23)	56.9 (107)
51–67 years	64.5 (20)	32.0 (16)	20.0 (6)	51.0 (26)	3.8 (1)	36.7 (69)
More than 67 years	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	3.9 (2)	0.0 (0)	1.1 (2)
Don't know/no answer	0.0 (0)	4.0 (2)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	1.1 (2)
Total	100.0 (31)	100.0 (50)	100.0 (30)	100.0 (51)	100.0 (26)	100.0 (188)

	BANGLADESH	DRC	GHANA	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	UGANDA	TOTAL
20–35 years	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	6.8 (4)	10.0 (6)	20.0 (4)	3.4 (14)
36–50 years	46.8 (37)	23.0 (14)	39.5 (17)	39.6 (36)	30.5 (18)	41.7 (25)	70.0 (14)	39.0 (161)
51–67 years	48.1 (38)	68.9 (42)	60.5 (26)	56.0 (51)	54.2 (32)	41.7 (25)	10.0 (2)	52.3 (216)
More than 67 years	5.1 (4)	6.6 (4)	0.0 (0)	2.2 (2)	8.5 (5)	6.7 (4)	0.0 (0)	4.6 (19)
Don't know/no answer	0.0 (0)	1.6 (1)	0.0 (0)	2.2 (2)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.7 (3)
Total	100.0 (79)	100.0 (61)	100.0 (43)	100.0 (91)	100.0 (59)	100.0 (60)	100.0 (20)	100.0 (413)

TABLE A3.54 Where was the interview conducted? (Ratio/Observations)

	MOE	MOF	MP	TOTAL
Dedicated survey room	1.8 (4)	2.0 (4)	1.2 (2)	1.7 (10)
Interviewee's office	44.3 (101)	45.0 (91)	36.8 (63)	42.4 (255)
Other [specify]	53.9 (123)	53.0 (107)	62.0 (106)	55.9 (336)
Total	100.0 (228)	100.0 (202)	100.0 (171)	100.0 (601)

	INDONESIA	LAOS	MONGOLIA	PHILIPPINES	VIETNAM	TOTAL
Dedicated survey room	0.0 (0)	4.0 (2)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	11.5 (3)	2.7 (5)
Interviewee's office	48.4 (15)	14.0 (7)	73.3 (22)	80.4 (41)	0.0 (0)	45.2 (85)
Other [specify]	51.6 (16)	82.0 (41)	26.7 (8)	19.6 (10)	88.5 (23)	52.1 (98)
Total	100.0 (31)	100.0 (50)	100.0 (30)	100.0 (51)	100.0 (26)	100.0 (188)

	BANGLADESH	DRC	GHANA	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	UGANDA	TOTAL
Dedicated survey room	1.3 (1)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	4.4 (4)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	1.2 (5)
Interviewee's office	55.7 (44)	13.1 (8)	39.5 (17)	70.3 (64)	35.6 (21)	10.0 (6)	50.0 (10)	41.2 (170)
Other [specify]	43.0 (34)	86.9 (53)	60.5 (26)	25.3 (23)	64.4 (38)	90.0 (54)	50.0 (10)	57.6 (238)
Total	100.0 (79)	100.0 (61)	100.0 (43)	100.0 (91)	100.0 (59)	100.0 (60)	100.0 (20)	100.0 (413)

TABLE A3.55 To what extent was the respondent willing to reveal basic and confidential/sensitive information? Select one response only

Option 1: Very reluctant to provide more than basic information
Option 2: Provided all basic information and some confidential/sensitive information
Option 3: Willing to provide both basic and confidential/sensitive information
(Ratio/Observations)

	MOE	MOF	MP	TOTAL
Option 1	18.9 (43)	20.8 (42)	21.8 (37)	20.3 (122)
Option 2	36.0 (82)	31.7 (64)	42.4 (72)	36.3 (218)
Option 3	45.2 (103)	47.5 (96)	35.9 (61)	43.3 (260)
Total	100.0 (228)	100.0 (202)	100.0 (170)	100.0 (600)

	INDONESIA	LAOS	MONGOLIA	PHILIPPINES	VIETNAM	TOTAL
Option 1	0.0 (0)	18.0 (9)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	3.8 (1)	5.3 (10)
Option 2	25.8 (8)	54.0 (27)	70.0 (21)	25.5 (13)	23.1 (6)	39.9 (75)
Option 3	74.2 (23)	28.0 (14)	30.0 (9)	74.5 (38)	73.1 (19)	54.8 (103)
Total	100.0 (31)	100.0 (50)	100.0 (30)	100.0 (51)	100.0 (26)	100.0 (188)

	BANGLADESH	DRC	GHANA	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	UGANDA	TOTAL
Option 1	55.7 (44)	23.0 (14)	14.3 (6)	8.8 (8)	61.0 (36)	0.0 (0)	20.0 (4)	27.2 (112)
Option 2	43.0 (34)	50.8 (31)	78.6 (33)	31.9 (29)	13.6 (8)	6.7 (4)	20.0 (4)	34.7 (143)
Option 3	1.3 (1)	26.2 (16)	7.1 (3)	59.3 (54)	25.4 (15)	93.3 (56)	60.0 (12)	38.1 (157)
Total	100.0 (79)	100.0 (61)	100.0 (42)	100.0 (91)	100.0 (59)	100.0 (60)	100.0 (20)	100.0 (412)

TABLE A3.56 During the interview, did the respondent seem patient? Select one response only

Option 1: Little patience – wanted to run through the interview as quickly as possible
Option 2: Some patience – willing to provide richness to answers but also time constrained
Option 3: Lots of patience – willing to talk for as long as required (Ratio/Observations)

	MOE	MOF	MP	TOTAL
Option 1	15.9 (36)	9.4 (19)	20.2 (34)	14.9 (89)
Option 2	34.4 (78)	40.1 (81)	39.9 (67)	37.9 (226)
Option 3	49.8 (113)	50.5 (102)	39.9 (67)	47.2 (282)
Total	100.0 (227)	100.0 (202)	100.0 (168)	100.0 (597)

	INDONESIA	LAOS	MONGOLIA	PHILIPPINES	VIETNAM	TOTAL
Option 1	0.0 (0)	20.0 (10)	13.3 (4)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	7.4 (14)
Option 2	29.0 (9)	68.0 (34)	50.0 (15)	5.9 (3)	23.1 (6)	35.6 (67)
Option 3	71.0 (22)	12.0 (6)	36.7 (11)	94.1 (48)	76.9 (20)	56.9 (107)
Total	100.0 (31)	100.0 (50)	100.0 (30)	100.0 (51)	100.0 (26)	100.0 (188)

	BANGLADESH	DRC	GHANA	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	UGANDA	TOTAL
Option 1	51.9 (41)	14.8 (9)	7.3 (3)	16.9 (15)	5.1 (3)	0.0 (0)	20.0 (4)	18.3 (75)
Option 2	38.0 (30)	65.6 (40)	70.7 (29)	30.3 (27)	33.9 (20)	5.0 (3)	50.0 (10)	38.9 (159)
Option 3	10.1 (8)	19.7 (12)	22.0 (9)	52.8 (47)	61.0 (36)	95.0 (57)	30.0 (6)	42.8 (175)
Total	100.0 (79)	100.0 (61)	100.0 (41)	100.0 (89)	100.0 (59)	100.0 (60)	100.0 (20)	100.0 (409)

TABLE A3.57 How do you think the interview went? Select one response only. (Ratio/Observations)

	MOE	MOF	MP	TOTAL
1) Somewhat badly	1.8 (4)	1.5 (3)	1.8 (3)	1.7 (10)
2) Somewhat well	38.2 (87)	42.6 (86)	43.3 (74)	41.1 (247)
3) Very well	60.1 (137)	55.9 (113)	55.0 (94)	57.2 (344)
Total	100.0 (228)	100.0 (202)	100.0 (171)	100.0 (601)

	INDONESIA	LAOS	MONGOLIA	PHILIPPINES	VIETNAM	TOTAL
1) Somewhat badly	3.2 (1)	2.0 (1)	6.7 (2)	0.0 (0)	3.8 (1)	2.7 (5)
2) Somewhat well	22.6 (7)	92.0 (46)	86.7 (26)	5.9 (3)	30.8 (8)	47.9 (90)
3) Very well	74.2 (23)	6.0 (3)	6.7 (2)	94.1 (48)	65.4 (17)	49.5 (93)
Total	100.0 (31)	100.0 (50)	100.0 (30)	100.0 (51)	100.0 (26)	100.0 (188)

	BANGLADESH	DRC	GHANA	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	UGANDA	TOTAL
1) Somewhat badly	1.3 (1)	1.6 (1)	0.0 (0)	3.3 (3)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	1.2 (5)
2) Somewhat well	36.7 (29)	63.9 (39)	76.7 (33)	26.4 (24)	32.2 (19)	8.3 (5)	40.0 (8)	38.0 (157)
3) Very well	62.0 (49)	34.4 (21)	23.3 (10)	70.3 (64)	67.8 (40)	91.7 (55)	60.0 (12)	60.8 (251)
Total	100.0 (79)	100.0 (61)	100.0 (43)	100.0 (91)	100.0 (59)	100.0 (60)	100.0 (20)	100.0 (413)

TABLE A3.58 Was the interview completely private, or was there somebody else in the room during the interview (aside from members of the survey team)? (Ratio/Observations)

	MOE	MOF	MP	TOTAL
1) Completely private	75.2 (170)	73.0 (146)	68.8 (117)	72.7 (433)
2) Other people in the room	9.7 (22)	13.0 (26)	14.7 (25)	12.2 (73)
3) Sometimes private	15.0 (34)	14.0 (28)	16.5 (28)	15.1 (90)
Total	100.0 (226)	100.0 (200)	100.0 (170)	100.0 (596)

	INDONESIA	LAOS	MONGOLIA	PHILIPPINES	VIETNAM	TOTAL
1) Completely private	90.3 (28)	34.0 (17)	37.9 (11)	85.7 (42)	100.0 (26)	67.0 (124)
2) Other people in the room	6.5 (2)	8.0 (4)	13.8 (4)	12.2 (6)	0.0 (0)	8.6 (16)
3) Sometimes private	3.2 (1)	58.0 (29)	48.3 (14)	2.0 (1)	0.0 (0)	24.3 (45)
Total	100.0 (31)	100.0 (50)	100.0 (29)	100.0 (49)	100.0 (26)	100.0 (185)

	BANGLADESH	DRC	GHANA	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	UGANDA	TOTAL
1) Completely private	87.3 (69)	85.2 (52)	9.3 (4)	73.3 (66)	83.1 (49)	91.7 (55)	73.7 (14)	75.2 (309)
2) Other people in the room	0.0 (0)	9.8 (6)	60.5 (26)	14.4 (13)	15.3 (9)	3.3 (2)	5.3 (1)	13.9 (57)
3) Sometimes private	12.7 (10)	4.9 (3)	30.2 (13)	12.2 (11)	1.7 (1)	5.0 (3)	21.1 (4)	10.9 (45)
Total	100.0 (79)	100.0 (61)	100.0 (43)	100.0 (90)	100.0 (59)	100.0 (60)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (411)

TABLE A3.59 Did the respondent appear knowledgeable about the work environment, and their organization as a whole? Select one response only

Option 1: Some knowledge of their own working environment, but not about the organization as a whole
Option 2: Expert knowledge about their working environment, but not about the organization as a whole
Option 3: Expert knowledge about both their own work and about the organization as a whole
(Ratio/Observations)

	MOE	MOF	MP	TOTAL
Option 1	14.6 (33)	17.5 (35)	30.0 (51)	20.0 (119)
Option 2	24.8 (56)	21.5 (43)	20.0 (34)	22.3 (133)
Option 3	60.6 (137)	61.0 (122)	50.0 (85)	57.7 (344)
Total	100.0 (226)	100.0 (200)	100.0 (170)	100.0 (596)

	INDONESIA	LAOS	MONGOLIA	PHILIPPINES	VIETNAM	TOTAL
Option 1	12.9 (4)	72.0 (36)	3.4 (1)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	22.0 (41)
Option 2	29.0 (9)	14.0 (7)	13.8 (4)	14.0 (7)	3.8 (1)	15.1 (28)
Option 3	58.1 (18)	14.0 (7)	82.8 (24)	86.0 (43)	96.2 (25)	62.9 (117)
Total	100.0 (31)	100.0 (50)	100.0 (29)	100.0 (50)	100.0 (26)	100.0 (186)

	BANGLADESH	DRC	GHANA	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	UGANDA	TOTAL
Option 1	32.9 (26)	26.7 (16)	16.3 (7)	13.3 (12)	23.7 (14)	0.0 (0)	15.8 (3)	19.0 (78)
Option 2	54.4 (43)	26.7 (16)	37.2 (16)	13.3 (12)	25.4 (15)	5.0 (3)	0.0 (0)	25.6 (105)
Option 3	12.7 (10)	46.7 (28)	46.5 (20)	73.3 (66)	50.8 (30)	95.0 (57)	84.2 (16)	55.4 (227)
Total	100.0 (79)	100.0 (60)	100.0 (43)	100.0 (90)	100.0 (59)	100.0 (60)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (410)

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Center for Global Development
2055 L Street NW
Floor 5
Washington DC
20036

CGD Europe
1 Abbey Gardens
Great College Street
London
SW1P 3SE

WWW.CGDEV.ORG