Abstract
The prevailing fiscal outlook alongside broader shifts in the health landscape have important implications for countries’ eligibility for support from Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance. This analysis, based on recent economic growth data, explores countries’ transition and eligibility prospects between 2023 and 2040 and highlights two key takeaways. First, current projections are largely similar to pre-COVID estimates. However, the cohort of transitioning countries face more challenging fiscal conditions, with implications for governments’ abilities to sustain immunization financing and delivery. Second, roughly 40 countries are projected to remain eligible for Gavi support through 2040, raising questions about funding commitments beyond the Sustainable Development Goals era and the need for alternative pathways to sustainability.

In view of these trends, this paper offers four policy recommendations for Gavi’s leadership and board to consider during its next strategic period, known as “Gavi 6.0”: (1) rethink criteria for eligibility and align on core principles to determine how best to evolve the overall approach, which could entail incremental changes or substantive reform; (2) re-examine Gavi’s approach to prioritization of resources and value for money; (3) modify Gavi’s operating model and modalities of engagement, especially in fragile and conflict-affected settings; and (4) align and clarify approaches with other global health mechanisms.
Projections of Eligibility and Transition Trajectories up to 2040: Implications for Gavi’s Next Strategic Period and Beyond

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For a summary blog related to this work, see https://www.cgdev.org/blog/its-time-evolve-gavis-eligibility-and-transition-model.

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Introduction

Many low- and middle-income countries are facing harsh fiscal prospects as they confront high inflation, soaring interest rates, currency depreciation, and rising debt, among other aftershocks from the COVID-19 crisis. As debt-to-GDP ratios rise and debt servicing crowds out social-sector spending, the outlook for spending on health, as well as many other sectors, does not look promising. Recent projections from the World Bank indicate that spending on health is likely to contract or stagnate in most low- and lower-middle-income countries over at least the next five years. Some low-income countries could see as much as a 20 percent reduction in health spending (in real terms)—with potential implications for the availability of and access to essential health services. At the same time, donor budgets are also under immense pressure, amid a shifting global landscape.

This prevailing fiscal outlook also has important implications on eligibility, transition, and co-financing trajectories for different global health mechanisms. This CGD policy paper expands on recent analysis of transition trajectories for different global health mechanisms, diving deeper into the implications of up-to-date macroeconomic projections on countries’ prospects for transition from Gavi between 2023 and 2040. It highlights key takeaways and implications for Gavi’s eligibility, transition, and co-financing model going forward.

These findings should be understood within the broader post-COVID context. Health systems in many countries are still reeling from the aftershocks of the pandemic—and immunization coverage rates are flatlining and even backsliding in some instances, alongside persistent inequities. Furthermore, evidence suggests the upcoming cohort of transitioning countries fares worse than previous ones.

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than previous ones on economic growth rate and immunization coverage indicators—and is potentially at risk of unsuccessful transition. Finally, the growing portfolio of new and potentially more expensive vaccines is likely to increase the overall price tag of childhood immunization programs.

Taken together, our findings and these macro forces indicate serious challenges with Gavi’s existing eligibility, transition, and co-financing model. The next strategic period (known as “Gavi 6.0”) presents a key opportunity for Gavi to substantively evolve its eligibility, transition, and co-financing model to ensure its policies are fit for purpose in a rapidly evolving global landscape.

Overview of Gavi’s eligibility, transition, and co-financing model

Among the global health financing mechanisms, Gavi has a particularly explicit policy for eligibility, transition, and co-financing (see Box 1 and Figure 1 for more details on Gavi’s overall approach). Still, Gavi has demonstrated a willingness to consider flexibilities and adjustments to its transition and eligibility policy, including country- and vaccine-specific exceptions. For instance, Gavi has approved a special partnership with India, which transitioned from Gavi support in 2021, and bespoke co-financing arrangements for specific vaccines, such as vaccines against malaria and polio.

The Gavi board also recently approved changes to its eligibility and transition policy at its December 2022 meeting, which extended the overall duration of the accelerated transition phase from five to eight years and introduced a requirement for countries to co-finance at least 35 percent of vaccine costs to enter the accelerated transition phase. These changes signal, at least in part, an openness to adapt in response to COVID-induced budgetary pressures that countries are currently facing.
BOX 1. Background on Gavi’s eligibility, transition, and co-financing model

Gavi defines country eligibility based primarily on gross national income (GNI) per capita. The eligibility threshold is updated annually to account for inflation using the World Bank’s income category adjustments. For 2023, countries are eligible for Gavi support if their average GNI per capita over the past three years is below the threshold of $1,730 (up from $1,660 in 2022).

Countries below the GNI per capita eligibility threshold fall into one of two groups. First, countries in the low-income category (with GDP per capita below $1,135, as defined by the World Bank) are in the initial self-financing phase. Co-financing obligations in this phase include a fixed price per dose ($0.20) for Gavi-supported vaccines. Second, countries above the World Bank’s low-income threshold yet under Gavi’s eligibility threshold ($1,730 GNI per capita) are in the preparatory transition phase and see gradual increases in co-financing obligations (see Figure 1).

Once a country’s three-year average GNI per capita is above the eligibility threshold, it enters the accelerated transition phase, with some exceptions. During this phase, co-financing contributions gradually increase; in turn, Gavi reduces its support. This phase has historically lasted five years and was recently extended to eight years, although shorter transitions have also been recorded. A country has “transitioned” from Gavi support once it is fully self-financing. Nineteen countries have transitioned from Gavi support to date.

For further details, see Gavi’s full policies on eligibility, transition, and co-financing.
In 2023, a total of 54 countries are eligible for Gavi support—28 countries in the initial self-financing phase, 16 countries in preparatory transition, and 10 in accelerated transition. The latest data on country disbursements (using the average of Gavi disbursements for 2017–2019) suggests that 39 percent of Gavi’s disbursements were channelled to countries in the initial self-financing phase, 23 percent to preparatory transition countries, and 22 percent to accelerated transition countries.

**Methods and caveats**

First, we constructed country-specific projections of annual GNI per capita up to 2040 using data on gross domestic product (GDP) from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s World Economic Outlook. Our analysis used data from April 2023 as a measure of the current outlook and data from April 2017 as a proxy for pre-COVID projections. The IMF’s economic growth projections are available up to 2028; we then estimated countries’ GDP for all other years up to 2040 based on the linear trend observed over the past seven years. GDP projections served as a proxy for GNI projections in this analysis.

Of the 54 Gavi-eligible countries, our sample included 51 countries for which GDP projections are available through 2028. Our analysis excluded three countries currently in the initial self-financing phase (Afghanistan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and Syrian Arab Republic) for which projections are not available.

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17 Country disbursements total to 84 percent, rather than 100 percent; see more on methods and caveats in the next section.
In addition, we constructed two growth scenarios for Gavi’s eligibility threshold. First, we used a 4 percent annual inflation adjustment scenario (“4 percent scenario”), which aligns with the 4.2 percent increase in Gavi’s threshold between 2022 and 2023 (from $1,660 to $1,730, respectively) and the upcoming 4.6 percent increase for 2024. Second, we used a 2 percent inflation adjustment scenario (“2 percent scenario”) to align with the average inflation adjustment from previous years. This approach aligns with the model used in our colleague Rachel Silverman Bonnifield’s previous analysis (apart from assuming linear growth in the eligibility threshold) and is detailed further in the recent companion CGD working paper.

For Gavi disbursements to recipient countries, we used data from the International Aid Transparency Initiative. Specifically, we calculated average disbursements over the period 2017–2019 to obtain stable estimates. The sum of disbursements for the countries in our sample represent 84 percent of total disbursements rather than 100 percent, given that three Gavi-eligible countries were excluded from the analysis and India stopped receiving Gavi disbursements in 2019 (though, as of recently, India has an active strategic partnership agreement).

Finally, we used data from the World Health Organization’s Global Health Expenditure database for domestic government health expenditure. We calculated average expenditure over the period 2017–2019 to obtain stable estimates and align with the disbursements data.

As with any projections, the overall approach, methods, and data sources have inherent limitations. While these projections should not be taken as concrete predictions of what will happen to individual countries, they are useful in understanding the overall landscape and broad trends, yielding insights for informing policies and approaches going forward. Notably, this analysis is based purely on projections for GNI per capita; it does not account for other considerations in the macroeconomic context, such as country-specific debt repayment schedules, or other criteria in Gavi’s eligibility and transitions.
transition policy, such as Penta3 coverage and the recently implemented 35 percent co-financing requirement. These factors will, in turn, have implications for the specific trajectories of individual countries and would be useful areas for future inquiry. Furthermore, we acknowledge that the 4 percent increase in Gavi’s eligibility threshold between 2022 and 2024 may not hold throughout the period of analysis; to this end, we consider a 2 percent growth scenario for illustrative purposes.

Results

In the following sections, we present projections for the 2023–2040 period broken down by Gavi’s three eligibility phases.

Countries in the initial self-financing phase

Based on our GNI projections, none of the 25 initial self-financing countries included in this analysis is likely to enter the accelerated transition phase by 2040 in the 4 percent scenario (Figure 2). Ethiopia and Guinea, which together represent about 6 percent of Gavi’s disbursements, are the only two countries projected to exceed the GNI-based eligibility threshold in the 2 percent scenario.

For many of the countries in this phase, Gavi disbursements are a significant component of external health spending and are sizeable compared to domestic government spending on health. Specifically, Gavi disbursements account for about 15 percent of external health spending and are equivalent
to around 20 percent of domestic government health spending, on average, though levels vary significantly between countries. Some fragile and conflict-affected countries like the Central African Republic, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are particularly reliant on Gavi financing, with disbursements equivalent to roughly 50–60 percent of general government health expenditure.

**Countries in the preparatory transition phase**

Our projections suggest that no more than two of the 16 countries (Cambodia and Haiti) currently in the preparatory transition phase are likely to have a GNI per capita above Gavi’s eligibility threshold by 2040 based on our 4 percent scenario (Figure 3). Cambodia is currently below the eligibility threshold and is projected to exceed the GNI eligibility threshold required to move to the accelerated transition phase by 2040. In addition, our projections suggest Haiti will remain above the GNI eligibility threshold between 2023 and 2040; in reality, it is not likely to progress to the accelerated transition phase due to ongoing political, social, and economic unrest and other factors potentially impacting its ability to satisfy other eligibility criteria.  

24 While our projections using the IMF’s World Economic Outlook data from April 2017 and April 2023 suggest that Haiti will remain above the GNI eligibility threshold in both the 4 percent and 2 percent inflation adjustment scenarios, we noted that Gavi documents do not include Haiti among the list of countries expected to transition. See here: “Raising Generation ImmUnity: The 2023 Mid-Term Review Report,” Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, June 2023, https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/investing/funding/resource-mobilisation/MTR23_Report_FULL_eng.pdf, page 28.
Seven additional countries (Comoros, Guinea, Kyrgyz Republic, Mauritania, Nepal, Senegal, and Tajikistan) are projected to cross the eligibility threshold in the 2 percent scenario. Exact timelines for these countries will depend on the actual year-on-year growth rate of the eligibility threshold.

**Countries in the accelerated transition phase**

Of the 10 countries currently in the accelerated transition phase, seven countries are likely to remain above the eligibility threshold through 2040 based on the 4 percent scenario (Figure 4)—and, therefore, expected to transition away from Gavi support and become fully self-financing. In the 2 percent scenario, our projections suggest nine countries may remain above the eligibility threshold through 2040.

![Projected GNI trajectories for countries currently in Gavi’s accelerated transition phase](image)

If the increase in Gavi’s eligibility threshold to account for inflation outpaces the growth in countries’ GNI per capita, some countries may initially transition but could later become re-eligible. Depending on the actual rate at which Gavi’s eligibility threshold increases, Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) may fall below the threshold after 2035 and become re-eligible for Gavi support. Additionally, Kenya and Ghana could also become re-eligible if the threshold grows at 4 percent annually.

See Appendix A for an illustrative comparison between our analysis and Gavi’s own projections of countries that are poised to transition in the next few years.
Takeaways and implications for Gavi and global immunization efforts

Overall, our analysis underscores two key takeaways and related implications.

**Takeaway 1: Compared to pre-COVID projections, transition prospects have mostly stayed consistent, with a few exceptions**

Transition prospects using updated economic growth data have, for the most part, not changed significantly compared to projections from 2017 using pre-COVID data (see Table 1). These trends could be attributable—at least in part—to better-than-expected economic growth just prior to COVID as well as to a rebound after COVID.

**TABLE 1. Number of countries projected to be above Gavi’s GNI-based eligibility criteria by 2040 using World Economic Outlook data from 2017 and 2023**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evolution Against the Eligibility Threshold Between 2023 and 2040</th>
<th>Projected Number of Gavi-eligible Countries* (% of Current Gavi Disbursements)**</th>
<th>4 Percent Inflation Adjustment Scenario</th>
<th>2 Percent Inflation Adjustment Scenario</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stay eligible: below threshold in 2023 and 2040</td>
<td>36 (55%)</td>
<td>37 (59%)</td>
<td>35 (55%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Become re-eligible: above threshold in 2023, below threshold in 2040</td>
<td>5 (7%)</td>
<td>5 (6%)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stay above: above threshold in 2023 and 2040</td>
<td>9 (21%)</td>
<td>8 (18%)</td>
<td>14 (28%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exceed threshold: below threshold in 2023, above threshold in 2040</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1 (&lt;1%)</td>
<td>1 (&lt;1%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: a) Based on the 51 current Gavi-eligible countries included in this analysis. b) Percentages do not add up to 100 because some countries were excluded from the analysis, as explained in the methods and caveats section above. c) Somalia is excluded from the 2017 sample because economic growth projections were not available.

Source: Based on data from Adrian Gheorghe and Pete Baker, “Country Transition Projections up to 2040: Gavi, the Global Fund, and the World Bank’s IDA,” Center for Global Development, October 11, 2023, [https://www.cgdev.org/publication/country-transition-projections-2040-gavi-global-fund-and-world-banks-ida](https://www.cgdev.org/publication/country-transition-projections-2040-gavi-global-fund-and-world-banks-ida). However, there are some exceptions to this pattern. First, some countries have better economic growth prospects and transition projections than before the pandemic. For example, Côte d’Ivoire and Solomon Islands were expected to become re-eligible by 2040 based on 2017 data but are now likely to stay above the threshold based on updated projections. 2017 data suggested Cambodia may be eligible for support in 2040, but 2023 data projects it may now exceed the GNI threshold in this timeframe. Second, some countries (e.g., Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Sudan) had better economic growth
prospects prior to the pandemic—and are now likely to remain below the GNI threshold and eligible for Gavi support through 2040. The trend for Kenya and Ghana is aligned with the 2017 projections.

**Implications for Gavi**

The prevailing fiscal outlook could have several potential implications for Gavi and global immunization financing and outcomes (see Box 2). Some countries that are poised to transition from Gavi may be less able (and less willing) to sustain—let alone increase—current levels of spending for immunization among competing priorities in health and other social sectors. As a result, countries could face difficulties meeting Gavi co-financing requirements going forward. And in instances where countries simultaneously face increasing co-financing requirements and/or undergo simultaneous transition from multiple global health mechanisms, there could be additional demands on limited public resources and related programmatic challenges. For example, projections suggest Cambodia, Kyrgyz Republic, and Nepal may cross the eligibility thresholds for both IDA and Gavi by 2040, depending on the rate of annual inflation adjustment for each mechanism’s threshold.

**BOX 2. Potential implications and considerations for countries across Gavi’s transition phases**

The current fiscal context has several potential implications for immunization financing and outcomes across Gavi’s three transition phases. As mentioned in the methods and caveats section, this analysis did not account for co-financing levels, which could be considered in follow-on research.

**Initial self-financing:** Given the prevailing fiscal outlook, the length of time countries spend in this stage may be significantly longer, on average, than previous cohorts. Notably, World Bank analysis finds that many of these countries are expected to see health spending stagnate or even drop in the coming years. Of the 23 initial self-financing countries included in this analysis for which World Bank estimates are available, five are currently in debt distress (Malawi, Mozambique, Somalia, Sudan, and Zambia), 10 are at high risk of debt distress, and eight are at moderate risk. Further, more than half of this total cohort of countries (17/28; 61 percent) are also characterized as fragile and conflict-affected, underscoring the need for Gavi to continue to adapt its modalities of support tailored to these settings.
**Preparatory transition:** Similarly, challenging macroeconomic conditions could result in countries spending a longer time in this phase, until they cross the GNI eligibility threshold and are able to reach the recently introduced 35 percent minimum co-financing requirement to proceed to the accelerated transition phase. In some instances, Gavi may therefore need to revisit co-financing requirements and/or new and different approaches to incentivize higher levels of co-financing amid competing priorities in the health sector and beyond.

In other cases, some countries may exceed the 35 percent co-financing threshold before advancing to the accelerated transition phase. Countries may stay below the GNI eligibility threshold for several years due to slow or negative economic growth; however, they will still face the required annual increases in co-financing levels while in the preparatory transition phase. Gavi may therefore need to consider modifying the level or timeline of co-financing increases for some countries that will remain in the preparatory transition phase for extended periods of time.

**Accelerated transition:** Given the prevailing fiscal outlook, some countries undergoing accelerated transition may face acute constraints. World Bank projections suggest that per capita government spending on health is expected to contract for two of these countries (Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands), stagnate for five (Djibouti, Kenya, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, and Lao PDR), and expand for only three countries (Bangladesh, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ghana).

As a result, countries may face challenges in rapidly ramping up co-financing levels to become fully self-financing within eight years. These difficulties may be particularly acute in countries like Bangladesh, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, and Djibouti that entered accelerated transition at less than 20 percent co-financing (prior to the 35 percent requirement introduced in December 2022).


Further, some countries (Ghana, Lao PDR, and Sao Tome and Principe) are also in debt distress, compounding challenges. Notably, Ghana is facing high levels of debt, with a 50 percent ratio of interest payments on loans as a share of national revenues—while at the same time, it is one of three countries introducing the newer, more expensive RTS,S vaccine through Gavi’s Malaria Vaccine Implementation Program.

Finally, the trajectories of a subset of countries in this phase, like Bangladesh and Nigeria, will be consequential for global immunization efforts, especially given their large birth cohorts and highly variable and inequitable levels of immunization coverage.

In addition, the growing portfolio of supported vaccines also presents a challenge to transitioning countries with limited budgetary space for health. Indeed, the cohort of countries currently in or entering the accelerated transition phase already has a larger vaccine portfolio than previously transitioned cohorts. The portfolio has increased from vaccines against four infectious diseases in 2000 to 19 in 2023. Moreover, Gavi has recently introduced support for the Malaria RTS,S vaccine and is utilizing the most recent vaccine investment strategy to consider other new and underused vaccines to add to its portfolio. Countries that are projected to transition but have less domestic resources available for immunization may experience challenges in introducing these new vaccines and may be concerned about trade-offs with sustaining and/or expanding vaccine coverage levels.

Finally, other health and socioeconomic factors could also have implications for a country’s ability to manage aid transitions. For example, there is evidence that countries approaching transition from Gavi support have worse health outcomes, higher levels of inequality, and lower performance on governance indicators than cohorts of countries that previously underwent transition (see Table 2 in Appendix B). This could mean that some countries expected to transition in the coming years could be at risk of unsuccessful transition, potentially requiring new and additional tailored forms of assistance.
of support. Beyond financing, Gavi and its partners will also need to support countries to become self-sufficient in key health system capabilities like procurement, supply chain management, and public financial management, among other important functions to ensure programmatic and operational sustainability.

**Takeaway 2: Projections suggest that roughly 40 countries are likely to remain eligible for Gavi support through 2040**

A sizeable cohort of approximately 40 countries—based on the 4 percent scenario—are likely to remain eligible for Gavi support well beyond the current Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) era (Figure 5). This is almost double the number of countries projected to remain eligible for IDA through 2040 (21), but significantly smaller than the number of countries projected to remain eligible for support from the Global Fund through 2040 (87). This comparison may suggest that Gavi’s approach facilitates transitions to self-financed immunization programs in some instances, but Gavi’s leadership should better tailor support and bolster sustainability among the cohort of roughly 40 countries going forward.

**FIGURE 5. Number of countries eligible (i.e., below the GNI eligibility threshold) for Gavi support at the end of each Gavi strategic period, 2000–2040**

Several countries, notably those in the initial self-financing phase, are also likely to diverge from Gavi’s GNI eligibility threshold in the 4 percent scenario. This trend suggests limited prospects for transition and a potential for continued support for a very long time under current policies. This

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cohort of approximately 40 countries represents around 60–70 percent of Gavi’s disbursements for the 2017–2019 period. (However, it is possible that increasing levels of co-financing from some of these Gavi-eligible countries may replace portions of this funding going forward.)

Most notably, we find only one other country (Cambodia) is projected to cross the GNI eligibility threshold (based on the 4 percent scenario)—and may enter the accelerated transition phase by 2026 if it meets other criteria. No additional countries are expected to enter the accelerated transition phase between 2026 and 2040 in the 4 percent scenario. Seven additional countries (for a total of eight) are projected to enter the accelerated transition phase by 2040 in the 2 percent scenario.

**Implications for Gavi**

If roughly 40 countries, representing the majority of Gavi’s current budget (see Table 3 in Appendix C), continue to remain eligible for Gavi funding well into 2040, Gavi’s leadership, donors, and other Alliance partners will need to contend head-on with longer-term commitments for support well beyond the SDG era. Relatedly, Gavi will need to rethink its overall approach and model to support progress towards programmatic and financial sustainability. Furthermore, about half of the 40 countries are currently classified as fragile or conflict-affected. Gavi’s ability to deliver effectively in these settings will be increasingly important to achieving its mission in the future.

Projections based on the 2 percent scenario estimate closer to 30 countries, representing about 50 percent of Gavi’s country disbursements, may remain eligible for Gavi support through 2040. As such, the exact inflation adjustment to the GNI per capita threshold is consequential for future transition and eligibility trajectories.

Gavi essentially has three core ways of focusing and prioritizing its budget: (1) adjusting the number of eligible countries; (2) adjusting the number of Gavi-supported vaccines as well as the level of...
support across these vaccines;\textsuperscript{42} or (3) adjusting the volume of doses of a particular vaccine supported for a given population.

With an expanding portfolio of vaccines and several additional new technologies in the pipeline, plus an eligibility policy that does not significantly advance transitions beyond 2026, the only choice if the overall budget remains flat is to reduce the volume of doses to eligible countries.\textsuperscript{43} This is made substantially more challenging given high population growths projected in most of the approximately 40 countries that will likely remain eligible through 2040, alongside a likely scenario where donor funding flattens or declines.\textsuperscript{44} Gavi’s leadership will therefore need to acknowledge these trade-offs as it considers adjustments to its eligibility, transition, and co-financing model, while simultaneously defining its overall ambitions for the next strategic period.

\section*{Policy options for evolving Gavi’s approach to eligibility, transition, and co-financing in the next strategic period and beyond}

To date, Gavi’s GNI-based approach to eligibility has been well-suited to periods of sustained growth in low- and middle-income countries, enabling earlier cohorts of countries to progressively advance along the different phases of Gavi support. Indeed, Gavi’s overarching model has successfully supported 19 countries to gradually increase financing for vaccines and become self-sufficient over time.

Gavi’s model has also allowed for flexibilities with tailored policies to adapt to unique country circumstances. Recent modifications to the eligibility and transition policy—including the co-financing threshold and extended length of the accelerated transition phase approved in December 2022—are welcome signs of Gavi’s ability and willingness to adapt to shifting trends, and demonstrate that combining flexibility, predictability, and transparency is possible.

Still, the post-COVID reality, where many countries are facing acute budgetary pressures amid broader fiscal challenges and competing priorities in the health sector, suggests that Gavi must evolve its approach more substantively. One-off exceptions may be neither feasible nor sustainable going forward.

\textsuperscript{42} We acknowledge that Gavi also provides additional funding streams beyond vaccine procurement, including support for health systems strengthening.

\textsuperscript{43} In some instances, some vaccine prices may fall in the future, which could free up additional resources.

Gavi’s next strategic period (“Gavi 6.0”) is a critical window of opportunity to evolve its model to ensure it is responsive to country-specific challenges and able to deliver on its mission in a rapidly changing global landscape.

Below we highlight four policy recommendations:

1. **Rethink criteria for eligibility and align on core principles to determine how best to evolve the overall approach.**

   Our findings suggest the dependence on a GNI-based threshold as the primary criterion for eligibility may no longer be fit for purpose in the post-COVID era where countries are facing acute budgetary pressures. A growing body of evidence also underscores the limitations of an income-based threshold. Furthermore, an income-based eligibility model does not serve as a good proxy for a country’s readiness for transition, as measured by a country’s capabilities across different health system functions.

   Gavi’s leadership, with input from partners and donors, should consider a range of possible options—from more incremental to more substantive changes—for evolving its approach to eligibility, transition, and co-financing going forward.

   As an initial step, Gavi should consider additional indicators to complement the GNI indicator and better reflect countries’ fiscal and programmatic readiness for transition. For example, an indicator like post-interest general government expenditure per capita could be a valuable measure of fiscal space and ability to pay for immunization. Importantly, it is routinely collected, externally verified, and non-distortionary. Another potentially useful indicator could be the ratio of each country’s GNI to the median GNI in the portfolio. A higher ratio could suggest that resources for that specific country should be prioritized less, relative to resources for countries with lower ratios. Measures that assess programmatic readiness for transition in terms of core health system capabilities, including functions such as priority setting, procurement, and supply chain management, could also be valuable.

   Furthermore, as Gavi revisits its eligibility criteria, it is worth noting that inflation adjustments to the GNI threshold are consequential. Indeed, as our projections indicate, the exact annual inflation adjustment to the GNI threshold significantly shapes transition trajectories—and, importantly, the size of the cohort remaining eligible for Gavi support through 2040. More predictability would enable countries to plan for adequate and increasing financing (and co-financing) for immunization programs. Still, predictability will need to be balanced with broader consideration of global prices and trends. One approach could be to consider a fixed five-year inflation adjustment rate at the beginning of each strategic period.

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45 For example, see Appendix Exhibit A5 in: Judith Kallenberg et al., ‘Gavi’s Transition Policy: Moving from Development Assistance to Domestic Financing of Immunization Programs,’ *Health Affairs* 35, no. 2 (2016).
Beyond incremental approaches to include additional criteria, efforts to explore bolder rethinking of Gavi’s existing approach, such as transitioning by vaccine rather than by country, should include more open discussion of the broader purpose of the eligibility policy. For instance, is it primarily a prioritization exercise, focusing resources on the populations with the most need, which may require a long time horizon and motivate better alignment with specific disease burdens? Or does it represent a compact between donors and countries regarding the time-limited nature of donors’ support, with a commitment to countries eventually self-funding core immunization services? Greater clarity in this core guiding principle will enable a more effective and fit-for-purpose eligibility policy, with criteria that better reflect its main purpose.

2. **Re-examine Gavi’s approach to prioritization of resources and value for money.**

The above-mentioned review of Gavi’s eligibility policy should be integrated into a wider effort to reassess Gavi’s approach to prioritizing resources and achieving value for money. This exercise should consider the reality of constrained donor budgets and the increasing range of vaccines that could be supported, alongside rapidly rising populations in the roughly 40 countries that our projections suggest could remain eligible for Gavi support through 2040.

Gavi has a range of policies with implications for value for money and prioritization of limited resources. These include its eligibility policy; country allocation formula that determines budget envelopes per country; “prioritization mechanism” that kicks into gear when countries request more than the total funds Gavi has available; and the vaccine investment strategy that determines which new vaccines Gavi should support.46 Alongside reviewing these approaches, potential areas for consolidation should be considered during the Gavi 6.0 strategy process. For instance, one potential consideration is whether a combined prioritization, allocation, and eligibility framework could serve as a useful mechanism to consider trade-offs between which countries are eligible, how much each country is allocated, and which technologies are funded.

A key discussion point for the board during the 6.0 strategy development process should be whether Gavi’s primary obligation is to promote value for money of its resources or strengthen the value for money of combined donor and domestic health system resources. If stakeholders agree on the latter, then Gavi could conduct pilot efforts of a “marginal

aid approach.\textsuperscript{47} Under such an approach, substantial investments are made in national prioritisation capacity (e.g., by National Immunization Technical Advisory Groups) and domestic financing is the first source to fund the highest priority vaccines, leaving external donors such as Gavi to fund immunization at the “margin” (e.g., supplementary vaccines).

3. **Modify Gavi’s operating model and modalities of engagement, especially in fragile and conflict-affected settings.**

Countries classified as fragile and conflict-affected represent a significant (already nearly 50 percent) and increasing portion of Gavi eligible countries—including a majority in the initial self-financing phase.\textsuperscript{48} Therefore, Gavi will need to revamp its existing model, designed for long-term sustainable development, to improve immunization coverage in unstable, fragile, and humanitarian settings. Gavi must consider shifting its model to enable it to operate in such settings with greater agility and a higher risk appetite.\textsuperscript{49}

Furthermore, Gavi, alongside other global health mechanisms, should reconsider modalities of engagement to support countries in building key health system capabilities such as procurement, supply chain, and public financial management.

4. **Align and clarify approaches with other global health mechanisms.**

Aligning and clarifying approaches with other global health mechanisms is critical to avoid duplication of efforts and set countries on a meaningful path to financial and programmatic sustainability. The boards and leadership of global health mechanisms—including Gavi, the Global Fund, and the Global Financing Facility, among others—should advance efforts to align the principles and criteria of their transition policies; resolve coordination challenges (e.g., how Gavi and the Global Fund will work on R21 and future tuberculosis vaccines, and how they could more effectively pool resources at the national level); collaborate to support national priority setting systems; and pilot new approaches to joint domestic and donor financing of health services, such as “marginal aid.”\textsuperscript{50} This coordination will be challenging and time-consuming, but it will help reduce complexity for countries receiving support and improve overall efficiency. It is vital that the board of each respective mechanism underscores this effort as a priority.


Conclusion

Our analysis using updated economic growth data to map countries’ prospects for transition from Gavi between 2023 and 2040 yields two key findings. First, compared to pre-COVID projections, transition prospects have mostly stayed consistent, with a few exceptions. Importantly, the upcoming cohort of transitioning countries will lose access to Gavi funding under more challenging fiscal conditions than originally anticipated. Second, roughly 40 countries could remain eligible for Gavi support through 2040, raising questions about longer-term funding commitments well beyond the SDG era, and suggesting a need for alternative paths towards financial, programmatic, and operational sustainability.

The prevailing macro-economic climate points to serious challenges with Gavi’s current approach to eligibility, transition, and co-financing. Specifically, the dependence on a GNI-based threshold as the primary criterion for eligibility may no longer be fit-for-purpose in the post-COVID era. Gavi’s next strategic period (“Gavi 6.0”) is an opportunity to evolve the model to be responsive to country-specific challenges and deliver on its mission in a rapidly shifting global landscape.
Appendix A

Comparison of our results to Gavi’s transition projections up to 2030

Both Gavi’s projections (up to 2030) and our analysis, in the 4 percent scenario, suggest that seven countries are likely to stay above the GNI threshold and transition from Gavi support by 2040. Based on the recently updated eight-year duration for the accelerated transition phase, Gavi anticipates these countries will transition in the following years:

- 2025: Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands
- 2026: Sao Tome and Principe
- 2028: Nigeria
- 2029: Bangladesh, Côte d’Ivoire, and Djibouti

Notably, our analysis raises concern about three countries currently in the accelerated transition phase. Gavi anticipates successful transitions for Lao PDR in 2025 and Kenya and Ghana in 2029; however, our analysis suggests these three countries may be at risk of becoming re-eligible for Gavi support, depending on the rate of annual inflation adjustment for the eligibility threshold.

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TABLE 2. Comparison of countries that previously transitioned and are currently transitioning from Gavi support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>DTP3 Coverage</th>
<th>GDP Per Capita Growth (annual %)</th>
<th>General Government Gross Debt as % of GDP</th>
<th>Birth Cohort</th>
<th>Gavi Support as % Government Health Expenditure</th>
<th>Fragility and Conflict Classification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Previously transitioned from Gavi support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>123.4</td>
<td>9,703</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>71,668</td>
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<tr>
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<td>10.8</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>216,645</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
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<td>2.4</td>
<td>No data</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
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<td>19.0</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>16,375</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
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<td>3.0</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>4,496,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
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<td>5.8</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>3,510</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
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<td>14.8</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>31,416</td>
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<td>Angola</td>
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<td>–2.0</td>
<td>84.9</td>
<td>1,339,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
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<td>6.3</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>33,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
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<td>5.2</td>
<td>18.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
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<td>4.8</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>263,820</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
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<td>100,445</td>
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<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
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<td>10.9</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>50,430</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Timor Leste</td>
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<td>3.6</td>
<td>16.4</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>1,463,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>23,114,000</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
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<td>41.5</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
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<td>5.3</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>802,875</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average for cohort</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>1,717,149</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Currently in the accelerated transition phase

| Bangladesh               | 98            | 5.7                              | 39.4                                     | 3,020,000    | 5.05                                            |                                       |
| Côte d’Ivoire            | 76            | 4.4                              | 56.8                                     | 932,943      | 5.65                                            |                                       |
| Djibouti                 | 59            | 3.3                              | 41.8                                     | 24,541       | 4.58                                            |                                       |
| Ghana                    | 99            | 3.3                              | 84.9                                     | 904,679      | 3.84                                            |                                       |
| Kenya                    | 90            | 5.5                              | 70.2                                     | 1,468,000    | 1.98                                            |                                       |
| Lao PDR                  | 80            | 1.1                              | 121.7                                    | 163,261      | 3.63                                            |                                       |
| Nigeria                  | 62            | 1.2                              | 38.8                                     | 7,923,000    | 6.37                                            | Conflict                             |
| Papua New Guinea         | 36            | –1.9                             | 49.5                                     | 253,720      | 1.80                                            |                                       |
| Sao Tome and Principe    | 97            | –0.2                             | 58.5                                     | 6,318        | 10.98                                           |                                       |
| Solomon Islands          | 89            | –2.9                             | 22.2                                     | 21,098       | 5.11                                            |                                       |
| Average for cohort       | 79            | 2.0                              | 58.4                                     | 1,471,756    | 4.90                                            |                                       |

# Appendix C

## TABLE 3. Projections for top 20 recipients of Gavi disbursements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Average Proportion of Total Gavi Spend (2017–2019) (%)&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Above/Below Eligibility Threshold in 2040 Based on 4 Percent Scenario&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Above/Below Eligibility Threshold in 2040 Based on 2 Percent Scenario&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>9.67</td>
<td>Below</td>
<td>Below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>9.01</td>
<td>Above</td>
<td>Above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>7.13</td>
<td>Below</td>
<td>Below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>5.53</td>
<td>Below</td>
<td>Above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>Above</td>
<td>Above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>Below</td>
<td>Below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>Below</td>
<td>Below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>Below</td>
<td>Below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>Below</td>
<td>Above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>Below</td>
<td>Below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>Below</td>
<td>Below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>Below</td>
<td>Above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>Above</td>
<td>Above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>Below</td>
<td>Below</td>
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<td>Niger</td>
<td>1.75</td>
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<td>Below</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
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<td>Below</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republic of Yemen</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>Below</td>
<td>Below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>Below</td>
<td>Below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>Below</td>
<td>Below</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:  
<sup>a</sup> Disbursements are averaged over 2017–2019 to obtain stable estimates.  
<sup>b</sup> Based on WEO April 2023 data. GNI per capita in Nigeria, Bangladesh, and Côte d’Ivoire already exceeded Gavi’s eligibility threshold in 2023.  
<sup>c</sup> Based on WEO April 2023. GNI per capita in Nigeria, Bangladesh, Kenya, Ghana, and Côte d’Ivoire already exceeded Gavi’s eligibility threshold in 2023.