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Foreign Aid in a Time of Right-Wing Populism

2024 is the year of the democratic “supercycle”: elections covering 4 billion people in over 70 countries are being held. A range of political outcomes are expected, but several major aid-giving countries already have or are expected to move toward the right of the political spectrum. In France, for example, Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National had a historically strong showing in the elections for the National Assembly—with uncertain effects on future development policy. In the US, former President Donald Trump has been leading in the polls, though the breaking news Sunday injects greater uncertainty into the race. Countries known for their pro-development stances, like Sweden and the Netherlands, have also shifted to the right. In Germany, the leading aid provider in the G7 by share of GNI, the aid budget was cut during past budget negotiations, reflecting growing public scrutiny over the purpose of aid. This, combined with rising support for right-wing parties in Germany during the European Parliament elections, is a concerning trend for foreign aid advocates as the country heads into its general election next year. The recent European Parliamentary elections saw liberals and Greens lose ground across many EU member states, while centre-right and right-wing parties gained traction. The upcoming negotiations for the next seven-year EU budget are expected to put significant pressure on foreign aid.

These political changes may have consequences for foreign aid and development policy more broadly, though likely more complex than one might imagine at first.

Research has shown the volume and type of foreign aid given by OECD countries is affected by the political makeup of the government. This should be clear from their rhetoric—the new Dutch Development Minister Reinette Klever from the far-right Freedom Party has previously advocated for abolishing foreign aid altogether. In the UK, the Reform Party manifesto included a 50 percent cut in foreign assistance. AfD Germany and the Sweden Democrats want to end EU development aid completely, and tie German/Swedish aid to partner countries willing to accept migrant returns.

This pattern can be found systematically, even comparing centre-left and centre-right parties—an analysis of all party manifestos from 13 countries over 55 years found that left-leaning parties are on average more positive on foreign aid than right-leaning parties, and these differences in rhetoric translate into differences in actual spending. When we surveyed Members of Parliament (MPs) in the UK in 2021, we found that respondents from left-leaning Labour were more likely to say UK foreign aid should be prioritized to countries where a larger share of the population live in extreme poverty, while the right-leaning Conservatives were far more likely to suggest that it be targeted to countries the UK could benefit from trading with (these results will be set out in a forthcoming paper).

This shows up in the data. On average, right-leaning parties increase foreign aid by 0.3 percent per year in power, while left-leaning parties increase it by 3.6 percent per year in power. This masks substantial variation but generally, when the political right is in the ascendancy, foreign aid grows more slowly (Figure 1). A study of 23 OECD countries from 1960–2009 found that left-leaning governments are associated particularly with growth in grants to the poorest countries. Others have found that left-leaning governments are more likely to spend aid on disaster response and via nongovernmental organizations. A study focused on “populist radical right parties” in Europe found that they haven’t reduced overall aid spending levels, but have reorientated it towards migration containment and away from multilateral cooperation.

Figure 1. Trends in aid spending in the top OECD donors

Set of charts showing changes in ODA spending as a percent of GNI under right, center, and left leaning governments

Note: These 9 donors accounted for the large majority (82 percent) of aid from traditional donor countries in 2022 according to data from the OECD/World Bank. Download code and data for this figure here.

But these results are averages, and each part of the political spectrum hosts a wide range of views regarding the desirable level and type of foreign aid, within and between parties. The Conservative party in the UK, for example, is capable of appointing a career-long aid and development advocate like Andrew Mitchell to the development brief and a mere two appointments later, a dyed-in-the-wool aid sceptic like Priti Patel, who once advocated for the slashing of the aid budget and closing of the development department. The George W. Bush administration created the Millennium Challenge Corporation, launched the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and oversaw an increase in the overall share of US GNI going on foreign aid (and there remains a great deal in its foreign aid that commands bipartisan support within the US). Angela Merkel oversaw a large increase in aid spending, much of which was for hosting Syrian refugees in Germany but which also included an increase in overseas spending, while the current centre-left government coalition under Chancellor Olaf Scholz just agreed to a nearly €1bn cut to the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development’s aid budget for 2025 (not including separate, additional cuts to the humanitarian aid budget overseen by the Foreign Office).

If a range of attitudes or beliefs about the optimal size and structure of foreign aid are possible in each segment of the political spectrum, and these attitudes translate into different outcomes (and consequently impacts on developing countries) understanding what shapes or changes these attitudes is of potentially first-order importance. Taking deep ideological position as fixed, we suggest three mechanisms through which positions on foreign aid might be affected:

  1. Contact: Politicians who go to developing countries and interact with people in poverty or those fighting to reduce poverty may become more positive about foreign aid in the future. Our analysis suggests that trips organised by the UK Conservative party may have played some role in encouraging MPs to vote against aid cuts, but conclusive evidence here is lacking.

  2. Information: Politicians may hold misconceptions about the effectiveness, distribution, or use of aid. Evidence shows that even aid officials have a poor handle on where the aid budgets of their countries go. Better information may shift attitudes.

  3. Advocacy: Politicians partly shape and partly follow public opinion. But they may be misinformed over how salient aid volumes are to voters, and how popular different approaches to aid can be. Evidence suggests that voters in rich countries actually do support global redistribution. Advocacy organisations act to make concerns more salient and shape politician preferences (this advocacy can be in either direction: the One Campaign and the Taxpayers’ Alliance will likely be pulling politicians in different directions).

At present we know next to nothing about the relative efficacy of these approaches or if they work better under specific circumstances or when organized through specific messengers, though projects or organizations attempt each. Watch this space for more research from CGD in this area, and we encourage others working on building political support for aid to think seriously about evidence.

We are grateful to Theodore Mitchell for research assistance and to Charles Kenny and Erin Collinson for excellent comments. Any errors or omissions are our own.

Disclaimer

CGD blog posts reflect the views of the authors, drawing on prior research and experience in their areas of expertise. CGD is a nonpartisan, independent organization and does not take institutional positions.


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