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DATA VISUALIZATION
What will the incoming Trump administration mean for US funding to multilateral development initiatives? This question is top of mind as we head into a second Trump term full of unknowns—especially as major funds that rely heavily on US financing, like Gavi, are in replenishment mode. While uncertainty about the future looms large, it is useful to look at historical data for insights on the track record of the largest funder to key multilateral development organizations.
As President-elect Trump reenters the White House, we drill down on US funding for a subset of the major multilateral development, health, and climate funds, to see how funding levels enacted by Congress compared to presidential budget requests across the Obama, Trump, and Biden years. For those not steeped in the US budget process, the president sends a budget request to Capitol Hill. Then, Congress must advance spending bills to fill the federal government’s coffers and set funding levels for a range of priorities.
It isn’t uncommon to see significant discrepancies between an administration’s proposed budget and the final figures in a congressionally approved appropriations package. During the Obama administration, enacted funding levels for development programs regularly fell below the administration’s request. This pattern changed during the first Trump administration, when lawmakers often rebuffed the White House’s attempts to cut funding for key multilateral institutions. As a result, in Trump’s first term, spending cuts were not always as dramatic as proposed—and didn’t necessarily align with rhetoric from the executive branch. While Congress provided less multilateral climate funding overall, some development and health funds were able to avoid meaningful cuts.
With new dynamics presented by Trump’s reelection—and a different context on Capitol Hill—it would be hasty to infer past as prologue.
Here are our three takeaways from recent trends:
Takeaway 1: During the first Trump administration, Congress protected funding for key global health multilaterals against proposed cuts
During his first term in office, President Trump’s budget requests to Congress sought to decrease contributions to major global health multilaterals such as the Global Fund, Gavi, and the World Health Organization (WHO). Congress didn’t follow through and upheld funding across the board for these organizations.
In the case of the Global Fund, the Trump administration repeatedly requested reduced US contributions. At the time of the Global Fund’s 6th replenishment in FY2020, the Trump administration pledged up to $3.3 billion—a $1 billion decrease from the previous US pledge—and requested Congress match $1 in US contributions for every $3 provided from other donors, bucking the previous trend to match $1 for every $2. But Congress didn’t budge, maintaining the$1-for-$2 match ratio, ultimately providing $4.68 billion over the three-year replenishment.
The Trump administration initially appeared to take a more favorable view of Gavi. In the administration’s first budget (FY18), it proposed to increase the annual contribution to Gavi by $15 million to fulfill an Obama-era $1 billion pledge to the institution. While the next two budget requests represented year-over-year decreases, they were modest compared to proposed cuts to other multilateral institutions. And in early 2020, the Trump administration pledged $1.16 billion to Gavi’s replenishment, a small bump up from the previous US pledge. However, the dynamic appeared to change sometime during the pandemic. Days before heading out of office in January 2021, the Trump administration submitted a rescission request proposing to claw back the entire $4 billion emergency appropriation for Gavi enacted in response to COVID-19.
The Biden administration announced a $1.58 billion US commitment in June 2024 to support Gavi for the next five years. While the future remains uncertain, there are encouraging signs Gavi continues to enjoy bipartisan support. In the 118th Congress, the Republican-controlled House passed an FY25 spending bill last Congress that would fulfill the Biden administration’s request to increase annual funding by $10 million.
In each of its four budget requests, the Trump White House proposed halving US funding towards its assessed contribution to the WHO. But Congress annually enacted the full amount. Throughout the first three years of the administration, US total contributions (assessed and voluntary) remained relatively stable compared to years prior. However, in mid-2020, President Trump initiated US withdrawal from the WHO, arguing the institution had badly mishandled the COVID-19 pandemic. US disbursements to the WHO were put on hold during this period. After taking office, President Biden retracted the withdrawal decision and restored funding. Trump’s second term is likely to have implications for WHO funding, as he’s pledged to pursure US withdrawal from the institution soon after taking office. With more time on the clock, the second Trump administration will be able to see it through this time around.
Takeaway 2: Notable cuts for several key multilateral development funds, but no zeroing out
The pledging session for the 18th replenishment of the World Bank’s concessional window (the International Development Association, or IDA) occurred in December 2016. President Obama announced an initial commitment to support financing for the world’s poorest countries; however, Trump’s Treasury Department chose to revise down the pledge, with its funding appeals to Congress reflecting a lower topline. Lawmakers delivered on the full ask, but the result was a notable decrease in funding for IDA when compared to earlier replenishment cycles.
With Trump’s return to office, history may repeat itself. An early signal of the second Trump administration’s approach to multilateral development will be how it handles the US contribution to IDA. The Biden administration announced a 14 percent increase to the US IDA pledge in November. But it will be left to the incoming administration to carry that forward (which could include an adjustment) and make the case to Congress. It’s worth noting that despite having sought a lower funding level than the pledge it inherited, the Trump administration’s FY2018 budget materials highlight the substantial leverage achieved through IDA and its pivotal role as the largest source of development finance for the world’s poorestcountries.
Congress failed to deliver the full amounts requested for the African Development Fund (AfDF) throughout much of President Obama’s second term in office. The incoming Trump administration pursued reduced funding for the AfDF—reflecting a lower pledge—but the annual asks of Capitol Hill were near level with appropriations during the Obama administration. AfDF has a replenishment coming up in December of this year, marking a key moment to see how the Trump administration might position itself on the list of donors in the face of concern about China’s growing influence on the continent.
Owing to changes made by the Asian Development Bank, the institution sought lower donor contributions for its concessional Asian Development Fund (AsDF).
While Trump’s Treasury Department demonstrated less ambition in their requests at the multilateral development banks described above, the administration took harder tack in its approach to the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), choosing not to make any commitment to the fund’s eleventh replenishment in early 2018. But Congress, seeing significant value in the food security-focused multilateral, took the unusual step of providing sustained funding absent a request and even directing the administration to deliver it to the institution. The US made a record pledge to IFAD’s most recent replenishment, but it remains to be seen whether Congress will deliver the full first installment for FY2025.
Takeaway 3: In contrast, the climate funds took a hit
Both the Obama and Biden administrations aimed to demonstrate international climate leadership, including through the provision of dedicated climate finance via multilateral funding. In contrast, President Trump has repeatedly made clear that he does not view tackling climate change as a priority. Nearing the end of his second term, President Obama requested funding to contribute to the Green Climate Fund (GCF), but Congress did not provide direct appropriations for the new climate multilateral and the administration’s subsequent decision to transfer flexible economic assistance dollars to the GCF fueled backlash from some lawmakers. The Trump administration did not request any funding for the GCF. Upon taking office, President Biden sought large sums for the GCF, but faced an uphill battle in Congress—ultimately choosing to transfer a more modest amount in the absence of dedicated funding.
The Global Environment Facility (GEF), a longer-running multilateral fund with a remit broader than climate, fared better than other environment-oriented funds. The GEF saw a modest reduction in funding during the Trump administration, despite efforts from the Trump White House to realize deeper cuts.
Two World Bank administered Climate Investment Funds (CIF)—the Clean Technology Fund (CTF) and the Strategic Climate Fund—enjoyed strong support from the Obama White House but proved less popular with lawmakers. The CIFs had been scheduled to sunset with the creation of the GCF, but that reality has yet to come to fruition. The Trump administration did not make any requests for CIF funding during his first term. After taking office, President Biden resumed requests for the Clean Technology Fund, but did so with plans to lend to the agency—requesting appropriations primarily for the subsidy cost of a loan—providing greater leverage than a grant contribution. Congress has consistently appropriated a far more modest sum to subsidize loans to the CTF.
The incoming administration’s rhetoric around climate leaves little doubt that they will scale back requests for climate-oriented funds. Still, the GEF, with its focus on conservation and biodiversity, could be the exception, having found some support in Trump’s first term and benefited from champions on both sides of the aisle.
Conclusion
The incoming administration will soon be confronted with funding decisions that will reverberate through the multilateral financing system, including how to treat inherited pledges to IDA and Gavi and approach upcoming replenishments for the Global Fund and AfDF. During the first Trump term, the funding cuts were often less dramatic than the rhetoric might have suggested, though climate resources were more scarce. We’ll be watching closely to see how the administration’s approach and dynamics with Congress might evolve in President Trump’s second term and the implications for these funds and more—in what increasingly looks to be an era of global aid austerity.
The authors are grateful to Erin Collinson for significant comments and suggestions.
Disclaimer
CGD blog posts reflect the views of the authors, drawing on prior research and experience in their areas of expertise. CGD is a nonpartisan, independent organization and does not take institutional positions.