

Why and How Development Agencies Facilitate Labor Migration

HELEN DEMPSTER · BEZA TESFAYE

Abstract

Development agencies in high-income countries spend a large amount of both official development assistance (ODA) and other forms of financing on migration programming. While most of this spending is aimed at *detering* migration, increasingly more is being focused on *facilitating* migration: to the high-income country itself; within and between low- and middle-income countries; and supporting people on the move and the diaspora. This paper, written by the Center for Global Development and Mercy Corps, aims to explore why and how development agencies in high-income countries facilitate labor, or economic, migration, and how they have been able to justify and expand their mandate in this area. Based on interviews with nine development agencies, we find that development agencies use a range of arguments to justify their work in this area, including supporting economic development and poverty reduction in partner countries while also meeting labor market demands at home or other countries. Yet expanding a mandate in this area requires substantial cross-government coordination and political buy-in, both of which are difficult to achieve. It also requires the ability to be able to use ODA to facilitate labor migration, which is currently up for debate. As development agencies seek to expand their work on labor migration, it will be necessary to define shared goals and start with pilot projects that focus on low-hanging fruit, while maintaining a focus on development and poverty reduction.

Why and How Development Agencies Facilitate Labor Migration

Helen Dempster

Center for Global Development

Beza Tesfaye

Mercy Corps

The authors would like to thank the policymakers in the development agencies that we spoke to, who generously shared their time and internal documents. Many thanks to Sam Huckstep and Cassandra Zimmer for research assistance. We would also like to thank Michael Clemens, Jon Kurtz, and our anonymous peer reviewers; as well as the Emerson Collective for funding this research. Any errors are the authors' own.

Helen Dempster and Beza Tesfaye. 2022. "Why and How Development Agencies Facilitate Labor Migration." CGD Policy Paper 265. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development. <https://www.cgdev.org/publication/why-and-how-development-agencies-facilitate-labor-migration>

CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT

2055 L Street, NW Fifth Floor
Washington, DC 20036

1 Abbey Gardens
Great College Street
London
SW1P 3SE

www.cgdev.org

Center for Global Development. 2022.

The Center for Global Development works to reduce global poverty and improve lives through innovative economic research that drives better policy and practice by the world's top decision makers. Use and dissemination of this Policy Paper is encouraged; however, reproduced copies may not be used for commercial purposes. Further usage is permitted under the terms of the Creative Commons License.

The views expressed in CGD Policy Papers are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the board of directors, funders of the Center for Global Development, or the authors' respective organizations.

Contents

Acronyms	1
Key messages	2
Introduction	2
Methodology	4
Programming on labor migration	7
Facilitating labor migration from low- and middle- to high-income countries	8
Facilitating labor migration within and between low- and middle-income countries	10
Supporting people on the move and the diaspora	13
Piloting, testing, and evaluating	15
Justifying programming on labor migration	16
Understanding the mandate	16
Institutional frameworks and policy coordination	18
Lessons learned in expanding mandates	20
GIZ	21
DFAT	21
Constraints and sensitivities	22
Political sensitivities	22
Resource constraints	23
Use of ODA	23
Conclusion and recommendations	24
Annex 1. Key informant interviews (KIIs)	28
Interviewees	28
Guide	28
Annex 2. Development agencies' key information	31

List of Figures

1. Forms and reasons for engagement on labor migration	17
A2.1. Full-time staff working for development agencies (both headquarters and in post).....	35
A2.2. ODA spend by development agencies (US\$ billion)	35
A2.3. Full-time staff vs ODA spend per capita	35

Acronyms

DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DFAT	Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
EUTF	European Union Trust Fund for Africa
FCDO	UK Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office
FDI	Foreign direct investment
GAC	Global Affairs Canada
GIZ	German Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ILO	International Labour Organization
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
MFAT	New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
ODA	Overseas development assistance
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Key messages

- Increasingly, development agencies are spending official development assistance (ODA) and other forms of financing on facilitating labor, or economic, migration: to the high-income country itself; within and between low- and middle-income countries; and supporting people on the move and the diaspora.
- These development agencies justify their mandate on labor migration using a range of arguments including supporting economic development and poverty reduction in partner countries, while also meeting labor market demands.
- Yet development agencies can face challenges to facilitating labor migration, including political sensitivities; resource constraints; and debates on the appropriate uses of ODA.
- If development agencies want to expand their mandate on labor migration, they need to work closely with other government agencies towards the same goal; start with pilot projects that tackle low-hanging fruit; maintain a focus on development and poverty reduction; and ensure they are able to spend ODA on labor migration pathways.

Introduction

The development agencies of major high-income country bilateral donors (hereafter referred to as 'development agencies') spend both official development assistance (ODA) and other forms of financing on migration programming.¹ This programming largely falls into two main categories. The first category includes programs which predominantly seek to *deter* migration. This includes development support for long-term livelihoods and service delivery initiatives targeting potential migrants (to address the 'root causes' of irregular migration); law enforcement and border management to stem people trafficking and smuggling; reintegration support for voluntarily and forcibly returned migrants; and information campaigns to raise awareness about the dangers of irregular migration.

The second category includes programs which seek to *facilitate* migration, particularly labor, or economic, migration, either within and between low- and middle-income countries, or from those countries to high-income countries. The amount spent on these programs tends to pale in comparison to those in the first category. For example, of the €3.9 billion spent on migration programming under the European Union's Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), just 1.5 percent was spent on facilitating labor migration.²

1 For example, see Anna Knoll and Andrew Sherriff (2017) *Making Waves: Implications of the irregular migration and refugee situation on Official Development Assistance spending and practices in Europe*. Maastricht: ECDPM. <https://ecdpm.org/publications/making-waves-irregular-migration-refugee-oda-europe/>.

2 Tuuli Raty and Raphael Shilhav (2020) *The EU Trust Fund for Africa: Trapped between aid policy and migration politics*. Brussels: Oxfam International. <https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/eu-trust-fund-africa-trapped-between-aid-policy-and-migration-politics>.

Yet in recent years, many high-income countries have recognized the benefits of increasing spending on facilitating labor migration, for three main reasons. Firstly, the relationship between migration and economic development has become better understood, with many policymakers now seeing the two as integrally and positively linked.³ As such, the development benefits of migration have been articulated in international frameworks such as the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (GCM) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This even extends to exploring the role migration can play in fostering climate adaptation efforts in vulnerable areas.⁴ Secondly, global demographic shifts have highlighted growing labor shortages in high-income countries and a surplus of labor in low- and middle-income countries, trends which could be addressed through increased labor migration.⁵ Thirdly, high-income countries are attempting to cultivate better relationships with their low- and middle-income country partners, who often view labor migration as a priority and remittances as a key contribution to their development.⁶

In expanding programming on labor migration, development agencies have a key role to play. While they are rarely the lead or sole government agency responsible for migration issues, they are often responsible for ensuring that migration has a tangible or ‘mutual’ development benefit for countries of migrant origin.⁷ Reducing barriers to labor migration is the single biggest investment that high-income countries could make to the development of low- and middle-income countries, as doing so cultivates economic, social, cultural, and technological transfers.⁸ It can also lead to other, less obvious, benefits, including greater investments in education and skill-building, shifts in gender norms, and increases in climate adaptation (see Box 1).

Despite these benefits, it can be hard for development agencies to argue—both internally and externally—for an increase in their budget and mandate on labor migration. For many, it remains a highly contentious and politically sensitive area of programming. Concerns around how to target the most vulnerable within such programs, and the impact of the movement of skilled workers

3 Michael Clemens (2020) “Emigration Rises Along with Economic Development. Aid Agencies Should Face This, but Not Fear It.” Center for Global Development (CGD) Blog, August 18, 2020. <https://www.cgdev.org/blog/emigration-rises-along-economic-development-aid-agencies-should-face-not-fear-it>.

4 US White House (2021) *Report on the Impact of Climate Change on Migration*. Washington DC: US White House. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Report-on-the-Impact-of-Climate-Change-on-Migration.pdf>.

5 Charles Kenny (2021) *Global Mobility: Confronting a World Workforce Imbalance*. Center for Global Development (CGD) Note. Washington DC: CGD. <https://www.cgdev.org/publication/global-mobility-confronting-world-workforce-imbalance>.

6 While taking stock of partner country’s perspectives on labor mobility and development is beyond the scope of this paper, both interviews with donors and strategy documents indicate that it is a priority for some. For example, countries like Niger have articulated the role of migration in social and economic development through a multi-year national migration policy (*Politique Nationale de la Migration 2020–2035*). This policy acknowledges regional mobility as a long-standing and important practice within Niger and the broader Sahel / West Africa Region.

7 Helen Dempster, Jenniffer Dew, Samuel Huckstep, Martina Castiglioni, and Cassandra Zimmer (2022) *Enhancing the Development Impact of the UK’s Immigration Pathways*. Center for Global Development (CGD) Policy Paper 258. Washington DC: CGD. <https://www.cgdev.org/publication/enhancing-development-impact-uks-immigration-pathways>.

8 Michael A. Clemens (2011) “Economics and Emigration: Trillion-Dollar Bills on the Sidewalk?” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 25(3): 83–106. <https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdf/10.1257/jep.25.3.83>.

on countries of origin (e.g., 'brain drain'), predominate. In addition, the complex nature of labor migration (not to mention conflicting mandates) can make it hard to define both which government agencies should lead this work and how they should coordinate.

Methodology

This paper, produced by the Center for Global Development (CGD) and Mercy Corps, explores why and how development agencies facilitate labor migration. This includes understanding their current programming on labor migration and the way they justify their mandate in this area of work, both internally and externally. It is based on key informant interviews (KIIs) with policymakers in nine development agencies:⁹

- Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)—Australia
- Global Affairs Canada (GAC)—Canada
- Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA)—Denmark
- Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GIZ)—Germany
- Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)—Japan
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT)—New Zealand
- Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)—Sweden
- Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC)—Switzerland
- Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO)—United Kingdom (UK)

A standard questionnaire was used, though the specific answers (and names of those interviewed) have been anonymized. This information was supplemented with additional internet-based research to understand how these development agencies present their mandate externally.

Labor migration is an ill-defined term with no commonly agreed definition. There was a risk that our interviewees would conceive of the term in different ways, and therefore speak of different forms of programming. As a result, our questionnaire included the following note, which was intended to provide the definition of labor migration that we wished our interviewees to focus on:

We are referring not to programming focused on refugees / displaced groups, programs focused on preventing migration, or programs focused on the reintegration of returned migrants; but rather programming that supports people who are on the move—either internally or internationally—or contemplating to move in search of economic opportunities.

⁹ For more information about these interviews, including dates and questions asked, see Annex 1. For an overview of the development agencies' budgets, structures, and mandates, see Annex 2. Unfortunately the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was unable to participate, however we have included examples from their programming throughout when they were available to us.

Our interviewees referred to a range of programming that falls within that definition, which we have grouped in three main categories:

1. Facilitating labor migration from low- and middle-income countries to high-income countries;
2. Facilitating labor migration within and between low- and middle-income countries; and
3. Supporting people on the move and the diaspora.

Many of the programs being funded and implemented by development agencies are not solely focused on labor migration and have some overlap or integration with programming in sectors such as livelihoods, climate adaptation, and humanitarian affairs. Consequently, we have attempted to highlight this where appropriate.

We hope that the findings in this paper can help development agencies, both those we interviewed and those we didn't, understand how others have sought to establish, defend, and expand their mandate to work on labor migration as part of their broader development agenda. In doing so, we hope to provide evidence of the benefits of this work and its importance to broader development goals.

BOX 1. Why invest in labor migration?

There is a substantial amount of literature which focuses on the benefits of expanded labor migration for migrants, their families and communities, their countries of origin, as well as their countries of destination. A full account of this literature is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice to say that these benefits are numerous and span both economic and non-economic, as outlined below. Many of our interviewees explicitly cited these reasons as to why they worked on labor migration in the first place.

Economic

Labor migration increases expected incomes for migrants in the short-term,¹⁰ and communities of origin in the long-term.¹¹ At the national level, the economic impacts on countries of origin are less clear, but typically positive. Of course, the emigration of highly skilled individuals can lead to concerns about 'brain drain,'¹² but a reduction in labor supply can also contribute to job creation

10 Michael A. Clemens, Claudio E. Montenegro, and Lant Pritchett (2019) "The Place Premium: Bounding the Price Equivalent of Migration Barriers." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 101(2): 201–213. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00776.

11 Mats Hammarstedt and Mårten Palme (2012) "Human capital transmission and the earnings of second-generation immigrants in Sweden." *IZA Journal of Migration* 1(4). <https://doi.org/10.1186/2193-9039-1-4>.

12 Jeffrey Grogger and Gordon H. Hanson (2011) "Income maximization and the selection and sorting of migrants." *Journal of Development Economics* 95(1): 45–57. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdevco.2010.06.003>.

and wage growth for those who remain.¹³ Migrants send remittances back home, while expanding networks and lowering barriers to information, increasing trade and foreign direct investment (FDI).¹⁴ In fact remittances to low- and middle-income countries present huge potential for development and poverty alleviation, representing more than three times what is received in ODA.¹⁵

Such benefits can also accrue to the country of destination. In high-income countries, migrants are usually better educated, higher skilled, and younger than the host population, reducing the negative impact of demographic decline,¹⁶ increasing innovation and productivity,¹⁷ and contributing new skills to the labor market.¹⁸ In doing so, migrants can help employers meet skill shortages, enabling employers to grow, become more productive, and hire more local workers.¹⁹

Non-economic

Labor migration can also have an array of non-economic benefits. Within communities and countries of origin, the existence of a migration pathway can increase demand for schooling, skill attainment, business growth, and further migration, the benefits of which magnify over

-
- 13 Christian Dustmann, Tommaso Frattini, and Anna Rosso (2012) "The Effect of Emigration from Poland on Polish Wages." *The Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 117(2): 522–564. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12102>; and Prachi Mishra (2007) "Emigration and wages in source countries: Evidence from Mexico." *Journal of Development Economics* 82(1): 180–199. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2005.09.002>.
- 14 World Bank (2021) *Resilience: COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens*. Migration and Development Brief 34. Washington DC: World Bank. [https://www.knomad.org/sites/default/files/2021-05/Migration and Development Brief 34_1.pdf](https://www.knomad.org/sites/default/files/2021-05/Migration%20and%20Development%20Brief%2034_1.pdf); and Beata S. Javorcik, Çağlar Özden, Mariana Spatareanu, and Cristina Neagu (2011) "Migrant networks and foreign direct investment." *Journal of Development Economics* 94(2): 231–241. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2010.01.012>.
- 15 Dilip Ratha (2021) "Global Remittance Flows in 2021: A Year of Recovery and Surprises." World Bank Blog, November 17, 2021. <https://blogs.worldbank.org/peoplemove/global-remittance-flows-2021-year-recovery-and-surprises>.
- 16 Benedict Clements, Kamil Dyzczak, Vitor Gaspar, Sanjeev Gupta, and Mauricio Soto (2015) *The Fiscal Consequences of Shrinking Populations*. International Monetary Fund (IMF) Staff Discussion Note 15/21. Washington DC: IMF. <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2015/sdn1521.pdf>.
- 17 Gnanaraj Chellaraj, Keith E. Maskus, and Aaditya Mattoo (2005) "The Contribution of International Graduate Students to US Innovation." *Review of International Economics* 16(3): 444–462. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9396.2007.00714.x>; Michael A. Clemens (2012) *The Effect of International Migration on Productivity: Evidence from Randomized Allocation of U.S. Visas to Software Workers at an Indian Firm*. Center for Global Development (CGD) Working Paper. Washington DC: CGD. <https://www.aeaweb.org/conference/2013/retrieve.php?pdfid=459>; William R. Kerr and William F. Lincoln (2010) *The Supply Side of Innovation: H-1B Visa Reforms and US Ethnic Invention*. National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper 15768. Washington DC: NBER. <https://www.nber.org/papers/w15768>; and Max Nathan (2015) "Same difference? Minority ethnic inventors, diversity and innovation in the UK." *Journal of Economic Geography* 15(1): 129–168. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lbu006>.
- 18 Ekrame Boubtane, Jean-Christophe Dumont, and Christophe Rault (2014) "Immigration and economic growth in the OECD Countries." *Oxford Economic Papers* 68(2): 340–360. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oepp/gpw001>.
- 19 European Investment Bank (EIB) (2018) *Investing in Europe's future: the role of education and skills*. London: EIB. https://espas.secure.europarl.europa.eu/orbis/sites/default/files/generated/document/en/EIB-investing_in_europes_future_the_role_of_education_and_skills_en.pdf; and Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) (2019) *2019 RSE Survey*. Wellington: MBIE. <https://www.immigration.govt.nz/documents/statistics/rse-2019-survey-report.pdf>.

time.²⁰ Developing opportunities for labor migration from low-income countries can provide a useful mechanism through which to channel investment to improve training and educational institutions and better align credentials and other qualifications. It can also help develop better foreign policy relationships; provide more avenues for private sector investment and trade; and encourage climate adaptation efforts by offering access to less ‘climate-sensitive’ livelihoods and channeling remittances back.²¹ Finally, there is some suggestion that expanding labor migration could reduce irregular migration—as well as related challenges like human trafficking and smuggling—if pathways are accompanied by robust border enforcement and available for those who are engaging in irregular migration (e.g., targeted at the right skill level).²²

Programming on labor migration

Labor migration programming implemented by the development agencies we interviewed can be grouped into three broad categories: (1) facilitating labor migration from low- and middle-income countries to the high-income country itself; (2) facilitating labor migration within and between low- and middle-income countries; and (3) supporting people on the move and the diaspora. These will be explored in depth below, with examples of programs provided.

-
- 20 Paolo Abarcar and Caroline Theoharides (2020) “Medical Worker Migration and Origin-Country Human Capital: Evidence from U.S. Visa Policy.” *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 1–46. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01131; Michel Beine, Frédéric Docquier, and Hillel Rapoport (2008) “Brain Drain and Human Capital Formation in Developing Countries: Winners and Losers.” *The Economic Journal* 118(528): 631–652. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02135.x>; and Gaurav Khanna, Dean Yang, and Caroline Theoharides (2021) “Beyond Remittances: How Migrant Wages Help Communities Back Home.” Center for Global Development (CGD) Blog, November 24, 2020. <https://www.cgdev.org/blog/beyond-remittances-how-migrant-wages-help-communities-back-home>.
- 21 Helen Dempster, Amelia Dal Pra, and Mariam Traore Chazalnoël (2021) *Facilitating Environmental Migration through Humanitarian and Labour Pathways: Recommendations for the UK Government*. Center for Global Development (CGD) Policy Paper 245. Washington DC: CGD. <https://www.cgdev.org/publication/facilitating-environmental-migration-through-humanitarian-and-labour-pathways>; and Samik Adhikari, Michael Clemens, Helen Dempster, and Nkechi Linda Ekeator (2021) *Expanding Legal Migration Pathways from Nigeria to Europe: From Brain Drain to Brain Gain*. Washington DC: Center for Global Development (CGD) and World Bank. <https://www.cgdev.org/publication/expanding-legal-migration-pathways-nigeria-europe-brain-drain-brain-gain>.
- 22 Rachel Cooper (2019) *Legal Pathways’ Effects on Irregular Migration*. London: GSDRC. https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/20.500.12413/14486/569_Regular_Pathways_Effects_on_Irregular_Migration.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y; Mathias Czaika and Hein De Haas (2013) “The Effectiveness of Immigration Policies.” *Population and Development Review* 39(3): 487–508. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2013.00613.x>; Jessica Bither and Astrid Ziebarth (2018) *Creating Legal Pathways to Reduce Irregular Migration? What We Can Learn from Germany’s “Western Balkan Regulation”*. Berlin: The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS). <https://www.gmfus.org/news/creating-legal-pathways-reduce-irregular-migration-what-we-can-learn-germanys-western-balkan>; and Michael Clemens and Kate Gough (2018) *Can Regular Migration Channels Reduce Irregular Migration? Lessons for Europe from the United States*. Center for Global Development (CGD) Brief. Washington DC: CGD. <https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/can-regular-migration-channels-reduce-irregular-migration.pdf>.

Facilitating labor migration from low- and middle- to high-income countries

Four of our nine development agencies worked on facilitating or supporting labor migration from low- and middle-income countries to the high-income country itself: DFAT (Australia); GIZ (Germany); JICA (Japan); and MFAT (New Zealand). As explored in the next section, these agencies used a range of arguments to justify their mandate in this area, including the development potential of labor migration and the demand for such programming from their partner countries. Many of these programs facilitate the migration of people that can meet certain labor market demands, from countries that are deemed strategically important to the high-income country; for example, DFAT and MFAT support migration from the Pacific Islands; and JICA works on intra-Asia migration.

The activities supported include:

- **Providing training within countries of origin to support potential migrants *before they move*.** This includes delivering long-term training programs to provide migrants with hard skills needed in the country of destination (e.g., the Global Skill Partnership model), or programs to provide potential migrants with soft skills such as languages or cultural awareness.²³ For example, after the Cold War, Japan set up 'Japan Centers' in seven countries, such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, Mongolia, and Kazakhstan, which are now managed by JICA. Among other things, these centers deliver education and training programs, which are used to ensure potential migrants obtain language and cultural skills before they move to Japan.²⁴
- **Working with recruitment firms and brokers to improve ethical recruitment practices and safeguard migrants' rights.** Many high-income countries implement seasonal worker programs, aiming to bring migrants from abroad to provide short-term labor in the agriculture and horticulture sectors. Some elements of these programs, such as the fact they often rely on employer-tied visas, bring the risk of abuse and labor exploitation, which some development agencies work to reduce. For example, USAID (US) is collaborating with other government partners to recruit Mexican and Central American workers under its

23 A Global Skill Partnership is a bilateral labor migration agreement between equal partners. The country of destination agrees to provide technology and finance to train potential migrants with targeted skills in the country of origin, prior to migration, and gets migrants with precisely the skills they need to integrate and contribute best upon arrival. The country of origin agrees to provide that training and gets support for the training of non-migrants too – increasing rather than draining human capital. The defining feature of the Global Skill Partnership is the 'dual track' model. At the start, or during the training, the trainees can pick which track they want to go down: a 'home' track for non-migrants, and an 'away' track for migrants. Those who choose to stay are plugged back into the local labor market, with increased skills and earning potential. Those who choose to move also have increased skills and earning potential, and the ability to migrate legally and safely. They could also be provided with additional training in soft skills, for example in different languages or other facets of integration. For more information, please see <https://cgdev.org/bettermigration>.

24 JICA (2017) *Ex-Post Project Evaluation 2015: Japan Center (Cambodia, Vietnam, Mongolia, Kyrgyz, Laos, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Ukraine)*. Tokyo: JICA. <https://openjicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/1000034425.pdf>.

H-2 visa program. With the Departments of State and Labor, they have issued 'Guidance on Fair Recruitment Practices for Temporary Workers,' as well as worked actively with major employers to reduce abuses.²⁵

- **Establishing partnerships with the private sector and employers to identify labor market shortages.** Labor migration pathways that aim to bring migrant workers from partner countries to staff skill shortages in the country of destination will only work if all partners have a good understanding of specific labor market needs. For example, GIZ has worked with the German Federal Employment Agency for decades on how to better link the priorities of companies within Germany with labor migration interests among partner countries (see section below). This collaboration has led to landmark labor migration pathways such as 'Triple Win' which aims to bring nursing graduates from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Philippines, Tunisia, Indonesia, and Kerala (India) to Germany to meet labor shortages and contribute to development back home.²⁶
- **Working with potential partner countries to identify those that could help meet labor market needs.** Part of establishing labor migration pathways involves identifying potential partner countries that may be interested in sending workers abroad. This requires investing capacity in building trust with partner countries. For example, DFAT's 'Pacific Australia Labour Mobility' (PALM) scheme is a collaboration between Australia and the Pacific Islands. In each country, there is a posted officer working on Pacific labor mobility that helps scope the engagement with that partner country (see Box 2).

BOX 2. Development agencies' support to Pacific labor mobility

Both DFAT and MFAT engage heavily in promoting labor mobility from the Pacific Islands to their respective high-income countries. In 2021, the Australian Government announced the new 'Pacific Australia Labour Mobility' (PALM) scheme, under which sits their existing programs: the 'Seasonal Worker Programme' (SWP) and 'Pacific Labour Scheme' (PLS). PALM allows eligible Australian businesses to hire workers from nine Pacific islands and Timor-Leste when there are not enough local workers available. Migrants can work in Australia under either nine-month visas for seasonal roles or one- to four-year visas for longer-term roles. It is especially aimed at meeting skill shortages in rural and regional Australia, but also has a strong focus on the development impact for communities back home.²⁷ For example, the scheme provides skills development training for workers while in Australia and facilitates the sending home of remittances.²⁸

25 US Department of Labor (2022) "US Department of Labor issues 'Fair Recruitment Guidance' as part of multi-agency effort to promote ethical recruitment of temporary migrant workers." News Release, June 10, 2022. <https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/ilab/ilab20220610>.

26 GIZ (n.d.) "Sustainable recruitment of nurses (Triple Win)." <https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/41533.html>.

27 Pacific Australia Labour Mobility (PALM) (2021) "Welcome to the PALM scheme." <https://www.palmscheme.gov.au/>.

28 For example, see Pacific Australia Labour Mobility (PALM) (2022) "Skills Development." <https://www.palmscheme.gov.au/skills-development>.

Similarly, MFAT is providing NZ\$10 million (approximately US\$6 million) over five years to the ‘Strengthening Pacific Labour Mobility’ program, delivered by the Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment (MBIE). The purpose is to help Pacific Island countries maximize the social and economic benefits from participating in New Zealand’s existing labor mobility schemes, including the ‘Recognised Seasonal Employer’ (RSE) seasonal worker scheme. The ‘Strengthening Pacific Labour Mobility’ program has five strands: (1) capacity building; (2) enabling mobility expansion into new sectors; (3) fostering new relationships; (4) research and development; and (5) minimizing the negative outcomes of migration. According to MFAT the program has had mixed success due to the impacts of COVID-19; an external evaluation will feed into a re-designed program, due to be launched in 2023.²⁹

- **Providing support and meeting the welfare needs of migrants within countries of destination.** The labor migration process does not stop with migration; development agencies often see ensuring positive integration outcomes for migrants as part of their role, maximizing the poverty reduction potential of such pathways.³⁰ These outcomes may include migrants adapting to societal, cultural, and language expectations in countries of destination, ensuring they are able to earn a living free of exploitation. For example, in late 2020, JICA created the ‘Japan Platform for Migrant Workers towards Responsible and Inclusive Society’ (JP-MIRAI). JP-MIRAI is intended to provide “support before coming to Japan, while staying in Japan, and after returning home” to make Japan “the destination for foreign workers.”³¹ Today, it is focusing on bringing together local governments, employers, and other civil society actors to address the worker issues inherent within the ‘Technical Intern Training Programme’ (TITP), among others.

Facilitating labor migration within and between low- and middle-income countries

Many of our interviewees stressed the importance of supporting regional mobility: as one mentioned, the “regional approach makes the most sense, just focusing on one country means you miss out on the bigger picture.” As a result, five of our nine development agencies worked on facilitating labor migration within and between low- and middle-income countries: GAC (Canada), GIZ (Germany), Sida (Sweden), SDC (Switzerland), and FCDO (UK). To do so, they operated in an opportunistic way, engaging with partner countries and regional bodies that were interested in collaboration. Many of these agencies spoke about the development potential of such activities (see Box 3) and how they satisfied

29 MFAT (2022) *Strengthening Pacific Labour Mobility Programme Evaluation*. Wellington: MFAT. <https://www.gets.govt.nz/MFAT/ExternalTenderDetails.htm?id=25866818>.

30 Helen Dempster, Jenniffer Dew, Samuel Huckstep, Martina Castiglioni, and Cassandra Zimmer (2022) “How the UK Can Promote Global Development Through Immigration Pathways and Why They Should.” Center for Global Development (CGD) Blog, April 21, 2022. <https://www.cgdev.org/blog/how-uk-can-promote-global-development-through-immigration-pathways-and-why-they-should>.

31 JICA (2020) *Annual Report*. Tokyo: JICA. https://www.jica.go.jp/english/publications/reports/annual/2020/c8h0vm0000fc7q2b-att/2020_data_all.pdf, page 27.

the desires of partner countries and migrants themselves. Some also mentioned that working regionally was more palatable politically and had resulted in less oversight and critical interest.

BOX 3. Piloting support for seasonal labor migration in West Africa

Seasonal migration has long been an adaptation strategy for communities in the Sahel affected by climate variability and a lack of livelihood alternatives outside of agriculture. In countries like Niger and Mali, migrants typically move from rural, agriculture-dependent, communities during the dry season (October to June) and return home at the beginning of the short rainy season.

Migrants travel internally and to other countries within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), particularly Cote D'Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria, which offer greater livelihood options. Since its establishment, ECOWAS has formalized a system of free movement through several different protocols, effectively allowing citizens from member states to be able to easily move to, work, and reside in other member states. While the existing legal framework offers economic opportunities for labor migration within the region, households continue to face financial (transportation costs), administrative, and other constraints that limit their ability to migrate safely and reap the full economic benefits.³²

In 2021, USAID's Development Innovation Ventures (DIV) funded a pilot project in Niger, implemented by Mercy Corps and Stanford University's Immigration Policy Lab (IPL), to test a model helping people from rural communities benefit from safe and productive seasonal migration.³³ The pilot focuses on both implementation (e.g., pre-migration training and preparation; financial assistance; and ongoing support to mitigate risks, including exploitation) and data collection (e.g., frequent phone and in-person surveys with migrants and their families). The pilot will generate learnings for implementers and policymakers on how this approach may compliment broader development objectives (such as climate adaptation and poverty reduction); and the merits of scaling it, both in terms of size and geography.

The activities engaged in include:

- **Providing training within countries of origin to support potential migrants *before they move*.** As described above, some development agencies engage in these activities to ensure labor migrants are able to contribute fully to development once they arrive. For example, the 'Better Regional Migration Management' program (see Box 4) has been working in nine East and Horn of Africa countries to (among other things) prepare migrants for work in the region and in the Gulf, with the support of FCDO.

32 Beza Tesfaye, Jeeyon Kim, and Natalia Cañas (2021) *Harnessing the Development Potential of Labor Migration: Challenging the Dominant Paradigm of Development in-Place*. Washington DC: Mercy Corps. https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/2021-03/PRG_LaborMigration_R_lo_0321_WEBv2.pdf, page 16.

33 USAID (2021) "Development Innovation Ventures New Awards." <https://usaidinnovation.my.salesforce.com/sfc/#t0000000TZKp/a/t0000002D8bT/Vb41Tq3hTuHgRCQmhCmTBA4ix6mGqSY35A3Mqm.v3x4>.

BOX 4. The ‘Better Regional Migration Management’ program

From 2021–25, the FCDO has budgeted £35 million (approximately US\$41.6 million) for the ‘Better Regional Migration Management’ program, primarily operating in nine countries: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.³⁴ The program aims to contribute to poverty reduction and sustainable development in East Africa and the Horn of Africa through facilitating improved, evidence-based, regular labor migration.

FCDO has four priorities in engaging with the program: (1) expand data on migration, and use this data to influence policy; (2) enhance the skills of potential and returning migrants; (3) enhance inclusion and dignified employment through the promotion of ethical recruitment and the training and upskilling of employment agencies; and (4) increase the evidence base and understanding of the impact of labor migration pathways on migrants and their countries of origin.

- **Creating new labor migration pathways.** Some development agencies, recognizing the benefits of enhanced regional free movement, have been actively facilitating the expansion of such pathways. For example, GIZ is one of the primary implementers of the ‘Towards a Holistic Approach to Labour Migration Governance and Labour Mobility in North Africa’ (THAMM) program. There are several strands to this four-year, multi-million-dollar program, one of which is “preparing, putting in place or improving legal migration and mobility schemes in cooperation with targeted North African countries and EU Member States.”³⁵
- **Working on governance and policy to improve ethical recruitment practices and safeguard migrants’ rights.** The role of development agencies in improving the recruitment and migration process was frequently touted. For example, GAC supports the International Labor Organization (ILO) to deliver the ‘Promoting and Protecting the Rights of ASEAN Migrant Workers’ program. It aims to harmonize labor migration governance frameworks in the ASEAN region to maximize the protection of migrant workers and their contributions to equitable and inclusive growth in the region. In addition, SDC has a long-standing program in Sri Lanka—the ‘Safe Labour Migration Program’ (SLMP)—which aims to improve the safety of migrant workers at all stages of the migration cycle.³⁶
- **Strengthening regional governance and policy concerning labor migration and migration management.** Several agencies mentioned working with regional labor migration bodies and coordination mechanisms such as the Colombo Process, Quito Process, ECOWAS, and

34 FCDO (2022) “‘Better Regional Migration Management’ Development Tracker.” <https://devtracker.fcdo.gov.uk/projects/GB-GOV-1-301228/summary>.

35 International Labour Organization (ILO) (2019) “Towards a Holistic Approach to Labour Migration Governance and Labour Mobility in North Africa (THAMM).” https://www.ilo.org/africa/technical-cooperation/WCMS_741974/lang--en/index.htm.

36 International Labour Organization (ILO) (2020) “Recognising contributions of migrant workers.” https://www.ilo.org/colombo/info/pub/pr/WCMS_737558/lang--en/index.htm.

the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to improve regional migration management and governance. For example, SDC, Sida, and GIZ are all supporting the 'Joint Programme on Labour Migration Governance for Development and Integration in Africa' (JLMP). The JLMP is a collaboration between the African Union, ILO, International Organization for Migration (IOM), and European Commission for Africa (ECA) aiming to support intra-African labor migration through (among other things) improved strategic coordination. SDC notes that even gathering all stakeholders together to agree on a long-term strategic plan for the JLMP was a big achievement.³⁷

Still, some noted the limits of such engagement, particularly those that were more strictly focused on poverty reduction: "once people migrate outside of DAC [Development Assistance Committee]-eligible countries, we can no longer support them." Other agencies noted that they should be working more on the issue. For example, the recently agreed PACER Plus trade agreement in the Pacific includes a new working group on intra-Pacific labor mobility, which both DFAT and MFAT aim to support.³⁸

Supporting people on the move and the diaspora

For many development agencies, supporting people on the move and the diaspora was the main focus of their labor migration programming. The development and poverty reduction potential of such activities was clearly articulated, and many felt that such efforts were 'safer' politically. Some framed their work more broadly as "providing support to labor migrants" rather than "supporting labor migration."

The activities engaged in include:

- **Reducing the costs and improving the ease of sending remittances.** Many agencies spoke about how to increase the development potential of labor migration, with some focusing on the role that cheaper and better channeled remittances could play. For example, MFAT and MBIE jointly funded a 'Remittance Pilot Project' to understand the remittance behavior of labor migrants under New Zealand's 'Recognised Seasonal Employer' (RSE) scheme.³⁹ One of the things they did was use a private financial services provider to make sending remittances easier and cheaper, while also allowing migrants to make voluntary superannuation contributions. Based on the success of this pilot, they have rolled out the

37 SDC (2021) "Labour Migration governance for development and integration in Africa." https://www.eda.admin.ch/deza/en/home/themes-sdc/migration.par1_projectfilter_page2.html/content/dezaprojects/SDC/en/2019/7F10348/phase1?oldPagePath=/content/deza/en/home/themen/migration.html.

38 PACER Plus (n.d.) "Labour mobility arrangement." <https://pacerplus.org/pacer-plus/components/labour-mobility-arrangement>.

39 Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment (MBIE) (n.d.) *The Remittance Pilot Project: The economic benefits of the Recognised Seasonal Employer work policy and its role in assisting development in Samoa and Tonga*. Wellington: MBIE. <https://www.immigration.govt.nz/documents/statistics/remittance-pilot-project-report.pdf>.

scheme to all RSE workers in a bid to increase remittances in future years.⁴⁰ In addition, SDC and Sida are collaborating on a program to increase remittances in both the Asia and West Africa regions (see Box 5).

BOX 5. Increasing remittances from labor migration in Asia and West Africa

There are an estimated 281 million international migrants, many of whom send money back home through a remittance transfer market estimated at over half a trillion dollars annually within low- and middle-income countries.⁴¹ Recognizing the enormous potential that remittances offer for development, Sida and SDC are supporting the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) to make remittances more accessible and better linked to poverty reduction strategies.

This initiative, falling under SDC's Global Programme on Migration and Development and Sida's regional strategy for regional development in sub-Saharan Africa, invests in innovative remittance services and products globally whose work aligns with two key objectives: (1) "to make remittances themselves more accessible, affordable and convenient;" and (2) "to reimagine remittances as the gateway to a full suite of effective financial products for a population" including credit, insurance, and financial savings products.

An overarching aim of the initiative is to move from cash-based remittances to digitized options that offer lower costs for remitting and the possibility for greater financial inclusion, including for women. Specific areas of work include supporting the scaling of digital remittances options, working to promote remittance-linked financial services, and working with governments and providers on improving the regulatory and enabling environment for remittances.⁴²

- **Combating trafficking and smuggling networks, and providing labor protections for vulnerable migrants.** Some development agencies focus explicitly on vulnerable migrants, particularly those who have been trafficked or smuggled, and work to reduce these vulnerabilities. For example, JICA supports an anti-trafficking program in Vietnam and Thailand which aims to strengthen the capacity of enforcement agencies and provide safe spaces for trafficked migrants.⁴³ In addition, Sida has been working on ethical recruitment in Asia through the 'Corporate Responsibility in Eliminating Slavery and Trafficking' (CREST) initiative (see Box 6).

40 New Zealand Immigration (2021) "Making it easier for RSE workers to send money home." <https://www.immigration.govt.nz/about-us/media-centre/news-notifications/making-easier-rse-workers-send-money-home>.

41 Dilip Ratha (2021) "Global Remittance Flows in 2021: A Year of Recovery and Surprises." World Bank Blog, November 17, 2021. <https://blogs.worldbank.org/peoplemove/global-remittance-flows-2021-year-recovery-and-surprises>.

42 For more information, see United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) (n.d.) "Migration & Remittances" <https://migrantmoney.uncdf.org/>.

43 For example, see JICA (2019) "International Women's Day: 10 Years of Assisting Thailand's Victims of Human Trafficking." https://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/field/2018/190301_01.html.

BOX 6. The ‘Corporate Responsibility in Eliminating Slavery and Trafficking’ (CREST) initiative

Labor migrants from low- and middle-income countries are often at risk of violations including human trafficking, labor exploitation, and debt bondage. To mitigate these risks, Sida is investing in the ‘Corporate Responsibility in Eliminating Slavery and Trafficking’ (CREST) initiative, implemented by IOM to help “business in upholding human and labor rights of migrant workers in key sectors and migration corridors.”

The initiative primarily targets countries in Asia. It works with multinationals, governments, employers, recruiters, civil society, and migrants to increase awareness about migrant rights, enhance ethical recruitment practices, and provide technical assistance to improve policies and management systems relevant to labor migrants. It sees the private sector, in particular industries that rely on migrant labor, as integral in the success of global commitments related to migration and development, such as the GCM. By engaging on both the demand and supply side of labor migration markets to ensure accountability to human rights standards, the initiative seeks to improve the experiences and outcomes for all.⁴⁴

- **Supporting socio-economic integration.** Finally, many development agencies spoke about their role in supporting the socio-economic integration of migrants in countries of destination, including providing employment and training programs; health and social protection services; and institutional strengthening. For example, GAC and Sida are some of the largest contributors to the UNHCR / IOM Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, focusing on meeting the humanitarian and development needs of forced migrants in the region, particularly socio-economic integration.

Piloting, testing, and evaluating

Labor migration programming often spans diverse geographic locations and subject areas. This requires a greater level of coordination with a greater range of partners, including public and private actors, as well as an understanding and appreciation of the needs, legal frameworks, and contextual factors of various countries. This often makes labor migration programming more complex than other types of development programs. It also may contribute to the perception of it being ‘risky,’ especially when considering the lack of tried and tested approaches, and their political implications. In such cases, particularly when this is a new area of programming, starting small and piloting different approaches can help develop the capacity—including the evidence, knowledge, and experience—needed to understand what works well and what can be expanded.

44 For more information, see International Organization for Migration (IOM) CREST (n.d.) “Partnerships.” <https://crest.iom.int/en/highlights/partnerships>.

To justify the impact of their programming on labor migration, the majority of the development agencies we spoke to monitor and evaluate their interventions in-house through qualitative and quantitative data collection. Much of this monitoring and evaluation is done at the program level, linked to key performance indicators and other program-specific metrics. This could include collecting *output* information (e.g., how many migrants were engaged by a training or received worker support) and / or *impact* information (e.g., how did the earnings of those migrants change after engaging in the training, versus a comparison group). Only a few development agencies looked at the impact of their programs beyond the migrants themselves, for example to employers, employer agencies, and countries of origin. In addition, few released their evaluation results to the public. As a result of the project specific nature of data collection, some development agencies mentioned it was difficult to aggregate results and prove the success of labor migration initiatives in achieving overarching goals.

Other development agencies felt they did not have the capacity in-house to conduct such data collection, and instead supported others to do so. For example, one mentioned they rely heavily on data from the IOM, regarding the impact of their programs and those of others. Others leverage the data collected by other agencies within the government, such as immigration or internal affairs departments. Some fund external data collection efforts, such as the Mixed Migration Centre⁴⁵ and academic institutions, in a bid to improve the general quality and quantity of labor migration data and evidence. The majority of these agencies mentioned they wanted to collect more primary data—especially regarding the impact of their programs in countries of origin—and release this data to the public, yet resource and political constraints stood in the way.

Justifying programming on labor migration

For development agencies, the relative focus on these three broad categories of programming depended on a number of factors including local political and domestic concerns; the desires of partner countries; their levels of cooperation with other government departments; and their size and budget. The following section delves into how these agencies justified their mandate working on these aspects of programming, and what issues were inherent in negotiating these mandates.


Understanding the mandate

All development agencies justified their mandate on labor migration by talking about its development and poverty reduction impacts (Figure 1). As a result, all focused on ways in which to maximize the development potential of labor migration, for example by increasing remittances; better channeling those remittances; and developing the investment potential of the diaspora. Others focused on integration, through providing language and soft skills training;

45 Mixed Migration Centre (n.d.) <https://mixedmigration.org/>.

reducing risk of exploitation, discrimination, and other protection outcomes; and increasing labor enforcement so that the maximum potential benefits could be realized. Yet their interpretation of how the development and poverty reduction impacts of migration linked to their mandate on programming differed.

FIGURE 1. Forms and reasons for engagement on labor migration



For example, some development agencies explicitly rejected working on labor migration to high-income countries themselves, stating that development policy had to be separated from immigration policy; “we are an agency that focuses on reducing poverty, not on [high-income country’s] immigration goals.” As a result, these agencies tended to focus on the second two categories of labor migration programming outlined above. This tended to occur more frequently within development agencies that remained stand-alone, separate from foreign affairs agencies, and had therefore retained their explicit focus on poverty reduction in ODA-eligible countries (see Box 8).

Other development agencies, those that worked on facilitating migration to the high-income country themselves, spoke about the development potential of such migration; “[we] see the aid program as a lever which we can use to maximize the benefits to partner countries.” These arguments tended to arise more frequently within development agencies that had been integrated within foreign affairs agencies, rather than remaining stand-alone. It was also more common among development agencies that had long-standing economic or historical ties with particular countries of origin. Of course, there were still concerns about investing in such programming. One mentioned that they were worried about “to what extent has [our] support through the aid program subsidized the operational delivery of an immigration policy?”

Development agencies that facilitate migration to high-income countries had three other justifications for working on such programming. Firstly, they frequently spoke about labor shortages within the high-income country and the role that migrants could play in meeting such shortages.

One spoke about the fact that such programming had whole-of-government buy-in; ministries of employment knew that employers needed more workers, and ministries of social development knew that local workers were not available. Secondly, such programming exemplifies the notion of ‘aid in the national interest.’⁴⁶ One development agency explicitly mentioned that they needed to justify how their programming would benefit the high-income country, in order to secure buy-in from both politicians and the public. Thirdly, some also spoke about the need to use labor migration to shift public attitudes within the high-income country. Specifically, one representative mentioned that working on the link between migration and labor shortages domestically was a way to “show that migration had a positive impact and not just failures,” or, in other words, labor migration should not be seen as not a problem but a benefit.

Some agencies were clearly stuck in the middle: they saw the benefits of engaging in labor migration to the high-income country but felt they either couldn’t justify working on such programming within such a narrow poverty reduction mandate, or found it difficult to develop the coordination mechanisms to do so.

Beyond the development and poverty reduction impacts of migration, some development agencies also saw legal migration as a counterforce to irregular migration. Acknowledging that increasing the penalties and costs of migration, alone, may force many into irregular pathways, some development agencies have argued that a more effective response is to create more legal pathways, either to their country or to other destinations. This justification enabled some development agencies to bridge domestic immigration goals, such as reducing irregular migration, and various foreign policy goals, including development and poverty reduction.

Institutional frameworks and policy coordination

Because migration policy sits across many other strategies deployed in foreign and domestic affairs, understanding how it is framed by development agencies relates to questions of broader institutional structures. Specifically, the migration focus of development agencies is contingent on the role of development agencies vis-a-vis other government agencies. Other agencies which often engage in migration policy include foreign affairs ministries—within which half of our development agencies are housed—employment or labor ministries, and refugee and / or immigration agencies.

Within governments, when working on a cross-cutting issue such as migration, different agencies contribute in different ways based on their expertise and broad mandate. It is often the focus of labor agencies to identify employment opportunities and labor needs at home, and work with private sector actors on recruitment. Refugee and domestic immigration agencies focus primarily on migration management and integration support, including the rights and welfare

46 Owen Barder (2018) “Aid in the National Interest: When is Development Cooperation Win-Win?” Center for Global Development (CGD) Blog, June 5, 2018. <https://www.cgdev.org/blog/aid-national-interest-when-development-cooperation-win-win>.

of new arrivals. Foreign affairs ministries engage in achieving foreign policy goals, which may include regulating overall immigration flows by engaging in various ways with countries of origin and transit.

The role of development agencies on labor migration policy, in most instances, was seen as relatively new and evolving. Their engagement has been first and foremost in countries of origin, concerned with reaping the poverty reduction and development benefits of safe, orderly, and regular migration. In this regard, work on labor migration often complemented or was integrated into other development and foreign policy portfolios including economic opportunities; livelihoods; humanitarian affairs; security affairs; climate adaptation; and financial inclusion (specifically for work helping to facilitate the flow of remittances). Some development agencies also see their work on labor migration as part of an agenda to address fragility, particularly when contributing to reducing irregular migration, smuggling, and trafficking.

The level and type of engagement across development agencies varied depending on the nature and framing of the labor migration efforts. The spectrum ranged from light-touch coordination involving regular updates and mutual capacity-building (to share experiences and expertise across agencies) to more intensive efforts involving co-financing and jointly implementing specific migration-related projects. Many were required to align their programming with broader foreign policy agendas. For example, Canada's response to the Venezuelan refugee and migration situation is jointly managed by GAC and the national immigration agency, Immigration Refugee and Citizenship Canada (IRCC). Each institution focuses on specific but complementary priorities, with humanitarian, development, and security needs managed by GAC and migration and protection-related capacity building support for refugee and migrant hosting countries led by IRCC. For those agencies working on migration to the high-income country itself, more collaboration and coordination with other government agencies was required, including with ministries of labor, employment, tax, and welfare. Some development agencies mentioned that such alignment was clearly understood among all government agencies: "everyone understands the priority that [such] labor schemes have." Others felt that government agencies were "all coming at it from a slightly different point of view," making it difficult to agree on a way forward. One mentioned that other government agencies didn't understand why the development agency was engaging in labor migration at all.

To align priorities, goals, and strategies, it is critical for development agencies and others working on migration policy to establish avenues for coordination and collaboration. For example, several agencies mentioned bodies which aimed to bring policymaking on migration together under one umbrella. This is especially relevant for programming on labor migration pathways from low- and middle- to high-income countries. Some of these coordination bodies had led to positive shifts in government coordination (see Box 7), while others felt that such coordination mechanisms hadn't exactly worked, at times diminishing the ability of the development agency to direct and manage resources related to migration initiatives. For example, one development agency spoke about a migration task force that was set up to facilitate closer engagement within agencies which "has been

a blessing and a curse:" while the cooperation was valuable, it took away ownership of dedicated funds for related projects from the development agency.

BOX 7. The Office of the Pacific

The Pacific Islands have long been Australia's biggest recipients of foreign aid; in 2020–21, AU\$1.44 billion (approximately US\$1 billion) was dedicated.⁴⁷ In addition, they are key partners and allies on a range of fronts including tackling climate change, expanding trade and foreign investment, and promoting security and stability.

To better coordinate government interaction with the Pacific Islands, in 2019, DFAT established an Office of the Pacific. The Office includes staff from DFAT as well as those from a range of agencies including the Departments of Defense, Home Affairs, Finance, Treasury, and the Attorney General. Notably, their website explicitly calls out the Office's mandate in supporting "the delivery of the Government's package of innovative initiatives in the Pacific, including in labour mobility and infrastructure financing."

Our interviewees explicitly noted that the establishment of the Office had led to better cross-government coordination and better information flows. In particular, it was noted that the insights of those that didn't usually engage in migration issues, such as the Department of Defence and the Australian Federal Police, had strengthened programs. They also noted that many of the expected benefits of the Office had not yet been reaped, and they were looking forward to more internal consultation in the coming years.

A key ingredient in effective coordination on such a multidimensional issue is the articulation of a clear overarching policy framework. Many development agencies referred to cross-government multi-year migration policy plans as their guiding framework, seeing how their work complements the work of other agencies implicated in the sector. These were largely agreed at the level of headquarters (the capital of the high-income country) with some consultation and input from regional offices, embassies, and partner countries. Some development agencies noted the importance of nominating a clear lead agency. Their role would be to maintain oversight over the implementation of the framework, as well as build coordination mechanisms.

Lessons learned in expanding mandates

In our interviews, two development agencies emerged as those who had been able to successfully expand their mandates on labor migration: GIZ and DFAT. One important thing to note is that while the aid department in Germany remains stand-alone, it is integrated into the foreign affairs ministry in Australia, showing that government structures should not necessarily impede the expansion of a

47 DFAT (2021) "Office of the Pacific." <https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/office-of-the-pacific>.

labor migration mandate. Yet in both, cross-government coordination was essential, as will be briefly recounted below.

GIZ

GIZ was established in 2011 through the merger of three other German development organizations.⁴⁸ It operates differently than other development agencies in that it is often ‘commissioned’ to deliver technical expertise and other capacity when required. Their main commissioning partners are in the German government, particularly the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the Federal Employment Agency, for which they deliver ODA- and non-ODA-eligible projects. Yet they can also be commissioned by the private sector, projects they channel through their commercial arm on which they pay tax.

It is partly this commissioning structure that has enabled GIZ to expand its work on labor migration. Around the time of GIZ’ establishment, the issue of labor shortages was frequently discussed in Germany. The Federal Employment Agency bilaterally approached GIZ to establish a pilot that leveraged their core mandates and expertise: promote development-oriented legal migration. Working within a pilot structure was important, so as to not “open up the doors,” though they did receive pushback from other government agencies. Yet their commissioning structure enabled GIZ to establish innovative partnerships with the private sector (who they had long been collaborating with) to establish such pilots and eventually scale.

In these projects, GIZ maintained their focus on development and poverty reduction, always careful to not overstep into the mandates of other government agencies. The issue of what was or was not ODA-eligible arose frequently (see Box 8); in GIZ’ case, their programming on either side of this line also has tax implications. They could also only work with countries where there was a strong foreign policy rationale in engaging, which limited the scope of their activities. Certainly, though, the cross-government approach necessitated by GIZ’ commissioning structure enabled the German government to develop projects that fell within multiple mandates and leveraged respective comparative advantage. As a result of this collaboration, GIZ has been able to grow into one of the biggest development agencies (see Annex 2) with a large ODA budget and number of staff working on labor migration.

DFAT

The Australian Aid department (AusAID) merged with DFAT in late 2013, creating an integrated ministry which leads on development, trade, and foreign policy. It has always had an explicit focus on both promoting Australia’s interests abroad, while also contributing to sustainable economic growth

48 Kerina Tull (2017) *How do development agencies organise their in-house technical expertise?* GSDRC Helpdesk Report. London: DFID. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5b9bc28f40f0b662dd843af5/K4D_HDR_How_do_development_agencies_organize_in-house_expertise.pdf.

and poverty reduction. They have also always focused on the Indo-Pacific; every year, two-thirds of their ODA spend goes to the region (in 2021–22, it was 70 percent).⁴⁹

This regional focus, as well as their mandate to address both development and foreign policy interests, has bipartisan support and has been frequently touted by Ministers from a range of government agencies. The importance of labor migration to economic growth and poverty reduction has likewise been underscored. For example, their recent ‘Partnerships for Recovery: Australia’s COVID-19 Development Response’ strategy includes a pillar on ‘Economic recovery.’ A large part of this pillar focuses on the importance of Pacific labor mobility to economic development in countries of origin and labor market needs in Australia. They also highlight the role that their ‘Australian Pacific Training Coalition’ (APTC) has in building skills across the region to “maximize the opportunities created by labour mobility.”⁵⁰

Again, it is this cross-government buy-in for labor mobility which has enabled DFAT to expand its mandate in the area and concurrently grow in size and budget. Interviewees noted that this has happened organically. For example, migration used to be a sub-sector of economic development when the Pacific Division was first conceptualized. As it grew in size and budget, it split away from the economic team and became more associated with the sectors in which labor mobility was being promoted (e.g., agriculture and horticulture). As a result, DFAT collaborates very closely with other government agencies to develop a cross-government mandate on labor mobility (the Office of the Pacific has assisted with this, see Box 7). Yet it is unlikely that DFAT would have been able to expand its mandate in this way without bi-partisan support for labor migration from the region, and the concurrent prioritization of its programming in this area.

Constraints and sensitivities

Some development agencies have succeeded in carving out a mandate to facilitate labor migration, and others are actively working on this. Yet engagement on this issue has presented a number of challenges. These challenges can be categorized as political sensitivities related to working on migration; resource constraints; and debates on the appropriate use of ODA.

Political sensitivities

While many development agencies indicated progressive recognition of the linkage between migration and development, and how labor migration may also positively affect high-income countries (whether through mitigating irregular migration or filling labor shortages), interviewees noted that at times their work can be challenged by political actors within their countries.

49 Cameron Hill (2022) “The ‘Indo-Pacific’ and Australia’s aid program.” DevPolicy Blog, March 25, 2022. <https://devpolicy.org/the-indo-pacific-and-australias-aid-program-20220325/>.

50 DFAT (2022) “Development assistance in the Pacific.” <https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/development-assistance/economic-growth-and-private-sector-development>.

One agency mentioned that “behind closed doors everyone knows we need to do it, but no-one wants to take on overall responsibility.” Many felt their work on labor migration was dictated by the political leaning of the governments and the way that these governments framed migration.

For other development agencies, the main constraint was political scrutiny on migration programs and investments, particularly when issues such as worker protection arose. This required development agencies to continue to justify their work on labor migration to elected officials by demonstrating its benefits through evidence and working closely with partners such as unions. Over time, some development agencies have managed to withstand political challenges by strengthening their reputation, internally and externally, and clearly framing their work as contributing to other national and international interests (as the discussion above shows). One mentioned that their work on labor migration was innovative and filled a gap, which was “good in terms of our position, globally.” Other development agencies deliberately tried to ensure their programming on facilitating labor migration “flew under the radar,” so as to not attract political or media attention. Notwithstanding some of these successes, cuts to funding are a periodic threat and it is important to anticipate and respond to these types of political challenges.

Resource constraints

While not unique to labor migration, many development agencies faced financial and human resource constraints in working on such programming. For most development agencies interviewed, facilitating labor migration was a relatively small part of their portfolios. Given other priorities, the amount of funding allocated to labor migration work was relatively low, and paled in comparison to the potential demand for greater labor migration opportunities within low- and middle-income countries. Concerns that development assistance was not ‘agile’ was also mentioned as a challenge for undertaking work on labor migration, due to constraints on length of time of programs, where funding could be spent, and how. Many wanted multi-year projects to be able to see the development impact of labor migration on a longer-term time horizon. Relatedly, for many development agencies, limited resources also translated into a limited number of staff working on labor migration issues, including development and migration experts.

Given the novelty of the work for some development agencies, starting with smaller initiatives can be beneficial. Such an approach can ensure the programming doesn’t raise the suspicions of political actors, while helping to test risks and assumptions before scaling.

Use of ODA

A common constraint mentioned by several development agencies related to restrictions on the use of ODA to facilitate labor migration. This issue, which is described further in Box 8, primarily came up in discussing why development agencies do not work on facilitating migration to the high-income country itself. Some explicitly mentioned the upcoming OECD DAC guidance on the use of ODA for

labor migration, expressing concern that it may limit the activities that they have been able to do up to this point.

BOX 8. Spending official development assistance (ODA) on labor migration⁵¹

The OECD DAC defines ODA as “government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries.”⁵² There is an ongoing debate as to whether ODA can be spent on projects that also have some benefit for the country distributing the aid (a ‘win-win,’ or ‘aid in the national interest’).

Throughout 2017 and 2018, the OECD debated a new purpose code to capture ODA-eligible migration activities. Under this code, ODA could be used to assist low- and middle-income countries to facilitate migration. It was not to be used to address the ‘root causes’ of forced displacement and irregular migration, nor for “activities that pursue first and foremost providers’ interests.”⁵³

In 2020, the DAC created a Temporary Working Group on the issue. By September 2022, they hope to produce a set of concrete criteria that can be used to help assess whether a migration-related activity can be reported as ODA.⁵⁴ In the absence of this guidance, it is reasonable to fall back on the original ODA definition. Activities that primarily target the economic development and welfare of low- and middle-income countries (such as education and skill building, the development of migration management capacity, and sustainable reintegration) can be declared as ODA. Other activities inherent within labor migration (such as implementation and set up costs, physical migration, and the development of migration policies) cannot.

Conclusion and recommendations

This paper aimed to summarize the experience of nine development agencies in facilitating labor migration. In the course of our interviews, it became apparent that these development agencies came at the issue of labor migration from different perspectives, and justified their mandate in different ways.

51 A longer version of this box is included in Helen Dempster, Ismael Gálvez Iniesta, Reva Resstack, and Cassandra Zimmer (2022) *Financing Legal Labor Migration Pathways: From Pilot to Scale*. Center for Global Development (CGD) Policy Paper 261. Washington DC: CGD. <https://www.cgdev.org/publication/financing-legal-labor-migration-pathways-pilot-scale>.

52 OECD (2020) “Official Development Assistance (ODA).” <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/official-development-assistance.htm>.

53 OECD (2018) *Proposed New Purpose Code for “Facilitation of Orderly, Safe, Regular and Responsible Migration and Mobility.”* Paris: OECD. [https://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DCD/DAC/STAT\(2018\)23/REV3&docLanguage=En](https://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DCD/DAC/STAT(2018)23/REV3&docLanguage=En).

54 OECD (2020) *Brief on the DAC Temporary Working Group on Clarifying the ODA-eligibility of Migration-related Activities (TWG)*. Paris: OECD. <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/collapsecontents/brief-dac-twg-migration.pdf>.

Several development agencies interviewed said that they would like to do more to facilitate labor migration—especially within and between low- and middle-income countries, and to high-income countries—but felt constrained in doing so. These constraints could be political (for example, the government of the day may not feel labor migration is a development priority); resource-based (for example, not having the budget or capacity to work on labor migration); or more fundamentally based on mandate (for example, some agencies felt that they should not be using ODA on labor migration activities).

Throughout, we have attempted to provide some strategies that development agencies have employed to try and secure more political buy-in and more resources to work on labor migration, thereby expanding their mandate. These strategies can be summarized as follows:

1. **Understand where migration ‘fits.’** Unlike many other areas of development programming, labor migration is a fundamentally cross-sectoral issue. It will rarely be solely the remit of the development agency, even if they are integrated within a foreign affairs ministry. The challenge, however, is that each agency has its own focus and approach to migration which is often disconnected from the whole. Programming on labor migration should fit within a broader development strategy, as well as contribute towards goals regarding education, coordination, and investment with partner countries. If working on migration from low- and middle- to high-income countries, it also needs to fit within broader assessments of labor market demand. The first step, therefore, is to understand how migration is viewed by different actors across the government in the high-income country; identify the blind spots in how it is understood and addressed; and ‘re-frame’ it in a more coherent and evidence-informed way. This could include highlighting the mutual benefits of labor migration to countries of origin and destination alike, and showing how it can increase the impact of other investments (e.g., existing skill-building and training programs).
2. **Work towards the same goal.** While the involvement of development agencies in labor mobility initiatives is critical to ensure these projects focus on achieving development outcomes, the development agency cannot work in a vacuum. Any programming on labor migration must be done in conjunction with other government agencies, all working towards the same goals and objectives. These government agencies can be strategic allies in expanding a development agencies’ mandate. For example, GIZ’s long-standing partnership with the Federal Employment Agency helped them justify their work on labor migration from low- and middle- to high-income countries, as did DFAT and MFAT’s relationships with their employment departments. The FCDO felt they could only justify working on labor migration between low- and middle-income countries as it didn’t infringe on the mandate of other government actors. The articulation of a ‘whole-of-government’ migration strategy, with clear roles for different actors, can be a useful way of coordinating across agencies.
3. **Look for low-hanging fruit.** It will be difficult for a development agency to conceive of, and implement, a new labor migration program at any significant scale. Instead, the agency

should look for opportunities to meet the mutual needs of partners where there is existing demand. This came out strongly from our interviews; the need to ‘go with the grain’ and work with partners who were interested in working with them. For example, some partner governments may be asking for specific activities that could be ‘tacked’ on to existing investments (e.g., facilitating the movement of some people already being trained by the development agency) or a private sector employer may want support for their existing recruitment efforts in a low- and middle-income country. It will likely be required to start small (say, with 100 people) and expand from there.

4. **Focus on activities in the country or region of origin.** It is the explicit mandate of the development agencies we interviewed to work within low- and middle-income countries of origin. They have the best sense of all government departments as to the needs of those countries and the role that they could play in improving efforts on labor migration. Expanding activities in countries of origin—such as identifying potential migrants, investing in preparing them for migration, and supporting their reintegration and investments—can be ‘safer’ and more easily justified as a use of ODA. Once such interventions have been established, development agencies can work with other agencies (such as ministries of labor) to expand programming within low- and middle-income countries, and to high-income countries (if desired).
5. **Slowly expand scope.** While we acknowledge the possibility that political changes in a particular country can cause a sea-change in how a development agency engages on migration, it is more likely that such change will be gradual. For example, the growth and importance of labor migration within DFAT occurred over decades, with increases in mandate, budget, and scope going hand-in-hand. Development agencies should be opportunistic, looking for ways to expand their operations and connections with other departments as and when such opportunities become available, but they should also be realistic about the amount of time this could take.

Once development agencies have been able to secure political buy-in, resources, and a mandate to work on labor migration, what can they do to improve the development and poverty reduction potential of their labor migration investments? To conclude this paper, we offer four recommendations:

1. **Expand programming.** The benefits of expanded labor migration pathways have been well elucidated in the academic and policy literature (and summarized in Box 1). Whether within and between low- and middle-income countries, or to high-income countries, expanding and improving such pathways would bring development and poverty reduction benefits. As a result, development agencies should seek to expand their programming, support, and investment to such initiatives wherever possible. As evidenced by the diversity of ways development agencies are already supporting labor migration, there are many options of how this can be done, including through a focus on preparation, matching, reducing

financial and administrative barriers for moving, and / or integration. These efforts can also be bilateral or multilateral, including through partnerships and support to institutions already working in this realm like IOM, ILO, and the EU.

2. **Protect ability to use ODA.** As described above, the OECD DAC is currently debating whether and how ODA can be spent on migration activities. Presumably, the DAC wants to ensure that aid isn't being spent on projects that are purely in the interests of the country of destination. Yet many of the labor migration pathways discussed in this paper benefit both countries. Reducing a country of destination's ability to spend aid on these pathways may mean that few are piloted or scaled, which would negatively impact countries of origin. As such, countries of destination should use the debates within the Temporary Working Group to ensure that aid can still be spent on facilitating labor migration, particularly on those pathways that are channeling additional investments into the country of origin (such as to support education and training) beyond remittances.
3. **Collect better, and more meaningful, data.** There is a tendency to measure the success of a project using *output* indicators (e.g., how many people moved, or how many people were trained) rather than *impact* indicators (e.g., improvements in income or changes in perceived gender norms). Development agencies should create robust theories of change and ensure their evaluation efforts are measuring (and reporting on) the actual impact of the program. Doing so can identify ways in which to increase the development and poverty reduction potential of programs. For example, when implementing labor migration pathways, it is essential to go beyond the numbers of people who moved to look at whether their rights were upheld throughout and their integration process was smooth.
4. **Work with others.** Several of our interviewees mentioned that there was no coordination mechanism which brought together development agencies that work on labor migration. Efforts such as the Inter-governmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum and Refugees (IGC) tend to be dominated by home or internal affairs ministries and rarely tackle development issues.⁵⁵ Others, such as the Migration Partnership Facility's (MPF) Labor Mobility Practitioners Network, focus more on the practical steps to implementing labor migration pathways, rather than ways to enhance their development potential. There is therefore a need to establish some form of global convening and collaboration platform, bringing together development agencies to share best practices, learning, and experiences. This could be organized among the development agencies themselves (perhaps led by front-runners in this space such as DFAT or GIZ), or set up by an international body such as the IOM and / or the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

55 International Organization on Migration (IOM) (n.d.) "Inter-governmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum and Refugees (IGC)." <https://www.iom.int/inter-governmental-consultations-migration-asylum-and-refugees-igc>.

Annex 1. Key informant interviews (KIIs)

Interviewees

The following details the interviews that we held with development agencies. We have omitted mentioning the specific people interviewed for privacy reasons.

Development Agency	Country	Date
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)	Australia	March 8, 2022
Global Affairs Canada (GAC)	Canada	April 28, 2022
Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA)	Denmark	March 17, 2022
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GIZ)	Germany	March 11, 2022
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)	Japan	March 10, 2022
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT)	New Zealand	April 21, 2022
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)	Sweden	March 10, 2022
Swiss Development Corporation (SDC)	Switzerland	April 13, 2022
Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO)	United Kingdom (UK)	March 1, 2022

Guide

Thank you for taking the time to speak with me today. My name is [insert] and I'm a [role] at [Mercy Corps / CGD]. We are undertaking a study looking at opportunities and challenges for addressing migration through development assistance. We are particularly interested in speaking with donors that are strategizing or funding programs focused on facilitating safe, orderly, and legal labor migration from low- and middle-income countries (either South-South or South-North migration, for example migration to [name of country]). The study is meant to inform other development donors on how they can better support such initiatives, in ways that align with global commitments like the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (GCM) and the Sustainable Development Goals (including target 10.7 to facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well managed migration policies).

You were identified as someone with experience with or knowledge of donor strategies that relate to development and migration. I have prepared an interview guide to facilitate our conversation, but please feel free to skip questions you do not feel comfortable answering. You can also choose to terminate the interview at any time.

With your permission, we would like to record this interview. The recording will be made available only to the members of our research team, and to ensure that we accurately capture your reflections and perspectives. Please note that everything you share with us is in confidence, and we will not identify you, your role or affiliation in the final report or any dissemination of our findings.

Our conversation will last about 45 minutes to an hour. Do you have any questions/concerns you'd like to discuss before we begin?

Introduction

1. Ice-breaker: To begin our conversation, would you kindly tell me about your experience in the international development and migration field?

Key Questions

2. Within [name of agency / donor] where does the mandate for facilitating labor or economic migration programming / investments lie? [NOTE: By migration programming we are referring not to programming focused on refugees/displaced groups, programs focused on preventing migration, or programs focused on the reintegration of returned migrants; but rather programming that supports people who are on the move—either internally or internationally—or contemplating to move in search of economic opportunities]
 - a. Are program / investment objectives defined centrally (at the HQ level) or locally (regional or national offices / embassies)?
 - b. Is migration seen as a specific sector or does it integrate within other sectors?
 - i. If integrated within other sectors, which ones specifically is it most associated with: (e.g. employment, climate adaptation, protection etc) and why?
3. Do you consider labor / economic migration as part of your agency's remit?
4. Are there other governmental agencies / departments/bodies that have migration (specifically economic migration) within their remit?
 - a. If so, who is considered the “lead” agency and how do you coordinate with these other bodies?
 - b. Do you believe there is a shared goal/objective among these governmental bodies (and yours) with regards to labor/economic migration, or do you feel like your goals do not align?
5. Can you give me examples of types of migration programs or initiatives that [insert name of agency] supports in low- and middle-income countries to support safe, orderly and regular migration? [NOTE: refer again to above definition of what we mean by migration programs if needed]
 - a. Which countries or regions currently have the greatest number of these types of programs that are funded by [insert name of agency]?
 - b. Where was the migration program facilitating migration to and from?
 - c. What have these program(s) achieved, and how have you measured it?
6. How has [insert name of agency] managed to be able to support these types of initiatives/ programs?
 - a. Were or are these programs perceived as politically sensitive and, if so, how have you been able to overcome that challenge?
 - b. Aside from political considerations / sensitivities, what other constraints do you/have you faced in actualizing these types of programs / initiatives?
7. Does [insert name of agency] collect data on migration, whether regular or irregular, in M&E processes or use migration metrics for programmatic purposes?

- a. If so, what variables are collected and / or analyzed? I.e. Municipality of origin, destination, demographics, visa, income, temporality, comparison group, etc.
 - b. To what degree is the use of data on migration standardized across projects, implementing partners, and / or countries?
 - c. What is the objective for [insert name of agency] when looking at data on regular or irregular migration?
8. At the country level, what type of engagement with local authorities is needed to support migration initiatives?
- a. What does coordination surrounding these efforts look like between sending governments (national or local) and private sector actors in countries of origin and development agencies working in those countries?
 - b. Are there particular political dynamics that make coordination easier?
9. Most migration remains within regions. Are there plans or current initiatives that are supporting labor migration through a regional approach? What may be the benefits or challenges to this?

Closing

10. Given what we have discussed today, do you have anything else you would like to share with us?
- a. [Probe: Advice about study orientation/framing]
 - b. [Probe: Additional persons to interview]

Annex 2. Development agencies' key information

Development Agency	Country	Integrated or Stand-Alone?	Staff	Country's ODA Spend	Additional Remarks
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)	Australia	Integrated	3,953 (2021) ⁵⁶	US\$2.6 billion (2020) ⁵⁷	<p>DFAT's primary goal is a "stable, prosperous, resilient Indo-Pacific in the wake of Covid-19."⁵⁸ This goal is part of a whole-of-government approach which positively discusses the role of labor migration in contributing to the economic recovery of the region.</p> <p>New schemes, such as the PALM, have recently been set up, and DFAT's mandate and budget on this issue have been increasing in recent years. They collaborate closely with other agencies such as the Departments of Home Affairs; Treasury; and Education, Skills, and Employment, the Attorney General's Office, and the Australian Tax Office.</p>
Global Affairs Canada (GAC)	Canada	Integrated (under Ministry of Foreign Affairs)	12,158 (2019–20) ⁵⁹	US\$5 billion (2020) ⁶⁰	<p>Canada has long been a supporter of labor migration, including supporting the GCM and other international efforts, including the SDGs. They explicitly have a feminist foreign policy approach, under which they aim to empower women and girls in particular in the migration process.</p> <p>GAC collaborates very closely with other government agencies, particularly IRCC to implement immigration programming and capacity-building of partner countries and institutions.</p>
Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA)	Denmark	Integrated (under Ministry of Foreign Affairs)	2,395 (2016) ⁶¹	DKK 17.446 billion (2022) / US\$2.44 billion ⁶²	<p>Denmark's strategy for development cooperation ('The World We Share') mentions irregular migration several times, noting the need to tackle 'root causes' and combat smuggling.⁶³ It speaks about creating alternatives, but sees this as creating opportunities in regions of origin, rather than expanding migration opportunities.</p> <p>It is prioritized to implement their programming related to labor migration in collaboration with the EU.</p>

56 DFAT (2022) *Entity resources and planned performance*. Canberra: DFAT. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/pbs-2022-23-department-of-foreign-affairs-and-trade-dfat.pdf>.

57 Donor Tracker (2022) "Australia." <https://donortracker.org/country/australia>.

58 DFAT (2022) *Aid programming guide*. Canberra: DFAT. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/aid-programming-guide.pdf>.

59 GAC (2020) *Departmental Results Report*. Ottawa: GAC. https://www.international.gc.ca/gac-amc/assets/pdfs/publications/plans/drr-rrm/drr-rrm_1920-en.pdf.

60 Donor Tracker (2022) "Canada." <https://donortracker.org/country/canada>.

61 OECD (2016) *OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Denmark*. Paris: OECD. https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/oecd-development-co-operation-peer-reviews-denmark-2016_9789264259362-en#page1.

62 MFA Denmark (2022) *The Government's Priorities for Danish Development Cooperation*. Copenhagen: MFA Denmark. <https://amg.um.dk/policies-and-strategies/priorities-of-the-danish-government>.

63 The Government of Denmark (2021) *The world we share: Denmark's strategy for development cooperation*. Copenhagen: The Government of Denmark. <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/world-we-share-denmark-s-strategy-development-cooperation>.

Development Agency	Country	Integrated or Stand-Alone?	Staff	Country's ODA Spend	Additional Remarks
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GIZ)	Germany	Stand-alone	22,199 (2019) ⁶⁴	US\$28.4 billion (2020) ⁶⁵	<p>GIZ has always maintained a focus on the developmental impact of migration, particularly on diaspora, remittances, and brain gain. Their 'Migration Master Plan' includes measures to address 'root causes' and manage migration, while also acknowledging the need for "skilled and educated workers" through the enabling of legal immigration.⁶⁶</p> <p>They have worked on labor migration for the past ten years, in close collaboration with the Federal Employment Agency, Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Economic Affairs, and external partners such as the EU.</p>
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)	Japan	Stand-alone (under Ministry of Foreign Affairs)	1,942 (2021) ⁶⁷	US\$16.3 billion (2020) ⁶⁸	<p>Japan's new Medium-Term Plan (beginning in 2022) does not yet have an English translation, but the previous plan only mentioned labor migration in the context of supporting Japanese emigrants.⁶⁹ In other areas where high-income countries work on migration (such as the Horn of Africa), JICA only looks at livelihoods and resilience. Yet Japan is slowly starting to pay more attention to expanding and regulating immigration, for example, establishing the JP-MIRAI program in 2020.</p> <p>To implement this programming, they work closely with the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, the Immigration Agency, and the Cabinet Secretariat, among others.</p>
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT)	New Zealand	Integrated	1,826 (2021) ⁷⁰	NZ\$804 million (2020-21) ⁷¹ / US\$522.6 million	<p>MFAT has seven main goals, including growing economic returns and embedded New Zealand within the Indo-Pacific. This translates through into a cross-government mandate to expand labor migration to the benefit of all parties. There is a strong focus on displaced populations and climate migration.</p> <p>In terms of collaboration with others, they work closely with MBIE, who deliver the RSE scheme, and since 2011 have funded MBIE to ensure the scheme delivers enhanced development benefit. They also work closely with the Ministry of Primary Industries and of Social Development, while also having strong connections with employment industry groups such as Horticulture New Zealand.</p>

64 GIZ (2019) "People at GIZ: in figures." <https://reporting.giz.de/2019/creating-value/people-at-giz/people-at-giz-in-figures>.

65 Donor Tracker (2022) "Germany." <https://donortracker.org/country/germany>.

66 German Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community (2018) "The Migration Master Plan." <https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/kurzmeldungen/EN/2018/07/masterplan.html>.

67 JICA (2021) "Organization Chart / Executive Officers and Auditors." https://www.jica.go.jp/english/publications/reports/annual/2021/fp4rrb000000sky0-att/2021_26.pdf.

68 Donor Tracker (2022) "Japan." <https://donortracker.org/country/japan>.

69 JICA (2017) *Medium-term Plan of Japan International Cooperation Agency*. Tokyo: JICA. https://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/organization/c8h0vm000000ks38-att/medium_term_plan.pdf. The 2022 Medium-term Plan will be published in August 2022.

70 MFAT (2021) *Annual Report*. Wellington: MFAT. <https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/About-us-Corporate/MFAT-corporate-publications/MFAT-Annual-Report-2021/MFAT-Annual-Report-2020-21-v2.pdf>.

71 Ibid.

Development Agency	Country	Integrated or Stand-Alone?	Staff	Country's ODA Spend	Additional Remarks
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)	Sweden	Stand-alone (under Ministry of Foreign Affairs)	800 ⁷²	US\$6.3 billion (2020) ⁷³	<p>Sida has a strong focus on humanitarian assistance and support, and also provides large amounts of money to the multilateral system. Labor migration does not feature in their strategy documents, aside from supporting such work regionally in target partner countries.</p> <p>Sweden's Ministry of Foreign Affairs oversees development policy and financing, creating government policy on many issues including migration in cooperation with Sida. They also collaborate closely with the National Immigration Authority and Labor Authority, as well as external partners such as the EU.</p>
Swiss Development Corporation (SDC)	Switzerland	Stand-alone (under Federal Department of Foreign Affairs)	423 (2018) ⁷⁴	CHF 2.365 billion (2021) ⁷⁵ / US\$2.46 billion	<p>SDC has four thematic priorities, including contributing to sustainable economic growth and decent local jobs. Migration receives a large amount of attention in their 2021–24 Strategy, and is one of the four thematic priorities under the 'international cooperation' bucket. It recognizes the importance of remittances, the need to ensure policy coherency, and the impact of climate change on migration.⁷⁶</p> <p>While this is SDC's core area of engagement, they occasionally collaborate with other government agencies such as the State Secretariat of Migration and the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.</p>

72 Donor Tracker (2022) "Sweden." <https://donortracker.org/country/sweden>.

73 Ibid.

74 Graduate Institute Geneva (2019) *Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation | SDC*. Bern: Graduate Institute Geneva. <https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/sites/internet/files/2019-09/SDC.pdf>.

75 SDC (2021) "Funding." <https://www.eda.admin.ch/deza/en/home/strategie-21-24/finanzen.html>.

76 SDC (2020) *Switzerland's International Cooperation Strategy 2021–24*. Bern: SDC. <https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/fdfa/publikationen.html/content/publikationen/en/deza/diverse-publikationen/broschuere-iza-2021-24>.

Development Agency	Country	Integrated or Stand-Alone?	Staff	Country's ODA Spend	Additional Remarks
Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO)	United Kingdom (UK)	Integrated	16,732 (2021) ⁷⁷	US\$18.6 billion (2020) ⁷⁸	<p>The UK's development agency has recently merged with the FCDO. They have a number of initiatives to support labor migration, including the 'Better Regional Migration Management' program, run by the Productive Migration unit. They are also the largest contributors to the Multi-Partner Trust Fund for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration, and recently stated their intention to work with other countries to "support safer, more orderly and regular migration."⁷⁹</p> <p>To implement their programming, the FCDO collaborates very closely with the Home Office, as well as other government departments such as the Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs; Work and Pensions; and Health and Social Care.</p>

77 FCDO (2021) *Annual Report & Accounts*. London: FCDO. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1019938/FCDO_annual_report_and_accounts_2020_to_2021_accessible.pdf.

78 Donor Tracker (2022) "United Kingdom." <https://donortracker.org/country/united-kingdom>.

79 HM Government (2022) *The Global Compact for Migration: UK Voluntary National Review 2022*. London: HM Government. <https://unitedkingdom.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd11381/files/uks-voluntary-national-review-for-imrf-may-2022.pdf>.

FIGURE A2.1. Full-time staff working for development agencies (both headquarters and in post)




FIGURE A2.2. ODA spend by development agencies (US\$ billion)



FIGURE A2.3. Full-time staff vs ODA spend per capita

