Recommended
Some of America’s best foreign aid was spent on American campuses. In 1954, the US Foreign Operations Administration, a predecessor to USAID, sponsored a contract to the University of Minnesota to help rebuild Seoul National University (SNU) after the Korean War. Over the next eight years, 226 of its faculty studied in the US, helping train the doctors, engineers, and public administrators behind one of history’s greatest economic turnarounds. South Korea’s story, and others like it, shows that US graduate scholars can help reduce poverty long-term, while building US strategic partnerships.
USAID called this kind of investment “participant training.” The State Department, which now runs US foreign assistance, appears to be accelerating a historical trend away from these programs. That is a mistake, especially as Beijing steps up training of students and foreign officials.
These programs are neither cheap nor do they deliver immediate impact. But history suggests that training promising economists and other technocrats at US universities may be among the most consequential things USAID has ever funded. They also deliver what advocates of economic statecraft say they want: allies, customers, and influence.
USAID helped train South Korea’s miracle makers
South Korea’s rise from a country dependent on US aid to one of its top ten trading partners and a close ally is a familiar story. Less familiar is who made it happen. Starting around 1964–65, civilian technocrats replaced military officers in key economic posts, and many had studied in the United States. The Minnesota project meant that roughly 70 percent of SNU’s faculty had trained with Americans. In 1970, USAID funded the Korean government’s launch of the Korean Development Institute (KDI), whose first president toured the United States and recruited 12 PhD economists. KDI became the analytical core of Korean economic policy. It built the country’s first macroeconomic model, produced the research behind its competition reforms, and helped the government weather the 1997 and 2008 financial crises. South Korea is now a major international donor, a US investor, and one of America’s closest strategic partners.
Beyond South Korea: Colombia, South Africa, and Chile
South Korea is not the only case. Elsewhere, the US government worked with American foundations and universities to send groups of students to the United States and helped build up the institutions they returned to.
Starting in the late 1950s, Rockefeller and Ford Foundation fellowships sent Colombian economists to US universities, and USAID sponsored a graduate program at the Universidad de los Andes with visiting University of Minnesota professors. Berkeley PhD Miguel Urrutia went on to run the planning department and the central bank, and Stanford-trained Eduardo Wiesner became finance minister—both received Rockefeller fellowships. Colombia was the second South American country to join the OECD and is now a major non-NATO US ally. It has maintained a relatively steady macroeconomic track record, helping it absorb migrant flows from Venezuela.
South Africa offers a more recent example. After apartheid, the country had few non-white economists. In 1996, USAID launched the Mandela Economic Scholars Program, which spent $6.6 million to put 177 historically disadvantaged South Africans through graduate economics degrees, more than 70 of them in the US. Scholars had to return to public service, and within a decade more than 60 held senior posts, including in the Presidency and the National Treasury.
Chile is the hardest case and the most contested legacy. In 1956, the International Cooperation Administration, another USAID predecessor, brokered a deal between the University of Chicago and Chile’s Catholic University. The US government funded about thirty graduate students through 1964, the so-called “Chicago Boys.” By the mid-1970s, they were running economic policy for General Pinochet’s brutal dictatorship. While their economic reforms ended hyperinflation, a severe economic crash followed in 1982, and controversy still surrounds their impact on inequality.
After democracy returned, the subsequent center-left governments extended many of the Chicago Boys’ free-market policies. In 2010, Chile became the first South American country to join the OECD. It is now a close US partner, foreign assistance donor, and among the largest foreign suppliers of copper and lithium, both critical minerals, to the US.
(Note: Nothing in this blog post is intended to dismiss or minimize the brutality of the Pinochet Regime or the role of the Chicago Boys in that complex legacy.)
Why the training slowed
Three things caused participant training to fade. The first was the end of the Cold War. Training survived into the 1980s, but afterward US foreign aid budgets shrank rapidly, along with the rationale of training free-market technocrats to compete with the Soviet development model.
The second was a push for measurable results. In his 2010 paper, Andrew Natsios blamed what he called “the counter-bureaucracy”—the oversight offices and rules that reward what is easy to count—for shrinking scholarships by demanding numbers that such programs cannot “produce in a short timeline.”
The third was cost. USAID Myanmar’s Lincoln Scholarship Program, which I helped establish after the country’s 2015 elections, cost about $19 million for 100 master’s students, or roughly $190,000 each. Doctoral degrees cost more. That is a far greater cost per person than proven interventions in basic education or public health. The majority of US development funding should fund measurable and cost-effective interventions, but participant training belongs alongside them.
Myanmar shows what happens when the pipeline of technocrats breaks. When Aung San Suu Kyi’s democratic government took office in 2016, its few senior economic advisers were in their eighties, trained at American universities before decades of military rule cut the country off. The Lincoln Scholars Program was an attempt to rebuild that pipeline. After the 2021 coup, many of its scholars joined the pro-democracy movement, ready to contribute when democracy returns.
Bringing it back would serve US strategic interests
Today’s US political environment is hostile to international students. New international enrollment at US universities fell 17 percent in the fall semester of 2025, in line with hardening US immigration policies. But participant training is not an immigration program— scholars are required to return to their home countries, and many take leadership roles upon return.
These programs also build on a US competitive advantage. Economics departments at American universities dominate global rankings. The money for these programs also lands at home. Tuition goes to universities across the US, and scholars spend their stipends in American towns. And as scholars take on key economic roles in their home economies, they spread market ideas and serve as valuable interlocutors for US diplomats and businesses. Those relationships compound over time. South Korea recently pledged a $150 billion investment in US shipbuilding—a key US national security priority.
Participant training alone did not produce those results. But many former aid recipients became America’s closest allies, principal investors, and biggest customers. US-trained officials helped steer many of those journeys.
China understands the value of training
While Washington has soured on participant training, China sees its value. In 2024, China’s lending to Africa fell to $2.1 billion, less than a tenth of its peak, while its commitment to training foreign officials appears to have increased. Its 2025–2027 plan with African governments promises 60,000 training opportunities and invites 1,000 African political party figures to China. The Chinese Communist Party backs a leadership school in Tanzania that trains members of ruling parties from six African nations. These programs teach party control of the state, a lesson that could have profoundly negative impacts on the continent with the world’s fastest-growing population.
An opportunity to reconsider participant training
As great power competition returns, sometimes described as a “G2,” the US will again need to win and maintain allies. The dismantling of USAID creates an opening to reestablish what may be the highest-return program in US foreign assistance, using lessons from the past.
First, the program should strengthen institutions. Korea, Chile, and Colombia worked because scholars came home together to a university, ministry, or think tank, so scholarships should be paired with partner institutions like a young KDI. The US should also, where appropriate, ask for co-funding from these partner institutions. Countries and participants should be chosen with care, looking for reform openings and keeping scholarships from going to local elites—who can pay their own way.
Second, scholars should return home, but first they need to be able to come. Washington should exempt government- and foundation-sponsored scholars from newly enacted time limits on student visas. Finally, programs should build alumni associations to strengthen networks and track graduates’ careers.
Participant training is not the only tool in the development toolbox, but it deserves a place in it. Smart investments in people now can pay enormous dividends for economic development, diplomacy, and national security for decades.
DISCLAIMER & PERMISSIONS
CGD's publications reflect the views of the authors, drawing on prior research and experience in their areas of expertise. CGD is a nonpartisan, independent organization and does not take institutional positions. You may use and disseminate CGD's publications under these conditions.
Thumbnail image by: Aerial Film Studio/ Adobe Stock