Recommended
CGD NOTE
What to Do When You Can’t Prove DFI Additionality
The Trump administration is betting that foreign aid can do more by backing American businesses. Its first big test is underway.
By the end of November, the State Department plans to tell applicants which projects won the first round of a $500 million competition for critical minerals and commercial diplomacy in Africa. On November 1, the US Embassy in Amman opened a $50 million fund to promote US-Jordan commercial deals. A similar $100 million Egypt competition was scheduled to notify unsuccessful applicants by October 15.
These Annual Program Statements (APSs) are one of the few public windows into how the State Department spends economic assistance after absorbing USAID in 2025. Applicants, including for-profit firms, submit a short concept note. Review panels then pick the promising ideas, refine them with the applicant through iterative “co-creation,” and then invite full proposals before a senior official—likely the relevant regional assistant secretary—makes the final call.
The deal-first approach in these APSs bets that grants steered toward American firms and investment can deliver more economic growth than traditional aid. That bet may pay off. But it could also be difficult to know if it does. There’s still time to address that gap.
The commercial diplomacy evidence gap
The challenge is that an approach built on commercial diplomacy and deal-making has a relatively thin evidence base.
In poverty alleviation programs, decades of rigorous evaluation give grant reviewers a good sense of what works. For instance, a team of economists pooled 115 studies of 72 randomized evaluations of cash transfers across 34 countries and found consistent gains in consumption, income, and assets—albeit with weaker attenuating effects after the payments stop. A new meta-analysis of poverty graduation programs, which combine elements like consumption support, coaching, and a lump-sum transfer, found that programs launched since 2016 deliver about $5.39 in benefits per dollar, up from $2.89 for earlier ones, which the authors suspect reflects a field learning from its own evidence.
Commercial diplomacy has little comparable evidence. For instance, a meta-review of economic diplomacy found that some approaches could increase trade and investment. But that evidence is thinner and less rigorous than the evidence on cash transfers or public health programs. More rigorous evidence exists mostly for small or micro firm programs, such as a matching grant trial in Yemen. There is far less rigorous evidence on deal facilitation, transaction advisory, or helping US firms win tenders—interventions that the APSs seem to want to fund.
This evidence gap matters at selection. A panel scoring an application for a graduation program can check it against the evidence. A panel scoring a commercial diplomacy application has little to check it against—so policy alignment or fit fills the space. This could be especially true in the State Department, given its traditionally long and high-level bureaucratic clearance processes.
Determining additionality is difficult
One of the trickier questions for any public funding seeking to harness market actors is additionality—does it cause something that wouldn’t otherwise happen? Previous commercial diplomacy initiatives—including the Prosper Africa Presidential Initiative, which I led until 2025—and development finance institutions have wrestled with how to measure additionality for decades. The issue is that researchers can’t observe the deals investors would have done anyway, and Patrick Carter and coauthors show that standard statistical models can mistake correlation for impact. That doesn’t mean we should give up. Charles Kenny and Todd Moss's answer is to follow a few rules of thumb to mitigate the risk of needless subsidies—or worse.
- Do no harm: Apply strict safeguards to projects with social, environmental, or economic risks. Adopting strict safeguards has the additional benefit of potentially improving standards and lowering risk, which itself can be a source of additionality.
- Harness market signals: Use competition to minimize subsidies and set terms so that projects that don’t need publicly provided grants go elsewhere for capital.
- Use transparent benchmarks: Steer support to where private capital is scarce, such as agriculture in low-income countries. The idea is that it is harder to displace private capital in sectors where it is not already abundant.
How do the APSs measure up?
Judged against these rules, the recent APSs get a few things right but miss a lot. Here’s how the State Department’s APSs measure up against the rules of thumb for additionality.
Table 1. Grading the APSs: Do they guard against needless subsidies?
| Principle | Rating | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Do no harm | Insufficient | APSs cover safeguards related to legal compliance, such as human rights and counterterrorism vetting.
|
| Market signals | Incomplete | APSs are open competitions, which is a good start. But a grant is the most attractive financing there is, so firms that don’t need help have every reason to apply.
|
| Benchmarking | Missing | Priority sectors lean toward those where private capital already flows, such as energy, telecoms, and oil and gas in Africa, and AI and computing in Egypt. |
Improving commercial diplomacy over time
The State Department can keep its commercial focus while mitigating the risk of needless subsidies—or much worse. And it can do so within the APS process. My first three suggestions relate to the rules of thumb; the fourth seeks to improve the long-term effectiveness of US commercial diplomacy.
First, do no harm. The State Department should leave extraction and processing projects to the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and coordinate on mining governance interventions with the Millennium Challenge Corporation. The State Department is not ready to take on the diplomatic, environmental, social, and economic risks associated with mineral extraction and processing. At a minimum, the State Department should hire expertise to assess and monitor these risks and ensure that all projects are consistent with OECD, DFC, and Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative standards.
Second, through the co-design process, the State Department should require applicants to focus on a small set of clearly defined outcomes. It can then turn each round of competitive application revisions into a subsidy-minimizing auction among applications with the same—or very similar—outcome. If done correctly, this can reduce the size of unnecessary subsidies.
Third, the State Department should also publish awards by country and sector and give extra weight to applications that go where private capital is scarce but viable. This might result in more emphasis on sectors like agriculture, as opposed to capital-intensive sectors like oil and gas, but it will lower the risk of displacing—or needlessly subsidizing—private capital.
Finally, the State Department should engage economists to find ways to build counterfactuals into the revised applications, where possible. The State Department does not necessarily need randomized evaluations. But there is potentially an opportunity to introduce some elements of a rigorous ex-ante impact assessment at a low cost. Grant competitions are inherently oversubscribed, which makes a meaningful evaluation possible. Given that AI makes grant applications increasingly cheaper to complete, the State Department will likely receive far more applications than they’re able to fund.
At the former USAID Office of the Chief Economist, we found that engaging academic economists with these questions can be a cost-effective way to draw on expertise and improve the effectiveness of our assistance. For instance, the State Department, with help from researchers, could design evaluations that use lottery selection of comparable proposals—randomizing “in the bubble” where the difference of a few points is unlikely to be meaningful.
The timing for all of this can still work. The Africa APS is still reviewing initial applications, and Jordan’s first quarterly review is coming up. Small changes now can still improve hundreds of millions of dollars in awards and potentially improve US commercial diplomacy in the long term.
Commercial diplomacy may be a more effective way than traditional aid to advance both development and foreign policy goals. But a bet on new approaches should be managed as a bet—measured, tested, and learned from if it fails.
DISCLAIMER & PERMISSIONS
CGD's publications reflect the views of the authors, drawing on prior research and experience in their areas of expertise. CGD is a nonpartisan, independent organization and does not take institutional positions. You may use and disseminate CGD's publications under these conditions.
Thumbnail image by: diegograndi/ Adobe Stock