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Moss served as Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of African Affairs at the U.S. Department of State 2007-2008 while on leave from CGD. Previously, he has been a Lecturer at the London School of Economics (LSE) and worked at the World Bank, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) and the Overseas Development Council. Moss is the author of numerous articles and books, including African Development: Making Sense of the Issues and Actors (2018) and Oil to Cash: Fighting the Resource Curse with Cash Transfers (2015). He holds a PhD from the University of London’s SOAS and a BA from Tufts University.
“An Aid-Institutions Paradox? Aid dependency and state building in sub-Saharan Africa,” with Nicolas van de Walle and Gunilla Pettersson, in William Easterly (ed.) Reinventing Aid, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2008.
“The Ghost of 0.7%: Origins and Relevance of the International Aid Target,” with Michael Clemens, International Journal of Development Issues, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2007.
“Compassionate Conservatives of Conservative Compassionates? US political parties and bilateral foreign assistance to Africa”, with Markus Goldstein, Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1, October 2005.
“Is Africa’s Skepticism of Foreign Capital Justified? Preliminary Evidence from Firm Survey Data in East Africa”, with Vijaya Ramachandran and Manju Kedia Shah, in Magnus Blomstrom, Edward Graham, and Theodore Moran (eds), Does a Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development?, Institute of International Economics, Washington DC, May 2005.
“Irrational Exuberance or Financial Foresight? The Political Logic of Stock Markets in Africa”, in Sam Mensah & Todd Moss (eds), African Emerging Markets: Contemporary Issues, Volume II, African Capital Markets Forum, Accra, 2004.
“Stock Markets in Africa: Emerging Lions or White Elephants?” with Charles Kenny, World Development, Vol. 26, No. 5, May 1998.
“Africa Policy Adrift,” with David Gordon, Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 3, Summer 1996.
“US Policy and Democratisation in Africa: The Limits of Liberal Universalism,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 33, No. 2, June 1995.
Clocking in at 264 pages, this particular RISE report scores the national policy and regulatory frameworks for sustainable energy in 111 countries across 27 indicators spanning three categories: energy access, energy efficiency, and renewable energy. More data and cross-country comparator benchmarks are useful, so the report and its public database are very welcome contributions. For an overview, check out the 2-pagers on energy Access, Efficiency, Renewables, and Africa.
A few of our takeaways from an initial read of the energy access section:
No surprise: Africa lags. Across all but one of the seven dimensions that the report uses to measure access, Africa is the lowest scoring region. For example, almost 40 percent of African countries do not have official electrification plans. Paired with the fact that Africa has the largest electricity access deficit, and is far behind in generation capacity to meet demand, it is further evidence that we must keep the momentum going on Power Africa, or other energy access initiatives.
“Subsistence consumption” is a better phrase for minimal electricity than “modern energy.” The report uses 30 kWh per month per household as the minimum monthly consumption level for the affordability analysis. This works out to just 1 kWh per household per day or 72 kWh per person per year—which is barely any electricity at all. The average American uses 13,000 kWh per year. But at least calling this “subsistence consumption” is more appropriate than the current IEA standard which defines “modern energy access” as 100 kWh for urbanites and just 50 kWh for rural citizens. (In More Than a Lightbulb, CGD proposed labelling the 100 kWh threshold as the “extreme energy poverty line.”)
Expect rapid progress from Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Cameroon and Senegal... The graphic below (from the report) compares RISE access scores with actual electrification rates from SE4ALL’s Global Tracking Framework. In the circle are countries with good scores but poor results so far. If the RISE scoring has any meaning at all, this should be the group of future high-performers. We blogged recently about Kenya’s impressive connections, where the access rate jumped from 27 percent to 55 percent in just three years, in part due to policies targeting connections for under-the-grid households.
Figure 1: Association between RISE energy access score and electrification rateSource: World Bank
… Or maybe not? What, really, do these scores tell us? The report claims a "strong association" between a country’s RISE access score and its electrification rate. But look again at the graphic above and this seems a bit generous. The R^2 is just 0.20. Ideally, we’d like to see if a good score predicts future results. For instance, does a high score predict a faster-than-average change in electrification? Since the RISE scores are only available for today, we won’t know for sure until 2020 or beyond. Is Kenya the anomaly or is the RISE scoring capturing a wider phenomenon? The best we can do today is compare the most recent RISE score with the most recent actual results. If RISE is robust, we’d logically expect countries with strong ratings to be those also making the fastest progress. Below is our own graphic showing RISE energy access score versus the change in electrification rates between 2010-14. The R^2 drops to just 0.11. (Hmmm. CPIA endogeneity redux?)
Figure 2: Association between RISE energy access score and change in electrification rate (2010-2014)
Overall, we welcome the enhanced data on energy and its many dimensions. Whether RISE changes the way we think about access and ultimately helps to identify the steps to close the gaps even faster, we’ll have to wait to see.
The budget just released zeroes out the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the nation’s development finance institution. In an era where many government agencies are under threat, it may not be surprising that OPIC would come under fire. Yet, none of the arguments often used to justify killing off OPIC are logical. Here’s why:
Save taxpayer money? Nope. OPIC has paid money into the US Treasury for 37 years in a row. Last year, it contributed $358 million toward the federal budget. Even the Heritage Foundation admits that closing OPIC will cost (!) taxpayers an additional $2.2 billion over the next ten years.
Drain the swamp? Nope. A decade ago, many critics worried that OPIC was fostering corporate welfare by subsidizing large American companies. It’s true that in the 1990s OPIC lent money to Enron and occasionally it has approved some questionable investments, but today there’s no evidence that OPIC is engaging in corporate welfare. In fact, a thorough scrub of OPIC’s portfolio found that less than 8 percent of OPIC commitments have involved any Fortune 500 company.
OPIC is irrelevant to US national security? Nope. When the US government wants to help promote stability and job creation in strategic allies, it turns to OPIC. Last year, OPIC lent money to build financial services in Egypt, power in Pakistan, and to catalyze private investment in infrastructure in crucial allies like Jordan and Kenya. In Iraq, OPIC has played a major role in helping rebuild the economy by spurring investment in water, agriculture, electricity, banking, construction, housing, and industry. (Check out the whole portfolio here.)
The US has better tools to promote private sector development? Nope. OPIC’s mandate is to mobilize private capital to solve development problems and build markets overseas. To do this, it can provide commercial loans, risk insurance, and seed capital for venture and private equity funds. No other agency has these capabilities.
That only leaves pure ideology. If the current administration truly wants to get government out of the way of any market potential distortions, then one could imagine getting rid of OPIC as part of an extreme laissez faire policy that could only logically also include completely free trade and completely open borders.
If the administration takes a deep breath and looks at the pros and cons of OPIC, it’s not even a close call. If the White House truly wants to build markets for American goods in fast-growing emerging markets, support private sector led growth in our strategic allies, and ensure that US companies are competing in these markets with Chinese and European firms—all at less than zero cost to taxpayers—then there’s isn’t a more valuable agency than OPIC. In fact, a sober assessment can only conclude that the U.S. should get serious about making OPIC bigger and better.
If the White House won’t do the sensible thing, then it’s up to you, Congress.
Aspects of the Oil-to-Cash model are being tested and tried around the globe. Momentum is growing in two of the largest countries, India and Nigeria. An epic report from the Indian government highlights the potential for both a universal basic income (UBI) and a Mining-to-Cash option in the state of Goa. Nigeria, which is struggling to reform fuel subsidies and to deliver basic services in the face of mounting macroeconomic pressure, has also begun experimenting with monthly cash transfers. Both countries will be closely watched. More details below, plus updates from Alaska (lawsuits and acrimonious politics!), rethinking Iran's experience with Subsidies-to-Cash, a new analysis of energy subsidy reform from our friends at CFR, and more.
India’s Ministry of Finance recently released a whopper of an annual Economic Survey. Don’t let the boring title fool you: this is a magnum opus on contemporary development. (Full disclosure: the lead author is Chief Economic Advisor Arvind Subramanian, a friend and senior fellow on leave from CGD.) The Survey contains the usual detailed analysis of the Indian economy. Yet the parts of most interest to developmentistas are likely to be the special chapters on demonetization, low-skill manufacturing, fertility puzzles, urbanization, and more.
“Universal Basic Income: A Conversation With and Within the Mahatma” (Chapter 9) is the one that really caught my attention. It’s a thoughtful, cogent, and thorough discussion of the potential to replace India’s vast complex of subsidies and targeted in-kind benefits to the poor with a guaranteed cash transfer to all citizens. The idea of UBI is simple: instead of providing subsidies for fuel, free meals, and dozens of other welfare benefits, just deposit money directly into the bank account of every citizen to use as they see fit.
The Survey’s assessment begins with quotes from Mahatma Gandhi suggesting both support and objection to the principles of UBI. The chapter then methodically addresses the conceptual pros (e.g., justice, equity, agency, efficiency) and potential cons (e.g., labor disincentives, moral hazard, political objections). It attempts various modeling, including a rough estimate that cutting national poverty in half via UBI would cost just 1.5 percent of GDP, less than the subsidy bill in the 2016-17 budget. For the data nerds, there are seven (!) appendices explaining all the estimates and calculations.
Implications of the UBI and its effect on poverty and vulnerabilitySource: NSS 2011-21, Budget 2016-17, Survey Calculations
For followers of CGD’s Oil-to-Cash initiative, the survey also highlights the fascinating case of the state of Goa (page 297), where a 2012 judgement by the Supreme Court of India created the Goa Iron Ore Permanent Fund. A group of citizens, the Goenchi Mati Movement, are now fighting for the expansion of the fund and the distribution of cash dividends, akin to the Alaska Permanent Fund dividend, which pays out an equal share of half the five-year average earnings from the state’s sovereign wealth fund to each resident.
So, should India go for UBI or not? In the end, the Survey concludes, with its characteristic blend of charming caution and righteous audacity:
…UBI is a powerful idea whose time even if not ripe for implementation is ripe for serious discussion. One can easily imagine the Mahatma as fair mediator, deliberating and examining both sides of the argument carefully. The Mahatma as the embodiment of universal moral conscience would have seen the possibility of UBI in achieving the outcomes he so deeply cared about and fought for all his life. But the Mahatma as moralist would have had doubts because of seeing uncompensated rewards as harming responsibility and effort. As a fiscal conservative he would permit UBI only if convinced that macro-economic stability would not be jeopardized. Recognizing the difficulty of exit, the Mahatma as astute political observer would have anxieties about UBI as being just another add-on government programme. But on balance he may have given the go-ahead to the UBI.
For a few days last month, the Gambia—a tiny sliver of less than two million people in West Africa—had the international spotlight. Yayha Jammeh, a delusional longtime dictator, lost an election on December 1 to the opposition coalition candidate, Adama Barrow. Jammeh first conceded, then changed his mind. But West African leaders—led in particular by Nigeria and Senegal—weren’t having it. They arranged for Barrow to be inaugurated at the Gambian embassy in Dakar on January 20 and then, after a midnight deadline expired, sent troops over the border to enforce the election result. Jammeh tried to obfuscate and delay, but in the end was forced into exile without a shot being fired. On January 21, he flew to Equatorial Guinea, reportedly along with suitcases of cash and his luxury car collection.
So now what? The Barrow administration has to rebuild the country which has been suffering repression and staggering corruption for 22 years. The Gambia is the only country in the region to have grown poorer over the past two decades. In Foreign Affairs, Jeff Smith of Vanguard Africa and I lay out ways outsiders can help the Gambia recover.
Quickly deploy funding and teams from the international financial institutions.
Help to locate and recover looted property and public money.
Support a truth and reconciliation commission, which President Barrow has identified as a national priority.
The Gambia’s experience also has lessons for others. A united political opposition, aggressive regional support, media attention, and a vocal diaspora all came together to bring down an entrenched autocrat. Democrats everywhere should take note.
In the summer of 2003, the West African nation of Liberia was facing a humanitarian calamity. After 23 years of war, the regime of warlord-turned-president Charles Taylor was crumbling. Rebels in the south controlled the second-largest city and were creeping toward the capital’s airport. Another rebel group, led by a fighter calling himself General Cobra, was advancing from the north and seized the capital’s main port and the country’s lifeline. Displaced civilians crowded into the increasingly tight peninsula of Monrovia as stocks of fuel, food and medicine dwindled. The city waited for a rebel invasion. Peace talks in Ghana ended abruptly when a UN Special Court unsealed an indictment against Taylor for war crimes in Sierra Leone. Taylor returned to Liberia, cornered diplomatically and militarily. A tragedy loomed. Would Taylor make a bloody last stand?
The international diplomatic corps and most humanitarian organizations had fled the country. The last remaining outpost was the U.S. Embassy, a compound at Mamba Point in the heart of the city. Ambassador John Blaney and a hardy band of embassy staff fought to keep the post running and to give diplomacy a final chance.
Blaney and Co. faced many foes. Taylor’s government was corrupt, venal, and delusional. He deployed militias of conscripted child soldiers, many too small to carry their weapons. The rebels were mysterious and unpredictable, often drugged and with unclear loyalty to their supposed political leaders. Even if a peace deal could be reached on paper, would anyone go along?
But the most interesting battle was with Washington DC. With wars raging in Iraq and Afghanistan, the last thing the United States wanted was to deploy troops to West Africa or get dragged into another armed conflict. The Defense Department in particular didn’t want to have to rescue the stubborn Ambassador and his staff. Secretary Donald Rumsfeld pushed hard to close the post and walk away.
The Embassy: A Story of War and Diplomacy by Dante Paradiso tells the inside story of how Blaney and his team kept the embassy open, risked their lives to cross the front lines to meet with General Cobra, and played a crucial role in negotiating a complicated sequence that included Taylor being forced into exile, the rebels allowing ECOWAS peacekeepers to reopen the port, and getting peace negotiators back to the table.
Paradiso, a foreign service officer who served in that embassy, skillfully tells the story through the eyes of several unsung heroes: the ambassador, a defense attaché, a diplomatic security officer, a local Liberian staffer, and a humble and unnamed “Political Officer” that can only be the author. Although the book is nonfiction, it keeps pace like a thriller and includes just enough context to keep the reader well-informed without bogging down the story. The dialogue between the officials is authentic and at times jarringly human. The Embassy is a riveting quick read and a dramatic firsthand account of a fascinating and frightening series of events. I’d recommend it alongside other recent books on Liberia, such as Helene Cooper’s The House at Sugar Beach, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s memoir, This Child Will Be Great, and Riva Levinson’s Choosing the Hero (see my previous review of that terrific book).
As a policy analyst and former diplomat, several aspects of The Embassy’s tale especially caught my attention. First, is the unheralded courage of the embassy staff. The ambassador and his colleagues faced immense personal danger to represent their country and to save innocent lives. This is a must-read for anyone who thinks diplomacy is about fancy cocktail parties.
It’s also striking how the U.S. Embassy plays a unique role in some parts of the world. Liberia has a special history with the United States and American influence is unusually high. But the embassy grounds were a haven of stability and an outpost of hope, both physically and symbolically. If the post had been closed, it would have meant the likely death of tens of thousands of people and a disaster that we would still be dealing with—and no doubt apologizing for—today.
Foreign policymaking is often messy, but Paradiso’s story is startling for how often the embassy is unaware of what’s happening outside a narrow slice of central Monrovia or even back in Washington. At several points, the ambassador learns of U.S. policy decisions, including the imminent arrival of protective troops, via the media. The embassy staff appear to have only the vaguest outlines of the policy battles underway between the White House, State Department, and Pentagon.
That partly explains why the story sheds no light on one of the decisive factors in the outcome: why did President George W. Bush take such an active and firm line on Liberia? In the midst of multiple foreign policy crises, the President repeatedly made the point of insisting publicly that “Charles Taylor must go.” I would have loved to know the full story of what happened behind the scenes and why Taylor eventually agreed to leave. Then national security advisor Condoleezza Rice and NSC senior Africa director Jendayi Frazer were obviously central, yet they barely get a mention. But I suppose that’s partly the point of the book: the embassy was in many ways flying blind.
Finally, for developmentistas who worry about greater State Department control of aid programs, there’s an amusing section (pages 219-220) where the ambassador cooks up a recovery plan on the spot. He wants a demobilization plan, cash for education, and a public works program. How much? One hundred million is his first answer. Nah, he thinks. “Let’s go for two hundred million!”
We now know that those tense and tenuous weeks back in June-August 2003 would eventually lay a foundation for democratic elections two years later that brought Ellen Johnson Sirleaf to power and the beginning of the country’s recovery. Today, Charles Taylor is in prison and Liberia is considered largely a post-conflict success. The Embassy shows how close the line between triumph and tragedy can be—and how a few brave people can make the difference.
In the twelve months to June 2016, nearly 1.3 million Kenyan households were connected to the grid for the first time. This impressive feat pushed Kenya’s national electricity connectivity rate to 55 percent from just 27 percent in 2013, one of the fastest connection increases recorded in the region. These latest connections illustrate the Kenyan government’s commitment to a goal of achieving universal energy access by 2020 (at least as measured by number of connections by Kenya Power and Lighting Corporation (KPLC), the national utility that owns and operates most of the electricity transmission and distribution system).
This is impressive. The jump from 27 percent to 55 percent took Kenya a little over three years. That same achievement took the United States about eight years during the height of the push to expand household electrification.
Now, Kenya aims to move from 55 percent to a ‘near universal’ access rate of 95 percent in just four more years—a leap that took the United States nearly twenty-six years. Yes, the U.S. is larger in size and population, but Kenya’s ambitions are still tremendous. In order to reach its goal, Kenya aims to hit 6.5 million connected households by July 2017, their most ambitious annual connections target yet. As of the end of last month, they are just about halfway there and roughly on track.
All this highlights Kenya as an example of extremely fast progress in electrification. So, what is Kenya’s strategy?
Invest heavily: In 2015, the Kenyan government and KPLC announced the Last Mile Connectivity Project, an initiative to connect one million customers per year. The government has already secured over $600 million from various international donors, and aims to connect over 814,000 households, measured as four million Kenyans, over the next four years.
Promote ‘under grid’ connections: Many Kenyans continue to live ‘under the grid,’ meaning the grid infrastructure is near where they live, but they are not connected. In response, many of Kenya’s connectivity programs, including the Last Mile project, have made an effort to leverage existing infrastructure in order to connect nearby populations as quickly as possible. For example, Phase I of the Last Mile project is focused on connecting under grid households within 600 meters of existing KPLC transformers.
Address demand side constraints: Two major policy adjustments in the last year reflect the government’s awareness of demand-side barriers to access. The government reduced the connection charge by over 50 percent and offered customers the option to pay the charge in installments. KPLC also scrapped a cumbersome application process, which was evidently skewed in favor of literate and wealthier households.
Will Kenya reach 95 percent by 2020? Due to KPLC’s remarkable transparency on progress on household connections, we can follow along in nearly real-time. Check it out, here.
If a degenerate gambler who abused his children lived on your street, there are many things the community might do to try to help: call the police, confront the bully, give comfort to the victims, maybe even quietly pass them money. One of the last things the neighbors would do is lend money to the abuser. Such is the dilemma for the international community and Zimbabwe. So, how can countries with a strong history and connection to that beleaguered country help its people while not entrenching its kleptocratic leadership?
First, some facts. The country is reeling from the increasingly abusive government of Robert Mugabe who has been in power since independence 36 years ago. Political repression is on the rise as incidents of assault, abduction, and torture by the security services have spiked. The average citizen is poorer today than in 1980, while the economy suffers from parasitic corruption and the deliberate destruction of the rule of law. Nearly one in three Zimbabweans are food insecure this year. Some 2-3 million, including much of the educated middle class, have fled the country. The government is now nearly $11 billion in debt, much of which is unpaid arrears to international financial institutions.
The current rebound strategy on the table, as represented by the Government of Zimbabwe’s Lima Plan, is to clear the country’s unpaid debts and restart borrowing. This is the favored approach of the finance minister Patrick Chinamasa and central bank governor John Mangudya—who are, in practice, the front men for Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa and his particular faction of Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party. Lima entails others paying to clear the country’s arrears at the African Development Bank and the Government borrowing another roughly $1 billion from unidentified creditors to clear its tab at the World Bank. These steps would then allow Zimbabwe to borrow even more from these same institutions, including to repay the mystery lender.
Debt relief and new financing, with a nod to conditions for better behavior, is central to a British government-funded proposal from Chatham House. The hope of this strategy is that, with an injection of cash and some positive reinforcement, the reformers within the government (presumably, Mnangagwa, Chinamasa, and Mangudya) will win the day and put the country back on a path to prosperity and good governance. Even if this approach seems highly unlikely to succeed, the report claims the current approach of international isolation is destined to fail. At a minimum, supporters of active re-engagement hope to avert a meltdown and worsening humanitarian conditions.
The United States has made clear its opposition to debt relief and premature lending, arguing that any assistance must wait until there is actual evidence of meaningful economic, governance, and human rights reforms. Absent those steps, the consensus in Washington is that any new help to the Government of Zimbabwe would only further entrench the cabal around Mugabe and likely wind up financing further political repression. Moreover, US officials remain deeply skeptical of the so-called reformers and are highly doubtful that the current regime—the very same people responsible for gross human rights abuses and the collapse of the economy—can now lead the country toward a robust and democratic recovery. They know that Mnangagwa was the architect of the Matabeleland Gukurahundi massacres in the 1980s and that Chinamasa was the justice minister who implemented the notorious Public Order and Security Act and all but destroyed the judiciary in 2001 by driving independent judges from the Supreme Court through threats and intimidation and replacing them with party loyalists.
Between the “lend and hope” strategy and the “isolate and wait” approach, what could the international community do to prevent unnecessary suffering without aiding the oppressors? What can be done to help Zimbabweans without helping ZANU-PF? Here’s an agenda:
Provide even more humanitarian support outside government channels. Any assistance to the people of Zimbabwe must be done either through non-governmental organizations or directly to the population. In Fiscal Year 16, the US government spent $232 million on development programs in Zimbabwe, the majority covering health care and emergency food relief. None of this aid is run through the Government of Zimbabwe. The UK has budgeted $136 million for Zimbabwe this year. Donors could expand this support through such channels, especially in non-health sectors.
Where possible, give people direct cash. The UK has already funded a promising pilot to provide $5 per month to vulnerable households. This approach—paying poor and vulnerable families directly through their mobile phones—could be scaled up.
Double-down on monitoring and responding to abuses. Credible grassroots Zimbabwean organizations that do the hard work of documenting abuses and providing victim services are grossly under-resourced. This is a high-impact area especially ripe for private philanthropy.
Don’t apologize for supporting democratic forces—in fact, do much more. Support for democracy and governance comprises only a small fraction of total US assistance. Worthy civil society groups both inside the country and in the diaspora could bolster the democratic environment.
Hurry up to prevent (and potentially react to) mass violence. The risks of renewed mass atrocities in Zimbabwe are high and rising. A recent report from the Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide at the Holocaust Memorial Museum calls for increased international attention on Zimbabwe and urgent international steps to prevent mass atrocities. While South Africa has largely buried its head in the sand on Zimbabwe, the US, UK, EU, and others should aggressively move to prevent mass violence and revive dormant planning efforts for potential intervention.
Overall, the international community should be wary of engaging with a disingenuous Government if the politics aren’t yet aligned. In the meantime, the international community should concentrate on supporting the people of Zimbabwe, not the Government of Zimbabwe. More engagement is not always a good thing. A World Bank strategy document leaked here reveals the downside of trying too hard to engage. The organization, which pledged to increase its attention to human rights, is instead bending over backwards to justify engagement with a regime held together through patronage and violent repression. Cognitive dissonance is the only way to explain how the World Bank could, in all seriousness, propose as an indicator of success that human rights violations merely “level off” (page 29).
There are often strong political dynamics or a bureaucratic logic to want to engage in a bad situation. Diplomats are trained and incentivized to build relationships. Bankers are trained and incentivized to push loans. But sometimes engagement is a euphemism for appeasement. Sometimes the desire to help can make matters worse. Like lending money to an abusive neighbor—or lending money to an abusive regime.
A strengthened OPIC—more efficiently deploying existing tools at no additional budget cost—would (1) increase US commercial access in emerging economies, (2) reflect economic, social, and political priorities in developing countries, (3) promote flagship US initiatives during austere budget conditions, and (4) support stability in fragile or frontline states.
On July 7, CGD chief operating officer and senior fellow Todd Moss testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at a hearing titled “An Assessment of US Economic Assistance.” Moss’s remarks emphasized the role development finance in promoting market solutions to poverty and insecurity.
On February 27th, senior fellow and Chief Operating Officer Todd Moss testified before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Energy and Power regarding the US role in promoting international access to energy.
Visit the report page for a full interactive version and video.
“Modern energy access” is finally on the international agenda, but the current common definition of 100 kilowatt-hours (kWh) per capita per year is far too low.
To reflect likely demand and historical trends would require measuring energy usage at higher levels, such as 300 and 1,500 kWh per capita per year.
…groups like the Center for Global Development, which has published reports urging antipoverty groups worldwide to be more transparent in their business operations, said that after being pressed by Transparify and other transparency advocates, it decided to publish a detailed accounting of its donors.
Here is the full table of all US think tanks in the report:
As we shared in a CGD blog post earlier this year, we recently launched a new web page showing exactly How We’re Funded. We list all grants and donations, including sources and exact amounts, received in 2013 and so far in 2014 above $100,000 (roughly anything more than 1% of our annual budget). We’ll update this and improve it later this year.