Yes, Governance Matters in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas

In response to Nancy Birdsall’s last open letter, which focused on the limits of what the U.S. aid program can do in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), several people left similar blog comments. They commented on an issue the letter didn’t cover: FATA’s unaccountable or simply absent governance.The sentiment of those comments is correct—the people of FATA deserve better governance and fundamental political rights, and it is hard to see sustainable development happening without reform. However, political reform for FATA is a hot potato issue in Pakistan, and this debate is not one where the United States has (or should have!) much say.  While the United States can keep pressuring Pakistani officials to resolve FATA’s status, it is worth considering how we can proceed with our aid program in ways that are both effective in the short-run and supportive of whatever long-run solution on political reform ultimately emerges.First, for non-Pakistan hands, a bit of background. Currently, FATA is completely separate from the normal political structures of Pakistan. Although the region has representatives in the National Assembly, federal laws don’t apply there and it lacks elected representatives at the provincial or local levels. In place of standard Pakistani law, it is governed by the Frontier Crimes Regulation, an archaic legal code dating to British colonial rule in 1901 that allows for arbitrary arrest and detention and for collective punishment (punishing an entire village for the actions of one resident).FATA is overseen by a secretariat appointed by the central government, with offices not in FATA itself but in Peshawar, the capital of neighboring Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (formerly NWFP) province. At the local level, appointed political agents control how government money is spent—often using this money to build patronage networks and enrich their friends.So, one might think, given the trouble this situation poses for U.S. development and security goals in the region, perhaps the United States should be much tougher in tying our aid there to resolution of the region’s political status. Not so fast. FATA integration has been hashed and rehashed so often over past decades that any resolution of the issue would be sure to upset one political faction or another. FATA parliamentarians would prefer their own province, while most others would absorb the FATA into Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province (one observer has even suggested expanding Pakistan from four to perhaps 17 provinces).This is a thorny issue that only Pakistanis can resolve. The United States has no standing in this debate. And, for better or for worse, the process for making a decision—which has been in a holding pattern since 2002—is unlikely to move forward until active military operations have concluded. Even simple, incremental reforms like allowing political parties to operate in the tribal areas and curtailing some of the arbitrary powers of political agents have been stalled for nearly a year. And, in the landmark package of political reforms that recently became the 18^th Amendment to Pakistan’s constitution, FATA was entirely absent.So what’s the United States to do? The administration wants to accelerate development in FATA, seen as one of the most critical regions in the world for our national security, but there are few locally accountable or capable channels to deliver assistance money. John Wall’s dark vision of, “people in committee rooms in Washington, Islamabad and even Peshawar lobbing aid programs over FATA’s borders,” is well taken. At best, money spent strengthening the FATA Secretariat is money invested in institutions that, with any luck, will have been reformed out of existence in 10 years. At worst, that money could strengthen existing patronage networks, engendering resentment among those left behind by a system dominated by local elites.It is in part because of the concerns over governance in FATA that the CGD study group focused tools other than aid that might make a difference. Preferential market access for Pakistani firms or blanket wage or power subsidies for companies operating in tribal areas could create jobs and lift the economy without relying heavily on the implementation capacity of the local government. Even absent political reforms, these sorts of measures (along with limited aid spending) might be able to improve quality of life and partially integrate FATA into the Pakistani economy.However, it’s still worth asking the question: does the United States have options for short-term spending in FATA that might be more in line with a long-term political solution? Below are some possible answers (thanks to Faiysal AliKhan for sharing his ideas with our study group). There are more in an excellent report released last year by the International Crisis group. And perhaps you have some to add—I encourage you to leave your thoughts in the comments field at the end of this post!

• To the extent possible, the United States should direct its support into the sorts of community driven projects that could build constituencies for the future. That’s the great strength of the Rural Support Program model. By organizing beneficiaries into groups that make real decisions about how development budgets are spent in their communities, this model engages citizens who could help any future system of government work better. USAID’s Office of Transitions Initiatives promotes these types of projects in FATA, apparently with a reasonable degree of success, but at a relatively small scale. Is there scope for the expansion of the national network of Rural Support Programs into FATA?
• U.S. officials should think much more seriously about meeting the needs of the huge population of internally displaced people (IDPs) created by the conflict in FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province. Involving community members in assessing the needs of IDP populations and in monitoring the delivery of humanitarian aid could bring new leaders to the fore, who could continue to play an important role in directing reconstruction efforts after they return to their home villages.
• Finally, the United States should help to bridge the information gap between the residents of FATA and those in charge of development budgets. Some of this can be done by promoting better radio and mobile phone networks in the region. Some of it could be done by having a development authority, or even just a branch office of the overall FATA Development Authority, located in each agency where assistance is being delivered. Finally, part of the answer will be in reassessing our policies on the transparency of how aid projects in this region are planned and delivered. Although the United States has tried to keep a low profile in the area, as multiple study group members reported, people in FATA know that projects are funded with U.S. money. There is very little to be gained by attempting to keep U.S.-funded programs hush-hush. And the appearance of secrecy damages our cause by raising suspicions about our intentions and those of our partners.

So, commenters, we agree—solving the long term challenge of integrating FATA politically is critical. But FATA politics are complex, and by pouring in money without a full understanding of their dynamics, the United States could make things worse. We can’t make the necessary big decisions about the political status of FATA. But we can do more to ensure that our aid is delivered through channels that might someday help to make the future government of FATA more responsive to the needs of its people.