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She is also the chair of the Latin American Committee on Macroeconomic and Financial Issues (CLAAF) and Adjunct Professor at the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, New York. From March 1998 to October 2000, she served as managing director and chief economist for Latin America at Deutsche Bank. Before joining Deutsche Bank, Rojas-Suarez was the principal advisor in the Office of Chief Economist at the Inter-American Development Bank. Between 1984 and 1994 she held various positions at the International Monetary Fund, most recently as deputy chief of the Capital Markets and Financial Studies Division of the Research Department. She has been a visiting fellow at the Institute for International Economics, a visiting advisor at the Bank for International Settlements and at the Central Bank of Spain. She has also served as a professor at Anahuac University in Mexico and advisor for PEMEX, Mexico’s National Petroleum Company. Rojas-Suarez has also testified before a Joint Committee of the U.S. Senate on the issue of dollarization in Latin America.
She has published widely in the areas of macroeconomic policy, international economics and financial markets in a large number of academic and other journals including Journal of International Economics, Journal of International Money and Finance, Journal of Development Economics, Journal of Contemporary Economic Policy, International Monetary Fund Staff Papers. She has also published or being cited in prestigious newspapers such as the Financial Times, the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post. She is also regularly interviewed by CNN en Español.
Michael P. Dooley & Donald J. Mathieson & Liliana Rojas-Suarez, 1997. "Capital Mobility and Exchange Market Intervention in Developing Countries" NBER Working Papers 6247, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Rojas-Suarez, L & Weisbrod, S-R, 1997. "Financial Markets and the Behavior of Private Savings in Latin America" Working Papers 340, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
McNelis, P.D. & Rojas-Suarez, L., 1996. "Exchange rate depreciation, Dollarization and Uncertainty: A Comparison of Bolivia and Peru" Working Papers 325, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
Rojas-Suarez, L. & Weisbrod, S.R., 1996. "Banking crises in Latin America: Experience and Issues" Working Papers 321, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
Rojas-Suarez, L. & Weisbrod, S.R., 1996. "Building Stability in Latin American Financial Markets" Working Papers 320, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
Rojas-Suarez, L. & Weisbrod, S.R., 1996. "Managing Banking Crises in Latin America: The Di's and Don'ts of Successful Bank Restructuring Programs" Working Papers 319, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
Rojas-Suarez, L. & Weisbrod, S., 1994. "Achieving Stability in Latin American Financial Markets in the Presence of Volatile Capital Flows" Working Papers 304, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
Each of the G20 summits of the past seven years has suffered in comparison with the London and Pittsburgh Summits of 2009, when the imperative of crisis response motivated leaders, finance ministers, and central bankers to coordinate effectively with each other. Subsequent summits have lacked the same sense of urgency and have failed to deliver any kind of agenda that can be pinpointed as clearly as “saving the global economy.” This week’s summit in Hamburg, Germany promises more of the same, with the real possibility that the G20’s stock could fall even further at the hands of a non-cooperative US delegation.
A rise in protectionism and increased external uncertainty may compound already existing domestic weaknesses. Latin America cannot run the risk of being unprepared for the significant potential direct and indirect effects of such a menace to its exports, capital inflows and growth.
A protectionist stance from the US looms large as a policy concern for Latin America, where many countries have chosen a growth model based on increased integration with the rest of the world. It may force a major policy revision involving trade and financial sectors. Moreover, the region may be impacted even if protectionist policies are geared to other regions, e.g., China, given that they may result in a deterioration of commodity prices.
What should Latin America’s response be? What are the alternative forms of trade integration and markets creation that the region should explore? What is the role for monetary, fiscal and financial policies? What are the mistakes of the past to be avoided? These are among the key and timely issues that the Latin American Committee on Macroeconomics and Financial Issues (CLAAF) will address.
The rate is still very low at 0.75% in the US, and, in addition, there is no perception or expectation that rates are about to rise in other advanced economies such as Japan or the EU. Taken together then, interest rates in advanced economies look set to stay extremely low. So, for now at least, emerging markets may not need to worry too much about capital inflows drying up. But in the medium to long term a problem may loom for emerging markets.
Many emerging economies could benefit from insurance against this backdrop of volatility. Fortunately, cheap and no-strings-attached liquidity insurance exists, in the form of the IMF’s Flexible Credit Line (FCL) for countries with very strong policy fundamentals; for countries with somewhat weaker, but still sound fundamentals, the Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL) offers a similarly good deal. But these precautionary instruments remain underutilized. We have some suggestions on how the IMF could fix this.
In the wake of the global financial crisis, the IMF undertook a series of reforms to its lending facilities to manage volatility and help prevent future crises. The reforms included the adoption of two new lending instruments: the Flexible Credit Line (FCL), introduced in 2009, and the Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL), introduced in 2011. They are meant to serve as precautionary measures—effectively, as insurance—for member states with a proven track economic record. Yet, the IMF’s precautionary instruments remain underutilized.
This paper presents lessons derived from the 2008–09 financial crisis for Latin America and developing countries in other regions that might seek economic growth in the context of greater integration to the international capital markets.
This paper addresses four misconceptions (or ‘myths’) that have likely played a role in the limited utilization of the IMF’s two precautionary credit lines, the Flexible Credit Line (FCL) and the Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL). These myths are 1) too stringent qualification criteria that limit country eligibility; 2) insufficient IMF resources; 3) high costs of precautionary borrowing; and 4) the economic stigma associated with IMF assistance. We show, in fact, that the pool of eligible member states is likely to be seven to eight times larger than the number of current users; that with the 2016 quota reform IMF resources are more than adequate to support a larger precautionary portfolio; that the two IMF credit lines are among the least costly and most advantageous instruments for liquidity support countries have; and that there is no evidence of negative market developments for countries now participating in the precautionary lines.
Regulators at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basel, Switzerland, are hard at work designing regulatory standards to avoid future financial meltdowns like the global financial crisis of 2008. Joining them for two months is Liliana Rojas Suarez, a CGD senior fellow and the founding chair of the Latin American Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee.
It’s been a tough few months for emerging-market currencies. The top slider, India’s rupee, has fallen 20 percent against the US dollar. The Indonesian rupiah and the Brazilian real have fallen about 15 percent; Turkey’s lira is down about 10. As the currencies fall, so do the countries’ international reserves, creating what’s known in non-technical terms as a really bad situation.