Much of the world is undergoing profound geopolitical realignment. The post–Cold War consensus that underpinned development cooperation is weakening, and as political priorities shift in donor countries, foreign aid is increasingly vulnerable to domestic pressure. Official development assistance (ODA) from EU member states is contracting, while many African governments face intensifying fiscal stress and rising development needs.
Rather than ushering in the end of cooperation, these pressures should prompt a rethink of the Europe–Africa relationship by encouraging a move away from short-term, aid-driven engagement to long-term cooperation rooted in mutual interests and shared prosperity.
The upcoming EU–AU summit presents an opportunity to chart a new path for the partnership, one that recognises shared priorities and redefines cooperation for the decade ahead.
Why the old model no longer works
Estimates suggest that planned cuts by 11 DAC members—most of them EU member states—could result in a 16–28 percent decline in ODA to sub-Saharan Africa in 2025. Aid cuts being carried out simultaneously across multiple donors create serious near-term consequences, particularly in lower-income countries with limited fiscal space and rising debt burdens.
Yet the decline in aid comes amid longstanding debate about the effectiveness and sustainability of foreign assistance. Modern aid was born out of postwar geopolitics and the Cold War, when Western governments used development cooperation to secure alliances and deepen spheres of influence. Once there was no explicit need for the geopolitical arguments after the end of the Cold War, the rationale for aid turned instead toward moral justifications: reducing poverty, debt relief, and financing global development goals. This shift supported major international efforts in the 1990s and 2000s and helped frame development as a shared global responsibility culminating in the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals. But the moral narrative has not been resilient enough to insulate development budgets from recent political scrutiny. As popular discontent grows in richer countries and scepticism of globalization deepens, foreign aid, which is perceived as distant from domestic priorities, has become easier to question and cut.
Economists have long disagreed about whether aid “works.” Critics such as William Easterly and Dambisa Moyo argue that it often misses intended outcomes and can distort incentives, fuel corruption, and weaken state capacity. In recent years, development institutions have leaned on technocratic fixes: randomised evaluations, cash transfers, and tighter targeting. These tools have expanded evidence and improved efficiency in some areas, but have done little to address deeper structural issues, including the political economy of aid, frequent misalignment with local systems, and the vulnerability of relying on donor budgets shaped by domestic politics far away.
This does not mean cooperation will fade, even as political pressures in Europe and the United States erode the already fragile consensus around ODA. But it does mean the rationale and modalities must evolve.
Positive public sentiment in Africa offers a foundation for building a stronger partnership
Despite shifting geopolitics, African citizens continue to see the EU as a relevant and constructive actor. Recent Afrobarometer surveys, covering 34 African countries, show that Africans express some form of opinion about the EU at nearly the same rate as they do about the African Union (see Figure 1). This suggests that people see the EU, positively or negatively, as more consequential in their national affairs than nation states such as India or Russia. Encouragingly, the ratio of Africans holding positive views of the EU is roughly three to one. This level of favourability is surpassed only by China and the AU. Moreover, favourability varies less across the 34 surveyed countries for the EU than for China, the United States, or Russia. This suggests that views of the EU are more consistent or less polarised across the continent than views of other major powers.
Figure 1: Public opinions of global powers in Africa
Note: The surveys were conducted in 2024 or 2025. The countries covered include Angola, Benin, Botswana, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Eswatini, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
This reservoir of goodwill gives European leaders a real opening to build a more resilient partnership with Africa, if they resist the pull of short-termism. As the EU seeks to secure critical minerals, stabilise energy supply chains, and curb irregular migration, it may be tempted to pursue narrower, transactional deals: trading investment or budget support for access to resources or outsourced border control. While such arrangements may yield quick political wins, they risk eroding public trust and weakening the foundations of long-term partnership. Transactionalism, especially when driven by crisis management rather than strategy, could ultimately damage Europe’s standing, reinforce perceptions of extractive intent, and empower competitors offering seemingly more equitable engagement.
From projectised aid to long-term strategic partnership
A rebalanced Europe–Africa relationship requires rethinking how ODA is deployed and understood.
- First, aid should strengthen domestic capability.
In more stable and middle-income African countries, ODA should lay the groundwork for deeper economic engagement—trade, investment, and innovation—rather than financing service delivery indefinitely. The aim is not sudden withdrawal but deliberate “graduation”: using ODA to build institutional capacity and crowd in investment. - Second, donors must make strategic choices.
Too often, ODA is spread thin across many small activities, none large enough to achieve transformative impact. As my colleagues Rachel Glennerster and Siddhartha Haria argue here, concentrating support on a narrower set of proven, scalable interventions is likely to deliver better value for money and stronger systems. But this does not mean the intervention menu should dictate strategic priorities. - Third, ODA should retain a moral core.
Protecting those without a political voice through basic health and nutrition, social protection, and foundational education, must remain central, especially in fiscal downturns. This is not only a moral imperative; it is an investment in long-term prosperity and stability.
Time for principled reorientation
The era of expanding aid budgets is likely over, but this need not signal retreat. Instead, it can prompt overdue reform: moving from a donor-recipient model shaped by Cold War geopolitics to a more equal, strategic partnership. The historical ties and geographic proximity between Europe and Africa make this especially important.
Three principles could guide a renewed EU–AU relationship:
- Anchor cooperation in long-term mutual interests.
Resist the temptation to pursue reactive, transactional deals driven by short-term pressures such as migration management or resource competition. - Use ODA to build capability, not dependency.
Focus on scalable interventions and systems strengthening. - Retain a moral core.
Protect the most vulnerable, even as strategic priorities shift.
African public opinion remains broadly favourable toward Europe. That goodwill is a strategic advantage, but only if both parties act with pragmatism, moral clarity, and long-term commitment.
