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In the push for electricity access in the developing world, many policymakers are trying to figure out where on-grid or off-grid solutions make the most sense. My new CGD paper with colleagues Ben Leo and Jared Kalow asks 39,000 consumers in 12 African countries about their energy use and demand. The big takeaway: African consumers don’t view grid versus off-grid as a binary question.
Off-grid (non-generator) electricity is largely inadequate. A significant proportion of respondents reported that their off-grid electricity solution did not fulfill any of their power needs, including almost two-thirds of Rwandans with off-grid systems.
Off-grid customers still exhibit strong demand for grid electricity. In most countries, off-grid respondents reported a high desirability for grid electricity. In fact, demand for a grid connection is significantly higher among off-grid households than those with no electricity at all.
On-grid customers rely heavily on generators. For example, nearly half of on-grid Nigerians also report generator reliance.
While these findings undermine a key assumption implicit in the on-grid versus off-grid question, they make sense given energy consumption patterns. Off-grid customers may appreciate the lights and basic appliances (e.g., phone charger, fan, small TV) that off-grid systems can power, but want to move up the energy ladder toward higher power appliances (refrigerator, larger TV) enabled by a grid connection. At the same time, on-grid customers face a host of reliability issues and thus see off-grid options as an important backup.
So what might this all imply for policymakers or initiatives like Power Africa?
We shouldn’t assume rural means off-grid and urban means on-grid. Better information about actual consumer behavior and demand would present a more nuanced picture and a variety of solutions.
Low-energy off-grid solutions should expect growing consumer demand for higher-energy systems over time.
As bad as this is, it gets far worse. Sometime around 2045, Nigeria’s population will pass the United States in size. That’s tens of millions of new Nigerian consumers and job-seekers—who will fuel even more demand for energy. As large as the power gap is today, what will Nigeria’s electricity generation capacity look like in 30 years?
The graph below compares the United States’ and Nigeria’s historical and projected populations and electricity generation capacity. The US Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration (EIA) projects that the United States will have around 1,300 GW of power capacity by 2050. Officially, Nigeria has 12.5 GW of installed capacity today. (In practice, the country is really closer to 4 GW of functional capacity.) The Sustainable Energy for All Action Agenda, developed in partnership with the Nigerian government, targets total electricity capacity of 23.5 GW by 2020 and 45 GW by 2030. Yet one estimate puts peak national power demand as high as 213 GW by 2040. In other words, the gap is already a chasm, and looks to get even bigger.
If these predictions are anywhere near accurate, then the implications are colossal. Economic growth and job creation won’t possibly keep up. Electricity is already among the top constraints to firm growth in Nigeria, as pointed out by our colleagues Vijaya Ramachandran and Alan Gelb and in a new paper from UC Berkeley.
This dystopian jobless scenario also creates repercussions for American national security. As I (Todd) argued in recent testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Nigeria is an unavoidable partner in our fight against transnational threats like terrorism, disease, and criminal networks. The specter of a Nigeria that cannot come close to meeting its growing population’s demands for jobs and modern lifestyles—all underpinned by high volumes of energy—should be alarming.
We present results below from a survey of shop owners who are part of the Indian government’s Akshay Urja Solar Shops program. To our knowledge, the Akshay Urja program has not previously been evaluated. These results build on a case study featured in an upcoming CGD policy paper on clean energy access entitled, “Financing for Whom by Whom? Complexities of Advancing Energy Access in India.”
India’s Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) began the Aditya Solar Shops program in 1995 to support entrepreneurs who opened shops to sell subsidized solar-powered technologies. Shops were designed to sell items which would help poorer households without electricity access (or unreliable access) to tap into distributed solar power. Although most urban households in India tend to be connected to the grid—even if service is poor—many rural areas lie well beyond the reach of power plants and the central grid. This creates space for viable alternatives, such as distributed solar-powered systems and technologies.
Aiming at a barrage of clean development targets
In 2010, the Indian government re-branded the Aditya program as the Akshay Urja Solar Shops program and expanded its reach to set up at least one shop in every district in the country. This was a signal from the government that India was serious about providing electricity access to its less centralized populations and that it intended to promote clean growth. This became blaringly clear in 2015 when the government declared it would provide reliable access to every household in the country by the next national election in 2019; that’s quite a promise considering nearly a quarter of the country’s 1.3 billion people still live beyond the reach of the grid and without any modern alternatives.
Riding the wave of solar’s momentum in India, the Akshay Urja program was folded into the government’s wildly ambitious National Solar Mission (part of the National Action Plan on Climate Change) to install 100 gigawatts of solar in India by 2022. There are now over 400 subsidized shops operating, with some districts containing multiple shops to meet demand and other districts operating just one shop as part of the program’s loosely mandated floor (i.e., at least one shop per district).
Akshay Urja’s hybrid public-private model
Akshay Urja shops receive partial government support in the form of subsidized soft loans, recurring grants, and turnover incentives for the first two years of operations. In addition to individuals, NGOs, state nodal agencies (SNAs), and manufacturers’ associations can also access financial support to open and operate solar shops. The open incentive structure of the program ensures more manageable startup costs and helps shops pass on slightly lower costs to consumers.
We take a first stab at evaluating the Akshay Urja program by presenting the results from interviews conducted among shop owners. Overall, a handful of shops within a few districts reported strikingly high sales figures, while a majority of shops reported much more modest sales. We discuss our initial results at both the state and district levels in the following sections.
Is solar heating up?
As of 2012, there were 284 solar shops (both Aditya and Akshay Urja) operating throughout India. Of these, 176 shops—located throughout 163 districts—were sampled to be interviewed when data was collected in 2014. Of the 176, a total of 81 shop owners (about 30 percent of the total population of shops) participated in the survey.
Shop owners were called at least three times to attempt to administer an interview. The questionnaire included a simple set of questions, asking owners to report their sales of four major products in the previous year (2013-2014). Technologies included 1) solar home systems, 2) solar street lights, 3) solar lanterns, and 4) solar hot water heaters. An overview of the results at the state level is included in Figure 1 below. We discuss the results in more detail at the district level in the following section.
Figure 1: Solar technology sales by state (2013-2014)*
*All figures are authors' production.
Shop owners were asked to report their estimated sales of four major solar products during the year 2013-2014. Each of the four graphs represents annual sales of each product aggregated at the state level. Two states, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh (UP), were home to shops reporting relatively high sales of almost all products. Madhya Pradesh and Assam also exhibit relatively high sales for solar lanterns. States without any participating shops are not included in the figure above; those states are: Andhra Pradesh, Chandigarh, Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka, Manipur, Mizoram, Odhisha, and Puducheery.
Solar sales at the district level
Photo source: Kartikeya Singh
In each of the subsections below, we discuss each of the four products and reported sales results at the district level. Sales are reported predominantly by one shop per district. There are some districts with more than one shop, but these additional shops do not add any sales to the aggregated total at the district level. We highlight the top 10 sales districts in tables to the right of each subsection map.
Lanterns ensure a basic amount of light and are often considered a first rung on the energy access ladder. Solar-powered, as opposed to kerosene, lanterns offer co-benefits of reduced carbon (and black carbon) pollution and long-term health benefits. According to a recent study conducted by Muyanja et al. (2017) in rural Uganda, only 27.6 percent of sampled households with kerosene lanterns met the World Health Organization’s (WHO) safe indoor air quality standards. Conversely, 75 percent of sampled households with solar lanterns met the WHO’s standard.
In the map below, we see that many Akshay Urja shops (which are represented in aggregate at the district level) reported modest solar lantern sales, while select and seemingly random districts exhibited higher sales. The darkest district on the map, Agra (located in the northern, central region), is an extreme outlier with self-reported annual sales of 35,000 lanterns. All other shops reported under 4,000 lanterns sold annually. This may be the result of falsely reported sales figures or incredibly high uptake of lanterns in Agra for distribution throughout the country (though the latter seems unlikely). The top ten sales figures by district are shown in the table to the right.
Figure 2. Solar lantern sales by district in India (2013-2014)
Solar home systems
Of all the individual technologies sold by the Akshay Urja shops, solar home systems (SHS) are capable of providing the most power to a household. The problem with SHSs is the upfront cost. As part of a growing pay-as-you-go (PAYG) finance model in India, many companies allow customers to pay a small upfront fee and subsequent monthly payments to eventually own a SHS. This type of finance model makes SHSs more affordable, particularly for poorer rural customers. The model does, however, require there to be an established mobile money transaction system, which may not exist in more isolated areas.
As we see below, shops in Hisar and Agra districts have claimed notably high sales of 25,000 and 20,000 units, respectively; the majority of districts contain shops reporting aggregated sales of less than 1,000 units per annum. Again, the top ten sales figures by district are shown in the table to the right of the map. The diagram in Figure 4 depicts the flow of a simple SHS and its features.
Figure 3. Solar home system (SHS) sales by district in India (2013-2014)
Figure 4. A simple solar home system (SHS)
Solar radiation reaches mounted panels, which convert light energy to electric energy that is sent through a charge controller. From here, energy is either stored in a battery (if available), used by household appliances, or lost as heat energy.
Solar street lights
Street lighting is important for several reasons. Low-carbon street lighting can help curb greenhouse gas emissions from lighting, but street lighting is also a very important safety feature of a community. Street lighting allows people to safely commute to and from work or school, allows women to walk at night without fear (or less fear) of sexual harassment, and generally helps to deter crime.
The national government aims to replace all existing street lights with solar-powered LED lights within the next decade, and this will require successful market penetration of solar street lighting technology throughout the country. As we can see in the map below and among the top 10 districts of aggregated shop sales, there has been measurable uptake of solar street lights consistent with other major technologies. Hisar and Agra, along with Yamuna Nagar, report remarkably high sales figures compared to other districts.
Figure 5. Solar street light sales by district in India (2013-2014)
Solar HWHs are compact fixtures which are typically placed on rooftops so that gravity easily feeds hot water down into the home’s plumbing. Photo source: Ajay Tallam
Solar hot water heaters
Hot water is central to bathing, laundry, and cleaning. However, it’s energy-intensive to heat water. Even for households connected to the grid, using the energy required for heating water for bathing and cleaning is not always practical.
The map below shows areas of weak to strong market penetration for solar HWHs. Again, Hisar reports vastly higher sales figures of 30,000 units compared to other districts, which mostly report sales under just 1,000 units per annum.
Figure 6. Hot water heater (HWH) sales by district in India (2013-2014)
Mixed success = room for improvement
Shop owners were asked supplementary questions during follow-up interviews about their keys to success or failure. In sum, although the Akshay Urja program did establish a network of solar product distribution centers around the country, many shops have struggled to connect their products to large markets of consumers for a few major reasons: upfront costs remain burdensome, maintenance problems aren’t addressed, and competition with a rapidly expanding electric grid is increasing.
Despite a basic level of incentives which help to keep the upfront costs lower than market rate, most products are still too expensive for low-income, rural markets. Shop owners also reported very few maintenance requests, though it’s likely that many of these technologies—except for possibly solar lanterns—require regular inspections and repairs. A possible explanation for this is that shops don’t offer any in-home maintenance services and are located in district headquarters, which tend to be far from their remote customers. Finally, as the electric grid expands more rapidly into rural areas, consumers appear to prefer grid connections, at least initially. However, considering the sporadic service delivery from the central grid, many consumers may draw electricity from a diverse set of options.
The continuation of the Akshay Urja program may depend on further business innovations in how the entrepreneurs choose to sell their products against the backdrop of an increasingly competitive grid and the benefit of decreasing costs of various solar technologies. Central and state governments could revise the currently capped incentive structures for conducting sales along the lines of the successful franchisee model of Bangalore-based private firm Orb Energy. Finally, the government’s Surya Mitra program which seeks to train an army of solar engineers could be paired with Akshay Urja shop owners to improve quality assurance of products and after-sales support.
Estimating latent demand for electricity can be tricky. Are some countries too poor to consume a lot more energy? Or is income growth being held back by a lack of reliable and affordable electricity? While there is a strong relationship between energy consumption and income, the direction of causality is often far less clear. One way to estimate unmet demand may be to try to compare pairs of countries—e.g., how much additional energy does Kenya need to reach the level of Tunisia?
Another way may be to look at all countries together and see how far any individual country is from the global trendline. So, here we plot per capita energy consumption against per capita GNI (PPP$) for all available countries in the World Development Indicators. A few things to note right away: we have data for 136 countries and the relationship is extremely tight (for those who care, the R^2 is 0.84). Then, we measure each country’s distance from the predictive line. This distance is one way to think about what any one country’s energy consumption should be given their income level.
In this graphic, countries above the line consume more energy than their incomes would predict, while those below consume less. Yes, yes…the data is highly imperfect, and a lot of factors beyond income like economic structure, endowments, fuel mix, climate, geography, policy, etc., all can influence energy demand and supply. But 0.84 is pretty tight and we are only looking for ballpark magnitudes.
A few things strike us when we look closer at the sub-Saharan countries:
Nigeria is the most underpowered. Per capita energy consumption is a whopping 79 percent below what its income level alone predicts. Further, if we make the (huge) assumption that all the Nigerian projects in the Power Africa pipeline reach completion, we estimate that this would close less than one-third of the present gap.
The other initial Power Africa countries are all below the line too: Tanzania (-60 percent), Ethiopia (-47 percent), Kenya (-44 percent), and Ghana (-18 percent). Sorry, no data on Liberia.
Southern Africa is a regional outlier. Of the seven sub-Saharan countries above the line, six are in the Southern African Development Community. Most of these countries still rely on very large hydroelectric projects built long ago (e.g., Kariba completed in 1959, Inga 1 in 1972, Cahora Bassa in 1974). Mozambique is over 400 percent “overpowered.”
Togo, the only West African country above the line, has seen a 50 percent increase in electricity since 2008, largely because of the opening of one large thermal plant (with the support of OPIC).
In sum: much more analysis is needed to better understand demand. But this simple exercise does reveal, especially in West and East Africa, that there is a lot of work left to be done to close the gap between power supply and demand.
Some researchers view informality as a survival strategy; they see the informal sector as characterized by low wages and poor working conditions, without much prospect for growth. Other studies indicate that informal firms are often led by micro-entrepreneurs, who prefer to stay unregistered to avoid the additional costs and administrative burden associated with formalization.
The bottom line: there is little we can say about the motivations, productivity, or other characteristics of informal firms in a generalized, global context. The size of productivity gaps between registered and unregistered businesses, the costs and benefits of formalization, and firms' motivation for staying in the shadow economy tend to differ from country to country. Gelb et al. (2009) show that informal firms in East African countries differ a great deal from their Southern African counterparts. While informal businesses in East African countries were found to be fairly productive relative to formal ones with similar characteristics, informal firms in Southern Africa lagged behind their registered peers in almost all aspects. Our current analysis, based on recent data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys for five countries—the DRC, Ghana, Kenya, Myanmar, and Rwanda—again shows that informal firms vary a great deal in their differences with formal firms, whether it be on measures of productivity or access to public services such as electricity and water. Our results also reveal a number of striking differences and similarities between formal and informal firms with regards to a wide range of issues:
How likely is it that informal firms are connected to the electricity grid? Do they experience more power outages than their formal counterparts?
Are informal firms less likely to have to a bank account and access to loans than formal ones?
Does crime affect informal and formal firms differently?
Do owners and managers of informal firms have little education?
How do informal firms’ expectations about the costs of formalization contrast with reality?