Experimental Evidence on the Effectiveness of Input and Output Incentive Contracts for Health Care Providers with Different Levels of Skills

Featuring

Manoj Mohanan
Assistant Professor, Duke University

Host

Sebastian Bauhoff
Research Fellow, Center for Global Development

A central issue in designing performance incentive contracts is whether to reward the production of outputs versus use of inputs: the former rewards efficiency and innovation in production, while the latter imposes less risk. But the promise of output-based contracts may remain unmet if providers lack the requisite skills to innovate and increase performance.

In this seminar, Manoj Mohanan will present on new research that uses a field experiment in Karnataka, India to explore three questions: How does an input versus an output incentive contract affect maternity care, as measured by rates of postpartum hemorrhage, pre-eclampsia, sepsis, and neonatal survival? Do providers under input incentive contracts use different strategies and input combinations than providers under output incentive contracts? And, finally, does the skill level of the provider make a difference for their performance under the input versus output incentive contracts?