The Trump administration’s actions related to development policy are rooted in the “America First” doctrine. Their approach is not in line with internationally agreed objectives but narrowly aligned with perceived national interests.
One of the most striking signals of this comes in the form of a 36-question survey that was distributed to international organizations and NGOs receiving USAID funding. The questionnaire focuses on recipients’ alignment with US sovereignty, national security, and economic priorities.
While it was framed as an administrative tool, the questionnaire offers deeper insights into the administration’s vision for the US’s role in development cooperation. This is not a vision centered on the Sustainable Development Goals, global poverty reduction, or multilateral collaboration. Instead, it reflects a reorientation—emphasizing nationalism, transactionalism, and a reduced role for the US in global governance.
Researchers—including at CGD—have analysed which programmes are being cut, and advocated for changes of course which would mitigate harm or result in better development outcomes. Here, we take a step back to examine the underlying principles that appear to be shaping the shift—principles that the administration has, in some cases explicitly articulated (others less so), and that implementing partners are now navigating on the ground.
1. Aid as an instrument of geostrategic interests
Evident throughout the questionnaire is the expectation that aid should align with the strategic goals of the US, including a reduced reliance on multilateralism. One question asks recipients to confirm that their activities do not depend on international organizations such as the UN (Question 12). This suggests a preference for bilateral channels over multilateral cooperation, in line with a broader skepticism of international institutions.
Aid is being positioned as a vehicle for reinforcing national sovereignty and unilateral action. This stands in contrast with the long-standing view of all countries that are OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members for example that multilateralism can enhance the effectiveness, legitimacy, and burden-sharing of financing efforts. One question, looking ahead, is whether the US movement away from global governance structures (likely to be accelerated on August 4 when the membership of international organisation review reports) will reduce global coordination on shared challenges—from pandemics to climate change.
2. Ideological vetting and the question of political alignment
Another notable dimension is the inclusion of political and ideological screening criteria. Aid recipients are asked to affirm that they do not work with entities linked to “communist, socialist, or totalitarian parties” or those espousing “anti-American beliefs” (Question 11). This could be interpreted as a form of ideological vetting, potentially excluding certain partners based on political associations.
While governments have long imposed safeguards to prevent aid from supporting extremist or violent actors, this appears to broaden the criteria to encompass political worldview. Critics may argue that such measures risk undermining partnerships in contexts where political pluralism is part of the development landscape. More broadly, the approach reflects an effort to align foreign assistance with the administration’s domestic political agenda.
3. Reframing aid through the lens of migration and security
A third pillar of the survey is the prioritization of border security and migration control. It could be argued many donor countries are thinking or already heading in a similar direction. Questions ask whether aid activities contribute to “limiting illegal immigration” and “strengthening US border security” (Questions 14 and 26). This represents a shift from addressing the root causes of migration—such as conflict, poverty, or environmental degradation—toward more immediate deterrence-oriented goals.
This raises important questions. Can development cooperation be effective if narrowly focused on migration control, rather than broader economic and social transformation in low and middle income countries? And how might this shape the design of aid programs in countries of origin or transit?
4. Deprioritizing climate, equity, and inclusion
The Trump-era vision for aid also deprioritizes certain thematic areas. Recipients are asked to confirm that their projects exclude “DEI elements” (Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion) and “climate or environmental justice” components (Questions 15 and 16). This aligns with the administration’s skepticism toward climate policy and social justice frameworks more broadly.
The shift could have implications for how US aid engages with this key global challenge—especially as climate change continues to disproportionately affect low- and middle-income countries.
5. Aid as economic leverage
Finally, the questionnaire highlights a strong emphasis on measurable returns to the U.S. economy. Recipients are asked to outline the benefits of their projects for American workers and industries, including cost-sharing and burden-sharing arrangements (Questions 22, 34, and 35).
This approach aligns foreign aid with broader US trade and industrial policy. While ensuring accountability and value-for-money is a legitimate concern, a singular focus on domestic economic benefit risks displacing the long-held goals of development cooperation—namely, poverty reduction, sustainable growth, and human development.
What kind of development cooperation?
This questionnaire may be seen as a codification of an approach to development cooperation to one shaped by unilateralism and national interest. The likely outcome is a narrower, more politicized and instrumentalist model of aid.
The nature of these new US approaches means a significant shift from what has traditionally been understood as development cooperation.
The objectives deprioritized—tackling poverty, promoting resilience and or fostering inclusive institutions—remain central to international development thinking. The role of aid, many argue, is not only to serve donor interests but to contribute to shared prosperity, global public goods, and commitments to progress and global equity. Some speculate that the administration may rebrand USAID to reflect these new priorities.
The rest of the world is likely to watch closely. The Trump administration is recasting development cooperation as an extension of domestic policy, not international obligation: a tool to project values, and reward alignment. That shift doesn’t just move the goalposts—it redraws the playing field.
CGD blog posts reflect the views of the authors, drawing on prior research and experience in their areas of expertise.
CGD is a nonpartisan, independent organization and does not take institutional positions.
