The US Department of Defense (DOD) is not a development agency, but it does manage millions of dollars of development assistance.
Having more women peacekeepers is linked with large reductions in sexual misconduct by peacekeepers and more sustainable peace. The UN could potentially raise the proportion of women peacekeepers to 20 percent for around $75 million.A small multilateral trust fund would offer supplementary payments to troop contributingcountries for each woman peacekeeper provided.
At present rates of progress, it will take more than three centuries for the UN to see the same number of women as men in peacekeeping operations, even though evidence suggests that increasing the proportion of women in operations will improve the success rate of peacekeeping missions and reduce levels of sexual misconduct. One method to speed up the march to equality could be financial incentives directed at troop contributing countries. These could significantly increase the proportion of women peacekeepers, potentially for as little as $77 million per year.
US strategy in the Middle East and North Africa has not changed in the past 40 years, favoring security approaches over political and economic development, narrow partnerships with select regime elements over broader engagement with governments and people, and short-term responses and interventions over long-term vision. Symptomatic of this strategy is the fact that US security assistance vastly outstrips economic assistance.
Afghanistan’s progress against mortality reflects the success of providing health aid that differed radically from the bulk of American aid to Afghanistan during the war. The USAID program that contributed to the decline was a multilateral effort coordinated by Afghanistan’s own Ministry of Public Health. Results were verified by random sampling, and some funding was linked to measures of performance. This internal policy experiment, however, was destined to provoke resistance. More surprising is the source of resistance to an aid program that attempted to stop simply throwing money at a problem and focus on building sustainable systems: auditors.
In this note, CGD senior policy analyst Alexis Sowa outlines three recommendations for US development assistance to Pakistan: name the leader of US development efforts, clarify the mission, and finance what is already working.
Staff update of the 2011 report Beyond Bullets and Bombs: Fixing the US Approach to Development in Pakistan, based on the deliberations of the CGD Study Group on a US Development Strategy in Pakistan.
U.S. Support for Pakistan’s Private Sector (Sixth Open Letter on U.S. Development Policy in Pakistan)
Nancy Birdsall offers Deputy Secretary of State Thomas R. Nides three recommendations on strengthening the Pakistani private sector.
The Commanders Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan: Refining U.S. Military Capabilities in Stability and In-Conflict Development Activities - Working Paper 265
The U.S. military has become substantially engaged in the development and stabilization space and will likely continue to operate in this space for some time to come. This paper proposed five policy changes for the military to improve its development activities.
The Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan: Five Practical Recommendations (CGD Brief)
The U.S. military has become substantially engaged in economic development and stabilization and will likely continue to be for some time to come. This brief takes U.S. military involvement in development as a given and concentrates on five recommendations for it to operate more efficiently and effectively.
Arkedis focuses on understanding why long-term development is often subjugated to other objectives in the day-to-day planning processes of the U.S. government. She proposes one way to ensure that funding choices are made more rationally and systematically: by aligning the differing goals of aid more explicitly with redefined foreign assistance budget accounts.
A new focus on measuring development results would have far-reaching benefits for U.S. development strategy, for U.S. public diplomacy efforts, and for the strength of Pakistan’s democratic institutions. In this essay, Nancy Birdsall and Wren Elhai suggest five possible indicators that illustrate the type of measurable targets that could help the United State and Pakistan meet shared goals for effective and transparent development.
This essay draws on the work of the Center for Global Development's Study Group on U.S. Development Strategy in Pakistan and on the ideas in the group's open letters to Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to present five recommendations for spending aid money well in Pakistan.
In this essay, Andrew Natsios gives a first-hand account of what he finds most hinders USAID—layers of bureaucracy that misguide and derail development work.
Adequate Staffing of the Development Assistance Program in Pakistan (Fourth open letter to Ambassador Richard Holbrooke)
In the fourth open letter to Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, Nancy Birdsall conveys the recommendations of the CGD study group on a U.S. Development Strategy in Pakistan for necessary strengthening of USAID's staff capacity to better design and deploy an effective development strategy in the country.
U.S. Development Assistance to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Second open letter to Ambassador Richard Holbrooke)
In the second open letter to Ambassador Holbrooke, Nancy Birdsall conveys recommendations from the second meeting of the CGD Study Group on U.S. Development Strategy in Pakistan, focused on the policies and programs that would be most effective in dealing with the security and development challenges in the FATA region and vulnerable neighboring states.
In an open letter to Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, Nancy Birdsall relays four main suggestions from the CGD Study Group on a U.S. Development Strategy in Pakistan about how U.S. assistance should be delivered to maximize development outcomes.
Bases, Bullets, and Ballots: The Effect of U.S. Military Aid on Political Conflict in Colombia - Working Paper 197
Does foreign military assistance strengthen or further weaken fragile states facing internal conflict? In a new working paper, CGD post-doctoral fellow Oeindrila Dube and co-author Suresh Naidu find that U.S. military assistance to Colombia may increase violence and decrease voter turnout, undermining the perceived value of foreign military assistance.