The belief that developed countries are primarily responsible for climate change runs deep. UNFCCC climate negotiations—which have been characterized by deep divisions between “developed” and “developing” countries—are shaped by it. This year’s COP is proving no exception. Fallouts over finance have been driven by perceptions and claims that climate change is all developed countries’ fault because of their historically much larger emissions.
In the past year I’ve asked dozens of colleagues and contacts what proportion of total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions since 1850 did they think had come from the 23 developed countries that have a formal responsibility to provide climate finance (the so called “Annex II” countries—USA, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and 18 European nations—that were OECD members in 1992). Virtually all answers exceeded 60 percent (even amongst those familiar with climate issues) and most exceeded 75 percent. Many answers—particularly amongst those less familiar with climate—exceeded 90 percent. This is just a small sample snapshot, but it illustrates just how firmly entrenched that narrative has become.
The actual answer (based on GHG emissions over the period 1850-2022 compiled by Our World in Data (OWID)) was 37 percent. We used this data in earlier analysis on “fair shares” of climate finance, and presented this figure in a previous blog on climate and development. It has been met with surprise, if not incredulity, in some quarters.
Counting GHG emissions is not straightforward. Assigning responsibility for climate change is even less so. Results are sensitive to the measure of emissions, the definition of “developed” countries, and the choice of data source. Yet understanding the true picture is critical for ongoing UNFCCC climate negotiations.
For a forthcoming working paper, we have been exploring this issue with a comparative analysis of different data sets, measures of emissions and definitions of “developed”. To our knowledge this has not been done before. Our preliminary findings suggest that while different data sources do indeed yield slightly different figures (and only two—OWID (drawing largely on Jones et al, 2024), and PRIMAP—cover all GHGs from all countries since 1850), those differences are not large.
We find that the current group of climate finance providers are responsible for just 37-41 percent of cumulative historical GHG emissions from 1850-2023. OWID’s data on contributions to global warming (or rises in global mean surface temperature (GMST), which take account of the short-lived nature of some GHGs such as methane) suggest Annex II shares that are lower still at 35 percent.
Expanding our definition of developed countries to all Annex I countries (which include the rest of Europe, Turkey, Russia and some former soviet republics) significantly increases their share of all GHGs to just over half (50-52 percent), although their share of contributions to global warming (or GMST, the metric that really matters) is still less than half at only 46 percent.
There are ways in which the share of historical emissions coming from developed countries can be made to appear larger. Limiting the measure of emissions to just CO2 (for which there are more data sources such as the Global Carbon Project), results in an Annex II share since 1850 of 39-44 percent, and an Annex I share of 53-55 percent (in this scenario shares of contributions to global warming are the same because the effects of CO2 persist for thousands of years). This is because non-CO2 emissions (especially from agriculture and some industrial processes) have been rising more rapidly than CO2 and are more concentrated in developing countries. But even this is still well short of widespread perceptions.
Excluding emissions from land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF, around which there is greater uncertainty) and limiting the measure of emissions to the burning of fossil fuels and industry (where chemical reactions unrelated to burning fuel produce carbon dioxide) increases developed country shares by 5-10 percent. The most extreme scenario (the highest estimate for CO2 emissions excluding LULUCF from all Annex I countries) yields a developed country share of 64 percent, which is getting closer to perceptions. But even if this was an appropriate measure, it is still hardly consistent with a claim that climate change is all the fault of developed countries.
But what about responsibility for colonial emissions?
Some have argued that this data fails to take account of colonial legacies. Carbon Brief found that attributing emissions from their colonies to the respective colonial power makes a significant difference to the emissions of some individual countries, notably the UK (whose cumulative emissions since 1850 are doubled) and Netherlands (tripled) though their analysis focuses just on CO2. However, we find that differences are not so large when looking at the shares of the Annex groups overall. For example, using Carbon Brief’s data on the patterns of colonial occupation increases the range of Annex II shares of all GHG emissions since 1850 from 37-41 percent to 42-45 percent, and increases the figure in our most extreme scenario from 64 to 65 percent. However, as Carbon Brief also acknowledge, it would be equally unreasonable to assign full responsibility to the colonial powers, and the true share of responsibility for current warming lies somewhere between these two extremes. In short, allowing for colonial legacies makes relatively little difference to the overall picture.
Part of the reason for this is that around 40 percent of GHG emissions have been produced since 1990, with emissions falling steeply in most advanced countries and rising rapidly in many emerging economies, a reflection of the extraordinary economic progress that many have made. As a consequence, the share of cumulative emissions since 1850 coming from developed countries is steadily falling. Moreover, if more recent cut-off dates from which emissions are counted were chosen (for which more datasets are available such as EDGAR and Climate Watch, although this is the subject of ongoing debate), the developed country share is lower still. The Annex II share of all GHG emissions since 1990 for example ranges from 30-34 percent, while their share of contributions to rises in GMST is just 25 percent. That said, there are critical ethical issues around per capita emissions that also need to be more fully considered.
What does this all mean for COP and climate negotiations?
None of this analysis is intended to imply that developed countries are off the hook, far from it. I’ve argued before that significantly higher levels of climate finance are required, and that developed countries must take the lead. Moreover, past emissions clearly cannot be the sole determinant of future obligations, regarding emissions or climate finance. Levels of development must also play a part. But even taking that into account (in a way that is highly favourable to developing countries compared to “fair shares” models that seek to allocate within Annex II countries), we concluded previously that the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities justifies (even demands) a 20-30 percent contribution from non-traditional (non-Annex II) donors. We also argued that all low and lower-middle income countries (including, crucially, India), all least developed countries, and all small island developing states should be exempted.
But the key points here are that the notion that climate change is mainly the fault of developed countries is a myth that needs to be busted, and that old distinctions between developed and developing countries are no longer fit for purpose. The International Court of Justice, in its landmark advisory opinion on the “Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change”, seems to agree. As indeed does the Baku to Belem roadmap, which suggests that climate finance is the responsibility of all countries. It’s time to move on.
Acknowledgements: with many thanks to Tom Veale for research assistance in support of this analysis.
