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German Parties’ Vision for Development Policy: 2025 Federal Elections

In the second half of December, Germany's political parties released their manifestos for the Federal Election on 23 February. Traditionally, international and development issues have played a relatively minor role in German politics, even though Germany is the second biggest OECD donor country (in absolute terms) and one of the few countries that meet the UN target of spending 0.7 percent of gross national income (GNI) on foreign aid. However, in light of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, the pressure to secure cheap energy sources, China’s growing global influence, and the disruptive power of Donald Trump even before his second presidency begins, international topics have gained prominence. Security, defence, and foreign policy demands are now addressed by most parties in the Bundestag, the German parliament.

In this context, development policy appears across various manifestos as part of a three-pronged approach: How should German foreign, defence, and development policy be aligned? This blog examines answers to this question in the different manifestos, and what they might tell us about the future direction of the German development policy. It also explores where parties stand on the potential merger of the Foreign Office (AA) and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), an issue that has gained prominence in recent months. 

What the manifestos tell us about the future direction of German development 

Germany’s political landscape has become increasingly complex in recent years. Currently, eight political parties (or seven political forces) are represented in the Bundestag. The conservative CDU/CSU alliance (comprising Bavaria’s CSU and the CDU, who stand in the rest of the country) currently leads in the polls with around 33 percent of the vote. Their lead candidate, Friedrich Merz, is well-positioned to become the next Chancellor. While Merz does not have a particularly strong foreign policy profile, he outlined his perspectives on international issues in early December during a speech. He is a particularly strong supporter of Ukraine, advocating for the provision of Taurus missiles—a move Chancellor Scholz has thus far opposed—calling for at least two percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to be spent on defence, and pushing to make development cooperation more conditional on partner countries' collaboration.

The CDU/CSU's joint manifesto reflects the aim of enhancing Germany’s geopolitical capacity to act. Among other things, it proposes establishing a National Security Council within the Chancellery—a project that was debated but not implemented under Olaf Scholz’s government. The CDU/CSU seeks better coordination across foreign, security, defence, trade, European, and development policies. The manifesto clearly advocates for the use of development aid as a tool of foreign and security policy:

"We link our development policy with strengthening the rule of law, expanding economic cooperation, effectively stopping illegal migration, combating terrorism, and reducing the geopolitical influence of Russia and China. In doing so, we also aim to proceed on a European level and promote private investments."

While the manifesto proposes merging humanitarian aid, currently housed within the Foreign Office (AA), with development cooperation, currently mainly under the realm of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), it does not specify whether this would fall under the AA or the BMZ. Merz himself has yet to form a definitive opinion on merging the two ministries and said that this would need to be discussed with a future coalition partner.

Current polls place the Social Democratic Party (SPD), which has held the Chancellery under Olaf Scholz since December 2021, at approximately 16 percent of the vote. Their manifesto puts significant emphasis on preserving a rules-based order and ensuring greater participation of the Global South in international matters. Addressing "colonial continuities" is a key pillar of the party's international profile. SPD Development Minister Svenja Schulze has signalled her desire to continue in this role in a future government. Like the CDU/CSU, the SPD underscores the interaction between foreign, defence, and development policy. However, they advocate for a "strong and independent development ministry" and maintaining an Official Development Assistance (ODA) quota of at least 0.7 percent of GNI. In January 2025, Schulze proposed a plan for the future of Germany’s development policy, which includes renaming the BMZ as the “Federal Ministry for International Cooperation,” signalling an interest in further elevating the role of the ministry.

The SPD manifesto also plans to continue its feminist foreign and development policy and highlights key initiatives such as reforming the global financial architecture and introducing an international tax on the super-rich, an idea Schulze has championed with partners from Brazil and other countries. SPD co-chair Lars Klingbeil has sought to enhance his profile with a renewed focus on North-South relations, deliberately evoking the legacy of former Chancellor Willy Brandt and his leadership of the North-South Commission.

The Greens, currently polling at around 13 percent, have built a strong reputation over the years in foreign and climate policy. Since December 2021, they have held the Foreign Ministry under Annalena Baerbock, who also oversees humanitarian aid, climate foreign policy, and international climate negotiations. The Greens’ manifesto emphasises multilateral cooperation and strong international organisations as key to addressing global challenges. It acknowledges Germany’s "historic responsibility towards the poorest countries", aligning with the UN’s 2030 Agenda and adopting feminist and decolonial approaches. The Greens advocate for “independent development policy” but do not explicitly call for a dedicated ministry, emphasising instead “strong cross-departmental coordination”. The manifesto also supports meeting the 0.7 percent ODA target and allocating additional funds for international climate and biodiversity financing.

Based on current polls, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) could secure approximately 18 percent of the vote. A coalition involving the AfD is not seen as a realistic possibility, as all other potential governing parties categorically rule out cooperation with the far-right. The AfD’s manifesto criticises Germany’s development policy as a "failure". According to the party, development aid should be conditional on the willingness of partner countries to repatriate their citizens required to leave Germany and cooperate swiftly in determining citizenship. The AfD rejects funding "questionable gender-and woke ideology-based development projects", wants primarily investments in infrastructure projects while reducing financial transfers, and advocates reducing Germany’s development cooperation budget significantly.

Until the “traffic light" coalition (SPD, Greens, and FDP) which ended in November 2024, the liberal FDP was part of the government. Currently polling at around 4 percent, the FDP is at risk of failing to meet the 5 percent threshold to re-enter the Bundestag. The FDP manifesto identifies a pressing need for reform in Germany's foreign, security, and development policies, given the shifting geopolitical landscape. It strongly supports a National Security Council and a structural realignment of development cooperation and its institutions, aligning spending with Germany’s economic and security interests. The FDP has been particularly vocal about integrating the BMZ into the Foreign Office. It also advocates for LGBTIQ+ rights and women’s rights in its development policy. The manifesto does not specify financial targets but the FDP has frequently called for significant budget cuts in development policy over the past two years

The Left Party (Die Linke) is also at risk of failing to re-enter the Bundestag. Their manifesto emphasises a decolonial narrative, prioritises international solidarity over profit interests, and commits to the 0.7 percent GNI to ODA target. It highlights human rights, gender equality, and youth protection as core principles of development policy, while opposing the use of development funds for civil-military cooperation or border fortification against refugees.

The newly established Sarah Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), seen by many observers as a populist party with a non-traditional ideological orientation, has been gaining traction since its founding in early 2024. With approximately 4 percent in the polls, it is uncertain whether the BSW will enter the Bundestag. The party's manifesto provides little guidance on development cooperation or foreign policy, apart from the call to cut financial and military support for Ukraine.

Conclusion: An open race for development policy

Development policy retains advocates among democratic parties in the Bundestag. However, amidst populist criticisms of development projects, looming trade wars, and mounting defence budget pressures, traditional assumptions may not hold.

While the Global South is prominently featured in most programs, development policy is rarely framed as a strategic tool to shape relations with this diverse group. A more robust conceptual debate on the long-term future of development policy—beyond electoral cycles—would be valuable.

Development policy is unlikely to be a decisive issue in the federal election. Whether the BMZ continues as an independent ministry will likely depend on coalition negotiations. Proposals like the CDU/CSU’s integration of humanitarian aid and development cooperation and Schulze’s push for new international financing models offer promising directions.

A strategic realignment of development policy as a pillar for relations with the Global South would enhance Germany and Europe’s soft power. Such an approach should not be mistaken for crude, interest-driven politics, which would undermine its potential as a tool of development diplomacy. More than ever, Germany—and Europe more broadly—needs international avenues for influence, many of which can be forged through development policy.

Disclaimer

CGD blog posts reflect the views of the authors, drawing on prior research and experience in their areas of expertise. CGD is a nonpartisan, independent organization and does not take institutional positions.


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