Mapping China’s Multilateralism: A Data Survey of China’s Participation in Multilateral Development Institutions and Funds

Scott Morris, Rowan Rockafellow, and Sarah Rose

Abstract

A considerable body of recent research attempts to shed light on China’s bilateral aid and finance flows, but there have been fewer efforts focused on China’s participation in multilateral development channels. As a result, China’s role across the landscape of multilateral institutions and funds is poorly understood, even as China has emerged as a leading donor within many of these entities. Part of China’s increased multilateral engagement reflects its economic growth, with shareholding and assessed contributions based largely on economic size. But the government of China’s policy choices are also revealed, in part, through its patterns of voluntary funding, cooperation agreements, and influence through personnel instated in leadership positions. By collating data on China’s financial and non-financial engagement with multilateral development banks and other financial institutions, sector-based vertical funds, and the development entities of the United Nations, among others, this paper seeks to provide a clear picture of China’s role in the multilateral development system and the evolution of that role over the past decade. This assessment brings to light the weight of China’s voting power across the multilateral development banks, the extent to which Chinese firms benefit from procurement opportunities in multilateral institutions, and the degree to which China has achieved a singular position of being a large-scale donor and recipient in the multilateral system.
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Introduction and context

The Chinese government’s participation in multilateral development institutions like the World Bank and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has received little scrutiny, even as China’s role in these institutions has undergone a sea change. When the People’s Republic of China joined World Bank in 1980, it was allocated 12,000 IBRD shares, becoming the Bank’s 6th largest shareholder with 3.47 percent of the of the voting power. By 2013, decades of rapid economic growth had propelled China to its current position as the IBRD’s 3rd largest shareholder, eclipsing France, Germany, and the United Kingdom with 5.03 percent of IBRD voting power. China has also emerged as a leading donor to other established multilateral entities like the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA), while leading in the creation of new multilateral institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

But China’s newfound position as a leading multilateral donor sits uneasily beside a desire to maintain its status as a multilateral aid recipient and client, and as a major commercial partner to multilateral development institutions. Contemporary China is thereby defining a new role for itself distinct from both traditional donor and aid-recipient countries.

Given these dynamics, it is striking that basic information about China’s participation in multilateral institutions is hard to come by. The Chinese government itself provides only sporadic and limited data on its aid activities, with virtually no systematic reporting of its multilateral commitments. The OECD provides comprehensive reporting on its members’ multilateral activities, but it has less of a mandate or ability to cover non-OECD members like China.

The multilateral institutions themselves provide detailed information on their donors’ and members’ activities, but this information lacks a cross-institutional framework. The impetus for this project is to address that gap. By collecting and collating data provided by the major development-focused multilateral institutions and funds, we have sought to provide a clear picture of China’s role and the evolution of that role over the past decade.

Understanding this is important in the context of continued calls for multilateralism within the aid community, perhaps especially in leading areas of global action like climate change. Independent assessments of aid effectiveness tend to rate multilateral institutions more highly than bilateral approaches along key dimensions like transparency, procurement policies, monitoring and evaluation, and social and environmental safeguards. Leading donor countries like the United States have long encouraged China to step up its multilateral participation through higher donor contributions to key institutions like the World Bank’s IDA. But that might be changing, even if the core case for multilateralism remains sound. Political voices in the United States and other G7 countries are lately expressing a more skeptical view about China’s role in these institutions, suggesting that China’s multilateral ambitions should be kept in check from a strategic competition standpoint.

We do not seek to evaluate the case for or against China’s multilateralism in this paper. We do hope to better inform the debate though. For example, our data suggest that China’s
firms win commercial contracts from the multilateral development banks (MDB) at a higher rate than firms from most other member countries. But our analysis also suggests that through participation in MDB contracts, China’s firms operate under a highly transparent, rules-based system.

Properly evaluating the scale and nature of China’s participation across multilateral entities requires a clear assessment of China’s actions, but also of the rules and behavior of the multilateral institutions themselves. Hence this project seeks to provide a clear framework for understanding the landscape of multilateral development institutions and funds, the basis for participation in them by China or any other country, and an assessment China’s participation relative to other countries.

The primary aim of this paper is to characterize China’s participation along observable and measurable dimensions. These findings, however, raise important questions about what motivates the government of China’s decision making with respect to engagement in the multilateral development system. We conclude the paper with a discussion of several key qualitative questions that merit further study.

The first section of the paper describes the methodology used to select the set of multilateral entities to include in this analysis and the types of data collected for each institution. The following sections explore China’s engagement with groups of similar multilateral entities: section two focuses on multilateral financial institutions and funds, section three looks at vertical funds, section four explores the UN system, and section five discusses other multilateral institutions and funds. Section six takes a sectoral view of China’s participation in the multilateral development system with a deep dive into China’s involvement in agriculture and global health, including the COVID-19 response.

Data and methodology

The first step of this exercise involved identifying which multilateral institutions and funds fell within the scope of this paper and grouping the identified entities by type. Figure 1 provides a graphic representation of this process. Of the over 2,000 multilateral entities identified in our preliminary research, approximately 700 were categorized as development-focused entities. For the purposes of this analysis, we define development-focused entities as nonprofit institutions, organizations, or funds which a) provide direct funding for international development, or b) are directly engaged in international development policy.¹

¹ The OECD produces a list of ODA-eligible international organizations. The list of organizations used in this analysis overlaps significantly with that list with some important differences. For example, the list used for this analysis has a somewhat narrower set of UN entities. We included those entities associated with the UN Sustainable Development Group which rely on member contributions for much of their budget (see the United Nations section for more detailed inclusion criteria). This analysis also explores several multilateral and China-only trust funds associated with the multilateral and regional development banks that are not included on this list since these funds are represent a significant pool of financing within the MDB and regional development bank system.
Many of the roughly 700 development-focused entities identified consist of trust funds associated with the multilateral development banks, especially the World Bank. Since many of these are small, we included a second screen for entity size. To be included in this analysis, a fund must have either over $100 million in total capitalization with 10 or more donors or over $1 billion in total capitalization with three or more donors. This narrowed the list down to 152 entities.

Of these 152, around half (76) feature Chinese participation. We primarily looked for Chinese membership or direct funding contributions, but we also included several organizations like the Africa Finance Corporation in which China is neither a member nor shareholder, but which has received sizable loans from Chinese state institutions.

This final list of 76 entities is further categorized by type to facilitate comparability within groups: 34 multilateral financial institutions and associated trust funds (MDBs, regional development banks, and the IMF), 36 UN system entities and funds (WHO, UNDP, etc.), six vertical funds (Gavi, CGIAR, etc.), and six other institutions and funds (Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Chiang Mai Initiative for Multilateralization, etc.).

Data collection on these entities and China’s relationship with them focused on three broad categories:

- **Institutional characteristics**: information on overall structure and purpose of the entity, including mission, primary activities, number of donors, shareholder formula, sectoral focus, regional distribution of disbursements, and financing model—how the entity receives funds and how it distributes them.
- **Financial data**: information on the financial status of the entity, including total capitalization and/or the entity’s annual commitments, as well as China’s financial relationship with the entity, including its financial contributions (e.g., share capital, grant funding, loans) over time and its donor rank relative to other funders. Additional financial data include financing for development projects within China and, for a subset of entities, data on procurements going to Chinese firms.
• **Nonfinancial Chinese engagement:** information on nonfinancial aspects of China’s relationship with the entity, including the Chinese government body responsible for managing the relationship with the entity, details on any Chinese nationals in key leadership positions, and any memoranda of understanding (MOUs) or cooperation agreements between China and the entity. We also identified the extent to which Taiwan has a relationship with each of the included entities.2

All data were collected online from publicly available sources. For financial information, primary data sources included annual reports, financial system databases, entities’ open data portals, and other datasets on entities’ webpages. Primary sources for institutional characteristics and nonfinancial data were entity webpages as well as media reports.

The focal period of this analysis is the last decade. Financial data were collected as a time series from 2010 through the most recent year available (typically 2019 or 2020). Qualitative information—for example, on MOUs or Chinese leadership—also focuses primarily on this time period.

Throughout this data-collection process, some limitations emerged. First, for some entities, publicly available data were not available for the criteria we sought. Second, available data are not always directly comparable across entities. The year of most recent available data differed by entity, with some reporting through 2019 and others 2020 or 2021 (or, in some cases, earlier). In addition, there is some inconsistency in the ways different organizations raise funds, even within like types of institutions, as well as inconsistencies in the ways different organizations report procurement and disbursement/commitment data. Where possible, we attempt to account for these inconsistencies by using ranks and percentages to allow for comparability. Where questions about comparability remain, these are noted in the footnotes.

**Multilateral financial institutions and funds**

In this section, we explore data related to China’s engagement with multilateral financial institutions and funds—primarily multilateral and regional development banks, multilateral development finance institutions, and the special funds associated with each. We look over the past decade at funding patterns, voting power, the presence of Chinese nationals in decision making positions, and other forms of influence.

China is a shareholder or donor in 18 multilateral institutions (see Table 1). The discussion that follows primarily analyzes China’s participation in the multilateral development banks, their concessional arms, and multilateral development finance institutions, which provide capital—or facilitate the provision of private capital—to (mainly) low- and middle-income countries. The IMF, a multilateral organization that seeks to ensure the stability of the

---

2 Diplomatic recognition of Taiwan is a major factor determining how China allocates bilateral aid funds (see Dreher et al., 2018.)
international monetary system through surveillance and balance of payments support, is discussed separately within this section.

Table 1. Multilateral financial institutions in which China is a shareholder or donor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bretton Woods Institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Development Association (IDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Finance Corporation (IFC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Monetary Fund (IMF)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other International Development Banks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Development Bank (NDB)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Development Banks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Development Bank (ADB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Development Fund (ADF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Development Bank (AfDB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Development Fund (AfDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West African Development Bank (BOAD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank (TDB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Export and Import Bank (Afreximbank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America/Caribbean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDB Invest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Development Bank (CDB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Voting power

To begin with the big picture of Chinese influence in the MDB system as a whole, one can compare a measure of aggregate voting power across the set of institutions above whose membership is based on shareholding. This is calculated as the sum of voting power of individual shareholders in each institution, weighted by the size of the institution based on capitalization. As Figure 2 shows, China ranks second in aggregate voting power across the MDB system, far behind the top-ranked United States and just ahead of Japan.
Figure 2. Aggregate voting power in multilateral financial institutions with Chinese participation*

United States
China
Japan
India
Brazil
Germany
Russian Federation
France
Canada
United Kingdom

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16

*IBRD, MIGA, IFC, ADB, AFDB, IADB, EBRD, NDB, AIIB, CDB, TDB, BOAD, IDB Invest.


This position reflects two things about China’s MDB participation. First, it is a reflection of the size of China’s economy, the second largest in the world. Voting power is mostly a function of shareholding within each institution. And shareholding, especially for the largest institutions like IBRD, is largely a function of economic size, though voting power and shareholding in regional development banks often includes additional parameters around in-region vs. out-of-region (see Table 2 on MDB formulas for voting power).3

In addition, shareholding institutions that China has joined in recent decades, long after their establishment, must seek negotiated solutions to China’s voting power as a new member. Because voting shares are a fixed sum, existing members must give up voting power to accommodate China’s membership, something member countries are often reluctant to do. As a result, China’s position as a shareholder may be much smaller than would be implied by the country’s economic standing or the policy preferences of the Chinese government. This appears to be the case for the IDB and AfDB, which China joined within the last 20 years, where China’s shareholding is very small.

3 For a description of the IBRD’s shareholding formula, see Development Committee, 2020.
### Table 2. Rules governing shareholding at the multilateral financial institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>Country quotas are based on a formula that captures GDP (50 percent), openness (30 percent), economic variability (15 percent), and international reserves (5 percent).[^4]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>IBRD capital subscriptions are roughly based on each member's relative position in the global economy. Shareholding has historically been largely linked to countries’ IMF quotas, with some deviations and adjustments.[^5] Since 2010, the World Bank undertakes shareholding reviews every 5 years to assess, based on agreed principles and a dynamic formula, the extent to which voting power (tied to shareholding) is equitably distributed. The formula takes into account GDP (80 percent) and the country's share of IDA replenishments (20 percent, with the last three replenishments counting for 80 percent of the figure and historic replenishments 20 percent). If countries are determined to be over- or under-represented, based on this formula, the Board of Governors may consider a shareholding realignment, but such a step is not a requirement of the review.[^6]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFC</td>
<td>Historically IFC shareholding has been linked to IBRD shareholding, both for original and new members. However, since the two institutions have had different frequencies and amounts of capital increases and have had new members join or old members relinquish shares at different times, the linkage is more flexible than directly parallel.[^7]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Countries’ initial subscribed shares are determined by the Board of Governors, but regional members must always control at least 60 percent of the subscribed capital stock.[^8]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFDB</td>
<td>The Board of Governors determines the initial number of shares new members subscribe to, but since 1982, when the AFDB opened itself to non-regional members, shares must be allocated so that regional members hold 60 percent of the voting power and nonregional members hold 40 percent (each country’s voting power is generally set as equal to 625 votes plus one vote per share held).[^9]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDB</td>
<td>Originally, membership in the IDB was open only to members of the Organization of American States (OAS) but membership was expanded in the 1970s to include first regional non-OAS members and then nonregional members. Shares must be distributed in such a way that the regional developing members maintain at least 50.005 percent of total voting power, the largest shareholder (the United States) maintains at least 30 percent of total voting power, and Canada maintains at least four percent of total voting power (each country’s voting power is 135 votes plus one vote per share held).[^10]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBRD</td>
<td>The Board of Governors determines the initial number of shares to which new members subscribe, but the majority of shares must be held by member countries of the European Union, the European Union, and the European Investment Bank.[^11]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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[^4]: International Monetary Fund, 2018.
[^7]: Ibid.
[^10]: Inter-American Development Bank, 1996.
[^11]: When the EBRD was established, these rules specified the European Economic Community rather than the EU: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2013.
Regional members must hold at least 60 percent of shares; nonregional members may hold no more than 40 percent of shares. The Board of Governors establishes the formula that determines initial share subscriptions. No member can hold more than 15 percent of total shares.

Category A shareholders are member countries of the West African Monetary Union (WAEMU) which initially subscribed for an equal number of shares and the Central Bank of West African States whose initial subscription was equal to the sum of shares subscribed by all member countries. Category B shareholders include non-WAEMU countries or their financial institutions and international financial institutions.

Regional members must hold at least 75 percent of total shares. China’s initial share was 30 percent but is not fixed at that level.

Each of the NDB’s five founding members has subscribed in equal proportion to the initial capital stock. The Board of Governors will determine the initial subscription of other members as they are accepted for accession. However, shareholding will always be structured so that the five founding members never have less than 55 percent of total voting power; non-borrowing members must always have less than 20 percent of the total voting power and no individual non-founding member may exceed seven percent of total voting power.

China’s voting power is also a signal of China’s influence across the multilateral institutions, especially the larger institutions. As Figure 3 shows, in four of the five largest MDBs by capitalization, China is a top three shareholder. And in two of these—AIIB and NDB—China controls over 20 percent of votes.

Regionally, it is unsurprising that China is comparatively more influential in the ADB than in other regions. In Latin America, while China commands a small voting share, it ranks relatively high in IDB Invest and in the Caribbean Development Bank. There’s a similar story in the African institutions. China has less voting power in the AfDB but is more influential in terms of voting in the smaller subregional banks (BOAD and TDB).

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15 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, 2021a.
16 New Development Bank, 2021b.
Looking at how China’s voting power has changed over the past decade (Table 3), the biggest increases were in the IFC, AfDB, and TDB. Given the size of IBRD, China’s move from the sixth highest vote share to third highest is also significant. But again, this is largely a function of an increase in formula-based capital contributions that reflect China’s economic growth.

Table 3. Change in China’s voting share/rank over the past decade*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>China’s voting share</th>
<th>China’s rank</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>China’s voting share</th>
<th>China’s rank</th>
<th>Change in rank over reference period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIIB</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDB</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDB</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>↑6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>↓1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>↑3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDB</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>↑2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDB Invest</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>↑2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIGA</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFC</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>↑13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Contributions to MDB concessional windows

Within the MDB system, donors have more discretion in their financing of the development banks’ concessional windows. Unlike formula-based capital contributions, contributions to IDA, AfDF, ADF are entirely discretionary and therefore more reflective of donor policy choices.

As Figure 4 shows, China has significantly increased its support of the multilateral concessional windows, but primarily through IDA and to a lesser extent the ADF.  

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17 Through its contributions to the ADF, China also contributes to the ADB’s Technical Assistance Special Fund which is replenished at three percent of the size of the total size of each ADF replenishment.
Figure 4. China’s contributions to AfDF, ADF, and IDA replenishments (2010–2020)


It is important to situate changes in China’s contributions to these concessional funds within the context of their overall funding levels. The total volume of donor contributions was fairly consistent across replenishments for IDA and AfDF. For IDA, the growth in China’s contributions coincided with a period when non-donor resources for the fund also saw rapid growth in the form of reflows (repayments by IDA’s borrowers), loans to IDA from donors, and market borrowing in the form of newly issued IDA bonds. So, during the IDA16 replenishment when China was the 20th ranked donor, IDA’s total resources were $50 billion. By the IDA19 replenishment, when China had risen to be the 6th largest donor, IDA’s total resources had grown to $82 billion. These trends suggest that China chose to favor an institution that was already growing significantly within the multilateral system.

Contributions to ADF were roughly halved between the eleventh (2012) and twelfth (2016) replenishments when ADF became a grant-only operation, with financing for concessional lending shifting from ADF to ADB’s ordinary capital resources. In ADF 12, China was one of two donors to increase its contributions to ADF as almost all other donors reduced theirs substantially.

Concessional window contributions confer separate voting powers from those associated with core MDB shareholding. For example, IDA members hold voting power assigned according to historical contributions. But IDA voting power is limited in scope and has little bearing on the governance norms of the World Bank Group as a whole, where IBRD shareholding and voting power tend to dominate. That said, IDA contributions do
play a contributing role in the IBRD voting power formula. Because a country’s share of IDA replenishments factors into these assessments, China’s dramatic increase in IDA contributions—along with its economic growth—has contributed to its status as one of the most under-represented countries, measured as the difference between the calculated formula for shareholding and actual shareholding as decided through collective member decisions on selective capital increases.

**Contributions to special purpose funds**

In addition to capital subscriptions and periodic replenishments, many multilateral financial institutions have associated special purpose funds to which member states—and in some cases, non-member states and/or organizations—voluntarily contribute. These funds, which are intended to complement core funding, can be created at the behest of the institutions itself; in other cases, they are led by one or more member states. And they can comprise a significant source of funding; the value of the World Bank Group’s funds held in trust exceeds $13 billion.

Table 4 shows, for each MFI, the trust funds or other special funds to which China contributes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution/fund</th>
<th>Chinese contributions ($)</th>
<th>Donor makeup</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-South Experience Exchange Facility</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>Multi-Donor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China World Bank Group Partnership Facility</td>
<td>50,000,000</td>
<td>China Only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIIIB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIIIB Project Preparation Special Fund</td>
<td>50,000,000</td>
<td>Multi-Donor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility</td>
<td>342,800,000</td>
<td>Multi-Donor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADB Institute Special Fund</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>Multi-Donor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC Poverty Reduction and Regional Cooperation Fund</td>
<td>70,000,000</td>
<td>China Only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFDB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa Growing Together Fund</td>
<td>2,000,000,000</td>
<td>China Only</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18 These reviews, which began in 2010, occur every five years. A realignment in shareholding may take place as a result of the review if shareholders, through the Board of Governors, determine that it is warranted; however, a shareholding adjustment is not required as part of the review.


20 For a figure that excludes the World Bank’s Financial Intermediary Funds which are covered in this paper under the section on vertical funds, see The World Bank Group, 2020.
### Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution/fund</th>
<th>Chinese contributions ($)</th>
<th>Donor makeup</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>IDB</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral Investment Fund</td>
<td>50,000,000</td>
<td>Multi-Donor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China Co-financing Fund for Latin America</td>
<td>2,000,000,000</td>
<td>China Only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Caribbean Region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EBRD</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernobyl Shelter Fund</td>
<td>52,000,000</td>
<td>Multi-Donor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity Participation Fund</td>
<td>280,000,000</td>
<td>Multi-Donor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CDB</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Development Fund</td>
<td>13,000,000</td>
<td>Multi-Donor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Worth a particular mention are the large, China-led funds in two institutions where Chinese participation is otherwise fairly small. In 2014, the AfDB and the People’s Bank of China announced the Africa Growing Together Fund. The AGTF provides $2 billion in Chinese co-financing to be used over 10 years alongside AFDB resources.21 Similarly, the IDB’s China Co-financing Fund for Latin America and Caribbean Region was approved in 2013 to provide matching loans of up to $500 million for IDB public sector loans and up to $1.5 billion for IDB loans to private entities.22 These large funds can help increase China’s financing and influence where shareholding and voting power is limited by a region-based formula.

### Loans, memoranda of understanding, and other financial contributions

In addition to its contributions to share capital, replenishments, and special funds, China also provides financing to multilateral financial institutions—including institutions in which it is not a shareholder or member—through MOUs, ad hoc loans, or other pledges. These can be large financing packages, often structured as co-financing arrangements.

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21 Densil, 2014.
22 The China Co-Financing Fund for Latin America and Caribbean Region is part of the China-LAC Cooperation Fund which also contains a private equity fund administered by the Export-Import Bank of China. The total size of the China-LAC Cooperation Fund was expanded from $5 billion when announced in 2015 to $10 billion in 2016 (See Inter-American Development Bank, 2013).
**International Finance Corporation:** In 2013, the People’s Bank of China, through its State Administration for Foreign Exchange, pledged $3 billion in loans, to be committed over six years as co-investments with IFC loans to support private sector development in emerging markets.\(^{23}\) With this pledge, the IFC launched its Managed Co-lending Portfolio Program, in which the IFC and third-party investors contribute capital to deals which IFC identifies and manages. As of 2018, the MCPP has $7 billion in funding (43 percent from China) and eight global partners (all private partners except China and Hong Kong).\(^{24}\)

**African Development Bank:** In 2011, the AfDB signed an MOU with the Agricultural Bank of China that outlined joint ventures in co-financing and technical cooperation.\(^{25}\) An earlier MOU with the Export-Import Bank of China in 2008 outlined possibilities for information exchange about activities in Africa, joint analysis, staff exchanges, and potential co-financing or guarantees for investments.\(^{26}\) It is not clear, however, what level of additional Chinese funding has been deployed—beyond funds provided through the AGTF—to finance these obligations.

**African Export-Import Bank:** In 2016, China ExIm, which is a 6% shareholder in African Export-Import Bank and holds a seat on the board, issued a guarantee on $300m worth of loans for Afreximbank.\(^{27}\) Three years later, China ExIm extended Afreximbank another $500m 5-year loan facility, including $75 million of its own financing.\(^{28}\) In 2018, the China Development Bank provided a $500m facility with a 10-year tenor to the Afreximbank in support of trade-enabling infrastructure projects (including energy, telecommunications, transportation, agriculture, medical, and industrial).\(^{29}\) The same year, the Bank of China provided a $350m facility for direct bank-to-bank loans, participation in syndicated loans, and trade finance.\(^{30}\)

**TDB:** China Development Bank and China ExIm Bank have provided over $260 million in direct loans and participated in at least one $400 million syndicated loan since 2008. In 2019, TDB signed an MOU with state-owned PowerChina.

**EBRD:** Through 2015, EBRD had a limited relationship with China but expressed openness to joint investments with Chinese partners.\(^{31}\) When China joined the EBRD in 2016, the bank framed the move, in part, as an opportunity to increase participation and co-investment by Chinese banks and firms in EBRD projects.\(^{32}\) In 2019, Bank of China, one of China’s largest state-owned commercial banks, was EBRD’s second largest lending partner in terms

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\(^{23}\) International Finance Corporation, ND.
\(^{24}\) International Finance Corporation, ND.
\(^{25}\) Njoku, 2011.
\(^{26}\) The Export-Import Bank of China et al., 2008.
\(^{27}\) Bermingman, 2016.
\(^{28}\) Manders, 2019.
\(^{29}\) Afreximbank, 2018.
\(^{30}\) Afreximbank, 2018a.
\(^{32}\) Williams, 2015.
of annual new commitments and the sixth largest in terms of cumulative commitments.\textsuperscript{33} Bank of China is also one of the top participants in EBRD loan syndication.\textsuperscript{34} Several Chinese banks, including the Bank of China, the Agricultural Bank of China, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China hold guarantees with the EBRD’s Trade Facilitation Programme, an effort to promote and facilitate trade to, from, and within parts of Europe.\textsuperscript{35}

**Africa Finance Corporation:** The AFC is owned primarily by private African banks and China is not a shareholder. But, in 2019 China ExIm provided AFC a $300 million loan—made up of a $200 million 5-year loan and a $100 million 5-year standby facility—to support its investments in manufacturing projects.\textsuperscript{36} This was the first time China provided direct funding to the AFC to invest as it chooses, though in the past, Beijing has—through the China Development Bank’s China-Africa Development Fund—co-financed individual AFC projects, and Chinese state-owned corporations (the State Grid Corporation of China and China Harbour Engineering Company, a subsidiary of China Communications Construction Company) have served as project sponsors.\textsuperscript{37}

**Black Sea Trade and Development Bank:** China is not a member or shareholder of the BSTDB, whose largest members are Greece, Russia, and Turkey, however Chinese institutions have periodically signed MOUs with the bank. In 2020, China ExIm signed an MOU with BSTDB to promote cooperation on trade and economic development in the region. Areas of cooperation will include co-financing, guarantees, personnel and information exchanges, short-term trade finance, and joint promotion of China’s imports within BSTBD member countries.\textsuperscript{38} In 2016, an MOU between BTSDB and the Bank of China focused on information exchange and exploring co-financing opportunities in infrastructure, transportation, energy, and communications.\textsuperscript{39}

**Eurasian Development Bank:** The Eurasian Development Bank (EDB), founded by Russia and Kazakhstan, does not count China among its six members. However, in 2020, China ExIm extended a $230 million five-year loan facility to the EDB to finance transboundary transactions between China and the bank’s member countries.\textsuperscript{40} This was the first such lending arrangement between China and the EDB.

**The International Monetary Fund**

The International Monetary Fund has both a different objective and different model to the development banks and development finance institutions discussed above. But, similar

\textsuperscript{33} European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, ND.
\textsuperscript{34} European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2021b.
\textsuperscript{35} European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2018.
\textsuperscript{36} Pilling, 2018.
\textsuperscript{37} Africa Finance Corporation, 2019.
\textsuperscript{39} Black Sea Trade & Development Bank, 2016.
\textsuperscript{40} Eurasian Development Bank, 2020.
to those institutions, the IMF has seen an increase in China’s contributions over the past
decade. The basis of the IMF’s funding structure is its quota. Each member state’s quota is
determined largely by its economic size with additional measures of economic openness and
variability in economic performance, as well as the state of international reserves. Between
2010 and 2020, China rose from having the sixth largest quota to the third largest (closely
behind Japan in position number two but well behind the top ranked United States).

China also provides financing to the IMF through New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB),
credit arrangements that provide the main source of supplementary resources to the Fund
outside of the quota system. China also provides funding to the Poverty Reduction and
Growth Trust (PGRT), a window for concessional financial support to low income countries,
and the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT), which provides debt service
relief to poor and vulnerable countries; currently the CCRT is employed to mitigate the
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic by helping free up financial resources. While China is
a relatively large contributor to NAB and PGRT, it is a relatively smaller donor to the latter.
For the PGRT, which is funded through a mix of grants and non-concessional loans, China is
the only large creditor who lends to the PRGT but doesn’t also offer grants to fund the trust.

Table 5. China’s contributions to the IMF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contribution Type</th>
<th>Vehicle</th>
<th>China Contributions</th>
<th>China Contributor Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quota</td>
<td>Subscribed (share) capital</td>
<td>$43.4 billion</td>
<td>3rd of 190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB)</td>
<td>Non-concessional loans</td>
<td>$45 billion</td>
<td>3rd of 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT)</td>
<td>Grants; non-concessional loans</td>
<td>$1.4 billion</td>
<td>5th of 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT)</td>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>$8 million</td>
<td>9th of 15*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In addition to the 15 member states that have pledged or contributed, the IMF notes “Others” which have
pledged.
Sources: IMF Members’ Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors (accessed April 2021), IMF
press release “IMF Concludes Steps to Maintain its Lending Capacity” (January 8, 2021), Poverty Reduction
and Growth Trust—2020–21 Borrowing Agreements with The Government of Canada as Represented by
The Minister of Finance, and The People’s Bank of China, Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust—Third
Tranche of Debt Service Relief in the Context of the COVID-19 Pandemic.
China as a client of multilateral financial institutions

China is both a major shareholder and borrower in six multilateral financial institutions: IBRD, IFC, MIGA, AIIB, NDB, and ADB. Large emerging economy countries like India, Brazil, and Indonesia have also been large borrowers and significant shareholders, but China stands alone among these MDB borrowers given the size of its economy, level of development, and creditworthiness.

China’s practice of large-scale borrowing from IBRD and ADB, where it is also a top shareholder, seems to have informed the design of the newer AIIB and NDB, whose memberships tend to view the institutions (and in fact have legally constituted them) as credit cooperatives, abandoning distinct categories of borrowers and non-borrowers.

For most of the past decade, China was among the top five financial recipients from the IBRD and the ADB, though China has dropped in rank (Table 6) over the last two years. The volume of IBRD financing to China has also declined in recent years, though ADB financing has remained more consistently high (Figure 5). China has consistently been among the top 10 recipients of the IFC, but it has been less dominant in MIGA’s portfolio. Of the two Chinese-led development banks, the NDB has provided a higher volume of project finance to China than AIIB has, but it is relevant to note that while China’s typically second/third place ranking is comparable across both institutions, the NDB has only five borrowers compared to the AIIB’s 33.

Table 6. China’s rank as a recipient of multilateral financial institution financing

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFC</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MIGA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>AIIB</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>NDB</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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</table>

Sources: ADB Annual Reports (approvals excluding co-financing), World Bank Annual Reports (commitments), IFC Statement of Cumulative Gross Commitments (annualized commitments plus loan and guarantee participations), MIGA Issued Projects (gross issued amount by fiscal year of issue), AIIB’s “Our Projects” webpage (accessed July 2021, approved financing in year approved), NDB’s “Projects” webpage (accessed July 2021, value of approved project in year approved).
Figure 5. Multilateral financial institution financing to China

Note: The financing streams presented in this figure are similar but not entirely comparable. ADB reflects total annual approvals excluding co-financing (the 2020 figure includes additional special COVID relief funds), IBRD reflects annual commitments, IFC reflects commitments plus loan and guarantee participations, MIGA reflects projects’ gross issued amount by fiscal year of issue, NDB reflects the value of approved projects the year they were approved, and AIIB reflects approved financing the year it was approved.

Sources: ADB Annual Reports (approvals excluding co-financing), World Bank Annual Reports (commitments), IFC Statement of Cumulative Gross Commitments (annualized commitments plus loan and guarantee participations), MIGA Issued Projects (gross issued amount by fiscal year of issue), AIIB’s “Our Projects” webpage (accessed July 2021, approved financing in year approved), NDB’s “Projects” webpage (accessed July 2021, value of approved project in year approved).

The decline in IBRD lending to China may reflect, in part, institutional parameters around lending to higher income countries. Income level alone does not trigger graduation. But when countries’ incomes exceed a certain threshold—which China’s does—the World Bank begins to assess these members for graduation readiness based on (notably ambiguous) criteria around levels of institutional development and access to capital markets. The United States has called for reduced IBRD lending to China, but China is unlikely to graduate soon. That said, new policies introduced in 2018 could be at least partly behind the observed decline in scale and scope of IBRD lending to China in recent years. The World Bank’s updated terms of engagement with countries whose incomes exceed the graduation threshold include: a limitation on the share of IBRD’s portfolio that can be allocated to these countries, hardened pricing on IBRD lending, and a set of principles that guide the types of engagement allowed, with an emphasis on investing in global public goods.41

In recent years, the United States and Japan have also called for the ADB to limit lending to China due to its income level. In 2019, the bank highlighted the declining portfolio in China

41 Morris & Portelance, 2019.
(which has since increased in response to the COVID pandemic) but affirmed there were no plans for immediate graduation.42

Contracts to Chinese firms
Multilateral development banks provide billions of dollars in funding to governments each year to build and maintain infrastructure, operate education programs, and run health clinics, among other things. As a result of this financing, MDBs are a major, though indirect, source of public procurement opportunities for firms around the world. While procurement rules can vary from government to government, MDBs tend to enforce a uniform set of standards for projects that they finance, aimed at ensuring cost effective and transparent outcomes in the procurement processes that their client governments employ.

Given the scale of MDB-funded operations, particularly in infrastructure finance, as well as the relative uniformity of bidding procedures, MDB-backed projects can attract interest from multinational firms. In fact, for many shareholder governments, including non-borrowing governments like the United States and European governments, procurement opportunities for their firms are an attractive aspect of MDB operations.

Before assessing China’s performance when it comes to MDB procurement, it is important to understand MDB procurement rules—their guiding principles and how they vary across MDBs in ways that might affect procurement outcomes and even the behavior of shareholder governments. MDB procurement rules aim to guard against corruption by requiring competitive and transparent bidding procedures. These rules can vary in the degree to which they take factors other than price into account in awarding contracts. For example, all MDBs allow for local preferences that favor firms in the country of operation over foreign firms. And in recent years, the World Bank has sought to factor in measures of project quality, moving beyond a strict “lowest bid” standard for awarding contracts.

Finally, MDBs also vary on eligibility standards related to firms’ countries of origin. As a global institution, the World Bank does not limit procurement eligibility by nationality, but some regional MDBs do. The ADB, IDB, and AfDB all limit procurement to firms from member countries. Like the World Bank, the AIIB does not impose such a limitation. Restricting procurement to member countries can create strong incentives to join regional MDBs and could explain Chinese interest in joining the AfDB, EBRD, and IDB during the past two decades.

The following discussion offers a comparative and limited time series view of Chinese contractors’ participation in multilateral financial institution procurement. The analysis is somewhat limited by data availability. Of the 12 multilateral financial institutions covered in this study, only five produce publicly accessible data on the distribution of awards by country. Of these, only the World Bank, IDB, and EBRD make this data available for the full period

42 Reuters Staff, 2019.
between 2010 and 2020. It also is worth noting that these data only capture the nationality of the prime contractor. We are unable to assess the degree to which Chinese firms—or, for comparison purposes, firms from other countries—may be engaged as sub-contractors or as part of consortia.

Across the MDBs that report procurement data including contractor country of origin, China is a major procurement partner. As Table 7 shows, China is among the top ranked countries in terms of the total value of contracts awarded. The prominence of Chinese firms in World Bank, ADB, and AfDB procurement has been fairly consistent during the past decade. Chinese firms’ participation in IDB and EBRD procurements has been less consistent but has generally grown, relative to other countries, over the past decade.

Table 7. China’s rank in terms of value of procurements by multilateral financial institution, 2010–2020

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<tbody>
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<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
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<td>*</td>
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<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDB</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>*</td>
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<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBRD</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Indicates no data detailing the distribution of this MDB’s procurement by contractor country is publicly available.

*Indicates that no contracts were awarded to Chinese firms by the respective MDB during this year.


Over the last decade more World Bank contracts have gone to Chinese firms than to firms from any other country—around 20 percent of World Bank contracts by value, on average (Figure 6). As a point of reference, during this period the value of contracts to Chinese firms was 25 times higher than the value of contracts to US firms.

43 Throughout this section, we refer to “China as a procurement partner” for different multilateral development banks. This is total value of goods, works, and services contracts awarded to Chinese domiciled firms by an MDB in a given year. Note that, of the multilateral development banks included in this study, only the World Bank, AfDB, IDB, ADB, and EBRD publish procurement statistics detailing contractor nationality. The IDB and ADB publish contract-level data, from which we compiled the total value of contracts awarded to each country in each year. The AfDB and EBRD publish country-level statistics, with contracts already aggregated by contractor country and year. The World Bank system publishes both contract- and country-level procurement statistics. This analysis uses the World Bank’s country-level data unless otherwise noted. All statistics are reported for the years 2010–2020 for which data are publicly accessible.
Figure 6. World Bank (IBRD + IDA) procurements by nationality of contractor, top five countries, 2000–2019

Source: World Bank Group’s Procurement Contracts Awards Summary (Supplier Totals by Country).

Some of the dominance of Chinese firms in World Bank contracting may be explained by Chinese firms implementing the World Bank’s considerable portfolio in China. The World Bank’s procurement regulations allow for domestic preference in which contractors from the borrowing country may apply for a preferential margin to be applied to their bid price. Even with domestic preference accounted for, however, Chinese contractors have secured more World Bank contracts (in value terms) than contractors from any other country over the past 20 years. Fifty percent of World Bank prior-reviewed contracts awarded to Chinese firms since 2000 (by value) were awarded for projects outside China. As a point of comparison, for the two other countries that are both World Bank clients and whose firms win a large share of World Bank contracts, the value of contracts won for work outside the host country is much smaller: only 18 percent of the money paid to Indian firms was for projects outside India; for Brazil, it was just 13 percent. The total value of major World Bank prior-reviewed contracts awarded to China for goods, works, and services outside of China since 2000 is $17.6 billion—nearly seven times the value of all contracts awarded to US firms from 2000 to 2019.

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44 Prior-reviewed contracts are World Bank funded contracts large enough to require World Bank review before they may be awarded. The threshold for prior review differs depending on the borrower country. Data on prior reviewed contracts comes from the World Bank Major Contract Awards dataset.

45 For contract-level data on the distribution of contracts awarded to Chinese firms by borrower country, see The World Bank, 2021f. For country-level statistics on total contract value awarded to U.S./Chinese contractors, see The World Bank, 2020a.
ADB has awarded a decreasing share of its contracts to Chinese contractors since 2016, with China’s share of contracts by value dropping from 22 percent in 2016 to eight percent in 2020 (Figure 7). China was displaced as the ADB’s top procurement partner by India in 2019 and in 2020 was further eclipsed by the Philippines and Indonesia. This shift coincides with a recent decline in the share of ADB projects (by value) being implemented in China.

**Figure 7. ADB procurements by nationality of contractor, top five countries, 2016–2020**

![Chart showing ADB procurements by nationality of contractor, top five countries, 2016–2020.](chart.png)

*Source: ADB’s Operational Procurement Database Procurement by Nationality 2016–2021.*

Like the World Bank, the ADB maintains a domestic preference rule that rewards contractors who source goods and works from domestic markets. This allows Chinese contractors to apply for domestic preference on their own bids when competing for projects located in China. In fact, 48 percent of the ADB contracts awarded to Chinese firms between 2016 and 2020 were awarded for projects in China. But as the Chinese economy has grown, ADB’s portfolio in China has, in recent years, gotten somewhat smaller relative to the portfolios of other countries. In turn, the share of ADB contracts (by value) awarded for projects in China decreased from 13 percent in 2016 to four percent in 2020.

For AfDB, the success of Chinese firms in the bank’s procurements is particularly notable because, in this case, domestic preference rules hinder the chances of Chinese firms, rather than helping them. AfDB procurement guidelines allow borrowers to apply a 15 percent marginal discount to the bid price of locally owned firms bidding for manufactured goods and related services, and a 10 percent marginal discount to the bid price of locally

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owned firms bidding for construction works. The degree to which AfDB borrowers avail themselves of this rule is beyond the scope of this paper. However, assuming AfDB borrowers do apply preferential treatment to locally owned firms, China’s dominance of AfDB procurement would indicate that China either consistently underbids domestic African firms by margins in excess of 10–15 percent, or that domestic firms in AfDB borrower countries are not bidding on the work specified in many AfDB contracts (see Figure 8).

**Figure 8. AfDB procurements by nationality of contractor, top five countries, 2015–2020**

![AfDB procurements by nationality of contractor, top five countries, 2015–2020](image)

*Source: AfDB’s Listing of Awarded Contracts from 2015–2020.*

With the IDB, Chinese firms have won an increasing percentage of contracts over the past decade, but they are not as dominant as in some of the other multilateral and regional development banks (Figure 9). The IDB also utilizes a tiered domestic preference model, which incentivizes the purchase of domestically sourced goods and services as often as possible.

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47 African Development Bank, ND.
48 Inter-American Development Bank, 2011.
The graph above is particularly volatile because a small number of IDB projects make up large shares of the IDB’s total project portfolio by value. The “lumpy” distribution of IDB contracts awarded to China reflects large procurements awarded to Chinese firms on an infrequent basis.49

Chinese contractors have won a growing share of EBRD projects over the past decade, rising from two percent (by value) in 2010 to nine percent in 2020 (see Figure 10). Once again, the distribution of EBRD projects awarded to China is lumpy. In 2019—China’s most successful year for EBRD procurements—Chinese contractors won 3 percent of the EBRD’s total number of contracts, but those eight projects accounted for 28 percent of the EBRD’s total contracts by value.50 Notably, the EBRD’s procurement rules “do not allow domestic preference in any form,” so there are no organization-wide subsidies that would adversely affect the competitiveness of Chinese contractors for EBRD projects.51

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49 In 2019 Chinese firms secured seven IDB contracts. One of these contracts was for the $591 million Metro Linea 1 S.A.S. construction project in Columbia, accounting for 97 percent of the contracts awarded to China in 2019 by value. It was awarded to a consortium featuring two Chinese state-owned enterprises: Xi’an Metro and China Harbor Engineering Corporation, as well as the Columbian company Metro Bogota.


51 Smedley, 2013.
Why have Chinese firms performed so well when it comes to MDB procurement? There are a number of plausible explanations. First, Chinese firms are particularly active and competitive in sectors that tend to dominate MDB procurement by dollar volume, broadly defined as infrastructure. An analysis of World Bank contracts with Chinese firms, for example, found that, in 2020, most funding was concentrated in energy and extractives; water, sanitation, and waste; and transportation.\(^\text{52}\)

Many Chinese contractors are state-owned and may benefit from subsidies that support their ability to be among the lowest bidders on MDB contracts. Of the World Bank’s top 10 Chinese contractors in 2020—which received 59 percent of the total contract value awarded to all Chinese organizations—eight are owned or controlled by the Chinese state.\(^\text{53}\) Domestic overcapacity in infrastructure has contributed to an outward push as a means of preserving jobs and revenue streams for these firms.

Finally, World Bank debarment data do not suggest that the frequency of Chinese firm procurement is the result of corrupt practices. When a company is found to have violated World Bank procurement guidelines, the Bank may debar that company, excluding it from consideration for future projects for a specified period. As of this writing, the World Bank had 55 active debarments of Chinese entities announced between 2014 and 2019, accounting

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\(^{52}\) Cordale & Tamonan, 2021.

\(^{53}\) Cordale & Tamonan, 2021; State ownership data from RWR Advisory Group.
for 17 percent of the World Bank’s active debarments from those years. This puts China at the top of the list for debarments by number of firms, compared to India at number two with 34 active debarments. During that same period, Chinese firms received four percent of the World Bank’s total number of contracts, and 22 percent of the World Bank’s total contracts by value.

Based on these two measures, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about whether the number of debarments, at a single point in time, is proportionate to China’s overall procurement or whether Chinese firms have more frequently run afoul of the bank’s anti-corruption rules than firms from other countries. But it is important to recognize that debarments represent a very small share of the bank’s overall financing activities. Assuming that all 55 current debarments of Chinese firms were enacted in response to procurement violations in different contracts—a conservative estimate as the World Bank frequently debars entire corporate families for the violations of one parent entity—the rate of procurement malpractice among Chinese World Bank contractors would be just 3.7 percent between 2014 and 2019.

Chinese leadership in multilateral financial institutions

In addition to examining the financial angle of China’s participation in the multilateral system, it is also relevant to take stock of where China influences institutions through management roles. Table 8 shows where Chinese nationals currently occupy senior management positions within the MFIs.

Table 8. Current Chinese senior leadership within multilateral financial institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Incumbent</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Year role assumed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World Bank: IBRD + IDA</td>
<td>Shaolin Yang</td>
<td>Managing Director and World Bank Group Chief Administrative Officer</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank: IBRD + IDA</td>
<td>Jingdong Hua</td>
<td>Vice President and Treasurer</td>
<td>2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>Li Bo</td>
<td>Deputy Managing Director</td>
<td>2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Shixin Chen</td>
<td>Vice President</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDB</td>
<td>Qiangwu Zhou</td>
<td>Vice President and Chief Administrative Officer</td>
<td>2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIIB</td>
<td>Jin Liqun</td>
<td>President and Chair of the Board of Directors</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures exclude cross-debarments, which occur when the World Bank debars an entity in response to that entity’s debarment by another MDB. They also exclude debarments announced since January 1, 2020 to ensure comparability, as the World Bank Contract Awards Summary Supplier Totals by Country dataset used only includes data through CY2019. The World Bank Listing of Ineligible Firms and Individuals only reports data on debarments that are currently in force. A year-by-year comparison of World Bank debarments and contract awards is therefore impossible because historical debarments that have since been lifted would be undercounted. This analysis may also undercount historical debarments of Chinese firms that have since been lifted, but by limiting the debarments considered to those announced between 2014 and 2019, we hope to minimize this effect.
None of these institutions have rules or formal conventions that favor one nationality over another when it comes to management posts, though the regional institutions do restrict leadership positions to nationals of member countries in their by-laws. That said, all of the institutions have informal conventions that have guided the selection of senior management, including some that favor Chinese nationals for certain posts.

The World Bank and IMF, which by informal convention have always been headed by an American and a European respectively, have included at least one Chinese national in senior management in recent years, including the bank’s chief economist and the CEO of the International Finance Corporation, the bank’s private sector lending arm. At the IMF, this has been at the level of deputy managing director, and at the World Bank it has typically been at the level of managing director or vice president. As with Americans leading the World Bank and Europeans leading the IMF, Chinese nationals in these positions can come from government positions, the private sector, or academia, though individuals with substantial experience in the Chinese government tend to dominate.

At the Asian Development Bank, there has been a Chinese vice presidency, occupied over the past twenty years by individuals from China’s Ministry of Finance.

In the newer institutions where China is the largest or co-equal shareholder (AIIB and NDB respectively), a Chinese national serves as the inaugural president at the AIIB (currently in his second term) and as a vice president at NDB. At the NDB, the president is elected on a rotational basis from the five founding members, with the remaining four countries occupying vice presidential positions.

**Chinese government ministries responsible for decision making**

As a key ingredient to understanding the government of China’s decision making around multilateral engagement, we have mapped, where possible, which Chinese ministries or government entities are responsible for managing China’s relationship with each multilateral institution (see Annex II for a full list of responsible government agencies across all multilateral entities covered in this study). Across the multilateral financial institutions discussed in this section, responsibility is divided between the Ministry of Finance, the People’s Bank of China, and China ExIm Bank. This division of labor is based to a large degree on historical dimensions of where China is or has been a client and where China’s role is predominantly that of a shareholder.

The **Ministry of Finance** is largely responsible for the set of institutions in which China is—or was at one time—both a client and shareholder: the World Bank Group, ADB, NDB, and AIIB.

The **People’s Bank of China** manages China’s engagement with the regional development banks outside of Asia: AfBD, BOAD, TDB, IDB, IDB Invest, CDB, and EBRD. The People’s Bank of China also manages China’s relationship with the IMF.
As a shareholder in Afreximbank, China ExIm is the main point of contact for that institution.

**Vertical funds**

Vertical funds are sector-specific funds that leverage contributions from both government and private donors in support of specific global development priorities, particularly global public goods like climate change and communicable diseases, as well as sectors like agriculture and education. The World Bank acts as a trustee of these funds and provides financial intermediary services, along with, in some cases, other administrative and accounting services, but it does not directly manage the use of funds. There are 26 vertical funds, 18 of which met our inclusion criteria. We also include in this analysis the Advance Market Commitment for COVAX, managed by Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, a health-focused public-private partnership, as well as direct funding to Gavi. Gavi is not itself a World Bank financial intermediary fund, though it receives part of its funding through the International Finance Facility for Immunization (IFFIm), which is; IFFIm is analyzed separately.

**Chinese contributions to vertical funds**

The choice to contribute to a vertical fund (or not)—and the level of contribution—is entirely discretionary; there are no mandatory or assessed contributions. Exploring China's participation in vertical funds, therefore, provides some insight into its policy preferences.

Overall, China has been a fairly minor contributor to vertical funds over the last ten years. Looking an aggregate measure of contributions to vertical funds, China ranks 22nd (Figure 11).

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55 In reference to its role, the World Bank’s term for these funds is “financial intermediary funds.” The World Bank transfers funds either to implementing or supervising agencies (often UN agencies or other development banks) or directly to recipients based on the direction of the fund’s governing body (see The World Bank, 2021g).

56 Excluded are the AgResults Initiative, which has $106 million in contributions but only five donors; the Advance Market Commitment for the pneumococcal vaccine, which has had $953 million in contributions since 2010 but only five donors; the Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency with $62 million in contributions, Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems with a $71 million in contributions; Guyana REDD Plus Investment Fund with only one contributor; Nagoya Protocol Implementation Fund with $16m in contributions; the Pilot Auction Facility with $78 million in contributions; and the Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility which has $181 million in contributions but only four donors.
Looking at the individual funds, China is involved in a small subset of them: just five vertical funds plus direct funding to Gavi (Table 9). For most of the funds in which it participates, China is a relatively small to middle-sized contributor. The exception is the Global Infrastructure Facility, a relatively small fund in which China is the second largest donor. This level of participation would seem to reflect China’s position that infrastructure is critical for development; there is also reason to believe it is a topic of interest to a country whose state-owned firms are among the largest global infrastructure contractors.

Table 9. Vertical funds with Chinese participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Total contributions USD (m), 2010-present</th>
<th>China’s contributions</th>
<th>China’s rank among contributors</th>
<th>Number of contributors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research Trust Fund (CGIAR)</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>$5,556</td>
<td>$40</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Environment Facility (GEF)</td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>$10,784</td>
<td>$57</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank datasets on contributions to Financial Intermediary Funds, Gavi’s online report of Annual Contributions and Proceeds (31 March 2021, includes pledges between 2011 and 2025).

57 Rank is among government donors only; private donors are excluded from the ranking.
Looking at China’s contributions over the past decade, Gavi stands out (see Figure 12). After a $5 million initial pledge in direct contributions for the 2016–2020 funding period, China quadrupled its direct contributions in the most recent pledging round (2021–2025), promising $20 million. With that, China jumps in rank from 21st (out of 28 government donors) in the 2016–2020 round to 16th (out of 27 government donors) in the 2021–2025 round. China has also (more modestly) increased its contributions to CGIAR, GEF, and the Global Fund.

Vertical funds without Chinese participation
To understand China’s participation in vertical funds, it’s also instructive to understand where China does not participate. This is a larger list (Table 10).
Table 10. Vertical funds without Chinese participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Contributions, USD (2010–present)</th>
<th>Number of Donors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agriculture</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP)</td>
<td>1,738,790,000</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Climate</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Climate Fund (GCF)</td>
<td>15,092,870,000</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean Technology Fund (CTF)</td>
<td>4,944,400,000</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Climate Fund (SCF)</td>
<td>2,012,350,000</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF)</td>
<td>1,478,920,000</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptation Fund</td>
<td>952,670,000</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF)</td>
<td>226,160,000</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Partnership for Education Fund (GPEF)</td>
<td>5,646,870,000</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gavi/COVAX Advance Market Commitment</td>
<td>5,726,380,000</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm)</td>
<td>4,974,000,000</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness (CEPI)</td>
<td>1,759,620,000</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF)</td>
<td>777,210,000</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti Reconstruction Fund</td>
<td>411,400,000</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East North Africa Transition Fund</td>
<td>252,430,000</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source*: World Bank datasets on contributions to Financial Intermediary Funds, Gavi’s online report of Annual Contributions and Proceeds (31 March 2021) (includes pledges between 2011 and 2025).

Of particular note is the Green Climate Fund, a large fund with many donors but without Chinese financing. In addition, as shown below, while China receives no funding from the other funds without Chinese participation, in 2019, the Green Climate Fund issued a $100m loan to China.58

**Vertical fund financing to China**

Over the past decade, China has received financing from four of the six vertical funds to which it contributes, as well as the GCF, to which it does not contribute (see Figure 13).

58 Green Climate Fund, ND.

[31]
Figure 13. Vertical fund financing to China

![Diagram showing vertical fund financing to China]

Sources: CGIAR Active Grants Dashboard (accessed July 2021, grant amount based on contracts signed per year), GEF Projects database (accessed July 2021, value of grants and co-financing for projects in China during the three-year GEF replenishment period; multi-country projects that include China are excluded), The Global Fund Data Explorer (accessed July 2021, commitments), GIF Trust Fund Financial Report June 30, 2020 (funding decisions); GCF China dashboard (total GCF financing allocated/loan size).

China is the largest single-country recipient of GEF funding over the last decade.\(^{59}\) It is the 9th largest recipient of cumulative GIF funding,\(^{60}\) the 29th largest recipient of GCF financing,\(^{61}\) and the 36th largest recipient of CGIAR grants.\(^{62}\)

China used to be one of the largest recipients of the Global Fund (mainly focused on tuberculosis), but GFATM closed its China portfolio after 2013, marking the completion of the transition from China’s role as recipient to that of donor. China also used to receive funding from Gavi but it transitioned from recipient to sustainable self-financing country in 2005/2006.

**Chinese leadership in vertical funds and participation in governance**

In only one of the vertical funds with Chinese participation is there a Chinese national in a senior leadership position. Jason Zhengrong Lu has headed the GIF as since 2017. Unlike most of the Chinese nationals in senior positions in the multilateral financial institutions, Lu does not come to the position from the Chinese government.

Though China’s representation in vertical funds’ senior management roles is limited, representatives from China serve on the boards or governing committees of most of the
other funds to which it contributes, consistent with the governance frameworks of these funds.

All funding partners, including China, have representatives who sit on GIF’s governing council, its main governing body.

On the Global Fund’s board, Ren Minghui, WHO assistant director-general for universal health coverage and communicable and noncommunicable diseases, occupies the non-voting position held by the WHO. Ren was formerly with China’s National Health and Family Planning Commission and previously represented China on the Global Fund’s board.

As one of We-Fi’s founding contributors, China—represented by Lyu Xia from the Ministry of Finance—sits on the fund’s governing committee.

The main governing body of the GEF is the Council where countries are grouped into constituencies and represented by a member selected from among those in the group. China is in a constituency of its own and is currently represented by Qiangwu Zhou from the Ministry of Finance.

While China has not provided funding to the GCF, it does hold a board seat, represented by Ren Yan of the Ministry of Finance.

Vertical funds are somewhat different from the other multilateral entities discussed in this paper since they may include participation by actors outside of national governments. A representative of China National Biotec Group, a subsidiary of the state-owned China National Pharmaceutical Group Corporation (Sinopharm) is an alternative member of Gavi’s board in the position focused on the vaccine industry in developing countries.

And Shenggen Fan, Chair Professor at the College of Economics and Management at China Agricultural University in Beijing, has been a voting member of the CGIAR system board since 2020. The board provides overall leadership and governance and appoints and overseed CGIAR executive management. In addition, Hao Weiping, of the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Science, represents the East Asia and the Pacific constituency in the CGIAR system council which provides strategic direction to the fund.

**Chinese government ministries responsible for decision making**

For the most part, China’s participation in vertical funds is managed either by the Ministry of Finance or the line ministry of the relevant sector.

The Chinese Academy of Agricultural Science affiliated with the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs is the primary point of contact for China’s participation with CGIAR.
The **National Health Commission** is the main government agency responsible for China’s participation in the **Global Fund** and **Gavi**.

The **Ministry of Finance** is responsible for China’s participation in **We-Fi**.

The Chinese government points of contact for the **GEF** are the **Ministry of Finance** and the **Ministry of Ecology and Environment**.

### United Nations system

China’s engagement with the UN system has evolved considerably over the past decade. Chinese financing for the UN’s development-focused efforts has increased, reflecting both China’s economic growth and policy decisions by the government to increase engagement. Notably, at the 2015 UN General Assembly, President Xi announced major new financial commitments in support of the UN’s peacebuilding and development objectives. Observers noted this announcement came amid increasing calls for China to share more responsibility for advancing these objectives given its growing economic prominence.\(^{63}\)

In this section, we explore data on China’s engagement with the UN system over the past decade, looking at funding patterns (both assessed and voluntary) and the presence of Chinese nationals in high level positions. With the UN’s “one country, one vote” policy, analysis of voting power is less relevant than it was for the multilateral financial institutions.

The UN is a complex system of around 100 principal and subsidiary organs, specialized agencies, commissions, funds, and other entities. This analysis focuses on the subset of UN entities that have development-related mandates, as determined by their participation in the United Nations Sustainable Development Group (UNSDG), a high-level forum that seeks to coordinate development operations across agencies operating around the world (see Table 11). From among these entities, the analysis focuses further on those that are financed, at least in part, by direct contributions of member states.\(^{64}\) In addition to the UNSDG list, we also analyze contributions to the UN regular budget and to UN peacekeeping, as well as several multi-donor pooled funds.

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\(^{63}\) Perlez, 2015; Guensburg, 2015.

\(^{64}\) Entities that participate in UNSDG but are excluded from this analysis include the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UN ECA), United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (UN ECLAC), and United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UN ESCWA) which have less relevance for China and which are not funded by member state contributions; United Nations Volunteers (UNV) which is small and largely focused on personnel; and the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office (UN PBSO) which has been under DPPA since 2019.
Table 11. UN entities with a development mandate included in this analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Assembly: Programmes, funds, and other entities</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Capital Development Fund</td>
<td>UNCDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
<td>UNFPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
<td>WFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Trade Centre</td>
<td>ITC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women</td>
<td>UNWOMEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East</td>
<td>UNRWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
<td>UNEP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Human Settlements Programme</td>
<td>UNHABITAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Office for Project Services</td>
<td>UNOPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
<td>IOM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Secretariat: Departments and offices</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of Economic and Social Affairs</td>
<td>DESA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Peace Operations</td>
<td>DPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Peacebuilding and Political Affairs*</td>
<td>DPPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
<td>OHCHR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
<td>UNDRR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
<td>UNODC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic and Social Council: Specialized agencies, commissions, and other entities</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>UNAIDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
<td>FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
<td>ILO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Telecommunication Union</td>
<td>ITU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Fund for Agricultural Development</td>
<td>IFAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
<td>UNESCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Industrial Development Organization</td>
<td>UNIDO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
<td>WHO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Meteorological Organization</td>
<td>WMO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>ESCAP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Financing contributions to DPPA focus on the department’s Multi-Year Appeals, its primary extra-budgetary financing instrument.
Financial contributions to development-oriented UN entities

Member state contributions to UN entities are a mix of assessed contributions, which are mandatory according to a formula based on economy size, and voluntary contributions, which reflect choices made by the member state government.65

Looking at both assessed and voluntary contributions across the set of UN entities in our sample (Figure 14), China is the fifth largest contributor. This largely reflects three interrelated things: the size of the UN regular budget and the peacekeeping budget relative to the budgets of the other entities, the significant reliance of both of these on assessed contributions (over half of the regular budget and over 95 percent of the peacekeeping budget), and China’s high rate of assessment given its economic size.

Figure 14. Aggregate country contributions (assessed + voluntary) as a percent of total contributions, 2019


Looking only at voluntary contributions across this same set of entities (which largely excludes contributions to the regular and peacekeeping budgets, most of which are assessed), China is a much smaller financier, ranking 22nd among member states (Figure 15).

65 DESA, UNOPS, and ESCAP are not funded by member state contributions so are excluded from analysis of financial contributions.
Figure 15. Aggregate country contributions (voluntary only) as a percent of total contributions, 2019


The following figures break down China’s contributions by UN entity. For most entities, the data capture revenue from China, as reported in the financial statistics database of the UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination. The exceptions are DPPA, which captures contributions to Multi-Year Appeals reported in annual reports; OCHA, which captures programme donor income reported in annual reports; OHCHR, which captures voluntary contributions reported in an online table; UNCTAD, which captures contributions to technical cooperation trust funds reported in an online database; and UNDRR, which reports voluntary contributions reported in annual reports.
Figure 16 displays China’s contributions to the complete list of entities, including the UN regular budget and DPO. This is useful primarily in illustrating points above, that the relative scale of these two budgets and their heavy reliance on assessed contributions significantly shape the overall picture of China’s development-related UN contributions. While not a financial contribution, it is also worth noting China’s in-kind contributions to DPO. As of 2020, China is the tenth largest contributor of military and police personnel as peacekeepers.

Figure 16. China’s assessed and voluntary contributions to all development-oriented UN entities, 2019

USD, millions

[Diagram showing contributions to various UN entities]


Removing the UN regular budget and DPO from the picture enables a clearer picture of the breakdown of China’s funding to the other entities. As Figure 17 shows, China’s largest contributions go to WHO, UNESCO, and FAO. However, these are largely assessed contributions. China’s largest voluntary contributions, which are more indicative of China’s policy preferences, include IFAD, WFP, and UNDP.
Figure 17. China’s assessed and voluntary contributions to development-oriented UN entities (minus the regular budget and DPO), 2019


Figure 18 looks at how China’s voluntary funding has changed over the last decade for entities to which China gave over $500,000.66 The overall picture shows that China has significantly increased its voluntary funding, almost across the board. China’s voluntary funding to these entities rose by 250 percent between 2010 and 2019. IFAD, WFP, and UNICEF have had a particularly notable combination of high level of contribution and large magnitude of increase.

---

66 China’s contributions did not necessarily increase/decrease in a linear fashion between 2010 and 2019. This figure simply presents a comparison between two data points. The entities to which China contributed in 2010 or 2019 but in amounts less than $500,000 are UNCDF, DPPA, IOM, OCHA, UNCTAD, ITC.
The entities in this analysis have a wide range of overall budget size, so it can be instructive to look at China’s contributions not just in absolute terms but also relative to other donors. As Table 12 shows, China ranks among the top ten member states in voluntary contributions to IFAD, UNIDO, ITU, WMO, UNHABITAT, and UNCDF. China’s biggest gains in rank in terms of relative levels of voluntary funding were with FAO (from 46th to 24th), OHCHR (from 44nd to 22nd), and WFP (from 37th to 19th), though China remains a middle-ranked donor for all three.

**Figure 18. Change in China’s voluntary contributions by entity, 2010–2019**

![Graph showing change in China's voluntary contributions by entity, 2010–2019](image)

*Data for UNWOMEN begins in 2011.

**Source:** UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination Financial Statistics database (accessed April 2021, revenue by government donor), OHCHR table of voluntary contributions 2008–2019, UNDRR 2019 Annual Report, UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (former name of UNDRR) 2010 Annual Report (voluntary contributions). UNCDF, DPPA, IOM, OCHA,UNCTAD, and ITC are excluded from this graph since China’s voluntary contributions were below $500,000 in both 2010 and 2019.

**Table 12. China’s voluntary contributions, rank, 2010, 2019**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IFAD</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITU</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMO</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHABITAT</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCDF</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDRR</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAIDS</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDPPA</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNWOMEN*</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITC</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Voluntary contributions can be further broken down into core vs. non-core (earmarked) support. Core support contributions provide unrestricted funding for the entity (and are valued for their flexibility). Non-core support comes with restrictions, imposed by the donor, on how the funds can be spent. As Figure 19 shows, China provided a significant portion of its voluntary funding as core support for IFAD, UNWOMEN, and UNDRR. However, most of China’s voluntary funding is provided as non-core support (though information on the specific earmarks imposed is limited).
China’s contributions to UN funds

In addition to contributing to established UN entities (departments, programmes, specialized agencies, and the like), China also contributes to a selection of UN funds: a China-led (single donor) fund as well as a few multi-donor funds.

United Nations Peace and Development Trust Fund

In 2016, the government of China, in partnership with the UN, established the UN Peace and Development Trust Fund (UNPDF) with a commitment of $200 million over 10 years to advance peace and development objectives. As of 2020, China has put $100 million toward the fund.

UNPDF is divided into two sub-funds, the Secretary-General’s Peace and Security Sub-Fund and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Sub-Fund. The initial vision was that China’s contribution would be split evenly between the two, but data on actual distribution of funding between the two sub-funds is unavailable.

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69 Reuters Staff, 2016.
The government of China and UN work together to identify projects and activities that are financed by the fund. The UNPDF steering committee is composed of representatives from the Chinese Ministry of Finance, China’s permanent representative to the UN, and the (Chinese national) under-secretary-general for economic and social affairs. Since 2016, the peace and security sub fund has approved 52 projects worth over $20 million, and the sustainable development sub-fund has approved 28 projects worth over $34 million. Projects are in over 100 countries, but funds, particularly peace and security funds, are somewhat more concentrated in Africa. Ethiopia is a particularly prominent destination of the sustainable development sub-fund’s programming.\(^{70}\)

**Central Emergency Response Fund**

The Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) was established by the UN General Assembly in 2005 to provide quick response funding to meet urgent humanitarian needs. China has contributed to the CERF on an annual basis over the past decade, ranking 14\(^{th}\) among 111 member state donors for the period 2010–2020. China also applied for and received CERF grants for earthquake response in 2008 ($8 million) and 2010 ($5 million).\(^{71}\)

**Other UN pooled funding mechanisms**

The UN also has Multi-Donor Trust Funds and Joint Programmes, pooled financing mechanisms to support a range of specific development or humanitarian priorities. These are typically structured as pass-through mechanisms to which multiple financial partners can contribute and whose resources are allocated across multiple implementing entities.

Of the 11 multi-donor funds/joint programmes that meet our size criteria for inclusion—most of which are dedicated to country-specific humanitarian efforts—China contributes to just one, the **Peacebuilding Fund** (PBF). The PBF, managed by the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support with support from the Peacebuilding Support Office, provides fast, flexible funding to respond to peacebuilding opportunities in countries at risk of or emerging from violent conflict. China has contributed to the PBF periodically over the past decade, but not since 2015 (it is the 21\(^{st}\) largest of 52 member state contributors over the past decade).\(^{72}\)

China is the second largest contributor (after India) to **United Nations Fund for South-South Cooperation**. UNFSSC is a small voluntary trust fund (US$37 million in revenue 2009–2019), under the Office for South-South Cooperation.\(^{73}\)

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\(^{70}\) UN Peace and Development Trust Fund, 2021a.

\(^{71}\) UN Central Emergency Response Fund, 2009; UN Central Emergency Response Fund, 2011.

\(^{72}\) UN Development Programme, 2021.

\(^{73}\) UN Office for South-South Cooperation, 2020.
UN funding to China

Several UN entities spend money in China. The following analysis of UN expenditures relies on the financial statistics reported by the UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB).

Reported expenditures include all expenses in a country, including outlays to maintain offices, etc., not just program expenses. UNSDG entities that are not included in the CEB reporting system—and are therefore excluded from this analysis—are DESA, DPPA, ESCAP, OCHA, OHCHR, UNCTAD, and UNDRR.

Figures 20 and 21 below show UN entities’ expenditure in China over the past decade. China’s biggest funding comes from UNDP—with projects seeking to advance China’s transformation to a low carbon economy, support more resilient ecosystems, reduce multidimensional poverty, and facilitate China’s role in south-south cooperation—and UNICEF—with programming in child health and development, quality education, child-centered social policy, and child protection, with a focus on gender, inclusiveness, and urbanization.

For both UNDP and UNICEF, the agency’s regular resources make up a fraction of the total program budget, with other resources, including government co-financing, accounting for the rest. IFAD is another prominent funder; though the agency has not reported 2019 data through CEB, its annual reports show that China remains a top borrower.

Looking over time, Figure 20, shows a notable drop in UNDP funding in 2019 compared to 2010 levels but few other real declines. On the other hand, entities like UNIDO, ILO, and FAO increased their expenditures in China in 2019 relative to 2010. Data limitations require some caution in interpreting Figure 19, however. Most zero values are due to lack of country-level expenditure data reported from the entity for the year in question. The three exceptions are ITU, UNOPS, and WFP (for 2010); for these three, country-level expenditures are reported but were zero for China.

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74 Expenditures may include funds spent on things like local offices, as well as program expenses.
75 UN Development Programme et al., 2020; UN Children’s Fund, 2021.
76 Only three percent of UNDP’s 2016–2020 program was expected to be funded through regular resources. For 2021–2025, this drops to less than one percent. For UNICEF, 18 percent of the 2021–2025 program is expected to be funded from regular resources. Co-financing from the government of China almost certainly covers at least a portion of the remaining resource requirements, but the sources of “other resources” expected to finance the UNDP and UNICEF programs are not specified in the documentation. (see UN Development Programme, 2016; UN Development Programme et al., 2020; UN Children’s Fund, 2021.)
Figure 20. Expenditures in China, by entity

![Expenditures in China, by entity](image_url)

*Initial data is from 2011 for ILO and 2012 for WHO.*
Source: UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination Financial Statistics database (accessed July 2021, expenses by geographic location).

Figure 21 tells much the same story but is an important complement to Figure 20 above since single year values could be anomalous. Looking at the nine development-focused UN entities that had a mainly complete time series of data available (data beginning in 2010, 2011, or 2012 and extending through 2019) and expenditures in China of over US$1 million annually, similar patterns are visible: a general but inconsistent decline in funding from UNDP over the last decade, increases in funding from ILO and FAO, and minimal changes from the others. UNIDO, which looked like a big increase in Figure 21, shows no clear pattern but has remained above 2010 levels.

Figure 21. Expenditures in China, select UN entities, 2010–2019

![Expenditures in China, select UN entities, 2010–2019](image_url)

Source: UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination Financial Statistics database (accessed July 2021, expenses by geographic location).
While looking at funding levels can show how spending in China varies across UN entities and over time, it is also instructive to compare UN spending in China relative to UN spending in other countries (Table 13). China is a major recipient of funding from UNIDO, IFAD, ILO, ITU, and WMO. It used to be a top recipient of UNAIDS funding but is now less prominent. For the others—including UNDP and UNICEF, China’s biggest funders in absolute terms—China ranks near the middle (or lower) in terms of comparative expenditures.

Table 13. China’s rank as a recipient of UN entity spending, 2010, 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFAD</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>no data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO*</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITU</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMO</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAIDS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHABITAT</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO*</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNWOMEN</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data for 2010 are unavailable for ILO and WHO. The first year of data is 2011 for ILO and 2012 for WHO. Source: UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination Financial Statistics database (accessed July 2021, expenses by geographic location).

**Chinese leadership in UN entities**

Chinese nationals occupy high-level leadership positions in nine of the development-focused UN entities (those that participate in the UNSDG) (Table 14). In most of these entities, China is a top ten donor (taking into account both assessed and voluntary contributions). And for two of them—FAO and IFAD—China has substantially increased its contributions over the past decade.
Table 14. Current Chinese senior leadership within UN entities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN entity</th>
<th>Incumbent</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Assumed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA)(^{78})</td>
<td>Liu Zhenmin</td>
<td>Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Qu Dongyu</td>
<td>Director General</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>Li Yong</td>
<td>Director General</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITU</td>
<td>Zhao Houlin</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>Qu Xing</td>
<td>Deputy Director General</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFAD</td>
<td>Wu Guoqi</td>
<td>Associate Vice President</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Xu Haoliang</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary-General, UNDP</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>Ren Minghui</td>
<td>Assistant Director-General, Universal Health Coverage/Communicable and Noncommunicable Diseases(^{80})</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMO</td>
<td>Zhang Wenjian</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary General</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At **UN DESA** a Chinese national has been in the under-secretary-general position since 2007. Liu succeeded Wu Hongbo (2012–2017) and Sha Zukang (2007–2012).

At **FAO** and **UNIDO**, the incumbents are the first Chinese nationals to serve as directors general.

Zhao is the first Chinese secretary general of **ITU**; he was also the first and only (to date) Chinese deputy secretary-general from 2007 to 2014.

At **WMO**, Zhang is not the first Chinese national in a high-level position. Zou Zingmeng served as WMO president between 1987 and 1995.

Between 2007 and 2017, Margaret Chan, a Chinese-Canadian citizen from Hong Kong was director general of the **WHO**. Though Chan did not have close ties with Beijing or the Chinese Communist Party, the government of China endorsed and actively promoted her candidacy.\(^{81}\)

No Chinese national has ever headed **UNESCO**, **UNDP**, or **IFAD**, nor any of the other UN entities that participate in the UNSDG.

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\(^{78}\) DESA is not included in this paper’s financial analysis since it is not funded by member state contributions, but, as a participant in the UNSDG, it is included here.

\(^{79}\) Xu has been in his current position since 2019 but before that (from 2013) was assistant secretary-general and UNDP assistant administrator for Asia and the Pacific.

\(^{80}\) When Ren assumed the assistant director-general position in 2016, his title was assistant director-general for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and neglected tropical diseases.

\(^{81}\) Youde, 2018.

\(^{82}\) Two former assistant directors-general were from China: Qian Tang (2010–2018) and the original person to hold the position, Kuo Yu-Shou (1946–1948).
Chinese government ministries responsible for decision making

As noted above, mapping which parts of the Chinese government manage decision making around China’s engagement with which multilateral entities is an important piece of understanding China’s engagement in multilateral systems. Responsibility for China’s engagement in the UN system’s UNSDG entities is spread across ministries and other units (Table 15). The Ministry of Commerce, which has historically been responsible for a significant portion of China’s foreign aid, is the lead ministry for many UN entities; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also maintains a prominent decision-making role throughout the UN system. Other primary relationships seem to be based more on sectoral alignment.

Table 15. Ministries with primary responsibility for China’s engagement, by UN entity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</th>
<th>DESA</th>
<th>DPO</th>
<th>DPPA</th>
<th>ESCAP</th>
<th>IOM</th>
<th>OHCHR</th>
<th>UNHCR</th>
<th>UNRWA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Commerce</td>
<td>ITC</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>UNOPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs</td>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>IFAD</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Ecology and Environment</td>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>UNDRR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>UNDRR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Emergency Management</td>
<td>UNHABITAT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development</td>
<td>ILO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security</td>
<td>ITU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Industry and Information Technology</td>
<td>WHO</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Many UN entities—particularly those with a multi-sectoral remit—have relationships with multiple Chinese ministries. UNDP, for example, notes that it works with 13 different
Chinese ministries, plus other government units.\textsuperscript{33} For the three UNSDG entities which are not included in the table above (UNCDF, UNODC, and UNWOMEN), it is not possible to identify, based on public information, which ministry has primary responsibility for China's engagement. Furthermore, even for those UN entities that do have a primary relationship with a given ministry, the extent to which this ministry manages all aspects of the relationship, including decisions around China's financial contributions, is not fully understood. These are areas for further research.

**Other institutions and funds**

The six entities discussed in this section (Table 16) all feature China as a member state or other type of participant but do not fit squarely into any of the previous categories. Many of these organizations have limited publicly available data on things like membership, funding, and spending. Because of these gaps—and limited cross-entity comparability—this section discusses each entity separately.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Number of Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM)*</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Customs Organization (WCO)</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Network for Bamboo and Rattan (INBAR)</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of American States (OAS)</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mekong River Commission**</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*CMIM has 13 independent members, 14 if Hong Kong and China are treated independently.

**The Mekong River Commission has 4 member states and 2 “dialogue partners,” one of which is China.

**The Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization**

The Chiang Mai Initiative was founded in 2000 to facilitate currency swaps between the ten ASEAN member states plus China, Korea, and Japan (ASEAN+3) and address dollar liquidity issues that exacerbated the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. It was “multilateralized” in 2010, creating a single pooled reserve arrangement known as the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM).\textsuperscript{84} CMIM has two primary objectives: addressing balance of payments and short-term liquidity challenges among members and easing liquidity through currency swap transactions among CMIM participants.

\textsuperscript{83} UN Development Programme, 2021a.

\textsuperscript{84} Bank of Japan, 2010.
CMIM entitles its participant member states to swap their local currency for an amount of US dollars equal to their own financial contribution to the initiative multiplied by a purchasing multiplier. Member countries may accomplish this through two different facilities: the Stability Facility for Crisis Resolution (CMIM-SF) and the Precautionary Line for crisis prevention. Currency swap conditions and timelines differ between these two facilities, but any member country may draw on up to 40 percent of its maximum arrangement amount without seeking concurrent relief through an IMF program. As of September 2020, the CMIM facilities had not yet been used.

China was a founding member of CMIM and has retained its rank as CMIM’s second largest contributor since the organization’s inception. China has contributed $68 billion to the $240 billion facility (Hong Kong has contributed an additional $8 billion), and its purchasing multiplier is 0.5 (2.4 for Hong Kong). Voting power in CMIM is linked to financial contributions, leaving China (including Hong Kong) with 28 percent of the voting power in CMIM’s Executive Level Decision Making Body (ELDMB). The ELDBM is made up of deputy-level officials of ASEAN+3 Finance Ministries and Central Banks, and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority.

World Customs Organization

The World Customs Organization (WCO), established in 1952, is an independent intergovernmental body whose mission is to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of customs administration through standard setting, capacity building, cooperation, and information sharing. China became a member of the WCO in 1983.

In 2014, the government of China, represented by China’s General Administration of Customs (China Customs), and the WCO entered into agreement to establish the China Customs Cooperation Fund (CCF-China). China pledged approximately $800,000 (€600,000) in annual funding over five years to support WCO’s customs capacity building activities. In 2019, the agreement was renewed, with the government of China pledging an additional $5.6 million (€5 million) to the CCF-China over the next five years. CCF-China is one of six government-supported customs cooperation funds.

In 2021, WCO and the government of China signed a MoU establishing the Nanjing Customs Laboratory as a WCO Regional Customs Laboratory. With this designation, the Nanjing Customs Laboratory will play a role in knowledge sharing throughout the region by providing WCO members access to its facilities and expertise.

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89 World Customs Organization, 2019.
90 World Customs Organization, 2019a.
The International Network for Bamboo and Rattan

The International Network for Bamboo and Rattan (INBAR) was founded in 1997 to promote environmentally sustainable development using bamboo and rattan. It primarily facilitates international cooperation on policy relating to the bamboo and rattan industry (valued at $60 billion), and conducts research, advocacy work, and country support on related issues in member countries.92 INBAR consists of 48 member states and is headquartered in Shanghai, China. Its current deputy director general is a Chinese national.

INBAR has three decision-making bodies: the council, the board of trustees, and the secretariat. The council is made up of representatives from each member state, including representatives from China’s Ministry of Agriculture.93 It is responsible for voting on membership decisions, financial matters, and the appointment of the INBAR secretariat. Voting powers in the INBAR council are proportional to countries’ financial contributions to the organization, which are in turn based on the most recent fee scale used for calculating UN membership fees, and the total value of each member state’s bamboo and rattan trade over the past three years as reported to the UN-Comtrade database.94 Data on the distribution of financial contributions and voting power are unavailable.

Organization of American States

The Organization of American States (OAS) was established in 1948 to serve as a forum for the region to promote and cooperate on matters related to democracy, human rights, security, and development.95 The OAS’s 35 member states are all from the Americas. The organization also has over 70 permanent observers that can participate in meetings and contribute to the organization’s programs and broader goals but do not have voting rights.

In 2004, China became a permanent observer of the OAS. It is represented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs via the Ambassador of China to the United States. At the time of its joining, Chinese officials noted that China shares the OAS’ interest in peace and development and highlighted how permanent observer status “will be helpful in [their] joint efforts to further develop cooperation in all fields.”96

In 2005, the government of China signed a cooperation agreement with the OAS to establish a China-OAS Cooperation Fund. Between 2005 and 2014, China provided $2 million to the Fund (two rounds of $1 million over five years).97 In 2014, China upped its contributions to the Fund to $1.5 million for the next five years.98 In the years 2015–2019, China’s

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92 International Bamboo and Rattan Organization, ND.
contributions to OAS special funds were, annually, among the top ten highest among the permanent observer nations.\textsuperscript{99} In 2020, China was the 16\textsuperscript{th} largest permanent observer contributor.\textsuperscript{100} China, via the Chinese Government Scholarship Council, has also partnered with the OAS to offer scholarships to well over 100 students from the Western Hemisphere to study in China.

**The Shanghai Cooperation Organization**

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was announced in 2001 by leaders from China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Russia, and Uzbekistan to promote stability throughout Eurasia. In addition to coordinating security matters, the SCO serves as a forum through which member states may cooperate on issues relating to politics, trade, the economy, research, technology and culture, as well as in education, energy, transport, tourism, and environmental protection.\textsuperscript{101} Pakistan and India joined the SCO in 2017. The organization also has four observer states and six dialogue partners, but these countries are not represented on either of the SCO’s decision-making bodies: the Heads of State Council (HSC) and Heads of Government Council (HGC).

China’s engagement with the SCO is led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and one of the five deputy secretaries-general is currently a Chinese national.

Data on the SCO’s voting structure and funding are not publicly available.

**The Mekong River Commission**

The Mekong River Commission (MRC) was founded in 1995 by Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, and Vietnam to “promote and coordinate sustainable management and development of water and related resources for the mutual benefits of the lower Mekong countries and the people’s wellbeing.”\textsuperscript{102} It features two governing bodies: a joint commission comprising of one representative from each participating riparian state at the head of department level, and a council consisting of one representative from each riparian state at the ministerial or cabinet level. Member states contribute evenly to the operational budget of the MRC.\textsuperscript{103} For the MRC 2021–25 strategic plan, member states each contributed $25 million.

China joined the MRC as a dialogue partner in 1996. This does not entitle China to seat representatives on the MRC’s joint commission or council, but it does entitle it to participate


\textsuperscript{100} Organization of American States, 2020.

\textsuperscript{101} Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2021.

\textsuperscript{102} Mekong River Commission, 2021.

\textsuperscript{103} Mekong River Commission, 1995.
in high-level MRC summits, council meetings, technical exchanges, and joint studies with the MRC. China signed memoranda of understanding with the MRC in 2002 and 2020, committing it to provide the MRC with hydrological data from two scientific monitoring stations in China’s Yunnan Province. It also cooperates with the MRC on issues relating to flood prevention, hydropower development, and environmental management. China’s Ministry of Water Resources worked closely with the MRC secretariat in 2016 Mekong River downstream flow following a drought in 2016.

**China’s multilateral engagement by sector**

The government of China’s 2021 white paper, “China’s International Development Cooperation in the New Era” provides some insight into the sectoral priorities of Chinese assistance. By pulling together presidential announcements and recent (high-level) funding trends, the paper paints a picture of broad sectoral interests with a concentrated focus on infrastructure, as well as agriculture/food security and poverty reduction. Other sectors and issues like health, gender equality, and climate also feature prominently, and there is a section devoted to China’s contributions to humanitarian response.

Getting a clear picture of how China’s sectoral priorities play out across the multilateral system is not straightforward since most multilateral institutions—especially the largest ones like the multilateral and regional development banks, or, within the UN system, UNDP and UNICEF—work across multiple sectors. In some cases, China earmarks its funding to these entities for certain sectoral priorities but data on the sectoral allocation of China’s earmarked funding is not widely available. However, China’s investments in agriculture and rural development—a key focus of its UN engagement—and global health, including the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic, are worth additional discussion. The sector spotlights below explore in more detail China’s engagement in these two key sectors.

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104 Mekong River Commission, 2021.


106 At the second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in 2019, President Xi committed China to implementing a climate change initiative and expanding cooperation in agriculture, health, disaster mitigation, and water resources. In the 2018 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Xi announced new initiatives focused on industrial development, infrastructure connectivity, trade facilitation, green development, capacity building, health, and peace and security. In 2015, Xi announced the creation of China’s South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund (SSCAF), a US$3 billion fund that supports—often in cooperation with others, including multilateral actors— implementation of the SDG agenda. The SCAF’s most highly funded sectors include agriculture/food security and poverty reduction, but the fund also prioritizes health, humanitarian/disaster preparation and mitigation, education, sustainable industrial development, environmental protection, trade promotion, and investment facilitation. Looking at completed projects (a particular category of assistance, separate from technical assistance, goods and materials, and funding from the SCAF, among others), between 2013 and 2018, public or economic infrastructure comprised 91 percent of projects (see State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2021).
**Sector spotlight: Agriculture and rural development**

Over the last decade, China has increased its engagement with the UN entities focused on agriculture and rural development (the “Rome-based agencies”: IFAD, FAO, and WFP). In 2016, China signed an MOU with the UN’s Rome-based agencies to expand their partnership and enhance south-south cooperation.

Since 2016, China has more than doubled all of its prior contributions to IFAD. From IFAD’s inception in 1978 through its ninth replenishment in 2015, China contributed $106 million in total core funding, ranking 20th overall in this time period. In more recent replenishments, China has increased its contributions with $60 million for the 2016–2018 period (ranking seventh), $81 million for the 2019–2021 period (ranking third), and $85 million for the 2022–2024 period (ranking fifth).107

In addition to supporting IFAD through core funding, the government of China stood up the China-IFAD South-South and Triangular Cooperation Facility in 2018 with a $10 million contribution. So far, the facility has approved projects worth over $7 million, mainly across Africa and Asia.108

With FAO, China nearly tripled its contributions between 2010 and 2019. Most of this increase came from assessed contributions; China’s (smaller) voluntary contributions also increased over the last decade but remain relatively low. China is now the eighth largest member state donor but ranks 24th in voluntary contributions.109

Outside of assessed contributions, China also engages with the FAO though the FAO-China South-South Cooperation Program, established by the government of China to facilitate Chinese assistance in humanitarian and agriculture programs. The Chinese government initially endowed the program with $30 million in 2009 and committed additional tranches of US$50 million each in 2015 and again in 2020. Through the program, Chinese experts share agriculture knowledge and technologies with farmers in Africa and Asia.

China also participates in the FAO’s Africa Solidarity Trust Fund, a small fund with $25 million in contributions from six donors. With its 2019 pledge of $2.6 million, China is the third largest contributor, one of only two from outside the region.110

While WFP’s mission—to deliver food assistance to emergency, conflict, or fragile situations—is primarily humanitarian, it takes an agriculture and rural development angle, with programs to promote food security and build smallholder productivity and resilience. WFP ended its operations in China in 2005 and had a liaison office in Beijing until 2016. At that point, the partnership evolved. Though the WFP continues to support programs focused on nutrition, resilience building, and disaster preparedness in targeted counties in

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109 UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, 2020.
110 Food and Agriculture Organization, 2020.
China, the relationship—reflected in an MOU signed in 2016—now centers more around partnership and leveraging China’s experience and expertise in support of WFP’s goals around the world. In 2016, the government of China and the WFP established the WFP China Centre of Excellence to promote south-south cooperation through dialogue, training, deployment of experts, and research.111

China has also been active in CGIAR. The Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences collaborates closely with CGIAR (particularly with the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center, the International Food Policy Research Institute, the International Potato Center, and the International Rice Research Institute) on increasing productivity, reducing global poverty, and supporting global efforts to better manage natural resources.

Given China’s increased investment in these agriculture-focused multilaterals, it is worth noting China’s lack of involvement in the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP). GAFSP is a vertical fund established in 2010 to support agriculture and food system strengthening. Nine bilateral donors, led by the United States, have contributed over $1.7 billion to the fund since its inception, but China has not yet chosen to participate.

**Sector spotlight: Global health and the COVID-19 response**

Perhaps the most significant international global health priority in 2020–2021 is responding to the COVID-19 pandemic and strengthening systems to prevent future pandemics. In the spring of 2020, China donated $50 million to the WHO to support its fight against COVID-19.112 This was a significant increase from China’s approximately $10 million in voluntary funding given to the WHO during the 2018–2019 biennium.113 In September 2020, President Xi announced that China would provide another $50 million, this time through the UN-organized COVID-19 Global Humanitarian Response Plan (GHRP).114 To date, China’s recorded contributions to the GHRP total $27 million, making it the 15th largest government donor.115 China has also contributed an additional $10 million outside the GHRP to the UN’s global COVID-19 humanitarian response.116

China was not among the early funders of the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access Facility (COVAX), the multilateral initiative co-led by the Coalition of Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), WHO, and Gavi to speed and expand vaccine development, manufacturing, and distribution, especially to lower income countries. However, in 2021 China pledged $100 million to the Gavi COVAX Advance Market Commitment, making it the 15th largest government contributor of financial resources.117 Some governments...
have also pledged donations of vaccines to COVAX, but to date, China is not among them. Instead, COVAX has signed agreements with Chinese pharmaceutical companies to purchase 550 million vaccines by mid-2022.\textsuperscript{118}

China has also not provided funding to CEPI, a partnership of public and private organizations that seeks to accelerate the development of vaccines for emerging infectious diseases and ensure equitable vaccine access in the event of a future pandemic. However, CEPI established an office in Shanghai to help facilitate cooperation with China on pandemic prevention and control.\textsuperscript{119}

In 2020, the government of China partnered with the WFP to establish a Global Humanitarian Hub in Guangzhou. It currently has a health focus. The hub will help route medical cargo and healthcare personnel to areas of need. Looking ahead, WFP and the Chinese government are considering plans to transform the hub into a permanent center supporting humanitarian response more broadly.\textsuperscript{120}

Aside from the COVID-19 health response, the story of China’s engagement with the major health multilaterals over the past 10–15 years has been one of transition from major recipient to emerging donor. China was one of the Global Fund’s largest recipients during the fund’s first decade with investments over US$800 million.\textsuperscript{121} Between 2010 and 2011, China was classified as ineligible for Global Fund support and the fund closed its portfolio in China in 2012–2013. China first contributed to the Global Fund in its second replenishment (2008–2010) with a pledge of $6 million. Since then, its contributions have grown from this low base, with $18 million pledged for both the fifth (2017–2019) and sixth (2020–2022) replenishments. But despite the major growth of its economy during this period, China’s contributions have remained relatively small; in the sixth replenishment, China ranked 27\textsuperscript{th} of 29 donors.

China has also transitioned from Gavi recipient to donor. China received financing from Gavi between 2002 and 2005/2006 and a decade later made an initial contribution of US$5 million for the 2016–2020 period. For Gavi’s next period (2021–2025), China quadrupled its earlier pledge, committing US$20 million. As with the Global Fund, however, China remains a relatively small contributor, ranking 15th out of 26 bilateral donors in direct contributions.\textsuperscript{122}

China’s relationship with the WHO has been subject to scrutiny, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. Over the last decade, China has increased its contributions to the WHO, though it is still not a major contributor. China is influential within the WHO, by

\textsuperscript{118} Farge, 2021.  
\textsuperscript{119} Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovation, 2020.  
\textsuperscript{120} World Food Programme, 2020.  
\textsuperscript{121} The Global Fund, 2021.  
\textsuperscript{122} Gavi The Vaccine Alliance, 2021a.
virtue of its massive population size and, relatedly, its relevance for global public health.\textsuperscript{123} In addition, as noted above, a Chinese national serves as one of the WHO assistant directors-general (for universal health coverage/communicable and noncommunicable diseases). In 2017, the government of China and the WHO signed an MOU to cooperate in pursuit of health goals around China’s Belt and Road Initiative—China’s “Health Silk Road.”\textsuperscript{124} WHO director general Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus later gave a speech praising the initiative, though implementation has been slow.\textsuperscript{125}

Within the UN system’s smaller health entities, China emphasizes its role in south-south cooperation. For example, though China does not provide direct funding to UNAIDS, it has a strategic partnership with the entity to strengthen China-Africa cooperation and south-south around the Belt and Road Initiative and Agenda 2030. And in 2017, with support from UNFPA, China launched the Population and Development South-South Cooperation Center of Excellence within the China Population and Development Research Center, with support from UNFPA and the National Health and Family Planning Commission.\textsuperscript{126}

The World Bank’s IDA is also a prominent financier of global health programs with around 10 percent of its portfolio committed to the health sector. As noted above, China has substantially increased its IDA contributions over the last decade and is now the sixth largest contributor.

**Conclusion**

Over the past decade, China’s engagement with the multilateral system has grown substantially in scale and scope. Some of this evolution reflects China’s economic growth, since shareholding and assessed contributions are based largely on economic size. But China’s increased multilateral engagement also reflects policy choices, revealed in discretionary funding patterns. China has increased its contributions to the concessional lending windows of the World Bank and regional development banks and has established large-scale trust funds in partnership both with the UN and with regional development banks in Africa and Latin America to provide co-financing or other support for mutual objectives.

The sectoral allocation of China’s funds may also reveal policy preferences. It has become a top donor to multilateral institutions and funds devoted to infrastructure and agriculture but its contributions to funds focused on public goods like climate and global health remain disproportionately low, given its global economic standing.

\textsuperscript{123} For instance, China has been particularly invested in cooperation around monitoring and surveillance of pandemic influenza and the implementation of the international health regulations (see Glaser & Youde, 2020).

\textsuperscript{124} Baijie, 2017.

\textsuperscript{125} Adhanom, 2017; Tagliapietra, 2020.

\textsuperscript{126} UN Population Fund, 2021.
China’s engagement with the multilateral development system extends beyond financial contributions. Chinese firms, many of which are particularly competitive in high value infrastructure sectors, have been particularly successful in MDB procurements.

China also exercises influence throughout the multilateral development system through the institution of Chinese nationals into leadership positions. However, China’s presence in senior management roles is largely in line with its shareholding and funding status.

While the picture presented in this paper focuses on observable, measurable aspects of China’s participation, it does not explore in detail what motivates China’s decision making around its multilateral engagement. These motivational questions point to important areas for further study:

- How are China’s priorities—and relative (voluntary) contributions—set, both for each multilateral institution or fund and across multilateral institutions and funds?
- How do the ministries with leading responsibilities for multilateral institutions (as identified in this study) participate in decision making regarding multilateral policy? To what degree is policy coordinated across ministries?
- How do China’s multilateral contributions relate to its bilateral flows and policy priorities?
- Does the government of China have unique objectives for its multilateral participation—influence, contracts, prestige?

Understanding the answers to these questions—in combination with the data presented in this analysis—could be instructive for helping shape fellow shareholders’ and members’ interactions with China in the multilateral system.
Annex I. Institutional snapshots

World Bank: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Development Association

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

African Development Bank

Asian Development Bank

United Nations Development Programme

Food and Agriculture Organization

World Health Organization
World Bank (IBRD and IDA)

Overview

Mission
To end extreme poverty by reducing the share of the global population that lives in extreme poverty to 3% by 2030; to promote shared prosperity by increasing the incomes of the poorest 40% of people in every country.

Primary Activities
- Concessional loans and grants to low-income countries (IDA)
- Loans to middle-income countries (IBRD)

Regional Distribution of Commitments & Disbursements (IBRD and IDA, 2019)

![Regional Distribution Chart]

Funding
- $199 billion in total IDA assets (2020); 81% outstanding loans
- $297 billion in total IBRD assets (2020); 68% outstanding loans

Leadership Structure
- 189 member country representatives form the Board of Governors and elect 25 directors for each World Bank organization (IBRD, IDA, IFC, MIGA)
- Voting power in the Board of Governors and Boards of Directors is proportional to a country’s shares in the organization

Chinese Engagement

Chinese Representation
- China has 5.07% of IBRD voting power and 2.3% of IDA voting power
- Shaolin Yang (fmr. CN MOF Director General for International Economic and Financial Cooperation) is the Managing Director—Chief Administrative Officer of the World Bank Group
- Jingdong Hua is Vice President and Treasurer of the World Bank, and Pension Finance Administrator of the World Bank Group

Chinese Oversight Body
Ministry of Finance

Taiwan Membership
No

China Funder Rank

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fund</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>47th</td>
<td>44th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>30th</td>
<td>6th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chinese Share of Contributions
(IBRD Capital Increases)

![IBRD Capital Increases Chart]

Chinese Share of Contributions
(IDA Replenishments)

![IDA Replenishments Chart]

Additional Chinese Participation
- China was classified as an IDA recipient from 1980–1999, receiving $9.95 billion in concessional finance
- In 2015, China established a $50 million special World Bank fund aimed at reducing poverty
- In 2017, the World Bank signed an MOU with China’s Ministry of Finance, the AIIB, ADB, EBRD, EIB, and NDB to create the Multilateral Cooperation Center for Development Finance (MCDF) to promote infrastructure and connectivity cooperation.
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

Overview

Mission
To foster sustainable economic development, create wealth and improve infrastructure connectivity in Asia by investing in infrastructure and other productive sectors and promote regional cooperation and partnership in addressing development challenges by working in close collaboration with other multilateral and bilateral development institutions.

Primary Activities
- Sovereign and nonsovereign loans
- Equity Investments
- Guarantees

Sectoral Distribution of Institutional Funds (2019)

Funding
- $96.7 billion in AIIB subscribed capital (China share is 31%)
- $128 million in AIIB Project Preparation Special Fund (China contributed 39%)

Leadership Structure
- 86 Board of Governors members, each representing one member country, delegate most powers to the 12-member Board of Directors, each of whom represent a constituency of AIIB member countries
- Each Director votes on major decisions with the voting power equal to their constituency’s vote share

Chinese Engagement

Chinese Representation
- AIIB President Jin Liqun is a Chinese national who previously spent two decades in the Chinese MOF, reaching the rank of Vice Minister
- Liu Kun (CN Minister of Finance) represents China on the Board of Governors
- Zhijun Cheng (acting CN MOF Deputy Director General for International Economic and Financial Cooperation) represents China on the Board of Directors; China is the only with its own Board of Directors constituency
- China is the AIIB’s largest shareholder, holding 26.6% of the bank’s voting Power

Chinese Oversight Body
Ministry of Finance

Taiwan Membership
No

China Funder Rank

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fund</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIIB</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPSF</td>
<td>1st (tied)</td>
<td>1st (tied)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional Chinese Participation
- China played a key role in setting up the AIIB, convening the initial gathering of 22 Asian countries which agreed to formally establish the AIIB, and hosting its headquarters in Beijing.
- In May 2017, China’s MOF signed an MOU with the AIIB, ADB, EBRD, EIB, NDB and World Bank Group to create the Multilateral Cooperation Center for Development Finance (MCDF) to promote infrastructure and connectivity cooperation.
African Development Bank
Regional Development Bank | Established: 1964 | China Joined: 1985

Overview
Mission
To spur sustainable economic development and social progress in its regional member countries, thus contributing to poverty reduction. The AfDB achieves this objective by: (1) mobilizing and allocating resources for investment in regional member countries; and (2) providing policy advice and technical assistance to support development efforts.

Primary Activities
• Sovereign loans
• Guarantees
• Technical assistance programs

Sectoral Distribution of Institutional Funds (2019)

Funding
• $33.9 billion in cumulative AfDB subscribed capital (China contributed 2%)

Leadership Structure
• 80 Board of Governors members, each representing one member country, delegate powers to 20 AfDB Executive Directors (13 regional and 7 non-regional)

Chinese Engagement
Chinese Representation
• Yi Gang (PBoC Governor) represents China on the Board of Governors
• China, Canada, South Korea, Kuwait, and Turkey make up a consortium represented by Canada’s David Stevenson on the AfDB Board of Directors; the consortium controls 7.3% of AfDB voting power.
• China independently holds 1.2% of the voting power in the AfDB.

Chinese Oversight Body
People’s Bank of China

Taiwan Membership
No

China Funder Rank

2010 | 2019
16th | 12th

Chinese Share of Contributions (AfDB Replenishments)

Additional Chinese Participation
• The AfDB has signed MOUs with the Export-Import Bank of China, China Development Bank (CDB) and the Agricultural Bank of China to promote co-financing, knowledge sharing and joint analytical work in trade finance, the private sector, agribusiness and clean energy
• In 2014, the AfDB and PBoC jointly created the $2 billion Africa Growing Together Fund to finance sovereign and non-sovereign guaranteed development projects
Asian Development Bank


Overview

Mission
To achieve a prosperous, inclusive, resilient, and sustainable Asia and the Pacific, while sustaining its efforts to eradicate extreme poverty.

Primary Activities
- Sovereign and nonsovereign loans (ADB and ADF)
- Technical assistance programs
- Research and economic monitoring

Sectoral Distribution of Institutional Funds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Sector Management</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, Extractives, Rural Development</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water &amp; Urban Infrastructure</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Funding
- $147.1 billion in ADB subscribed capital (China share steady at 7.9%)
- $2.3 billion in ADF replenishment 2021–2024

Leadership Structure
- 68 Board of Governors members, each representing one member country, delegate power to the 12 Directors comprised of 8 regional representatives and 4 non-regional representatives

Chinese Engagement

Chinese Representation
- Liu Kun (CN Minister of Finance) represents China on the Board of Governors
- Weihua Liu (fmr. CN MOF Deputy Director General for International Economic and Financial Cooperation) represents China on Board of Directors
- China currently holds 5.4% of the ADB's voting Power

Chinese Oversight Body
Ministry of Finance

Taiwan Membership
Yes

China Funder Rank

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fund</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>3rd (tied)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>16th</td>
<td>6th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chinese Share of Contributions (ADF)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ADF-10</th>
<th>ADF-11</th>
<th>ADF-12</th>
<th>ADF-13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Additional Chinese Participation
- China is both a borrower from and donor to the ADB. To date, the ADB has committed $43.3 billion to development projects in China.
- Between 2016 and 2020, China cofinanced 65 ADB projects worth a total of $6.1 billion in addition to its capital contributions
- In 2021, China signed an MOU with the ADB and Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC) to promote China's rural vitalization program
UN Development Programme
UN Institution | Established: 1965 | China Joined: 1979

Overview
Mission
To end poverty, build democratic governance, rule of law, and inclusive institutions.

Primary Activities
- Expert advice and training
- Grant support: focus on “six signature solution” SDGs (Poverty, Governance, Resilience, Environment, Energy, Gender)
- Research & Advocacy

Regional Distribution of Funds (2018)

Funding (2018)
- $5 billion revenue
- 100% voluntary contributions

Leadership Structure
- 36-member Executive Board made up of representatives from member countries who serve on a rotating basis
- Bureau of the Executive Board is comprised of one President and four Vice Presidents, who are elected from the member countries

Chinese Engagement
Chinese Representation
- Haoliang Xu (UN Assistant Secretary-General) currently serves as UNDP Assistant Administrator and Director of the Bureau for Policy and Programme Support
- China currently controls one seat on the Executive Board

Chinese Oversight Body
Ministry of Commerce

Taiwan Membership
No

China Funder Rank

Chinese Share of Contributions

Additional Chinese Participation
- The UNDP signed the UNDP-Government of China Standard Basic Assistance Agreement in 1997, becoming China’s first development cooperation partner following Deng Xiaoping’s implementation of Reform and Opening Up policies in 1978
- In 2001, the UNDP supported China’s accession to the World Trade Organization by advising the Chinese government on intellectual property protection policies
- China signed an MOU on partnership strengthening, international cooperation, and South-South Cooperation with the UNDP in 2010
- In 2016, China and the UNDP signed an MOU that aims to enhance collaboration between the UNDP and Chinese government on the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative and China 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
UN Food and Agriculture Organization
UN Institution | Established: 1945 | China Joined: 1973

Overview
Mission
To defeat hunger; to achieve food security for all and make sure that people have regular access to enough high-quality food to lead active, healthy lives.

Primary Activities
- Supranational fishery, agriculture, forestry, and water resource regulation
- Research
- Technical assistance programs
- Agricultural training programs

Regional Distribution of Funds (2018–19)

Funding (2018–19)
- $2.6 billion budget
- 39% assessed contributions
- 61% voluntary contributions

Leadership Structure
49-member executive council elected biennially to rotating 3-year terms by 194 member states.

Chinese Engagement
Chinese Representation
- Qu Dongyu (fmr CN Vice-Minister of Agricultural and Rural Affairs) is sitting FAO Director General
- China controls 2/49 (4.08%) of executive council seats

Chinese Oversight Body
Ministry of Agriculture

Taiwan Membership
No

China Funder Rank

Chinese Share of Contributions

Additional Chinese Participation
- In 2009, China endowed the FAO-China South-South Cooperation Trust Fund ($30 million), contributing additional $50 million donations in both 2015 and 2020
- 2016 MOU between China and FAO, IFAD, WFP to foster South-South Triangular Cooperation and foster synergies between RBAs and China’s BRI/Agenda 2030
- 52% of Chinese voluntary contributions to the FAO support the FAO’s agriculture and fishery sustainability programs
- In 2019, China joined the FAO Africa Solidarity Trust Fund, contributing $2.6 million
- China, the WFP, IFAD, and FAO have jointly organized four International Seminars for Global Poverty Reduction Partnerships with a focus on rural empowerment and ICT deployment
World Health Organization
UN Institution | Established: 1946 | China Joined: 1946

Overview
Mission
The attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health.

Primary Activities
- Supranational health system coordination
- Research and policy advisory
- Global health monitoring

Regional Distribution of Funds (2020–21)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters</td>
<td>35%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
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<td>South-East Asia</td>
<td>12%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Western Pacific</td>
<td>9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>8%</td>
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</table>

Funding (2019)
- $2.2 billion budget ($1.7 billion in contributions)
- 28% assessed contributions
- 5% voluntary non-earmarked contributions
- 67% voluntary earmarked contributions

Leadership Structure
- The World Health Assembly, which is composed of 34 member state representatives serving 3-year terms, is the WHO’s primary decision-making body
- The World Health Assembly appoints the WHO Director-General

Chinese Engagement
Chinese Representation
- Ren Minghui (fmr. Assistant Director General of China’s National Health Commission) is sitting WHO Assistant Director-General for Universal Health Coverage and Communicable and Noncommunicable Diseases

Chinese Oversight Body
National Health Commission

Taiwan Membership
No

China Funder Rank

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2019</th>
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<td>64th</td>
<td>46th</td>
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Chinese Share of Contributions

Additional Chinese Participation
- China’s voluntary contributions to the WHO have largely been earmarked for three research programs: outbreak and crisis response, human reproduction research training, and tropical diseases.
### Annex II. Chinese government ministries with primary responsibility for engagement, by multilateral entity

#### Multilateral financial institutions and funds

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<tr>
<th>Ministry of Finance</th>
<th>World Bank Group</th>
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*The Chinese government points of contact for the GEF are the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Ecology and Environment.*
Works cited


