

Should the Randomistas (Continue to) Rule?

Martin Ravallion

Abstract

The rising popularity of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) in development applications has come with continuing debates on the pros and cons of this approach. The paper revisits the issues. While RCTs have a place in the toolkit for impact evaluation, an unconditional preference for RCTs as the “gold standard” is questionable. The statistical case is unclear on *a priori* grounds; a stronger ethical defense is often called for; and there is a risk of distorting the evidence-base for informing policymaking. Going forward, pressing knowledge gaps should drive the questions asked and how they are answered, not the methodological preferences of some researchers. The gold standard is the best method for the question at hand.

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Martin Ravallion

Department of Economics, Georgetown University

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Center for Global Development
2055 L Street NW
Washington, DC 20036

202.416.4000
(f) 202.416.4050

www.cgdev.org

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1. Introduction

Impact evaluation (IE) is an important tool for evidence-based policymaking. The tool is typically applied to assigned programs (meaning that some units get the program and some do not) and “impact” is assessed relative to an explicit counterfactual (most often the absence of the program). There are two broad groups of methods used for IE. In the first, access to the program is randomly assigned to some units, with others randomly set aside as controls. One then compares mean outcomes for these two samples. This is a randomized controlled trial (RCT). The second group comprises purely “observational studies” (OSs) in which access is purposive rather than random. While some OSs are purely descriptive, others attempt to control for the differences between treated and un-treated units based on what can be observed in data, with the aim of making causal inferences.

The new millennium has seen a huge increase in the application of IE to developing countries. The International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie) has compiled metadata on such evaluations.¹ Their data indicate a remarkable 30-fold increase in the annual production of published IEs since 2000, compared to the 19 years prior to 2000.² Figure 1 gives the 3ie series for both groups of methods, 1988-2015. The counts for both have grown rapidly since 2000.³

About 60 percent of the IEs since 2000 have used randomization. The latest 3ie count has 333 papers using this tool for 2015.⁴ The growth rate is striking. Fitting an exponential trend (and the fit is good) to the counts of RCTs in figure 1 yields an annual growth rate of around 20 percent—more than double the growth rate for all scientific publishing post-WW2.⁵ As a further indication, if one enters “RCT” or “randomized controlled trial” in the [Google Ngram Viewer](#) one finds that the incidence of these words (as a share of all ngrams in digitized text) has tended to rise over time and is higher at the end of the available time series (2008) than ever before.

¹ Cameron et al. (2016) provide an overview. The numbers here are from an updated database spanning 1981-2015.


² 4,501 IEs are recorded in the 3ie database, covering the period 1981-2015, of which 4,338 were published in 2000-15. The annual rates are 271 since 2000 and 9 for 1981-1999.

³ The 3ie series is constructed by searching for selected keywords in digitized texts. 3ie staff warned me (in correspondence) that their old search protocols were probably less effective in picking up OSs relative to RCTs prior to 2000. So the earlier, lower, counts of non-randomized IEs in figure 1 may be deceptive.

⁴ To put this in perspective for economists, this is about the same as the total number of papers (in all fields) published per year in the *American Economic Review*, *Journal of Political Economy*, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, *Econometrica* and the *Review of Economic Studies* (Card and DellaVigna, 2013).

⁵ Regressing log RCT count (dropping three zeros in the 1980s) on time gives a coefficient of 0.20 (s.e.=0.01; n=32; R²=0.96) or 0.18 (0.01; n=16; R²=0.96) if one only uses the series from 2000 onwards. In modern times (post-WW2), the growth rate of scientific publications is estimated to be 8-9 percent per annum (Bornmann and Mutz, 2015).

Figure 1. Annual counts of published impact evaluations for developing countries



Note: Fitted lines are nearest neighbor smoothed scatter plots. See footnote 4 in the main text on likely undercounting of non-randomized IEs in earlier years. Source: International Initiative for Impact Evaluation.

This huge expansion in development RCTs would surely not have been anticipated prior to 2000. After all, RCTs are not feasible for many of the things governments and others do in the name of development. Nor had RCTs been historically popular with governments and the public at large, given the often-heard concerns about withholding a program from some people who need it, while providing it to some who do not, for the purpose of research. Development RCTs used to be a hard sell. Something changed. How did RCTs become so popular? And is their popularity justified?

Advocates of RCTs have been dubbed the “randomistas.”⁶ They proffer RCTs as the “gold standard” for impact evaluation—the most “scientific” or “rigorous” approach, promising to deliver largely atheoretical and assumption-free, yet reliable, IE.⁷ This view has come from prominent academic economists, and it has permeated the popular discourse, with discernable influence in the media, development agencies and donors, as well as researchers

⁶ That term “randomistas” is not pejorative; indeed, RCT advocates also use it approvingly, such as Leigh (2018).

⁷ For example, Banerjee (2006) writes that: “Randomized trials like these—that is, trials in which the intervention is assigned randomly—are the simplest and best way of assessing the impact of a program.” Similarly, Imbens (2010, p.407) claims that “Randomized experiments do occupy a special place in the hierarchy of evidence, namely at the very top.” And Duflo (2017, p.3) refers to RCTs the “tool of choice.” Pritchett (2018, p.20) criticizes RCTs on a number of counts but still agrees that the tool “is superior to other evaluation methods.”

and their employers.⁸ This is an unconditional preference for RCTs. While there are a great many possible contexts for an IE (types of interventions, sectors of the economy, countries, communities, social/ethnic groups), the gold-standard claim is typically made independently of context.

There has been a pushback too. RCTs in social-policy applications have raised a number of concerns.⁹ The critics have argued that (*inter alia*): the assumptions required for a reliable impact estimate using an RCT need not hold in reality; RCTs are ethically questionable; the “black box” nature of RCTs limits their usefulness for policymaking, including both scaling up and learning about likely impact in other contexts. There have also been defenses against the critics.¹⁰

In the light of the rising prominence of development RCTs, and the debates, this paper returns, 10 years later, to the question posed in Ravallion (2009a), “Should the randomistas rule?”¹¹ The sense in which randomistas “rule” is in their claimed hierarchy of methods, which is the foundation of their intellectual authority.¹² That hierarchy is the focus of the paper. It argues that the supportive public narrative on RCTs that has emerged is not well grounded in an appreciation of the limits of this research tool. The paper’s intended audience is not the experts on either side, but the broader community of economists and other social scientists, donors, policymakers and their advisors, students and young researchers.

The paper begins with an overview of the theory of impact evaluation, as relevant to the choice of methods (Section 2). It then discusses the randomistas’ influence on development research (Section 3), the concerns about the ethical validity of their preferred method (Section 4), and the relevance of their research to policy (Section 5).

⁸ An example of the broader influence of the “gold standard” view is the [Wikipedia](#) entry on IE, which states that “Randomized field experiments are the strongest research designs for assessing program impact... as it allows for a fair and accurate estimate of the program’s actual effects.” In another example, Keating (2014) writes that “Randomistas, proponents of randomized controlled trials, have recently been transforming the way we think about economic development and aid to poor countries.” Similarly, Leigh’s (2018) volume is entitled “Randomistas: How Radical Researchers Changed our World.”

⁹ Including Heckman and Smith (1995), Grossman and Mackenzie (2005), Cartwright (2007), Ravallion (2009a,b; 2012), Rodrik (2009), Barrett and Carter (2010), Deaton (2010), Keane (2010), Baele (2013), Basu (2014), Mulligan (2014), Pritchett and Sandefur (2015), Favereau (2016), Ziliak and Teather-Posadas (2016), Hammer (2017), Young (2017), Deaton and Cartwright (2018) and Pritchett (2018).

¹⁰ Including Banerjee and Duflo (2009), Goldberg (2014), Imbens (2010, 2018), Glennerster and Powers (2016) and McKenzie (2018).

¹¹ This is a substantial update and extension to Ravallion (2009a), also drawing on Ravallion (2016, Chapter 6).

¹² Thus, McKenzie’s (2018) observation that only 10 percent of all papers in development economics (any field, in 14 journals) are RCTs does not refute the claim that the randomistas do indeed rule in the sense used here.

2. Foundations of impact evaluation

All impact evaluations can be thought of as experimental trials to see how well something works.¹³ The focus here is on assigned programs, in that some units (the “treated”) in a well-defined population get the program and some do not.

Imagine drawing two random samples from the population, one from those treated and one from those not, and we measure relevant outcomes for both. This constitutes a single trial. The difference in mean outcomes is the trial’s estimate of the true mean impact for that population. That estimate can differ from the true value due to measurement errors, sampling variability, spillover effects (“contamination”) between the two groups, monitoring effects, and systematic effects of any confounding variables that jointly alter outcomes and treatment status. Each trial’s sampled pair gives a different estimate, sometimes too high, sometimes too low, though we never know by how much since we do not (of course) know the true value. Every trial result has some experimental error.

The ideal RCT is the special case in which the trial’s treatment status is also chosen randomly (in addition to drawing the two random samples) and the only error is due to sampling variability. In this special case, as the sample sizes increase, the trial’s estimate gets closer to the true mean impact. This is the sense in which an ideal RCT is said to be unbiased, namely that the sampling error is driven to zero *in expectation*. In addition, the fact of using both random assignment and random sampling facilitates calculation of the standard error of the impact estimate, to establish a statistical confidence interval.¹⁴

These are clearly attractive features of an ideal RCT. However, as Deaton and Cartwright (2018) note, prominent randomistas have sometimes left out the “in expectation” qualifier, or ignored its implications for the existence of experimental errors.¹⁵ They attribute *any* difference in mean outcomes between the treatment and control samples to the intervention.

¹³ In the literature, the word “experiment” is sometimes defined as any situation in which the evaluator controls everything, and this is deemed to be the case for an RCT; see, for example, Cox and Reid (2000). However, it is almost never the case that the evaluator controls everything in RCTs with human subjects, as used to evaluate social policies. Here I use the broader definition of “experiment” as a trial, which does not assume full control.

¹⁴ There is some debate on current practices in this respect. Young (2017) points to a number of concerns in past impact estimates of standard errors when using RCTs with regression controls and shows that many published economics papers have over-estimated the statistical significance of their impact estimates. This depends in part on whether one is interested in testing the null that mean impact is zero or that impact is zero for every treated unit, which is (of course) more demanding. Also see the discussions in Deaton and Cartwright (2018) and Imbens (2018).

¹⁵ For example, with reference to RCTs, Banerjee and Duflo (2017) write that “any difference between the treatment group and the comparison group can be confidently attributed to the treatment.” One finds a similarly unguarded claim in the “[Introduction to Evaluation](#)” on the website of the *Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab* (J-PAL) (which Section 3 returns to); having described a stylized RCT for a water purification project, with treatment and control groups, J-PAL says that: “any differences seen later on can be attributed to one having been given the water purification program, and the other not.” Another example (cited in Deaton and Cartwright, 2018) is found in a technical manual on IE by the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank (Gertler et al. 2016).

This mistake might be thought of as little more than a minor expository simplification.¹⁶ However, the simplification is now embedded in much of the public narrative on RCTs. Beyond the experts (putting aside their unguarded statements), almost everyone in the development community seems to now think that any measured difference between the treatment and control groups in an RCT is attributable to the treatment. It is not. Even the ideal RCT has some unknown error.

A rare but instructive case is when there is no treatment. Absent any other effects of assignment (such as from monitoring), the impact is zero. Yet the random experimental error can still yield a non-zero mean impact from an RCT. An example is an RCT in Denmark in which 860 elderly people were randomly and unknowingly divided into treatment and control groups prior to an 18-month period without any actual intervention (Vass, 2010). A statistically significant (prob.=0.003) difference in mortality rates emerged at the end of the period.

In the light of these observations, consider the choice of methods. Suppose that, with a given budget, we can implement either an RCT or an OS. For the latter, people are free to select into the program, and we take random samples of those who do and those that do not. We want to rank the methods *ex ante* according to how close their trial estimates are likely to be to the true value. Let us say that an estimate is “close to the truth” if it is within some fixed interval centered on the true value. The focus here is on the “internal validity” of each estimator—its accuracy for the population in hand; Section 5 turns to “external validity.”

The reason one hears most often for the “gold-standard” ranking is the unbiasedness of an ideal RCT. Yet an OS need not be biased. Of course, one must do adjustments for covariate imbalance. Bias in an OS is removed if the treatment is conditionally exogenous, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term conditional on the covariates. That assumption may or may not be acceptable, depending on the context (the program and the data available). If unmeasured confounders remain then bias can be removed if one has a valid instrumental variable (IV). For this to work, the IV must be correlated with the chosen treatment status *and* uncorrelated with outcomes, given treatment. In a regression model, this requires that the IV is uncorrelated with the error term (the “exclusion restriction”). For example, consider a program for which the assignment to treatment depends on whether an eligibility score is above some critical threshold. As long as the threshold is arbitrary (that mean counterfactual outcomes do not change at the threshold), whether the score is above or below this critical value becomes a valid IV.¹⁷ Though less familiar to economists, the theory of causal inference also tells us that bias in an OS due to unmeasured confounders can be

¹⁶ As Imbens (2018) suggests, in his comments on Deaton and Cartwright (2018).

¹⁷ This is an example of regression-discontinuity design; for a formal treatment see Hahn et al. (2001).

eliminated if there is an intermediate variable that links treatment to outcomes but does not depend on the confounders.¹⁸

Even if we agree that the RCT is better at removing bias, that still does not clinch the ranking. There are two main reasons. First, given the constraints faced on RCTs in practice, it may not be feasible to represent the whole population of interest. At least when there is a free media, governments are likely to see a political risk in supporting ethically-questionable research. While RCTs are sometimes done with governments, more benign OSs are often easier to accept. Academic randomistas looking for local partners undoubtedly see the attractions of working instead with local non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The desire to randomize may thus deliver an unbiased impact estimate for a non-randomly-selected sub-population, such as those in the catchment area of a cooperative local NGO. The (biased) OS may then be closer to the truth for the whole population.

Second, we must also consider the variance of the errors for each method. To see why this matters, suppose that each trial is drawn from one of two normal distributions, one for an RCT and one for an OS. The parameters of each distribution (its mean and variance) depend on the method used. The mean of the RCT distribution is the true mean, while that for the OS is not. Even so, despite the bias, the OS variance could be low enough to assure that it yields a higher share of its trials that are close to the truth than for the RCTs. Despite their lack of bias, the RCTs may often end up further from the truth in practice. Those claiming that RCTs are the gold standard invariably ignore this possibility.

The economics of impact evaluation comes into play here. Larger sample sizes tend to reduce the variance of an estimate (as do repeated trials in the same context). Many OSs use existing data (from surveys and administrative records) while RCTs typically require new surveys. Thus, for a given budget, RCTs will tend to have lower sample sizes with higher variances. Nor is the outcome clear when an OS requires new surveys. A good way to reduce OS bias is with better data. Longer survey questionnaires may then entail smaller sample sizes. But the data requirements for an RCT are unlikely to be different, noting that one still needs baseline data to assure covariate balance in an RCT.¹⁹ The additional randomization (for treatment) in an RCT is never likely to be costless, and re-randomization may well be needed to assure covariate balance (Morgan and Rubin, 2012). In medical applications, RCTs are widely thought to be more costly than OSs.²⁰ I have not seen systematic cost data for development IEs, though one often hears concerns about underpowered RCTs.²¹ Cost

¹⁸ This is different to an IV, since the intermediate variable is endogenous. For an example, see Glynn and Kashin (2018). Pearl and Mackenzie (2018, Chapters 4 and 7) provide a non-technical exposition of the difference between “front-door” and “back-door” adjustment. For a more formal treatment see Pearl (2009, Chapter 3).

¹⁹ *Ex post* balancing tests and retrospective adjustments are often recommended for RCTs (Cox and Reid, 2000; Hinkelmann and Kempthorne, 2008; Bruhn and McKenzie, 2009; Hernán and Robins, 2018).

²⁰ See, for example, Hannan (2008) and Frieden (2017).

²¹ For example, in reference to development RCTs, White (2014) says that “...the actual power of many RCTs is only around 50 per cent. So, an RCT is no better than tossing a coin for correctly finding out if an intervention works.”

comparisons for IEs at the World Bank suggest far higher costs for RCTs (though the comparisons are crude).²²

The key point is that we cannot rule out the possibility that, for a given budget, the RCT ends up with a smaller sample size and (hence) higher error variance. Then it may well yield estimates that are further from the truth than an OS. We lack a clear theoretical justification for the claimed (unconditional) “gold standard” hierarchy of methods.

Greater clarity may well emerge when we know the specific context. If one knows the setting and program well enough to identify the relevant confounders—the theory of how the program works—and can collect data on them, or one can identify measurable deconfounders, then one may well obtain a very reliable impact estimate by observation alone. Yet if there is either considerable model uncertainty, or the important confounders are known but one faces high costs of collecting data on them, and the unit cost of randomized assignment is not too high, then an RCT (possibly conditional on covariates) has much appeal. Knowing nothing about the setting, treatment and data, it is anyone’s guess which method will be closer to the truth.

None of this should be taken to imply indifference to the choice of method. As noted, there may be a clear ranking of the options—one way or the other—in specific contexts. All that is in contention here is whether the trials using randomized assignment will necessarily be closer to the truth than OS. That is not established.

To the extent that the influence of the randomistas has stemmed from the (much-heard) belief that RCTs are invariably better for causal inference, that influence is not fully deserved. As we will see, other sources of their influence are no less questionable.

3. The influence of the randomistas on development research

Early examples of the use of RCTs in social policy contexts include the various experiments on US social policies starting in the 1960s.²³ With regard to development applications, the 3ie database has 133 published RCTs over the period 1981-1999. The earliest RCT in the database is from a World Bank research project on education interventions (textbooks and radio lessons) to improve the math scores of students in Nicaragua, namely Jamison et al. (1981). Among the pre-2000 RCTs, that done by the Government of Mexico for the *Progres* evaluation, which started in 1997, is an especially notable example. The (generally positive) results in the literature generated by the data from that RCT were influential in the

²² The World Bank’s IEs in recent times have tended to be RCTs with considerably higher average cost than the IEs done in the International Financial Cooperation (within the World Bank Group), where observational studies are more common (World Bank, 2012). This is at best suggestive since the comparison is not properly controlled.

²³ On the history of RCTs in US social policy see the discussions in Burtless (1995) and List and Rasul (2011). Other commentaries on the history of RCTs more generally can be found in Ziliak (2014) and Leigh (2018).

expansion of Conditional Cash Transfers to over 50 countries today.²⁴ At the beginning of the new Millennium, there was nothing new to the idea of RCTs in development applications.

Nonetheless, annual “RCT production” has been far higher since 2000 (figure 1). Numerous individual academics and groups have played roles, but one group stands out, the *Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab* (J-PAL).²⁵ This was founded in 2003 (as the *Poverty Action Lab*) and has been based in the Department of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). The founders were Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo and Sendhil Mullainathan. At the time of writing (August 2018), J-PAL’s [website](#) reports that they have 919 completed and ongoing RCTs in 80 countries. For an academic research group to get that far in just 15 years is nothing short of amazing. On top of its own RCTs, J-PAL has clearly influenced the shift in emphasis in empirical development economics more broadly toward RCTs. Indeed, J-PAL’s huge RCT output is unlikely to be a majority of the total count of RCTs today.

The discussion in this section looks first at the reasons for the influence of the randomistas on development research. It then asks if their influence has been justified.

Why have the randomistas had so much influence?

Propagating the view that (when feasible) RCTs dominate purely observational studies has clearly held sway. The landing page of J-PAL’s [website](#) tells us that: “Our mission is to reduce poverty by ensuring that policy is informed by scientific evidence.” Toward that aim, J-PAL only does RCTs. Strictly that does not imply that J-PAL’s researchers think that OS is unscientific (and, independently of J-PAL, many J-PAL-affiliated researchers have used OS). However, in this context, the phrases “scientific evidence” and (another favorite, including on J-PAL’s website) “rigorous evidence” are code for RCTs in the eyes of many readers, and that is plainly intentional. Then the implication is even stronger than the “gold standard” claim: for J-PAL, RCTs are not just top of the menu of approved methods, nothing else is on the menu.

The appeal of RCTs reflects in part the challenges faced in identifying causal impacts by observation alone. Since the 1990s, we have seen a welcome rise in the standards of identification in empirical economics. More critical attention has been given to the validity of IV estimators. It is easy to show that a failure of either of the aforementioned conditions for a valid IV can severely bias the estimate—possibly more so than for Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), which treats placement as exogenous. It was not hard for researchers to find

²⁴ See Skoufias and Parker (2001) and Fiszbein and Schady (2010).

²⁵ Another prominent group doing and promoting RCTs is the non-profit organization, *Innovations for Poverty Action* (IPA), founded in 2002 by Dean Karlan (then at Yale). IPA and J-PAL often work together, and clearly have close links. Within international organizations, the most prominent group doing RCTs is the *Development Impact and Monitoring* (DIME) group at the World Bank; three-quarters of DIME’s evaluations have used this method (World Bank, 2016).

exogenous variables that are correlated with selected treatment status (though they still needed to pass the appropriate tests). Accepting the exclusion restriction (that the IV is irrelevant to outcomes given treatment status) was often more challenging. There were some cases in which the IV could be accepted, but this was not always so. From the mid-1990s, seminar audiences and referees were regularly pointing to reasons why the IV in specific papers could have an effect on outcomes that was independent of the endogenous variable (treatment status in an evaluation context).

In due course, some economists started to reject any attempt at establishing causality by such means, with an RCT emerging (it seemed) as the only solution. If one only wants to know the difference in mean outcomes between those assigned the option for treatment and those not—which is called the Intent-to-Treat (ITT) parameter—then randomization side-steps these problems. Given randomization, the treatment assignment is exogenous, uncorrelated with the regression error term.

However, ITT is a rather limited parameter. It is sometimes defended as “policy-relevant” in that the policy is often the assignment of the *option* for treatment. Yet how would a policymaker or citizen react if it were found that the mean impact is (say) zero among those offered treatment, but positive among those who took it up? The lesson in this finding should not be ignored. Policymakers and others often want to know the impact of the treatment among those actually treated. In learning from an RCT, this is clearly what a prospective adopter of the treatment will want to know, rather than ITT. Yet the take-up of assigned treatment is endogenous, and the econometric problem has returned.

The randomistas had a solution on hand: use randomized assignment as the IV for actual treatment.²⁶ Clearly, take-up requires assignment, so this IV is correlated with treatment status. Since it is random, the IV is also uncorrelated (in expectation) with the error term when the treatment effect is common across the population. (The discussion will return to the complications that can arise when impacts vary, and people respond accordingly.)

Beyond these econometric arguments, a number of other factors have contributed to the randomistas’ influence. From the early 2000s, those researchers who did not use randomization, but could have, started to be criticized by the randomistas. Some of this took the form of referees’ comments on journal articles, which are not public. Journal editors do not need to accept such critiques, though the leading randomistas are now quite prominent among the editors and editorial boards of economics journals. At times, the critiques also took a public form, such as the study by Finkelstein and Taubman (2015), which questioned the fact that OS is often used in evaluating health-care delivery policies. This finding was then reported in the *New York Times* under the heading “Few Health System Studies use *Top* Method, Report Says” (Tavernise, 2015; my emphasis). The message here is clear, though it is less clear that it is right.

²⁶ As studied by Angrist et al. (1996). Also see the discussion in Pearl (2009, Chapter 8).

The leading randomistas also did a good job in teaching others how to use their preferred method.²⁷ Development economists got up to speed quickly. They have also been steadily raising the bar on what constitutes a good RCT, though the observation of Heckman and Smith (1995) that RCTs get less critical scrutiny than OSs still seems true today.

Another factor enhancing their influence is that J-PAL's founders professed their desire to make the world a better place through evidence-based policymaking. This was J-PAL's declared motivation from the outset. By this view, doing many RCTs lets us figure out what works and what does not, to scale up the former and scale down the latter (Banerjee, 2006). An analogy is drawn with RCT's in clinical trials, as used to find out what drug works best on average (Favereau, 2016).

Some followers have clearly been attracted by the zeal of the leading randomistas. By this view, "... the experimental ethic has been proposed as the way to change the spirit of development" (Donovan, 2018, p.27). Thus, the randomistas can be seen in part as an epistemic movement that attracts its "true believers."²⁸ The movement's faith in RCT's promises its followers a "quiet revolution" (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011, p.265).

Supporters (including donors) have also been attracted by the simplicity of RCTs—that they are "more transparent and easier to explain" (Duflo, 2017, p.17). It is a lot easier for non-economists to understand an RCT than the methods often favored for OS, which were also getting increasingly sophisticated, and technically demanding, by the time J-PAL was founded.

Is the randomistas' influence justified?

As Section 2 argued, the statistical foundations of IE do not tell us that (when feasible) RCTs are invariably more reliable, whatever the context, and so sit at the top of the hierarchy of methods. This appears to be more a matter of faith than science. The rejection of OS in some quarters has been an over-reaction to the challenges faced in identifying causal effects this way.

Nor is the analogy to clinical trials persuasive. It is unclear that the idea of using black-box RCTs to figure out what works and what does not in development is feasible given the dimensionality in both interventions and contexts. Moreover, it lacks a coherent structure for understanding why some things work and others do not (Heckman and Smith, 1995).

While the development randomistas were pointing to clinical trials as the model, medical researchers were taking a more nuanced view.²⁹ On the one hand, some of the recent literature suggests that past concerns about bias in observational health and medical studies

²⁷ An example is the excellent "RCT toolkit" produced by Duflo et al. (2011). The World Bank's [Development Impact](#) blog has provided a great deal of useful methodological support for doing RCTs.

²⁸ A reviewer of Leigh (2018) describes the author as a "true believer" and then recounts the various personal choices that Leigh makes based on the results of RCTs (Wydick, 2018).

²⁹ Examples of the following points are found in Silverman (2009), Bothwell et al. (2016) and Frieden (2017).

may have been exaggerated. On the other, it now seems well accepted that any gains from removing systematic bias (under ideal conditions) need to be weighed against the costs and risks of clinical RCTs.

Yet, putting these points to one side, the medical context is somewhat different. Economists (and other social scientists) are dealing with people (as individuals and groups) in social and/or economic contexts in which they can be expected to exhibit greater heterogeneity, and almost certainly greater agency, than is likely in clinical trials. This also warns against the push for greater use of pre-analysis plans in development RCTs.

Some deeper inferential issues lie under the surface of the randomistas' claims—issues that are known to the experts on both sides but poorly understood more broadly. When estimating the mean impact on those treated, the validity of randomized assignment as the IV to address selective take-up can be questioned in the presence of behavioral responses to unobserved heterogeneity in the impacts of treatment (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005; Heckman et al., 2006). The differing impacts must then be relegated to the regression error term, interacting with the selective take-up of the randomized assignment. Those units with high returns to treatment will be more likely to take it up. Then the interaction effect that has now surfaced in the error term must be correlated with the randomized assignment. The exclusion restriction fails. (Of course, none of this matters if one only wants IIT.)

Identifying the impacts of social programs is rarely easy, with or without randomized assignment. Suppose that the latent characteristics that enhance impact at the individual level also matter to the counterfactual outcomes in an RCT with selective compliance. The choice of estimation method then depends crucially on what impact parameter one is interested in, the type of program one is evaluating and the behavioral responses to that program (Ravallion, 2014). If the latent factors leading to higher returns to treatment are associated with lower counterfactual outcomes then the “IV cure” for endogenous treatment can be worse than the disease. Indeed, the OLS estimator may even be unbiased, despite the selective take-up. The key point is that practitioners need to think carefully about the likely behavioral responses to heterogeneous impacts in each application—similarly to any OS.

The design of RCTs in practice can also create threats to identification. The randomized assignment is sometimes done across clusters of individuals, such as villages. Some clusters get the treatment and some do not. Those within a selected treatment cluster are left free to take up the treatment as they see fit. This is a now classic design in development applications.³⁰ It runs into a problem whenever there is likely to be interference within the clusters whereby non-participants in the selected treatment clusters are impacted by the program. For example, the cluster RCT in Ravallion et al. (2015) used an entertaining movie to teach people their rights under India's *National Rural Employment Guarantee Act*. It was impossible to enforce ticket assignments; the movie had to be shown in public places—often

³⁰ Of course, if one can use double randomization—randomizing within villages as well as between them—then one can readily address this type of interference (Baird et al., 2017). Cluster randomizations are designed for situations in which within-cluster randomization is not feasible.

open areas of the village. So access to the movie was randomly assigned across villages, with people free to choose whether to watch it. Some did not, but (of course) they can talk with others who did, and this turned out to be an important channel of impact on knowledge (more so for some groups than for others). The cluster randomization had to be combined with a behavioral model of why some people watched the movie (Alik-Lagrange and Ravallion, 2018). Only then could the direct treatment effect (watching the movie) be isolated from the indirect effect (living in a village with access to the movie). In this example, the spillover effects within clusters violate the exclusion restriction, so the use of cluster assignment as the IV for individual take-up performs poorly.

The generic point is that—contrary to the claims about clean identification of the mean causal impact using randomized assignment—assumptions and models are often required in practice. It does not help that the behavioral assumptions underlying studies using randomization are not always explicit (Keane, 2010); structural approaches, in contrast, force this to happen.

Some concerns have received less attention in the literature than they merit. RCTs in economics do not often have the double-blind feature common to clinical trials, so biases associated with monitoring (Hawthorne effects) are more likely, and they merit more attention in development applications.³¹ (For example, if you know you are in the control group you may be inclined to seek a substitutable treatment.) A second example is the topic of the next section.

4. Taking ethical objections seriously

Ethical concerns are never far removed from policymaking. There are two dangers of not taking the ethics of evaluation seriously. First, morally unacceptable evaluations may end up being done, and possibly more often in poor places with vulnerable populations and weak institutions for protecting their rights. Second, socially valuable evaluations may be blocked as too risky politically, largely in ignorance of the benefits.

RCTs have been criticized on the grounds that “randomizers are willing to sacrifice the well-being of study participants in order to ‘learn’” (Ziliak and Teather-Posadas, 2016).³² Critics have often pointed out that in an RCT some people who need the treatment are not getting it, while others receive a treatment they do not need. The criticism is also heard that RCTs in poor countries do not get the same ethical scrutiny that is expected (though by no means assured) in rich countries.³³ Baele (2013) argues that the development randomistas have not paid enough attention to the ethics of their RCTs, though there has been some effort to defend RCTs against their critics, including Glennerster and Powers (2016).

³¹ This aspect of the difference between economic RCTs and clinical RCTs is discussed further in Favereau (2016). For a useful overview of the Hawthorne effect in the health field see Friedman and Gokul (2014).

³² Also see the comments in Barrett and Carter (2010), Baele (2013) and Mulligan (2014).

³³ In the US, the ethics of using RCTs for the evaluation of Federal social policies has not received the same attention as for clinical trials. Blustein (2005) discusses the reasons.

Ethical validity is not a serious issue for all IEs. Sometimes an IE is built onto an existing program such that nothing changes about how the program works. The IE takes as given the way the program assigns its benefits. So if the program is deemed to be ethically acceptable then this can be presumed to hold for the IE. We can dub these “ethically-benign evaluations.”

Other IEs deliberately alter the program’s (known or likely) assignment mechanism—who gets the program and who does not. Then the ethical acceptability of the intervention, as it normally works at scale, does not imply that the evaluation is ethically acceptable. Call these “ethically-contestable evaluations.” The main examples in practice are RCTs. Scaled-up programs almost never use randomized assignment, so the RCT has a different assignment mechanism, with potentially large differences in the benefits, given the likely heterogeneity in impacts. An RCT can be contested ethically even when the real program is fine.

It is surely a rather extreme position (not often associated with economists) to say that good ends can never justify bad means. It *is* ethically defensible to judge processes in part by their outcomes; indeed, there is a long and respected view in moral philosophy that consequences trump processes, with utilitarianism as the leading example. It is not inherently “unethical” to do an RCT as long as this is deemed to be justified by the expected benefits from new knowledge. However, the consequential benefits do need to be carefully weighed against the process concerns. This is especially so in the many instances in which there is a feasible, and benign, alternative OS.

Ethics has been much discussed in medical research where the principle of equipoise requires that there should be no decisive prior case for believing that the treatment has impact.³⁴ Only if we are sufficiently ignorant about whether it is better to be in the treatment group or the control should we randomize at all, or continue with an RCT. (The “we” here is best thought of as a set of people with sound knowledge of the relevant literature and experience. This is sometimes called “community equipoise.”) If evaluators are to take ethical validity seriously then some development RCTs will have to be ruled out as unacceptable given that we are already reasonably confident of the outcomes—that the gain from knowledge is not likely to be large enough to justify the ethically-contestable research.³⁵

The principle of equipoise is rarely applied to RCTs for development and social policies. Indeed, there may well be a tendency in the opposite direction. A recent call-for-proposals from a prominent philanthropic funder gave explicit preference to any RCT proposal “That is backed by highly-promising prior evidence, suggesting it could produce sizable impacts on outcomes...” (Arnold Foundation, 2018, p.2). At one level, one can understand the funder’s preference, given that RCTs are costly and there is a desire to have impact with limited resources. Some *ex ante* filters of this sort make sense. (One would not want to fund an RCT for an intervention that is unlikely to turn out to be feasible on the ground.) However, this

³⁴ There is a good discussion in Freedman (1987), which introduced the principle of equipoise in clinical trials. In the context of development IEs see Bacle (2013) and McKenzie (2013).

³⁵ See the examples discussed in Barrett and Carter (2010), Ziliak and Teather-Posadas (2016) and Narita (2018).

example points to a tension between donor objectives and ethical concerns. *Ex ante* confidence of “sizeable impacts on outcomes” leaves one worried about withholding a treatment from those who need it (and wasting treatment on those who do not). This also points to a concern about the funding processes determining what gets evaluated. The next section returns to this topic.

There have been some ethical defenses of RCTs. One view is that RCTs are justified whenever rationing is required; when there is not enough money to cover everyone, it is argued that randomized assignment is a fair solution.³⁶ This makes sense when information is very poor. In some development applications, we may know very little *ex ante* about how best to assign participation to maximize impact. Nevertheless, when alternative allocations are feasible *and* one does have prior information about who is likely to benefit, it is surely fairer to use that information, and not randomize, at least unconditionally.

Following from this, it has also been argued that the method of conditional randomization (also called “blocked” or “stratified” randomization) relieves ethical concerns. The idea here is that one first selects eligible types of participants based on prior knowledge about likely gains, and only then randomly assigns the intervention, given that not all can be covered. For example, if one is evaluating a training program or a program that requires skills for maximum impact one would reasonably assume (backed up by some evidence) that prior education and/or experience would enhance impact, and then design the evaluation accordingly. This has ethical advantages over pure randomization when there are priors about likely impacts.

There is a catch. The set of things observable to the evaluator is typically only a subset of what is seen on the ground. At (say) village level, there will be more information—revealing that the program is being assigned to some who do not need it, and withheld from some who do. But whose information should decide the matter? Pleading ignorance seems a lame excuse for an evaluator when other stakeholders do in fact know very well who is in need and who is not.

It has also been argued that encouragement designs are less contentious ethically. The idea is that nobody is prevented from accessing the primary service of interest but the experiment instead randomizes access to some form of incentive or information. This does not remove the ethical concern—it merely displaces it from the primary service of interest to another space. Ethical validity still looms as a concern when the encouragement is being deliberately withheld from some people who would benefit and given to some who would not.

An example is the RCT in Bertrand et al. (2007). One treatment arm provided a large financial reward to those participants who could quickly obtain a driver’s license in Delhi India, which facilitated bribes to licensing officials. The RCT did not pay bribes directly or give out licenses to people who did not verifiably know how to drive. However, these were predictable outcomes. The expected gain from this RCT was a seemingly clean verification

³⁶ See, for example, Goldberg’s (2014) comments on Mulligan (2014).

of the proposition that corruption happens in India and has real effects. There does not seem to have been any serious prior doubt about the truth of that claim.

There may be design changes to RCTs that can address ethical concerns. One option is to switch to an “equivalence trial” for which the control group gets what is thought to be the next best treatment option, rather than nothing or a placebo. Another option is adaptive randomization. This is feasible when there is a sequencing of assignment, with observed responses at each step. Adaptive randomizations change the assignment along the way, in the light of evidence collected on impacts or covariates of impact.³⁷ Narita (2018) has proposed an interesting market-like adaptive design for social experiments, whereby one takes account of each participant’s Willingness-to-Pay for the chance of treatment, given prior knowledge about impacts.³⁸ Unlike a classical RCT, one ends up with a Pareto efficient experiment, though with similar statistical properties for the impact estimates. At the time of writing, this idea does not appear to have been implemented in the field.

In the US and elsewhere, Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) have become common for proposed studies with human subjects. There is a designated IRB for most research institutions. They are largely self-regulating. Beyond occasional anecdotes, there does not appear to have been a systematic assessment of how well IRB processes have worked for development RCTs. One thing seems clear: IRBs need to give more attention to assessing the expected benefits of an ethically-contestable evaluation given prevailing knowledge. Syntheses of current knowledge (including from IEs) can help and these are becoming more common.³⁹

The randomistas have not denied the ethical concerns, though they have rarely given them more than scant attention. They assume that their RCTs generate benefits that outweigh the concerns. Whether that is true or not is generally unclear. We should also ask how well research efforts match the knowledge gaps relevant to fighting poverty. Imbalances of this sort raise further ethical concerns, given pressing development challenges and limited resources for research. The next section takes up these issues.

5. Relevance to policymaking

While there is clearly a lot more to good policymaking than good evidence, policymakers increasingly turn to evidence, hoping to inform their choices, and win political debates. The policy-relevance of evaluative research matters.

One can point to examples of policy-relevant research using RCTs. To give just one example, Banerjee et al. (2014) used RCTs in six countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, Honduras, India, Pakistan, Peru) to evaluate the long-established approach taken against poverty by

³⁷ These are getting serious attention in biomedical research. For example, the US Food and Drug Administration (2010) has issued guidelines for adaptive evaluations. Also see Cox and Reid (2000, Chapter 3).

³⁸ Also see the discussion in Özler (2018).

³⁹ These are sometimes referred to as systematic reviews; see for example, the [3ie searchable database](#) and the [Campbell Collaboration](#) on such reviews.

BRAC using a combination of transfers (assets and cash) targeted to the poorest with literacy and skill training.⁴⁰ The researchers found sustained economic gains from adopting BRAC's approach some three years after the initial asset transfer, and one year after the disbursements finished. If one is willing to extrapolate the earnings gains into the distant future, then their present value often exceeds the cost of the BRAC-type program (Banerjee et al. 2014). There are other examples. However, to the best of my knowledge, there has not yet been a comprehensive and objective assessment of the influence on development policy of all those RCTs.

Without aiming to provide a comprehensive assessment, this discussion points to some limitations of RCTs for informing development policy, drawing on the literature.

Policy-relevant parameters

Even under ideal conditions, an RCT is only well-suited to estimating one parameter of interest to policymakers, namely the mean impact. In reality, there will often be both gainers and losers, depending on the characteristics of participating units (and, as noted, some of those characteristics are unobserved to the analyst, though still motivators of behavior, including whether or not to take up the treatment). There is a distribution of impacts. Policymakers may want to know what proportion of the population benefit, and what proportion lose, or what types of people gain and what types lose. Identifying these policy-relevant parameters will typically require more data and more structural-econometric methods. A full-blown structural model need not be essential for addressing the question of interest, but (at the other extreme) an RCT will rarely deliver what is most needed.⁴¹

There are ways of reliably learning more about individual impacts than simply their mean. For example, the Local Instrumental Variables estimator proposed by Heckman et al. (2006) aims to identify the marginal impacts at all values of the empirical probability of being treated. Sometimes it is also possible to ask counterfactual questions in surveys, as in Murgai et al. (2016), though (of course) there are measurement errors in survey responses, and some averaging will almost certainly be required. But we can learn about more than the mean impact.

An aspect of performance that is often of interest to policymakers is who benefits from the program, as determined (in part) by the assignment mechanism proposed in its design. If it is demand driven, what are the characteristics of those choosing to take it up? If it is rationed, to whom? Answering such questions is the first stage in an important class of OS methods

⁴⁰ BRAC now stands for *Building Resources Across Communities*. The NGO started in Bangladesh (where it was once called the *Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee*) but now works in many countries.

⁴¹ See the discussions in Heckman et al. (2006) and Heckman and Urzúa (2010).

using matching, namely constructing a statistical model of who gets the program and who does not.⁴² Of course, if it is an RCT then, in expectation, the assignment is not predictable.

The RCT might be used to assess likely impact *ex ante*, and then later do a separate IE of the actual program at scale, possibly using an observational-matching estimator. However, given selective take-up and heterogeneous impacts one has essentially evaluated two different programs, only one of which is actually implemented by the government. It is not hard to guess which will be of greater interest to policymakers. Will the second evaluation be done? Probably not if one takes the “gold standard” view.

At the heart of the problem of learning about policy effectiveness is that an RCT is a rather artificial construction, unlike almost any imaginable real-world policy.

External validity

Policymakers naturally want to learn how a trial intervention might perform in other contexts. These are questions about the external validity of an impact evaluation, which is often hard to establish given the role of context. Vivald (2017) has documented the variance found in the impact estimates for a given program across settings (and even types of evaluators). Her findings warn against generalizations. As Vivald also notes, poor documentation of contextual factors in impact evaluations does not help. Pritchett and Sandefur (2015) provide examples (for microcredit schemes) in which a (presumed) internally-valid RCT done in one context is inferior to an OS for predicting impact in another context.

The advantages of working with NGOs in doing RCTs (Section 2) have also raised questions about external validity. An example is found in an RCT on schooling in Kenya. Randomly chosen schools were given the resources to hire an extra teacher working on a short-term contract (Duflo et al., 2015). Children with the contract teachers were found to do significantly better in test scores than those with regular civil-service teachers. This experiment was implemented by a local NGO. However, Bold et al. (2013) attempted to replicate this at scale, using a follow-up RCT, but this time with an arm implemented by the government (as well as one by the NGO). This revealed that it was NGO-implementation that led to test-score gains, not the type of teacher. The teacher-effect vanished.

A “black box” reduced-form estimate (whether from an RCT or OS) is not very informative for many purposes of policymaking. Learning from RCTs poses specific problems. Consider how we might learn about scaling up from an RCT (which is surely an important aim). An RCT randomly mixes low-impact people (for whom the program has little benefit) with high-impact people, based on latent attributes. It is plausible that the scaled-up program will have higher representation from the high-impact types, who will be attracted to it.⁴³ Given

⁴² This refers to propensity-score matching. The predicted values of that model are the “propensity scores” used in selecting observationally-balanced treatment and comparison groups (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).

⁴³ This is an instance of what Heckman and Smith (1995) dubbed “randomization bias.”

this selection, the national program is fundamentally different to the RCT, which may contain little useful information for scaling up. This reflects a more general point made by Moffitt (2006) that many things can change—inputs and even the program itself—on scaling up a pilot study.

One approach is to repeat the IE in different contexts. For example, using an observational method, Galasso and Ravallion (2005) studied the performance of Bangladesh’s *Food-for-Education* program in each of 100 villages and correlated the results with characteristics of those villages. The differences in performance were partly explicable in terms of observable village characteristics, such as intra-village inequality (with more unequal villages being less effective in reaching their poor). Not allowing for such differences has been seen as a serious weakness in past evaluations.⁴⁴

Looking inside the black box of an IE can throw useful light on its external validity. This will often require information external to the original evaluation design. An example is the *Proempleo* RCT by Galasso et al. (2004). Vouchers for a wage subsidy were randomly assigned across people currently in a workfare program, with a randomized control group. The theory is that the wage subsidy will reduce labor costs to the firm and make hiring the worker more attractive. The RCT found a significant impact on employment. However, subsequent checks against administrative records revealed a very low take-up of the wage subsidy by firms. *Proempleo* did not work the way the theory had intended. Follow-up qualitative interviews with firms and workers indicated that the vouchers had credential value to workers—a “letter of introduction” that few people had (and the fact that it was allocated randomly was a secret locally in this RCT). This could not be known from the RCT, but required supplementary observations. The extra data also revealed the importance of providing information about how to get a job (rather than wage subsidies *per se*), which carried clear implications for scaling up the program.

Some researchers have been using randomization (either of the intervention or of some key determinant of its placement) to throw light on deeper structural parameters. For example, Todd and Wolpin (2006) use the aforementioned RCT for *Progresa* in Mexico to model the dynamic behavioral responses to the schooling incentive provided by that scheme. Such research can help us understand a program’s impacts and facilitate simulations of alternative policy designs. Todd and Wolpin show that a switch of the *Progresa* subsidy to higher levels of schooling would enhance overall impacts. In a similar vein, there is scope for using an RCT to test one or more key links in the “theory of change” underlying a program’s rationale, even if the tool is not applicable to the program itself. This echoes the arguments of Heckman (1992) on the scope for more ambitious, “interesting,” experiments informed by theory.

⁴⁴ See for example the comments by Moffitt (2004) on trials of welfare reforms in the US.

Knowledge gaps

To help inform antipoverty policymaking, researchers should ideally be filling the gaps between what we know about the effectiveness of policies and what policymakers need to know. This is not happening as well as we might hope.⁴⁵

Why do these knowledge gaps exist? One answer is that it is simply very hard, or just very costly, to credibly fill the gaps. However, there is more to it than that. Like many other market failures, imperfect information plays a role. Here the problem is that development practitioners cannot easily assess the quality and expected benefits of an evaluation, to weigh against the costs. Short-cut non-rigorous methods promise quick results at low cost, though rarely are users well informed of the inferential dangers.⁴⁶ This constitutes what can be termed a “knowledge market failure.”

Another source of knowledge market failures is the existence of externalities in evaluations. There is evidence that having an impact evaluation in place for an ongoing development project can help improve some aspects of its implementation, such as its speed of disbursement (Legovini et al., 2015). However, the knowledge gains from an IE spillover to future projects, which (hopefully) draw on the lessons learnt from prior evaluations. Current project managers cannot be expected to take proper account of these external benefits when deciding how much to spend on evaluating their own project. There are clearly larger externalities for some types of evaluations, such as those that are more innovative—the first of their kind. The externalities in evaluation also play a role in the “myopia bias” that has been noted in development IEs, such that long-term evaluations are rare (Ravallion, 2009b).

Knowledge market failures also stem from publication biases. Franco et al. (2014) found that experiments in the social and political sciences reporting statistically significant effects are more likely to be published. Plainly, this distorts knowledge.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ For example, Kapur (2018) recounts an interview with Arvind Subramanian: “When asked how many of these expensive RCTs had moved the policy needle in India, Arvind Subramanian, Chief Economic Advisor, GOI, was hard pressed to find a single one that had been helpful to him in addressing the dozens of pressing policy questions that came across his table.” Also see Basu (2014) (another ex Chief Economic Advisor of the Government of India.)

⁴⁶ See, for example, OECD (2007). This report proposes a “poverty impact assessment” to assess the “poverty outcomes and impacts” of a development project in just 2-3 weeks at a cost of \$10,000-\$40,000; as the authors point out, this is appreciably less than standard IEs. A series of tables are proposed giving the project’s “short-term and long-term outcomes” across a range of (economic and non-economic) dimensions for each of various groups of identified “stakeholders,” as well as the project’s “transmission channels” through induced changes in prices, employment, transfers and so on. Many readers (including many practitioners) will probably not know just how hard it is to make such assessments in a credible way, and the OECD paper offers no guidance to readers on what confidence one can have in the results of such an exercise.

⁴⁷ Basu (2014, p.462) elaborates this point. With reference to whether medicine (M) improves school participation (P) he shows that, in a stylized situation in which there is no true impact of M on P: “With 10,000 experiments it is close to certainty that someone will find a firm link between M and P. Hence, the finding of such a link shows nothing but the laws of probability being intact. Yet, thanks to the propensity of journals to publish the presence rather than the absence of “causal” links, we get an illusion of knowledge and discovery where there are none.”

The dynamics of publication processes are a further source of persistence in knowledge gaps. Errors occur in the literature and it can take time to correct them. In recognition of its originality, the first paper on a topic may well be published prominently. Subsequent papers will tend to be relegated to lesser journals, cited less often, or may even have a hard time being published at all. The author of the original paper becomes the gatekeeper of knowledge on the topic. While the gatekeeper is not unpassable, she can have considerable influence. But the first paper may not have got it right. On top of this, the incentives for effort at replication appear to be weak in economics.⁴⁸ (Yet in the sciences, failures to replicate have been common; see Ioannidis, 2005.) Thus, the first draw from the distribution of impacts can have a lasting distortionary effect on accepted knowledge.

External invalidity also raises concerns about the process of knowledge accumulation. Even if the first paper came close to the truth in the specific context, it may have limited validity in different circumstances. When the topic concerns the impact of a policy, or an issue that is very relevant to that impact, policy knowledge will tend to be skewed accordingly.

These are generic concerns, not confined to RCTs. However, the gold standard method-hierarchy could well make things worse, as we will now see.

Matching research efforts with policy challenges

The development randomistas have had both output and substitution effects on knowledge. There is at least the suggestion of a positive output effect in the fact that we have seen a great many more RCTs (figure 1). However, as discussed already, neither the internal nor the external validity of these development RCTs is beyond doubt. We do not know the counterfactual—what we would have learnt if those resources (financial and human capital) had been deployed elsewhere.

The substitution effect relates to the methods used. Take, for example, the World Bank. While the earliest RCT in the 3ie database is by the Bank, until the early 2000s the tool was seen as only one of many options for IE. Since then there has been a marked switch in favor of RCTs within the Bank, which was applauded by some; for example, an editorial in *The Lancet* declared that “The World Bank is finally embracing science.” (Lancet, 2004, p.731).⁴⁹ The Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) reports that over 80 percent of the IEs starting in 2007-10 used randomization, as compared to 57 percent in 2005-06 and only 19 percent in prior years (World Bank, 2012).

Even if we presume that all those RCTs had a positive output effect on knowledge, the substitution effect could well work in the opposite direction. There are two aspects of the substitution effect. First, the emphasis on identifying causal impacts using RCTs has deflected attention from observational studies, both purely descriptive and causal. Good

⁴⁸ See the discussion in Rodrik (2009). Since then, 3ie has supported replication efforts for development IEs through its [Replication Window](#) and its *Journal of Development Effectiveness*.

⁴⁹ On the influence of RCTs at the World Bank see Webber and Prouse (2018).

descriptive work is surely undervalued in development research today. Nor has the gain from this substitution always been evident. Some of the lessons emerging from RCT research papers could have been derived from good “thick” descriptions (using qualitative and/or quantitative methods).

Second, a problem in evaluating the impact of the *portfolio* of development policies is that randomization is clearly only feasible for a non-random sub-set of policies and settings. Observational studies are the only option for the remainder. The implication is that we lose our ability to make inferences about a broad range of policies if we rely solely on RCTs. Randomization tends to be better suited to relatively simple programs, with clearly identified participants and non-participants, relatively short time horizons, and with little scope for the costs or benefits to spillover to the group of non-participants. In short, the tool is better suited to private goods, which are easy to assign across individual households, but are less able to handle public goods with benefits shared across many people (Hammer, 2017). There are exceptions (such as certain local public goods). However, it is generally far more difficult to randomize the location of medium- to large-scale infrastructure projects and seemingly impossible to randomize sectoral and economy-wide reforms. This makes the tool of limited use for some of the core activities in almost any country’s development strategy. Pressing global issues such as climate change also call for a different approach.

Focusing on neatly assignable private goods begs the question of what the economic rationale is for the “policy” being evaluated. Why would not markets provide this private good efficiently, eliminating the need for any impact evaluation? There may be good answers in some specific contexts, but one does not often hear them from the randomistas. Redistributive goals are often mentioned, but in a rather casual way. Distributional impacts are rarely addressed with any rigor, or even identified as outcomes. In short, the public economics is largely missing.

Of course, no single tool can cover all applications. The question here is whether we have a reasonable balance today between research effort and policy challenges. The (questionable) hierarchy of methods advocated by the randomistas makes it harder to attain that balance. Indeed, even for private goods, the very idea of randomized assignment is antithetical to the goals of many development programs, which typically aim to reach certain types of people or places. (In delivering cash transfers to poor people, governments will hopefully be able to do better than a random assignment.)

The aforementioned IEG report documents the unbalanced assignment of World Bank IEs across the sectors of its operations, and the seemingly poor fit of the evaluation portfolio to sectoral and development priorities (World Bank, 2012). Though I have not seen evidence, I suspect that there is also an imbalance in the assignment of IEs according to the likely duration of project benefits. Long-term impact evaluations of World Bank development projects are rare, despite the claims made about longer-term impacts. I can testify from personal experience how hard it is to organize and implement long-term IEs at the World

Bank.⁵⁰ It is plausible that favoring RCTs exacerbates the myopia bias in development knowledge.

This is not just happening in the World Bank. The sectoral bias in the use of RCTs more broadly is evident from the results of Cameron et al. (2016) who provide a cross-tab of over 2,200 published impact evaluations (in the aforementioned 3ie database) by method and sector.⁵¹ Overall, about two-thirds of these evaluations use RCTs, but the RCTs tend to be concentrated in certain sectors, notably education (58 percent used an RCT), health, nutrition and population (83 percent; 93 percent in health alone), information and communications technology (67 percent), and water and sanitation (72 percent). OS is more common—with under one-third using an RCT—in agriculture and rural development, economic policy, energy, environment and disaster management, private sector development, transportation, and urban development.

There are both supply and demand sides to this bias. On the supply side of evaluations, the reality today is that, enamored by the promise of cleanly identifying a causal effect, many economists and other social and political scientists have been searching for something to randomize. If randomization is not feasible, they are tempted to ask other questions.

On the demand side, governments (and development agencies) are largely free to choose what is evaluated. One concern here is that they do not always know what evidence they need.⁵² Politics also plays a role. They may be drawn to pick programs for which there is little risk that a negative appraisal will hurt politically, or to pick those that do matter but for which there are good reasons to be confident of a politically acceptable result (again raising ethical concerns). Other important development programs will not be evaluated. The risks are plain.

This all calls for more strategic evaluation agendas, not driven by the methodological preferences of researchers. Over the last 10 years, it is encouraging that we have started to see more strategic agendas emerging from the randomistas (such as the aforementioned multi-country BRAC example). This is welcome, though the choices are still led by academic researchers, anchored to their interests and devoted to one tool, RCTs. If we are really concerned about obtaining unbiased estimates of the impact of the portfolio of development policies it would surely be better to carefully choose (or maybe even randomly choose!) what gets evaluated, and then find the best method for the selected programs, with an RCT as only one option. That is what is called for if we take seriously the goal of obtaining an unbiased assessment of overall development impact. Research can serve that goal, but it is unlikely that will happen automatically.

⁵⁰ This largely based on the study reported in Chen et al. (2009).

⁵¹ In addition to RCTs the methods identified are difference-in-differences, instrumental variables, regression discontinuity and matching. Multiple methods are allowed in the counts.

⁵² See, for example, the discussion in Duflo (2017).

6. Conclusions

We are seeing a welcome shift toward a culture of experimentation in fighting poverty, and addressing other development challenges. RCTs have a place on the menu of tools for this purpose. However, they do not deserve the special status that advocates have given them, and which has so influenced researchers, development agencies, donors and the development community as a whole. To justify a confident ranking of two evaluation designs, we need to know a lot more than the fact that only one of them uses randomization.

The claimed hierarchy of methods, with randomized assignment being deemed inherently superior to observational studies, does not survive close scrutiny. Despite frequent claims to the contrary, an RCT does *not* equate counterfactual outcomes between treated and control units. The fact that systematic bias in estimating the mean impact vanishes in expectation (under ideal conditions) does not imply that the (unknown) experimental error in a one-off RCT is less than the (unknown) error in some alternative observational study. We obviously cannot know that. A biased observational study with a reasonably large sample size may well be closer to the truth in specific trials than an underpowered RCT.

There is still ample scope for useful observational studies, informed by theory. Yes, there is model uncertainty, though generally not as much as the randomistas assume. Moreover, when we look at RCTs in practice, we see them confronting problems of miss-measurement, selective compliance and contamination. Then it becomes clear that the tool cannot address the questions we ask about poverty, and policies for fighting it, without making essentially the same type of assumptions found in observational studies—assumptions that the randomistas promised to avoid.

RCTs are also ethically contestable in a way that experimentation using observational studies is not. The ethical case against RCTs cannot be judged properly without assessing the expected benefits from new knowledge, given what is already known. Review boards need to give more attention to the *ex-ante* case for deliberately withholding an intervention from those who need it, and deliberately giving it to some who do not, for the purpose of learning. There may be a good case in specific contexts, based on the limitations of existing knowledge, but the case does need to be made in a credible way and not just taken for granted.

The questionable claims made about the superiority of RCTs as the “gold standard” have had a distorting influence on the use of impact evaluations to inform development policymaking, given that randomization is only feasible for a non-random subset of policies. When a program is community- or economy-wide or there are pervasive spillover effects from those treated to those not, an RCT will be of little help, and may well be deceptive. The tool is only well suited to a rather narrow range of development policies, and even then it will not address many of the questions that policymakers ask. Advocating RCTs as the best, or even only, scientific method for impact evaluation risks distorting our knowledge base for fighting poverty. That risk was one of the main concerns in Ravallion (2009a), and the experience since then has reinforced that concern.

While we have seen much progress over the last 10 years, there are still grounds for doubting whether evaluative research on development fits well with the policy challenges now faced. This paper has argued that a better alignment requires (*inter alia*):

- Abandoning claims about an unconditional hierarchy of methods, with RCTs at the top, and making clear that “scientific” and “rigorous” evidence is not confined to RCTs.
- Demanding a clear and well-researched *ex ante* statement of the expected benefits from any development RCT, to be weighed against the troubling ethics.
- Making explicit the behavioral assumptions underlying randomized evaluations, similarly to the standards of structural approaches.
- Going beyond mean causal impacts, to include other parameters of policy interest and better understanding the mechanisms linking interventions to outcomes.
- Viewing RCTs as only one element of a tool kit for addressing the knowledge gaps relevant to the portfolio of development policies.

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