Where’s the Great Pakistan Aid Effectiveness Debate?

Gracing the cover of Tuesday’s Politico newspaper was the lead story, “The Great Pakistan Aid Debate.”   Politico gets the headline spot on.  But it misses another more important debate that should be taking place.The mounting evidence that the Pakistani Taliban is behind the Times Square bomb attempt is a powerful reminder of the national security imperative of getting U.S. aid and development strategy in Pakistan right.   Yet the key question facing U.S. policymakers is not how fast to spend our aid in Pakistan, or who should spend it, as the Politico story suggests.  Rather, the burning question is how best can the $7.5 billion in U.S. assistance to Pakistan be spent effectively – to improve the welfare of Pakistani citizens in a meaningful way, and to keep Americans safe at home?It’s little wonder that Politico made no mention of a “Great Pakistan Aid Effectiveness Debate.”  I am baffled by just how little discussion I have seen within the so-called “Af-Pak” community about how the vast U.S. aid resources in Pakistan can be spent well.  In policy discussions in Washington, there is simply no parity in the “Af” and “Pak” sides of the “Af-Pak” moniker.   Afghanistan captures the lion’s share of attention, and to the extent that the policy community does discuss Pakistan policy, security considerations dominate.  Rigorous discussions of development policy and how best to implement U.S. aid in Pakistan are far too rare.This conversation is precisely the “Great Pakistan Aid Effectiveness Debate” that I believe needs to take place – within the halls of the U.S. government, in the pages of Politico and the mainstream press, and in thank tanks and the academic community.   CGD is attempting to fill this gap through our study group on a U.S. Development Strategy in Pakistan.  It is my hope that the broader Af-Pak community will join this important conversation.Here are some questions I think could kick-start this alternative debate: How should the United States reconcile the competing goals of its aid program?To be sure, it is not easy for any donor to get aid right in Pakistan.   For decades, donors in Pakistan have struggled to spend aid dollars well, and the results from the perspective of poverty reduction and development outcomes have often been disappointing.  The challenge facing the United States today is even greater, given just how many different (and at times competing) objectives – including short-term diplomatic imperatives, stability and security objectives, and long-term development aims --  the administration is endeavoring to achieve, simultaneously, through its aid to Pakistan.   The list of priorities and objectives is long, exhaustive, perhaps even a bit exhausting, and at times contradictory.To break this question down even further:

1. To what extend does the foreign policy imperative of a strengthened U.S.-Pakistan relationship limit the willingness of U.S. officials to press for important (but politically difficult) reforms needed for long-term development, such as the extension of political rights to the FATA region, energy pricing reforms, or greatly needed tax reforms?  How can priorities be balanced in such a way that the urgency of better U.S.-Pakistan diplomatic relations tomorrow does not crowd out the prospects for a more developed Pakistan five, ten years from now?
2. Does the prioritization of social sector aid to the FATA region create a trade-off between security and stability objectives on one hand, and long-term development outcomes and impact on the other – if, for instance, aid dollars can be spent more effectively in schools in Punjab than in North Waziristan?  Which priorities matter most?
3. Ambassador Holbrooke has called for channeling more aid money through the Pakistan public sector to help build institutional capacity and ownership.  Congress, for its part, has stressed the need for proper oversight of U.S. funds.  And everyone has called for quick results. Are these three objectives—quick results, accountability, and capacity building and ownership–contradictory, particularly in light of Pakistan’s weak institutions and governance?

Do we know what really works?

1. What really wins hearts and minds?  Is it visibility and scale, as the administration has suggested?  Or something else entirely: perhaps accountability, as indicated by Chris Fair, or transparency, as CGD President Nancy Birdsall has suggested in her first open letter to Ambassador Holbrooke?
2. Can aid win hearts and minds at all?  The evidence from Afghanistan tells a dismal tale: aid there seems to be losing, rather than winning, hearts and minds.  Does the U.S. aid program in Pakistan run the risk of actually being counterproductive, if expectations are raised (and not met), or if Pakistanis perceive aid as a payoff to their government or contributing to corruption?  How can the United States mitigate these risks?  (Note: see Nancy’s call for greater transparency and the delineation of clear development outcomes and objectives).
3. Do we know what drives extremism and conflict in Pakistan?  Is it poverty and underdevelopment?  The development literature is mixed: some studies (here and  here) suggest that poverty and lack of opportunities are at least “contributing factors” to militancy.  Other surveys challenge these assumptions, and document that at least some samples of Pakistani militants were more educated and had low levels of unemployment, and that support for militancy in one survey was highest in the more prosperous areas of urban communities.  What further evidence do we need to inform the U.S. aid strategy?

Finally, who is in charge, and who should be in charge? Is Ambassador Holbrooke in charge of the U.S. aid program and development strategy in Pakistan?  What is the role of USAID administrator Raj Shah, and what should his role be in setting the priorities and strategy for the aid program – above and beyond his responsibility for implementing it?  Are there enough development voices at the table? I encourage you to join this debate and to share your ideas and suggestions in the comments below.  To follow our Pakistan work and the CGD Study Group on U.S. Development Strategy in Pakistan as we endeavor to answer these questions, please subscribe to our newsletter.