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This paper is co-published by AidData at William & Mary, the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, and the Peterson Institute for International Economics.
China is the world’s largest official creditor, but we lack basic facts about the terms and conditions of its lending. Very few contracts between Chinese lenders and their government borrowers have ever been published or studied. This paper is the first systematic analysis of the legal terms of China’s foreign lending. We collect and analyze 100 contracts between Chinese state-owned entities and government borrowers in 24 developing countries in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Oceania, and compare them with those of other bilateral, multilateral, and commercial creditors. Three main insights emerge. First, the Chinese contracts contain unusual confidentiality clauses that bar borrowers from revealing the terms or even the existence of the debt. Second, Chinese lenders seek advantage over other creditors, using collateral arrangements such as lender-controlled revenue accounts and promises to keep the debt out of collective restructuring (“no Paris Club” clauses). Third, cancellation, acceleration, and stabilization clauses in Chinese contracts potentially allow the lenders to influence debtors’ domestic and foreign policies. Even if these terms were unenforceable in court, the mix of confidentiality, seniority, and policy influence could limit the sovereign debtor’s crisis management options and complicate debt renegotiation. Overall, the contracts use creative design to manage credit risks and overcome enforcement hurdles, presenting China as a muscular and commercially-savvy lender to the developing world.
View a searchable repository of the contracts here.
This publication is CGD Working Paper 573.
This paper is co-published by AidData at William & Mary, the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, and the Peterson Institute for International Economics.
中国是世界上最大的官方债权方,但关于其放贷条款和条件的基本事实信息仍很匮乏。中国贷方和对应政 府借方之间的合同少有被出版或研究过。本论文首次系统分析了中国海外放贷的法律条款。本研究收集分 析了中国国有实体与非洲、亚洲、东欧、拉丁美洲和大洋洲的 24 个发展中国家政府借方间的 100 份合同。将它们与其他双边、多边和商业债权方的合同进行了对比,并发现了三条主要洞见。首先,中国的合同包 含非比寻常的保密条款,禁止借方披露条款内容,甚至禁止披露该债务的存在。其次,中国贷方寻求相对 其他债权方的优势,使用了担保安排,例如贷方控制的收入账户,并承诺债务不计入集体重组中(“不通 过巴黎俱乐部处理”条款)。第三,中国合同中的债务解除,提前收回以及稳定条款能让贷方影响债务方 的内政外交政策。即使这些条款在法庭上不能强制执行,但保密条款、清偿优先性以及政策影响相混合, 还是能够限制主权债务方的危机管理选项,让债务重新谈判复杂化。总体上说,此类合同采用富有创意的 设计来管理债权风险,克服执行障碍,展现出对于发展中世界来说,中国是一个强力而富有商业头脑的贷 方。
This publication is CGD Working Paper 573.
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