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Making Development Finance Go Further

In an earlier blog post, we examined what financing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and climate goals would mean for the poorest countries. Allocating the additional $500 billion a year in official finance called for by global estimates would give a typical low-income country (LIC) finance equal to more than 20 percent of GDP annually—and some countries 40 percent or more. These inflows would far exceed current levels of government revenue and aid.

Transfers on this scale are unrealistic: official development assistance fell 23 percent in real terms in 2025, the largest decline on record. They may also be unwise. The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) offer a cautionary lesson. Debt relief reduced annual debt service by about 2 percent of GDP—roughly a tenth of the inflows implied for a typical LIC. Yet the resulting fiscal space did not fully translate to an increase in poverty-reducing spending, while health's share of government expenditure barely changed.

How, then, can more limited external financing achieve greater development impact, and what can help countries mobilize more resources of their own? In a new paper, we consider three approaches: paying for results; matching increases in domestic revenue and health spending; and low-cost measures by high-income countries to help developing countries recover resources hidden offshore. The first two require public financial management (PFM) systems that reliably report government revenue and expenditure. Yet these systems are often weakest in the countries that need additional financing most.

Rewarding results

Results-based aid links payments to verified results—such as children immunized, students completing school, or additional revenue collected—rather than simply financing inputs or activities. Examples include Cash on Delivery Aid, UK-supported education programs in Ethiopia and Rwanda, the World Bank’s Program-for-Results financing, and performance-based financing for health facilities. The appeal is straightforward: payments reward what matters to citizens, while governments choose how to deliver it.

Evidence is mixed. In Rwanda, paying primary health facilities for services delivered increased institutional deliveries and preventive care for young children, but not prenatal visits. A systematic review of results-based financing for maternal and child health found partial, inconclusive evidence: most evaluations tracked service use rather than health outcomes, and many were conducted or funded by the agencies running the program. Results-based payments also require reliable data, independent verification, and governments able to fund activities upfront. These conditions are hardest to meet where budget execution and reporting are weak. Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessments identify timely in-year budget reporting and procurement monitoring as among the weakest PFM areas in low- and lower-middle-income countries. Results-based financing can therefore strengthen incentives for better service delivery, but it cannot substitute for investment in the public financial management systems needed to deliver, monitor, and verify results.

Matching domestic contributions

A second approach ties external finance to increases in domestic revenue. Under the Addis Tax Initiative, launched in 2015, donors pledged to double support for tax administration and policy by 2020, while partner countries committed to raising more revenue. Donor support peaked in 2016, missed the target, and remains a small fraction of aid. Matching arrangements could go further by linking part of budget support or concessional lending to verified increases in domestic revenue mobilization. For example, external financing could increase when countries achieve sustained improvements in their tax-to-GDP ratios. Two design choices are key. Because empirical evidence suggests that grants can weaken incentive for domestic resource mobilization matching should reward revenue increases rather than levels. And because revenue fluctuates with commodity prices and the economic cycle, targets should cover several years and allow for shocks beyond government control.

A similar matching principle can apply to health spending. The Global Fund makes a further 15 percent of a country’s allocation conditional on additional domestic commitments, while Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance requires countries to cover a rising share of vaccine costs as incomes grow. These arrangements respond to evidence that external health funding routed through governments can partly displace domestic health spending.

But commitments and budget allocations do not necessarily translate into actual spending. Low- and middle-income countries underspend approved health budgets by 13 percent on average. Matching should therefore reward actual spending, not simply budgetary commitments, supported by timely and reliable budget execution reports. This is particularly important given the weaknesses in budget execution reporting identified in PEFA assessments.

Strengthened public financial management: a prerequisite

As we argued in our earlier blog post, stronger PFM helps translate additional financing into better services and infrastructure by improving the efficiency of public spending, including public investment. Both results-based financing and matching arrangements require timely and credible information on government revenue, budget execution, and actual expenditure. Improving budget reporting, procurement monitoring, and external audit would enable more countries to benefit from these approaches. One option is to incorporate financing for better reporting and verification directly into results-based and matching arrangements, rather than relying exclusively on separate technical assistance projects.

Low-cost action by high-income countries

High-income countries can also help developing countries mobilize domestic resources through measures that require relatively little budgetary support. In several developing and resource-rich countries, households hold a large share of their financial wealth offshore, beyond tax authorities’ reach. Automatic exchange of bank account information between tax authorities has substantially reduced offshore tax evasion. Yet many LICs lack the legal frameworks and data safeguards needed to receive this information. High-income countries could help them participate, including through transitional arrangements allowing them to receive information before reciprocating. They could also give LIC tax authorities access to beneficial ownership information and registers for companies, trusts, and real estate, and strengthen enforcement against financial institutions and professionals who conceal wealth or corruption proceeds. They can further support international tax rules that reflect LIC interests, including in negotiations on a UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation. These measures cannot close financing gaps alone, but they can strengthen the revenue base needed for lasting increases in public spending.

Priorities for the international community

As aid budgets shrink, the international community needs to focus not only on how much financing it provides but also on how effectively that financing is used. Paying for verified results and matching external assistance against increases in domestic revenue and actual health expenditure can strengthen incentives and reduce the risk that aid displaces domestic resources.

Neither approach, however, will work reliably without stronger public financial management. Timely budget reporting, effective expenditure controls, procurement monitoring, and external audit are prerequisites for ensuring that financing commitments translate into actual spending and better outcomes. Support for these systems should therefore be integral to external assistance, not treated as a separate objective.

High-income countries can also help developing countries mobilize domestic resources at relatively little budgetary cost. Enabling LICs to participate in automatic exchange of tax information, providing access to beneficial ownership information, and supporting international tax rules that reflect their interests would help expand their domestic revenue base.

These measures cannot compensate for declining aid or close the financing gaps implied by global SDG and climate estimates. But they can make external assistance more effective, strengthen domestic resource mobilization, and help countries achieve more with the resources available.

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CGD's publications reflect the views of the authors, drawing on prior research and experience in their areas of expertise. CGD is a nonpartisan, independent organization and does not take institutional positions. You may use and disseminate CGD's publications under these conditions.


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