CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT

Papers, Paychecks, and Plans

Analyzing the Venezuelan Diaspora in Latin America

DANY BAHAR · JESÚS MARCANO · CARLOS MOYA · ROBERTO PATIÑO

Abstract

Over 8 million Venezuelans have left their country since 2014, mostly settling in Latin America. Using original survey data from nearly 3,000 Venezuelan migrants across nine Latin American countries, this paper examines how legal immigration status shapes labor market integration and settlement intentions. Legal status is strongly associated with better labor market outcomes: migrants with documentation are 30.5 percentage points more likely to receive wages through a bank account, 21.6 pp more likely to hold a written employment contract, and similarly more likely to contribute to social security, pay taxes, and hold formal jobs—associations that are robust across specifications, bootstrap inference, and leave-one-out analysis. Legal status alone, however, is not associated with wanting to stay in the host country: legal and undocumented migrants report virtually identical settlement intentions. There is suggestive evidence that a link between legal status and settlement may materialize when legal status is paired with formal employment, particularly written contracts. The findings point to the potential value of complementing regularization programs with measures that facilitate formal employment, financial inclusion, and labor market integration.

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1. Introduction

Over 8 million Venezuelans have left their country since 2014 (R4V 2024), making it one of the largest displacement crises in modern history. More than 6 million—have settled in Latin American and Caribbean countries, where they navigate complex processes of economic and social integration. Despite the scale of this phenomenon, we know surprisingly little about how these migrants are actually faring across the region. To what extent are they integrated into labor markets? Are they working formally or informally? And do they intend to stay? A large literature studies the economics of temporary migration and the factors that shape whether migrants settle or return (Dustmann and Görlach 2016). Recent work has examined the labor market effects of legal status in specific host countries—most closely, Ibáñez et al. (2025) document the effects of Colombia's Temporary Protection Status on Venezuelan migrants' labor outcomes. Yet the multi-country scope of the Venezuelan diaspora, and the specific role of legal status in shaping both labor market integration and settlement intentions across host countries, remain understudied.

This paper takes a first step toward answering these questions. Using original survey data from nearly 3,000 Venezuelan migrants across nine Latin American countries, we provide one of the first multi-country snapshots of Venezuelan migrant integration in the region. Understanding the current state of affairs is essential: host countries need evidence on how migrants are integrating in order to design effective policies, and migrants themselves need to know what kinds of support make the most difference.

The stakes extend well beyond the region. How Latin American countries manage Venezuelan integration has direct implications for migration flows to the US and other destinations further afield. If migrants fail to integrate—if they remain in informal jobs without contracts, without access to the financial system, and without a sense of stability—they are more likely to move again. Secondary migration, in turn, creates pressures on transit countries and destination countries like the US. Conversely, policies that successfully promote integration in the first host country can expand opportunity and stability for migrants, while also reducing the need for onward migration—creating more predictable outcomes for both migrants and the countries involved.

Our analysis reveals a finding that is both surprising and policy-relevant. Legal status—having a visa, nationality, or equivalent documentation—is strongly correlated with better labor market outcomes. Migrants with legal documentation are substantially more likely to hold formal jobs, have written contracts, contribute to social security, and receive wages through bank accounts. But legal status alone shows no link to whether migrants want to stay: legal and undocumented migrants report virtually indistinguishable settlement intentions.

The puzzle is somewhat solved when we look at how legal status and employment interact. There is suggestive evidence that a link between legal status and wanting to stay may materialize when migrants have also achieved formal labor market integration, particularly when they have written contracts or receive wages through bank accounts, though these patterns should be interpreted with caution.

These patterns carry implications for migration policy. Regularization programs—granting legal status to undocumented migrants—are an important first step (see Bahar et al. 2021; Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2002), and our data clearly show their association with better employment outcomes. But regularization alone may not be enough. The data point to the potential value of pairing legal status with measures that facilitate formal employment: job placement services, credential recognition, and support for formal contracting. Such complementary policies could benefit not only migrants but also the host countries whose economies and social systems depend on stable, productive integration.

2. The data

In 2024, we fielded a large-scale survey of Venezuelan migrants residing in nine Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and the Dominican Republic. Data were collected by a private polling company using stratified river sampling through online advertisements—an opt-in, non-probability method that has proven reliable for estimating public opinion in hard-to-reach populations such as migrants (Zhang et al. 2020; Rosenzweig et al. 2025; Grow et al. 2022).[1] Target demographic quotas were constructed from official estimates compiled by the Inter-agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela (R4V). Respondents accessed a self-administered digital questionnaire, with eligibility confirmed through demographic verification and multiple attention checks. Results were weighted using raking to correct discrepancies between the sample and target quotas. After excluding respondents in the US and Europe (where migration policy contexts differ fundamentally), our analysis sample consists of 2,987 respondents. Full details about the data collection process are provided in Appendix 1.

The nine surveyed countries account for over 95 percent of Venezuelan migrants in Latin America, making our sample representative of the Venezuelan diaspora in the region as a whole. However, while the pooled sample supports reliable inference at the regional level, the country-specific samples for Argentina (n = 136), Mexico (n = 32), Panama (n = 60), and the Dominican Republic (n = 175) are too small for reliable country-level inference. We therefore present country-level descriptive statistics only for the five countries with adequate samples—Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru—while including all nine countries in our regression analysis, where they contribute to the

1 Rampazzo et al. (2021) develop a related framework combining digital traces and survey data to estimate migrant stocks, further validating the use of online advertising platforms for studying migrant populations.

pooled estimates through country fixed effects. In Appendix 7, we show that our results are robust to restricting the sample to the five countries with individually representative samples.

Three variables are central to our analysis:

Legal status indicates whether the migrant possesses a visa, nationality, or equivalent documentation granting the right to reside and work in the host country. About 79 percent of respondents report having legal status (81 percent after applying survey weights), but this rate varies enormously across countries, from 56 percent in Chile to 97 percent in Argentina.

Labor market outcomes capture different dimensions of employment quality: whether the migrant has a job, whether it is formal, whether they have a written contract, whether they contribute to social security and pay taxes, whether they receive wages through a bank account, and whether they perceive wage parity with nationals. These are all *self-reported* measures. Among employed migrants, only 39 percent hold a written contract and 54 percent receive wages through a bank account, indicators of the precarious and largely informal nature of migrant employment across the region.

Settlement intentions capture whether the migrant wants to stay in the host country. Only 23 percent of migrants definitively want to stay; 41 percent want to leave and 36 percent are uncertain. Settlement intentions vary widely across countries, from 50 percent wanting to stay in Argentina to just 15 percent in Mexico.

Figure 1 presents the geographic distribution of these key variables across the five host countries with individually representative samples, adjusted for differences in gender, age, education, year of arrival, and mode of transport. Because the demographic composition of the migrant population differs substantially across countries, these adjusted rates provide a more comparable picture of outcomes across destinations. Argentina, Mexico, Panama, and the Dominican Republic are shown in gray because their sample sizes are too small for reliable country-level inference; these countries are included in the pooled regression analysis but not in the country-level maps. Panels (a)–(c) show the three core variables: legal status rates, written contract rates, and the share of migrants who want to stay. Panels (d)–(f) display additional labor market indicators: employment rates, formal work rates, and financial inclusion (measured as receiving wages through a bank account). Unadjusted (raw) rates are reported in Appendix 10.

FIGURE 1. Key variables by host country (adjusted)



Notes: Panels (a)–(c) show the three core variables: legal status, written contract rates among employed migrants, and the share wanting to stay. Panels (d)–(f) show additional labor market indicators. "Adjusted" means rates are estimated from a regression of each outcome on country fixed effects plus controls for gender, age, education, year of arrival, and transport mode; this accounts for differences in demographic composition across destinations and makes country comparisons more like-for-like. Unadjusted (raw) rates are reported in Appendix 10. Argentina, Mexico, Panama, and the Dominican Republic are shown in gray (sample too small for country-level inference).

Source: Venezuelan Diaspora Survey 2024.

Several patterns stand out. Adjusted legal status rates are highest in Brazil, where regularization programs have been comparatively generous, and lowest in Chile and Ecuador. Employment rates are broadly similar across countries—most are above 75 percent—but the *quality* of employment varies dramatically. Adjusted written contract rates and financial inclusion (bank account wages) span a wide range across destinations. There is no simple country-level correspondence between legal status rates and settlement intentions. Brazil has the highest adjusted legal status rate but only moderate settlement intentions. Chile has one of the lowest legal status rates but relatively high

settlement intentions. This foreshadows the individual-level finding that legal status alone does not predict who wants to stay.

Legal status pathways across host countries

The process by which Venezuelan migrants obtain legal status varies substantially across host countries, and this institutional variation is important for interpreting our results. In Colombia, which hosts the largest number of Venezuelan migrants, the government introduced the Temporary Protection Status (*Estatuto Temporal de Protección*, TPS) in 2021, granting up to 10 years of legal residence and work authorization to Venezuelans already in the country. This program was explicitly designed to regularize the existing undocumented population, meaning that legal status in Colombia typically follows arrival rather than preceding it. Brazil has offered residency permits through its National Immigration Council since 2017 and later expanded access through humanitarian visas, also allowing migrants to regularize after arrival. Chile requires migrants to obtain a visa either before or shortly after entry, though many arrive on tourist visas and later transition to work permits; a 2021 regularization program targeted those who had overstayed. Ecuador and Peru have each implemented temporary permits (the *visa VERHU* in Ecuador and the *Permiso Temporal de Permanencia* in Peru), both designed to provide legal status to Venezuelans already residing in the country.

Two features of this institutional landscape are relevant for our analysis. First, in most host countries, legal status is something migrants obtain *after* arriving and often after an initial period of informal employment. This raises concerns about reverse causality (where legal status is a consequence rather than a cause of employment) since migrants who find jobs may be more motivated or better positioned to navigate the regularization process. We cannot resolve this issue with our cross-sectional data, and it is one reason we emphasize throughout that our estimates are correlational. Second, the diversity of regularization pathways across countries means that legal status captures different institutional realities in different settings. Country fixed effects absorb the average differences across these regimes, but within-country variation in who obtains legal status likely reflects a mix of individual effort, employer support, and access to information about available programs.

Empirical approach

Raw differences between legal and undocumented migrants may reflect factors other than legal status. Migrants who obtain documentation may differ from those who do not in age, education, when they arrived, or how they arrived. To compare apples to apples—or at least to get closer to doing so—we use linear regression to estimate the gap between legal and undocumented migrants on each outcome, controlling for gender, age, education, year of arrival, mode of transport to the host country, and country fixed effects. In Section 4, we extend this approach by interacting legal status with each labor market indicator to test whether the two variables *together* predict settlement intentions.

All coefficients are reported in percentage points. Standard errors are clustered by host country, and survey sample weights are applied throughout.[2]

A few caveats are essential. These are *correlations*, not causal estimates. Legal status is not randomly assigned, and migrants who obtain documentation likely differ from those who do not in ways we cannot fully observe—motivation, networks, job-search skills. Our controls help but cannot eliminate this concern, so we refer to "associations" and "links" throughout. One notable omission is family composition: the survey does not collect information on whether migrants traveled alone, have a partner or children in the host country, or left dependents in Venezuela. Family structure likely affects both the decision to pursue legal status (migrants with families may have stronger incentives to regularize) and settlement intentions (those accompanied by family may be more likely to stay). If migrants with families are disproportionately represented among those with legal status, our estimates could overstate the association between documentation and settlement-relevant outcomes. The likely direction of bias is upward, since family presence is a positive confounder for both legal status and labor market integration. We cannot assess the magnitude of this bias with our data, but we note that the inclusion of country fixed effects and detailed demographic controls (age, education, year of arrival) absorbs some of the variation that correlates with family status. All outcome variables are self-reported, which introduces the possibility of measurement error. And because the survey recruits respondents through online advertisements, it likely underrepresents the most marginalized migrants—those without internet access—which could bias our estimates in either direction. We use raking weights to align the sample on observable demographics, but no weighting scheme can fully correct for who chooses to respond. One additional construction choice bears noting: the key outcome of wanting to stay in the host country codes respondents who answered "I might consider it, but I am not sure" (approximately 36 percent of the sample) as *not* wanting to stay. The 23 percent headline figure therefore reflects only those who answered definitively yes; the true share with positive settlement intentions lies somewhere between 23 percent and the 59 percent who answered yes or maybe. Readers should bear this construction in mind when interpreting the magnitude of the settlement intention estimates; full variable definitions and alternative codings are provided in Appendix 4. Finally, the survey was fielded September 11–17, 2024, approximately six weeks after Venezuela's contested presidential election on July 28, 2024. Settlement intentions measured at this politically charged moment may reflect transient uncertainty about conditions in Venezuela rather than steady-state preferences, and caution is warranted in extrapolating to other periods.

Appendix 4 provides full details on the sample restrictions and variable construction, including how we handle ambiguous survey responses. Appendix 2 provides descriptive statistics for all variables by legal status, and Appendix 3 reports the sample composition by host country. The full survey instrument is reproduced in Appendix 1.

2 The formal regression specification and additional technical details are provided in Appendix 10. This study was not preregistered.

3. Legal status and labor market outcomes

Is legal status linked to better labor market outcomes? Figure 2 shows the answer clearly: it is.

FIGURE 2. Legal status and labor market outcomes: estimated gaps



Notes: Each point shows the estimated difference (in percentage points) between migrants with and without legal status, after controlling for demographics, migration history, and country. Filled dots indicate statistically significant differences; hollow dots are not significant. Bars show 95 percent confidence intervals. For five outcomes (wage equity, social security, taxes, written contract, bank account), respondents who answered "don't know" are excluded; sample sizes vary accordingly.

After controlling for demographics, migration history, and host country, migrants with legal documentation are:

- 30.5 percentage points (pp) more likely to receive wages through a **bank account**
- 21.6 pp more likely to have a **written employment contract**
- 21.6 pp more likely to **contribute to social security**
- 16.5 pp more likely to **pay taxes**
- 15.5 pp more likely to **perceive wage equity** with nationals
- 13.3 pp more likely to hold a **formal job**

All six associations are statistically significant at the 1 percent level; confidence intervals are shown in Figure 2. Unemployment and inability to cover basic needs show weaker links that are only marginally significant.

The takeaway is straightforward: legal status is not strongly associated with whether migrants *have* a job, but it is strongly associated with the *quality* of that job. The 30-point gap in bank account wages is particularly striking—it suggests that financial inclusion looks fundamentally different for legal and undocumented migrants, even after controlling for observable characteristics.

The Panel A results are robust. Using alternative definitions of the outcome variables produces virtually identical results (Appendix 6), all seven core labor market associations survive wild cluster bootstrap inference with Benjamini-Hochberg correction for multiple testing (Appendix 8), and leave-one-out analysis confirms that no single country drives the results (Appendix 9). The interaction results reported in Section 4 are more sensitive and should be interpreted as suggestive.

4. Legal status and settlement intentions

Given the strong link between legal status and job quality, one might expect legal migrants to be more likely to want to stay. They are not.

The estimated gap between legal and undocumented migrants in wanting to stay is just 1.3 percentage points (SE = 4.8 pp; 95 percent confidence interval approximately −8 to +11 pp)—statistically indistinguishable from zero. Both groups report wanting to stay at around 23 percent. Having papers, by itself, does not appear to make migrants more likely to settle.

This is a puzzle. If legal status opens the door to better jobs, why doesn't it also promote settlement?

A descriptive look at the data offers a clue. Figure 3 maps the joint distribution of labor market outcomes and settlement intentions across host countries. Countries where both contract rates and settlement intentions are high—such as Argentina and Chile—suggest environments where labor market integration and settlement may go together. Brazil, despite having the highest contract rates, shows only moderate settlement intentions, hinting that other factors (economic conditions, proximity to home) also play a role. These geographic patterns motivate us to look more carefully at how labor market outcomes interact with legal status at the individual level.

FIGURE 3. Cross-country relationship between labor market outcomes and settlement intentions



Notes: These bivariate maps show the joint distribution of two variables at the country level among Venezuelan migrants.
Source: Venezuelan Diaspora Survey 2024.

The role of labor market integration

To examine this further, we ask whether the link between legal status and settlement varies depending on labor market outcomes. Does legal status matter *more* for migrants who have good jobs than for those who do not? We test this by interacting legal status with each of our labor market indicators.

Figure 4 shows the results. Most interactions are noisy and not statistically significant. Three point estimates stand out, though as we discuss below, these patterns should be interpreted with caution.

FIGURE 4. How labor market outcomes modify the link between legal status and wanting to stay



Notes: Each point shows how much the link between legal status and wanting to stay changes depending on the labor market indicator. Filled dots indicate statistically significant differences; hollow dots are not significant. Bars show 95 percent confidence intervals. For outcomes with possible ambiguous responses (wage equity, social security, taxes), "don't know" responses are excluded.

Written contracts. Among migrants *without* a contract, legal status has essentially no link to settlement intentions. But among those *with* a contract, legal status is associated with an 8.5 percentage-point higher likelihood of wanting to stay. This is the most robust of the three interactions, remaining marginally significant under wild cluster bootstrap inference ($p = 0.060$; Appendix 8).

Bank accounts. The pattern is suggestive and similar in direction: among migrants who do *not* receive wages through a bank account, legal status has no detectable link to wanting to stay. Among those who *do*, the point estimate rises by 6.6 pp, though this interaction does not survive bootstrap correction.

Unemployment. The interaction points in the expected direction: legal migrants who are unemployed are 3.1 pp *less* likely to want to stay than legal migrants with jobs, though again this does not survive bootstrap correction.

Formal employment indicators are themselves *negatively* correlated with settlement among undocumented migrants. Having a contract or a bank account without legal status is associated with

a *lower* likelihood of wanting to stay. One interpretation is that undocumented migrants with formal jobs may feel especially vulnerable, as formal employment without legal backing creates tensions and risks that could discourage long-term plans.

These results hold under alternative variable definitions (Appendix 6). Under wild cluster bootstrap inference, the written contract interaction remains marginally significant, while the bank account and unemployment interactions do not survive the correction (Appendix 8). The interaction results should therefore be interpreted as suggestive. Two additional caveats apply. First, we cannot rule out reverse causality: migrants who intend to stay may be more likely to invest in formal employment, meaning the interaction could partly reflect settlement intentions driving formalization rather than the reverse. Second, because labor market outcomes are themselves associated with legal status, the interaction coefficients should be interpreted as descriptive conditional associations, not as evidence of a clean moderation channel.

The story that emerges from these patterns is suggestive. Legal status is associated with formal employment, but the mere possession of documents does not appear to predict settlement. Settlement intentions appear higher when legal status coincides with tangible labor market outcomes: a contract that provides security, a bank account that signals financial integration, and the stability that comes with formal work. Unemployed legal migrants have documents but lack economic foundations; they remain open to moving on. Employed legal migrants with contracts have both the legal right to stay and the economic reason to do so.

5. Policy implications

What do these patterns mean for policy? While our results are correlational, they point to concrete implications for migration policy in Latin America and beyond.

Regularization is necessary but may not be sufficient. Prior causal evidence from large-scale amnesty programs shows that granting legal status improves labor market outcomes (Bahar et al. 2021; Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2002), and our data corroborate this across every indicator we examine. Yet legal status alone is not correlated with migrants' intentions to settle permanently. The link appears to materialize only when legal status is paired with formal employment, though this interaction evidence is suggestive rather than definitive.

Contracts and financial inclusion may be the missing links. Among the labor market indicators we study, written employment contracts and bank account wages show the strongest interaction with legal status in predicting settlement intentions, though this evidence is suggestive and should

be interpreted with caution. If these patterns reflect complementarities, the most promising complements to regularization may be policies that target these channels:

- *Support for formal contracting*, including information campaigns about labor rights and employer obligations toward migrant workers
- *Financial inclusion programs* that facilitate access to bank accounts and formal payment systems for newly regularized migrants
- *Recognition of foreign credentials* to help migrants access formal jobs that match their qualifications
- *Job placement services* that connect newly regularized migrants with formal employers

Integration benefits host countries too. Migrants who settle with formal employment contribute to the tax base, social security systems, and local economies. Countries that invest in integration infrastructure may see returns not only in migrant well-being but also in fiscal sustainability and social cohesion.

The stakes extend beyond the region. With millions of Venezuelans now living across Latin America, the question of whether migrants settle or move on has direct implications for the US. This concern is not hypothetical: Venezuela became the top nationality at the US southern border in 2022 and 2023, with hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans crossing irregularly in those years. While we cannot establish a causal link between integration outcomes in Latin American host countries and onward migration to the US, the broader logic is plausible: migrants who remain in informal jobs without contracts, without financial inclusion, and without a sense of stability may be more likely to consider moving again. Our results suggest that effective integration in the first host country—combining legal status with access to formal employment—is associated with a higher likelihood of wanting to stay. This is consistent with a policy framework in which regularization and labor market integration work as complements. If that logic holds, investing in migrant integration in Latin America is not just good development policy, it is consistent with the goal of orderly migration that the US government has long pursued. This creates a rare alignment of interests: migrants gain stability and opportunity, host countries gain productive, tax-paying workers, and the US sees reduced pressure from secondary migration.

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Appendix 1. Data collection process

Data were collected by a private polling company (MEG – Inteligencia de Datos) between September 11 and September 17, 2024, using stratified river sampling through online advertisements—an opt-in, non-probability method that, with proper methodological considerations, has proven reliable for estimating public opinion (Zhang et al. 2020) and cost-effective for reaching hidden or hard-to-find populations (Rosenzweig et al. 2025) such as migrants. A growing literature has demonstrated the value of Facebook's advertising platform for studying migrant populations specifically: Zagheni et al. (2017) show that Facebook ad data can be used to monitor migrant stocks across countries; Rampazzo et al. (2021) develop a framework combining digital traces and survey data to estimate migrant stocks; Grow et al. (2022) assess the accuracy of Facebook's advertising audience data for social science surveys across multiple countries; and Pötzschke and Braun (2017) evaluate the methodological strengths and limitations of recruiting migrants through Facebook advertisements. Our approach builds on these methods by combining ad-based recruitment with demographic quota targets derived from official migration statistics.

Sampling design and quotas

The survey targeted Venezuelan migrants aged 18 and older residing in nine Latin American countries plus the US. Country-level demographic quotas for age and gender were constructed from the most recent estimates compiled by the Inter-agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela (R4V, March 2024). The design targeted at least 450 completed surveys in each of the four largest host countries (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador) and 350 in the US, to ensure sufficient power for country-level analysis in these cases. The remaining countries (Argentina, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Dominican Republic) received proportionally smaller allocations. Table A1.1 shows the achieved sample alongside the R4V population benchmarks. The final sample was post-stratified using raking to align the weighted distribution to the R4V population shares.

TABLE A1.1. Sample composition and population benchmarks

Country	Completed Surveys	Sample % (weighted)	R4V Population	R4V %
Brazil	509	7%	572,739	8%
Chile	520	6%	532,715	7%
Colombia	656	44%	2,845,751	40%
Ecuador	614	7%	444,778	6%
Peru	519	22%	1,574,710	22%
US	358	7%	545,200	8%
Other countries	429	6%	622,022	9%

Notes: "Other countries" includes Argentina, Mexico, Panama, and Dominican Republic. R4V population figures from March 2024. Weighted sample percentages reflect post-stratification weights using raking. Colombia's weighted share (47 percent) exceeds its R4V benchmark (40 percent) because the raking procedure adjusted for age and gender composition within each country but did not impose exact country-level share constraints; country fixed effects ensure that all estimates are identified from within-country variation, so between-country share imbalances do not affect the coefficients of interest. The US sample is excluded from our regression analysis. The analysis sample (after excluding respondents with missing legal status, $n = 260$) is reported by country in Appendix 3.

Tables A1.2 and A1.3 compare the achieved sample composition to the target quotas by age group and gender within each country.

TABLE A1.2. Age distribution: target quotas vs. achieved sample (%)

	Target					Achieved				
2–6 (lr)7–11 Country	18–24	25–34	35–44	45–54	55+	18–24	25–34	35–44	45–54	55+
Colombia	20	33	25	11	10	12	32	37	9	10
Peru	19	41	22	11	7	15	43	29	7	6
Ecuador	22	38	23	10	7	18	36	29	10	6
Chile	9	42	29	11	9	13	34	31	15	7
Brazil	22	38	23	11	7	23	37	26	8	5
USA	12	21	24	20	23	12	21	24	20	23
Other	15	35	26	12	12	2	5	17	17	58

Notes: Target quotas derived from R4V demographic estimates (March 2024). "Achieved" columns show the unweighted sample composition. Discrepancies between target and achieved are corrected by post-stratification weights.

TABLE A1.3. Gender distribution: target quotas vs. achieved sample (%)

	Target		Achieved	
2–3 (lr)4–5 Country	Male	Female	Male	Female
Colombia	49	51	50	50
Peru	49	51	49	51
Ecuador	49	51	56	44
Chile	50	50	49	51
Brazil	51	49	54	46
USA	48	52	46	54
Other	51	49	53	47

Notes: See Table A1.2 notes.

Recruitment and respondent experience

For each demographic group, the pollster used online advertisements on social media platforms to promote digital content inviting individuals to complete a self-administered questionnaire. Advertisements were targeted by geographic location, age, gender, and digital footprints indicating the user had lived in Venezuela. The survey was branded under a social media page titled "Observatorio de Migración Venezolana," created and managed exclusively by the polling firm for the purpose of this study. No institutional affiliation (university or research center) was displayed to respondents, minimizing the risk that respondents would tailor their answers to perceived expectations.

The survey introduction read: "Gracias por participar en nuestra breve encuesta, nos ayudará a entender más sobre la diáspora venezolana y su condición general" ("Thank you for participating in our brief survey; it will help us better understand the Venezuelan diaspora and their general condition"). In the US, respondents were additionally offered a $5 Amazon gift card upon completion.

No incentive was offered in Latin American countries, where response rates were sufficiently high without one.

Screening, attention checks, and exclusions

Eligibility was confirmed at the start of the questionnaire: respondents who reported not being Venezuelan or currently living in Venezuela were screened out. Of the 7,412 total survey starts, 185 were disqualified for not being Venezuelan and 26 for residing in Venezuela. An attention check question asked respondents to select a specific color ("If you are reading this, please select 'green' and continue"); 27 respondents who failed this check were excluded. An additional 3,594 surveys were incomplete. The final sample of completed, valid surveys comprises 3,606 respondents (3,247 in Latin America, after excluding the US and one European respondent). Participation was voluntary; completing the questionnaire constituted implied consent to participate. No separate formal consent form was administered.

Legal status measurement and over-reporting risk

Because legal status is a sensitive topic for migrants, the question was marked as *optional* and included a "prefer not to answer" option, reducing social desirability pressure. The question asked: "What is your current immigration status in the country where you live?" with six response options ranging from "I have nationality or residency" to "I don't have papers and am not processing them." Respondents who selected "prefer not to answer" are excluded from the analysis sample ($n = 260$). While we cannot fully rule out over-reporting of legal status, the optional framing and the absence of institutional branding (which might signal enforcement risk) should mitigate this concern.

Survey instrument

The full survey instrument is reproduced below. The survey was administered in Spanish; we provide English translations of all questions and response options. Skip logic and screening conditions are noted in brackets.

Introduction shown to respondents

"Thank you for participating in our brief survey; it will help us better understand the Venezuelan diaspora and their general condition."

(In the US, the following was added: *"Complete the survey and receive a $5 Amazon gift card!"*)

Demographics

1. **Gender.** Please indicate your gender.
   Options: Male/Female

2. **Age.** What is your age?
   Options: 17 years or younger [screened out]/18–24/25–34/35–44/45–54/55+
3. **Nationality.** We would like to know your nationality.
   Options: I am Venezuelan/I am Venezuelan and also have nationality from the country where I live/I am not Venezuelan [screened out]
4. **Education.** What is the highest level of education you completed?
   Options: None/Primary or less/Secondary/Technical/vocational/University, postgraduate, or higher/Prefer not to answer
5. **Year of emigration.** In what year did you emigrate from Venezuela?
   Options: 2015 or earlier/2016–2019/2020–2021/2022 or later
6. **Mode of transport.** How did you emigrate? What mode of transport did you use?
   Options: By air, on a plane/By land, by bus or car for most of the journey/By land, walking for most of the journey
7. **Country of residence.** In which country do you currently live?
   Options: Venezuela [screened out]/Colombia/Ecuador/Chile/Peru/Argentina/Brazil/Mexico/Dominican Republic/Panama/US/Other country

Current situation

1. **Legal status.** *[Optional]* What is your current immigration status in the country where you live?
   Options: Prefer not to answer/I have nationality or residency/I have a visa or legal permit that I processed before arriving/I have a visa or legal permit that I processed after arriving/I don't have papers yet, but I am processing them/I don't have papers, and I am not processing them
2. **Resolved aspects.** Thinking about your current situation as a migrant, have you resolved the following aspects?
   Items: Housing for you and your family (owned or rented)/Economic capacity to cover basic needs/Access to medical care when needed/A valid passport (Venezuelan or other)
   Options per item: Yes, I have resolved it/I am in the process of resolving it/No, and I don't know how to resolve it/No, and I am not interested in resolving it
3. **Migration criteria.** If a family member or friend asks you what the most important criteria are when considering migrating to any country, what would you tell them? Select the two most important.
   Options: Having family or close friends in the country/Ease of obtaining legal immigration status/Treatment Venezuelans receive in the country/Economic situation of the country/Ease of finding work/Other (specify)
4. **NPS for host country.** On a scale of 0 to 10, how likely is it that you would recommend to your family or friends in Venezuela that they emigrate to [country]?

5. **Host country characteristics.** For the following characteristics of [country] as a receiver of Venezuelan migrants, would you say they are good and make you want to stay, or bad and make you want to leave?
   Items: Treatment Venezuelans receive/Ability to progress economically and achieve stability/Ease of obtaining legal status
   Options per item: Makes me want to leave/Does not affect my desire to leave or stay/Makes me want to stay/I wouldn't know
6. **Economic situation change.** Thinking about how the economic situation of [country] has changed from when you arrived until today, would you say it has improved or worsened?
   Options: Has improved/Is the same/Has worsened/I wouldn't know

Migration intentions

1. **Remigration intention.** Would you consider moving from [country]?
   Options: Yes, I am already making plans/Yes, I want to, but I haven't made plans yet/I might consider it, but I'm not sure/No
2. **Destination country.** [If Q14 ≠ "No"] To which country would you emigrate? Select all that apply.
   Options: Return to Venezuela/US/[list of countries, excluding current]
3. Some people respond to surveys without reading. If you are reading this, please select "green" and continue.
   Options: Blue/Purple/Green/Yellow
4. **US migration intention.** [If Q14 = "No" or US not selected in Q15; excludes US residents] Thinking specifically about the US, would you consider moving to that country?
   Options: Yes/No/I wouldn't know
5. **Reasons against US.** [If not willing to migrate to US] Why would you not consider migrating to the US? Select the three most important reasons.
   Options: No family or close friends there/I like being in [country]/Not enough money (or life is too expensive)/Hard to find work/The economy is very bad there/I don't like the culture/Not easy to get legal status/Not willing to be without legal status/Don't speak the language enough/The journey and border crossing is too dangerous/None of the above
6. **Reasons for US.** [If willing to migrate to US] Why would you consider migrating to the US? Select up to three reasons.
   Options: Have family or close friends/Don't like my situation in [country]/Good wages/Easy to find work/The economy is very good/I like the culture/Easy to get legal status/Don't need legal status to be there/Easy to get there/I speak the language/Other
7. **Network influence on US migration.** [If selected "family/friends" as reason] Which phrase best describes what your friends or family in the US tell you about migrating there?
   Options: They pressure me to move/They recommend I move/They don't interfere but tell me the good and bad/They don't say anything/They recommend I don't move

8. **Deterrents despite willingness.** [If willing to migrate to US] Among those same reasons, is there any that makes you think the US may not be a good option? Select up to three.
   Options: [Same list as Q17]
9. **US economic pull.** [If willing to migrate to US] Thinking specifically about the economic situation of the US, is it a reason for you to consider moving there?
   Options: It is the most important reason I would go/It is a reason but not the most important/It is a reason I would NOT go, but not the most important/It is the most important reason I would NOT go
10. **Border crossing willingness.** [If willing to migrate to US] How willing would you be to enter the US through the following mechanisms?
    Items: Enter with tourist/student status and process another from there/Enter with tourist/student status and stay even without another status/Enter through the border and process legal status from there/Enter through the border and stay even without legal status
    Options per item: Very willing/Somewhat willing/Not willing at all/I wouldn't know

Relationship with Venezuela

1. **Ties to Venezuela.** Do you have family or close friends living in Venezuela? Select all that apply.
   Options: No family or friends in Venezuela/Spouse/Child/Sibling/Parent/Grandparent/Close friends/Other
2. **Remittance dependence.** [If has someone in Venezuela] Does any of those family members in Venezuela depend on the money you send them?
   Options: Yes, the money I send is their main source of income/Yes, but the money I send supplements their income/No, I only send money in specific emergencies/I don't send money
3. **Perception of Venezuela.** Currently, do you think the situation in Venezuela is…
   Options: Very good/Good/Bad/Very bad/I wouldn't know
4. **Willingness to return.** How willing would you be to move back to Venezuela?
   Options: Totally willing/Somewhat willing/Not very willing/Not willing at all
5. **Reasons for considering return.** [If somewhat willing or more] What reasons make you consider returning to Venezuela? Select the 3 most important.
   Options: Family or close friends there/Don't like my situation in [country]/Economic situation has improved/I miss the country and its culture/Don't need legal status there/Other
6. **Reasons against return.** [If not willing at all] What reasons make you rule out returning to Venezuela? Select the 3 most important.
   Options: No longer have family or close friends there/I like my situation in [country]/Economic situation is not good/I don't like the culture/Insecurity/Political instability/Other

7. **Conditional return scenarios.** How willing would you be to move back to Venezuela if any of the following hypothetical scenarios occurs?
   Items: If the opposition wins the presidential elections/If you lose your legal status/ If sanctions on Venezuela are lifted
   Options per item: Totally willing/Somewhat willing/Not very willing/Not willing at all

Appendix 2. Descriptive statistics

Table A2.1 presents weighted means for key variables, disaggregated by legal status.

TABLE A2.1. Descriptive statistics by legal status

		All		Legal		Undocumented		
3–4 (lr)5–6 (lr)7–8 Variable	Sample	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Diff
Employed	Full	0.807	2,987	0.823	2,369	0.738	618	0.085
Formal employment	Employed	0.620	2,351	0.643	1,919	0.512	432	0.131
Perceives wage equity	Employed	0.611	1,900	0.646	1,554	0.438	346	0.208
Has written contract	Employed	0.393	2,293	0.441	1,881	0.158	412	0.283
Contributes to social security	Employed	0.515	2,008	0.555	1,685	0.282	323	0.273
Pays taxes	Employed	0.502	2,001	0.537	1,669	0.317	332	0.220
Paid via bank account	Employed	0.541	2,318	0.612	1,897	0.206	421	0.406
Cannot cover basic needs	Employed	0.058	2,351	0.054	1,919	0.080	432	–0.026
Wants to stay	Full	0.232	2,987	0.232	2,369	0.232	618	0.000
Has legal status	Full	0.810	2,987	—	—	—	—	—

Notes: Weighted means using survey sample weights. "Full" sample includes all respondents; "Employed" sample conditions on having any job. Diff = Legal – Undocumented. USA and Europe excluded from sample.

Appendix 3. Sample composition

TABLE A3.1. Sample composition by host country

Country	Total	Legal	Undoc.	% Legal	% Employed	% Stay
Argentina	136	129	7	97.4	80.2	49.6
Brazil	461	439	22	95.6	85.6	29.4
Chile	485	276	209	56.3	82.0	28.3
Colombia	585	475	110	79.9	77.7	22.6
Ecuador	578	379	199	61.9	72.8	22.1
Mexico	32	29	3	81.7	50.7	15.0
Panama	60	56	4	83.4	86.9	36.2
Peru	475	439	36	91.1	86.4	19.2
Dominican Republic	175	147	28	79.2	85.7	27.3
Total	**2,987**	**2,369**	**618**	**79.3**	**81.0**	**23.2**

Notes: Weighted percentages using survey sample weights. USA and Europe excluded.

Appendix 4. Sample definition and variable construction

Sample restrictions

The original survey collected 3,606 responses from Venezuelan migrants across eleven countries. We apply two sample restrictions. First, we exclude respondents in the US ($n = 358$) and Europe ($n = 1$), where migration policy contexts differ fundamentally from those in Latin America. Second, we exclude respondents with missing legal status information ($n = 260$), since legal status is the central variable in our analysis. The resulting analysis sample consists of 2,987 respondents across nine Latin American countries.

Main explanatory variable

Legal status is coded as a binary indicator equal to one if the respondent reports possessing a visa, nationality, or equivalent documentation, and zero if they report having no legal migratory status. Respondents who preferred not to answer are excluded (see above).

Outcome variables

All outcome variables are binary indicators constructed from categorical survey responses. Table A4.1 summarizes the construction of each variable.

TABLE A4.1. Variable definitions

Variable	Equals 1 if	Sample Restriction	N
Unemployed	"No tengo trabajo"	All respondents	2,987
Formal employment	"Tengo trabajo formal"	Employed only	2,351
Perceives wage equity	"No, gano lo mismo..."	Excl. "No sabría decir"	1,900
Has written contract	"Sí"	Excl. "No sabría decir"	2,293
Contributes to social security	"Sí"	Excl. "No sabría decir"	2,008
Pays taxes	"Sí"	Excl. "No sabría decir"	2,001
Paid via bank account	"Sí"	Excl. "No sabría decir"	2,318
Cannot cover basic needs	"No puedo cubrir..."	Employed only	2,351
Wants to stay	"No" (to remigration)	All respondents	2,987

Notes: "Employed only" excludes respondents who report being unemployed. "Excl. 'No sabría decir'" excludes respondents who answered "I wouldn't know" to the relevant question, as this response is ambiguous between genuine uncertainty and a true negative. The formal employment variable is defined among employed respondents only because unemployment is modeled as a separate outcome. N refers to the number of non-missing observations available for each variable.

Two construction choices merit explanation:

Excluding "don't know" responses. Several survey questions (contract, social security, taxes, bank account, and wage equity) included a "No sabría decir" ("I wouldn't know") option. We exclude these

respondents from the relevant outcome rather than coding them as zero, because a "don't know" response is ambiguous: it could reflect genuine uncertainty or an unwillingness to report. In Appendix 6, we show that recoding "don't know" as zero produces virtually identical results.

Formal employment among employed respondents. We define formal employment as holding a formal job conditional on being employed, rather than among all respondents. This avoids conflating the extensive margin (having any job) with the intensive margin (having a formal job). Unemployment is modeled as a separate outcome with the full sample.

Interaction models

In the interaction analysis (Section 4), we interact legal status with each labor market indicator as a binary mediator. The mediator takes the value one if the respondent reports the positive outcome (e.g., has a contract) and zero otherwise, using the same "clean" definitions described above. The interaction coefficient captures whether the link between legal status and settlement intentions differs between migrants with and without that labor market outcome.

Appendix 5. Regression results

For each outcome Y_i we estimate the following linear probability model:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta \cdot \text{Legal}_i + X_i'\gamma + \delta_c + \varepsilon_i$$

where Legal_i is a binary indicator for having legal documentation, X_i is a vector of individual controls (gender, age, education, year of arrival, mode of transport), δ_c are country fixed effects, and ε_i is the error term. For the interaction analysis (Table A5.2), we augment the model with a labor market mediator M_i and an interaction term $\text{Legal}_i \times M_i$. Standard errors are clustered by host country, and survey sample weights are applied throughout.

Because our sample spans only nine country clusters—fewer than the approximately 50 recommended for reliable asymptotic inference (Cameron and Miller 2015)—cluster-robust standard errors may understate true uncertainty. We address this in two ways. First, we verify that our main results are robust to restricting the sample to the five largest country groups (Appendix 7). Second, we compute wild cluster bootstrap *p*-values using Webb six-point weights (Roodman et al. 2019), which provide more accurate inference with few clusters. All seven core labor market results survive the bootstrap at the 5 percent level; the interaction results are more sensitive, with the written contract channel showing the most robust evidence (Appendix 8).

Table A5.1 reports the association between legal status and each outcome. Table A5.2 reports the interaction models for settlement intentions.

TABLE A5.1. Association between legal status and labor market outcomes

Outcome	Coef. (pp)	SE	*p*-Value	N
Unemployed	−4.64*	(2.23)	0.072	2,987
Formal employment	13.32***	(3.37)	0.004	2,351
Perceives wage equity	15.46***	(3.59)	0.003	1,900
Has written contract	21.64***	(4.04)	0.001	2,293
Contributes to social security	21.62***	(3.53)	0.000	2,008
Pays taxes	16.47***	(2.75)	0.000	2,001
Paid via bank account	30.51***	(5.99)	0.001	2,318
Cannot cover basic needs	−3.32*	(1.72)	0.089	2,351
Wants to stay	1.33	(4.81)	0.790	2,987
Controls		Yes		
Country FE		Yes		

Notes: OLS estimates from separate regressions of each outcome on a legal status indicator. Coefficients in percentage points. Controls: gender, age, education, year of arrival, transport mode, country fixed effects. Sample weights applied. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Ambiguous survey responses ("don't know") excluded from outcome definitions. *$p < 0.10$, **$p < 0.05$, ***$p < 0.01$.

TABLE A5.2. Association between legal status and wanting to stay in host country

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	No Inter.	Unemp.	Formal	Wage Eq.	Contract	Soc. Sec.	Taxes	Bank Acct.	Hardship
Legal status	1.33	2.10	−0.65	7.66	0.32	4.88	4.42	1.38	3.08
	(4.81)	(4.72)	(6.92)	(6.26)	(6.07)	(3.47)	(3.64)	(5.67)	(4.75)
Mediator		2.22	2.13	15.14**	−6.49***	9.56	6.93	−8.87***	−3.21
		(3.15)	(3.70)	(6.21)	(1.47)	(6.75)	(7.16)	(2.64)	(4.29)
Legal status × Mediator		−3.10**	4.97	−14.17	8.48**	−11.81	−7.40	6.57**	−7.06
		(1.14)	(4.84)	(7.94)	(3.36)	(7.18)	(6.63)	(2.81)	(8.81)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,987	2,987	2,351	1,900	2,293	2,008	2,001	2,318	2,351

Notes: OLS estimates. Dependent variable: wants to stay in host country (binary). All coefficients in percentage points. Column (1) shows the unconditional association between legal status and wanting to stay. Columns (2)–(9) show OLS coefficients from models interacting legal status with each labor market mediator. Controls: gender, age, education, year of arrival, mode of transport. Country fixed effects included in all specifications. Sample weights applied. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. USA excluded. Ambiguous survey responses (*don't know*) excluded from mediator definitions. *$p < 0.10$, **$p < 0.05$, ***$p < 0.01$.

Appendix 6. Robustness: Alternative variable definitions

Several survey questions included a "don't know" response option. Our main analysis excludes these respondents from the relevant outcome. As a robustness check, we re-estimate all models using a "broad" definition that recodes "don't know" as zero. Tables A6.1 and A6.2 show that results are virtually unchanged.

TABLE A6.1. Robustness: alternative variable definitions—labor outcomes

	Baseline (Excl. "don't know")			Broad ("don't know" → 0)		
2–4 (lr)5–7 Outcome	Coef. (pp)	SE	N	Coef. (pp)	SE	N
Perceives wage equity	15.46***	(3.59)	1,900	14.26***	(3.84)	2,351
Has written contract	21.64***	(4.04)	2,293	21.68***	(4.10)	2,351
Contributes to social security	21.62***	(3.53)	2,008	20.45***	(3.16)	2,351
Pays taxes	16.47***	(2.75)	2,001	15.34***	(3.04)	2,351
Paid via bank account	30.51***	(5.99)	2,318	30.25***	(5.87)	2,351

Notes: OLS estimates. "Baseline" excludes respondents who answered "don't know" from the outcome definition. "Broad" recodes "don't know" as 0 (i.e., absence of the characteristic). All other specifications identical: controls for gender, age, education, year of arrival, transport mode, country FE. Sample weights applied; SEs clustered by country. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

TABLE A6.2. Robustness: alternative variable definitions—interaction effects on wanting to stay

	Baseline (Excl. "don't know")			Broad ("don't know" → 0)		
2–4 (lr)5–7 Mediator	β_{int} (pp)	SE	N	β_{int} (pp)	SE	N
Wage equity	–14.17	(7.94)	1,900	–8.86	(6.64)	2,351
Written contract	8.48**	(3.36)	2,293	8.27**	(3.34)	2,351
Social security	–11.81	(7.18)	2,008	–10.89**	(4.22)	2,351
Pays taxes	–7.40	(6.63)	2,001	–7.14	(5.61)	2,351
Bank account	6.57**	(2.81)	2,318	5.93*	(3.18)	2,351

Notes: OLS estimates. Reported coefficient is the interaction term (Legal status × Mediator) from models predicting "wants to stay." "Baseline" excludes "don't know" respondents from mediator definition; "Broad" recodes them as 0. Controls: gender, age, education, year of arrival, transport mode, country FE. Sample weights applied; SEs clustered by country. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Appendix 7. Robustness: Restricted country sample

As discussed in Section 2, four of the nine surveyed countries—Argentina, Mexico, Panama, and the Dominican Republic—have sample sizes too small for reliable country-level inference. To verify that our main results are not driven by the inclusion of these countries, we re-estimate all models using only the five countries with individually representative samples: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. This reduces the sample from 2,987 to 2,584 respondents and the number of country clusters from nine to five.

Figures A7.1 and A7.2 replicate the main coefficient plots using this restricted sample. Panel A results are virtually identical: all six core labor market outcomes remain statistically significant with nearly unchanged point estimates. Panel B interaction results show stable point estimates but wider confidence intervals, reflecting the loss of statistical power from fewer clusters. The contract and bank account interactions, which are significant at the 5 percent level in the full sample, become marginally significant in the restricted sample—consistent with a power reduction rather than a change in the underlying pattern.

FIGURE A7.1. Legal status and labor market outcomes (5-country sample)



Notes: Sample restricted to Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru (N = 2,584). See Figure 2 notes for specification details.

FIGURE A7.2. Interaction effects on wanting to stay (5-country sample)



Notes: Sample restricted to Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. See Figure 4 notes for specification details. Point estimates are stable; wider confidence intervals reflect fewer clusters (5 vs. 9).

Appendix 8. Robustness: Wild cluster bootstrap inference

Because our sample contains only nine country clusters, standard cluster-robust inference may be unreliable (Cameron and Miller 2015). To address this, we compute wild cluster bootstrap *p*-values using Webb six-point weights with 99,999 replications (Roodman et al. 2019). This method provides more accurate finite-sample inference when the number of clusters is small.

Table A8.1 reports cluster-robust and bootstrap *p*-values side by side for all outcomes. Panel A results are strongly confirmed: all seven core labor market associations (unemployment through bank account) remain statistically significant at the 5 percent level under bootstrap inference. Inability to cover basic needs, which was only marginally significant under cluster-robust inference ($p = 0.089$), does not survive the bootstrap correction ($p = 0.324$). The null result for settlement intentions is unchanged. To address concerns about multiple testing, we also report Benjamini-Hochberg (BH) adjusted *p*-values for the nine Panel A outcomes. All seven core labor market results survive the BH correction at the 5 percent level, with adjusted *p*-values ranging from 0.027 to 0.041.

For the interaction results in Panel B, the written contract interaction—the strongest in our main analysis—remains marginally significant under the bootstrap ($p = 0.060$). The bank account and unemployment interactions, which were significant at the 5 percent level under cluster-robust inference, do not survive the bootstrap correction. This is consistent with the pattern observed in the restricted 5-country sample (Appendix 7): the interaction results should be interpreted as suggestive rather than definitive, though the written contract channel shows the most robust evidence.

We do not apply BH correction to the Panel B interactions because each interaction tests a conceptually distinct moderating channel—whether contracts, bank accounts, unemployment, or other labor market outcomes modify the legal status–settlement link. Unlike Panel A, where the same treatment is tested across related outcomes (raising the concern that at least one will be significant by chance), the Panel B interactions represent separate hypotheses about different mechanisms. Correcting across them would be analogous to correcting across all heterogeneity analyses in a paper, which is not standard practice in applied economics. For transparency, however, we note that if a BH correction were applied across the eight Panel B interactions, no result would survive at conventional levels (smallest adjusted $p = 0.48$). This underscores the exploratory nature of the interaction results and reinforces the need to interpret them as suggestive patterns rather than as confirmed statistical relationships.

TABLE A8.1. Wild cluster bootstrap inference

Outcome	Coefficient (pp)	Cluster-Robust *p*-Value	Bootstrap *p*-Value	BH-Adjusted *p*-Value	*N*
Panel A: Legal status → outcome					
Unemployed	−4.6	0.072*	0.032**	0.041**	2,987
Formal employment	13.3	0.004***	0.029**	0.041**	2,351
Wage equity	15.5	0.003***	0.010**	0.032**	1,900
Written contract	21.6	0.001***	0.014**	0.032**	2,293
Social security	21.6	0.000***	0.014**	0.032**	2,008
Pays taxes	16.5	0.000***	0.003***	0.027**	2,001
Bank account	30.5	0.001***	0.024**	0.041**	2,318
Cannot cover basic needs	−3.3	0.089*	0.324	0.364	2,351
Wants to stay	1.3	0.790	0.914	0.914	2,987
Panel B: Legal × mediator → wants to stay (interaction term)					
× Unemployment	−3.1	0.027**	0.143		2,987
× Formal employment	5.0	0.335	0.654		2,351
× Wage equity	−14.2	0.112	0.290		1,900
× Written contract	8.5	0.035**	0.060*		2,293
× Social security	−11.8	0.139	0.289		2,008
× Pays taxes	−7.4	0.297	0.419		2,001
× Bank account	6.6	0.048**	0.177		2,318
× Cannot cover basic needs	−7.1	0.446	0.638		2,351

Notes: Wild cluster bootstrap *p*-values computed using Webb six-point weights with 99,999 replications, following Cameron et al. (2008) and Roodman et al. (2019). Cluster-robust *p*-values based on *t*-distribution with $G - 1$ degrees of freedom (8 d.f. for 9 country clusters). BH-adjusted *p*-values apply the Benjamini-Hochberg correction for multiple testing across the 9 Panel A outcomes; not applied to Panel B because each interaction tests a distinct mediator channel rather than the same hypothesis across outcomes. *$p < 0.10$, **$p < 0.05$, ***$p < 0.01$.

Appendix 9. Robustness: Leave-one-out estimates

To verify that our results are not driven by any single country, we conduct a leave-one-out analysis: for each of the nine host countries, we drop that country and re-estimate the Panel A model. Figure A9.1 displays the results. Each point represents the estimated association between legal status and the outcome when one country is removed; the blue vertical line and shaded band show the full-sample estimate and 95 percent confidence interval for reference.

The estimates are stable. For all nine outcomes, the leave-one-out coefficients cluster tightly around the full-sample estimate, regardless of which country is excluded. No single country drives the results. Even dropping Colombia—the country with the largest sample—leaves point estimates essentially unchanged. This provides additional confidence that the associations we document reflect a broad pattern across the Venezuelan diaspora rather than an artifact of any particular host-country context.

FIGURE A9.1. Leave-one-out estimates: legal status and labor market outcomes



Notes: Each point shows the estimated association between legal status and the outcome when one country is dropped from the sample. The blue vertical line and shaded band show the full-sample point estimate and 95 percent confidence interval. OLS with country fixed effects, demographic controls, and survey sample weights. Standard errors clustered by host country. For five outcomes (wage equity, social security, taxes, written contract, bank account), "don't know" responses are excluded; sample sizes vary by outcome.

Appendix 10. Unadjusted maps

The maps below (see Figure A10.1) show raw (unadjusted) weighted means for each variable by host country. These complement the adjusted maps in Figure 1, which control for differences in demographics and migration history across countries.

FIGURE A10.1. Key variables by host country (unadjusted)



Notes: All rates are raw weighted percentages, not adjusted for demographic composition. Compare with Figure 1, which adjusts for gender, age, education, year of arrival, and transport mode to make country comparisons more like-for-like. Argentina, Mexico, Panama, and the Dominican Republic are shown in gray (sample too small for country-level inference).

Source: Venezuelan Diaspora Survey 2024.