What the MCC Could Have Known

The MCC could have known the risks of starting a new program at the cusp of a change of government. Other donors did. Both IADB and World Bank have experienced significant stoppages to their programs, even those that had been running for some time, in past political transitions in Honduras. One World Bank official explained that disruptions in Honduras are among the worst in the region because the country has yet to pass a civil service law that guarantees continuity of professional staff between administrations. This means that everyone from ministers to entry-level technocrats turns over every four years. Farmer with a seedling, Honduras

One particularly clear example of this is the case of the National Fund for Sustainable Rural Development (Fonaders). Fonaders, an independent unit within the Ministry of Agriculture, was initially selected to be the procurement entity for the rural development program. But in the aftermath of the elections, Fonaders lost most of its staff, including staff that had been assessed as capable of meeting MCC’s high standards for procurement. A new evaluation had to wait six months for new Fonaders staff members to get up to speed in their jobs, and then ultimately found Fonaders unfit to play this role. This process unfortunately left some bad blood between the MCAH and the Ministry of Agriculture.

This is just one illustration among many of the implications of premature EIF and not preparing for the foreseeable problems that it could cause. Now the MCAH is left to make the most of the remaining compact time in an enormously constrained, pressured and risky environment.

Next Section: Compressed Time Line