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CGD seeks to inform the US government’s approach to international development by bringing evidence to bear on questions of “what works” and proposing reforms to strengthen US foreign assistance tools.
The policies and practices of the US government wield formidable influence on global development. CGD seeks to strengthen US foreign assistance tools with evidence of “what works” and propose reforms grounded in rigorous analysis across the full range of investment, trade, technology and foreign assistance related issues. With high-level US government experience and strong research credentials, our experts are sought out by policymakers for practical ideas to enhance the US’s leading role in promoting progress for all.
This week, we took a broad look at what could be done to reform our foreign assistance architecture to reduce duplication and to make it more efficient, and we wrote about four steps the US government can take immediately toward those goals. You can read our full piece at Devex. Excerpts below.
The White House, State Department, and US Agency for International Development (USAID) reviews have rightly emphasized addressing duplication and inefficiency. But rather than focusing on a State/USAID merger, as has been widely rumored, the administration should look at something that leads to some of the biggest duplications, triplications, and even quadruplications of capacity that exists in the US government: the severe fragmentation of US development assistance.
Writing as former senior officials in two of the government’s largest development agencies—USAID and the Millennium Challenge Corporation—we have seen this fragmentation firsthand. The biggest efficiency gap in the US foreign affairs agencies is not the division between State and USAID—it is the diffusion of US development aid’s goals and roles across 20-some federal agencies and offices. State and USAID should remain separate and distinct—they have different missions, represent distinct professional disciplines, and require different organizational cultures. But the development architecture is long overdue for realignment and consolidation. We have just released a paper laying out a path for doing this—starting with a set of immediately actionable reforms, and moving from there toward a more fundamental reorganization plan.
1. Adapt foreign assistance to the realities of operating in fragile states.
The US must adapt as extreme poverty becomes increasingly concentrated in fragile and poorly governed states over the coming decade. By 2030, the share of global poor living in fragile and conflict-affected situations is projected to reach 46 percent. The US government must begin to give its foreign assistance efforts the nimbleness to address rapidly changing situations in fragile states. This means streamlining the procurement process for aid delivery in fragile states by responsibly expanding the use of USAID competition waivers, so that well-targeted development assistance can get there faster. It means allowing funds in the pipeline to be used more flexibly in post-disaster and transitional settings. And it means developing a new USAID mechanism for surging staff toward emergent crises and opportunities.
2. Focus on inclusive growth as a development objective.
Fostering more inclusive growth is a core development challenge for this decade and beyond, because growth in developing countries does not necessarily help their poorest citizens. Aid is not always the main tool in doing this. In relatively stable developing countries, development engagement should move toward catalyzing private finance and a country’s own domestic resources, rather than financing needs directly. A major step in this direction would be to expand the Overseas Private Investment Corporation into a full-fledged development finance institution, with a toolkit that is better suited to helping developing countries access private investment funds.
We should also embrace a longer-term role for the MCC, which works explicitly to foster economic growth. MCC’s default setting is to complete its engagement through one, or at most two, five-year compact programs, which is too short a timeline relative to the development trajectories of well-governed states. Eventual major reforms should expand MCC’s role over time so it has a more prominent leadership and coordinating role in promoting inclusive growth in better governed nations.
3. Reinforce—and grow—existing global health leadership.
Third, the US should reinforce its recognized leadership in global health as the world’s largest single investor. Programs such as the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief have achieved historic results, attracted bipartisan support, and shaped the global health landscape. But more can be done to align PEPFAR funding streams with US government agencies’ core capacities in conjunction with greater rigor and accountability for results.
In its early years, PEPFAR scaled up rapidly to respond to the urgent HIV/AIDS crisis, and as programming scaled up, an inconsistent division of labor emerged between the main implementing agencies, the Centers for Disease Control and USAID. The current division of labor is out of step with the two agencies’ distinct comparative advantages. The government should take a hard look at the roles and responsibilities now that the epidemic is moving to the stage of management and control versus emergency response—and recognize that more of the management, coordination, and day-to-day work should be led by the host countries themselves.
4. Streamline existing humanitarian aid efforts.
As the world contends with the highest level of displacement and humanitarian need in decades, the US should streamline and enhance its humanitarian aid efforts. The US funds roughly one quarter of the world’s humanitarian relief every year, providing the financial backbone of global crisis response. In 2015, USAID provided lifesaving support to 109 million victims of humanitarian emergencies around the world. But there is room for improvement.
USAID has long had two parallel offices responsible for humanitarian assistance: the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance and the Office of Food for Peace. In today’s world, food versus non-food is no longer a meaningful organizing principle for relief aid. To be fully effective, food aid programming depends on integrated water, nutrition, livelihoods, and health programming—and vice versa. These two offices should be merged and elevated.
By implementing changes that enable greater value for money, the US will be able to better maximize its impact within a flat or declining resource environment. This is by no means an exhaustive list of the reforms that could be undertaken, but these would be important first steps toward an aid system that is ready to confront present and future challenges.
CGD’s US Development Policy Initiative (DPI) has assembled five proposals to do foreign assistance better, drawing on both new and long-standing work and analysis from the Center. We believe there should be a shift in mindset to embrace “doing better” in a way that can be applied in times of budget-cutting or even budget expansion. The ideas we promote here offer ways in which our aid enterprise can pursue qualitative improvement alongside budgetary savings.
With last week’s decision by the Trump Administration to extend the review period for permanent removal of long-standing sanctions on Sudan, the debate over the nature of future US engagement with Sudan will continue. As this month’s report of the Atlantic Council’s Sudan Task Force points out, US support for debt relief will be high on the Sudanese government’s agenda; such relief would unlock international financing that supports economic development and poverty reduction. What the report does not mention is that such relief would likely require significant new funds being appropriated by Congress. In light of proposed cuts to US foreign aid and doubts about Sudan’s human rights record it is hard to imagine the US Congress agreeing to any money for Sudan debt relief now. But in the event the necessary political support is established down the road, I offer three options for addressing the financing challenge.
Sudan’s Debt is 60 Percent of its Entire GDP
As shown in the most recent World Bank/IMF debt sustainability assessment, Sudan is in debt distress. At end-2015, it had $48.2 billion in external public and publicly guaranteed debt, equivalent to roughly 60 percent of the country’s gross domestic product. 86 percent of the debt was in arrears. The Paris Club group of creditors accounted for almost $18 billion of the total, and the United States is reportedly the third largest Paris Club creditor. Virtually all the debt owed to the United States is in arrears.
Sudan is one of three remaining countries that are eligible for comprehensive debt relief under the HIPC Initiative , launched in 1996 (the other two are Somalia and Eritrea). Sudan’s access to debt relief is also a key element of the cooperation agreement with South Sudan. Under the 2012 agreement, Sudan agreed to retain all the external liabilities of the two states contingent upon a commitment from the international community to provide Sudan with debt relief within two years (the deadline has since been extended). This debt relief would allow Sudan to normalize relations with its creditors, including the international financial institutions (IFIs). The IFIs would then be in a position to finance development projects.
No HIPC debt relief without US participation
The HIPC debt relief process is extraordinarily complex, requiring a number of actions by creditors and the intended beneficiary. A key early step in the process is an IMF request for assurances from the Paris Club creditors that they will be in a position to provide preliminary debt relief (using so-called “Naples terms of treatment”). Without these “financing assurances” the HIPC process stops. Unfortunately for Sudan, the US is not currently able to provide such financing assurances as discussed below, and the likelihood for being able to do so down the road is bleak.
Roadblocks to US participation
While the US Congress has passed various laws that constrain any US support for the Sudanese government, there does not seem to be any provision that would bar bilateral debt relief, providing certain conditions are met and the necessary funds are appropriated. For example, the annual appropriations bill generally includes language prohibiting the use of funds for debt relief for Sudan, but it provides exclusions such as “assistance to support implementation of outstanding issues of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement [with South Sudan].” Presumably debt relief funds could be covered by this exclusion. A more significant obstacle is Sudan’s designation as a state-sponsor of terrorism, but there are reports it may be removed from the list and, in any case, the President has the authority to waive any legislative restrictions associated with such a designation.
The primary roadblock to US participation is lack of funds to cover the cost of debt relief. Under arcane US government accounting rules, the US government agencies that lent money to Sudan decades ago must be compensated for writing those debts off. According to the US Foreign Credit Reporting System, roughly 60 percent of what Sudan owes is held by the Department of Defense and 40 percent by the Department of Agriculture. And the amounts owed are increasing every year due to penalties and interest. Even though there is virtually no chance that Sudan will ever make payments, there is a residual value—the expected net present value—that will be calculated at the time the debt is written off. In the case of Sudan, this could amount to as much as $350-400 million by the end of FY2019.
Where to Find $400 Million for Debt Relief
The customary process for securing the necessary funds for HIPC debt relief is for the US Treasury Department to request the money in its portion of the overall foreign assistance request (once the budget is signed into law, Treasury dispenses the money to individual agencies to cover the debt relief costs). $400 million would represent a 25 percent increase over the FY2018 request, and the largest single amount ever requested for bilateral debt relief. In light of current budget constraints and the prospect for cuts to foreign assistance, it is implausible to think that there would be widespread support for any such request. (In fact, it should be noted that the Trump Administration FY2018 budget proposal did not include language from the Obama Administration budgets that contemplated transfer of funds from the State Department for this purpose).
I offer three possible options for the Administration and Congress to consider:
Follow the usual procedure, with Treasury requesting funds in its budget submission—presumably for FY2019—while explaining that the request is an anomaly that does not reflect an ongoing program.
Make the agencies that extended the loans cover the costs of debt relief in their own budgets. In the case of Sudan, the Department of Defense and USDA would take the hit. In view of the shrinking foreign assistance pie, it doesn’t seem right that Treasury Department would have to cover the costs of bad loans extended by these other agencies.
Ask Congress to waive the statutory requirements for funding debt relief for Sudan and strike it from the US books without an appropriation. There are sound arguments for providing such a waiver given the unique circumstances involved and it may be the only politically feasible option.
Doing nothing is not a viable option. If sanctions are permanently removed, pressure will immediately build to provide Sudan with debt relief so it can resume borrowing from the World Bank and other international financial institutions. Not only would the image of the United States, which has the largest economy in the world, be further tarnished by reneging on its past debt relief commitments, but the US would be accused of walking back from debt relief commitments made in the context of the Sudan-South Sudan cooperation agreement. This could exacerbate tensions in the east Africa region and weaken Sudan’s interest in working with the United States on regional conflicts and the threat of counterterrorism, among other issues.
The bevy of hearings revealed an Administration struggling to get its message straight on foreign aid. In one camp are those who favor sharp budget cuts and a shift away from a values-driven foreign policy—OMB director Mick Mulvaney, senior strategist Steve Bannon, and (perhaps to a lesser extent) Tillerson. But another camp advocates robust continued support for US global engagement and promotion of US values—including UN Ambassador Nikki Haley, Green, and Ivanka Trump. One of the big questions surrounding the President’s draconian foreign aid budget was how aggressively and effectively the administration would defend it, given these internal divisions.
In his hearings, Tillerson tried to split the difference but ultimately offered no compelling strategic rationale for the proposed cuts. With his strategic review of the Department still underway, he struggled to articulate why his “cut first, strategize second” approach wasn’t putting the cart before the horse. He asserted that the United States could slash resources by a third but sustain its leadership in international development, global health, and disaster response—but this ran into widespread, bipartisan skepticism from legislators.
Mark Green’s nomination hearing was strikingly different, and put him squarely in the more traditionalist camp. Speaker Paul Ryan, a fellow Wisconsinite, opened the hearing by praising Green and calling USAID “a very important agency at a very important time.” Green expressed a foreign aid vision more in step with the bipartisan consensus of the past decade—and received glowing reviews from senators as a result. Congress seems to be signaling its support for Green and Haley’s more mainstream approach to foreign assistance—but Green and Haley could still face an uphill battle in persuading their colleagues in the administration.
2. …and with Congress
Of course, the administration does not set foreign aid policy on its own. And Congress, importantly, controls the purse strings. Congressional leaders have been signaling for months that they continue to see value in constructive US engagement. But the big question has been how aggressively members would stand up to oppose the President’s proposed aid cuts.
If these hearings are any indication, Trump’s proposed spending reductions face strong headwinds on the Hill. Key members of both appropriations and authorizing committees have repeatedly indicated they will disregard them: Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) called the President’s budget “reckless,” Senator Bob Corker (R-TN) opened his hearing by calling it a “total waste of time,” and Representative David Cicilline (D-RI) noted that virtually every serious foreign affairs expert has dismissed it. Tillerson’s counter-arguments fell flat, and the administration’s efforts to defend the broader request have fallen short as well. In one telling example of the administration’s weak budget outreach, Representative Kay Granger (R-TX) told Tillerson that had she called his office four weeks ago to offer help and never received a response. This outreach is unlikely to improve: the lack of senior political appointees at State and USAID means the administration has few officials in place to sell its budget behind the scenes.
However, this does not mean development advocates can declare victory and pack it in. There is clear Congressional opposition to the massive cuts proposed in the Trump budget. But individual accounts still face risks, and cuts of even 5-10 percent—though less politically toxic—could still be damaging.
3. Cuts to humanitarian assistance are a front and center concern
Trump’s FY2018 budget request proposes to cut foreign aid across the board, but the 38 percent cut to humanitarian assistance garnered some of the most vocal opposition from lawmakers. Given four potential famines and the ongoing mega-crisis in Syria, we’re glad to see attention to these cuts. Multiple lawmaker across committees and party lines, including Senator Graham, Representative Chris Smith (R-NJ), and Representative Karen Bass (D-CA), pressed Tillerson and Green on the cuts to humanitarian assistance. Green pledged USAID would not be walking away from its commitment to humanitarian assistance.
The crisis in Yemen got particular attention—not just as a budget priority but as a policy issue. Senators Todd Young (R-IN) and Chris Murphy (D-CT) pressed Tillerson on the importance of diplomatic engagement to support humanitarian access there. This is critical, as humanitarian assistance on its own will not be able to contain the crisis there—a big diplomatic push will be needed.
4. The Hill wants a say in the State Department-USAID reorganization efforts
Members of Congress pressed Tillerson about plans to reorganize US development and diplomacy functions amid rumors the administration may seek to merge USAID into the State Department. Tillerson mostly punted on these questions. Numerous lawmakers nonetheless indicated they expect congressional involvement in any substantial decisions. Senator Todd Young directed attention to a task force on reform and reorganization he is co-chairing with Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), and Representative Eliot Engel (R-NY) pointed out that a reorganization process would require statutory changes (i.e. Congress would need to be involved).
During Green’s hearing, Senator Bob Menendez (D-NJ) likewise noted the USAID-State rumors and pressed the nominee on whether the United States’ primary aid agency should remain independent. Green avoided answering the question directly, but noted that USAID and the State Department have distinct roles and cultures.
Here at CGD, we have explored how to judge a State Department-USAID reorganization plan and will be publishing further ideas of potential reforms. Stay tuned for more work on this front in the coming weeks. Speaking of which….
5. A real opportunity for foreign aid reform?
Interestingly—and unexpectedly—the stars may be aligning to enable one of the best opportunities for serious foreign aid reform in years. But it will depend on which camp within the administration ends up leading on the design of potential reforms. Mark Green emphasized the need for reform as one of the main pillars of his testimony, citing the United States’ evolving relationship with the rest of the world and the need to update the US development policy toolbox. But Tillerson’s vocal defense of aid cuts raises questions about whether the ongoing review process at State will simply lead to a predetermined outcome. And OMB’s credibility to lead good-faith reforms is also questionable, given the draconian vision it outlined in the President’s budget.
But if, once confirmed, Green can grasp the lead on aid reform within the administration, he will find a receptive audience in Congress. The leadership of the congressional authorizing committees—on both sides of the aisle—is fairly unified in support for constructive reform. Given his favorable standing on Capitol Hill and the Hill’s clear interest in the issue, Green may have a unique opportunity to build bipartisan support for a smart set of reforms. There a plenty of options, from development finance to a multilateral review. Here’s hoping he can seize the opportunity.
I don’t claim to know about financing movies, but I have some sympathy for the bemusement Treasury Secretary Mnuchin has displayed over the state of US financing for the multilateral development banks (MDBs). At a recent budget hearing, committee chairman Hal Rogers drew Mnuchin’s attention to the fact that the “past due” notices from the World Bank and regional MDBs are now approaching a record $2 billion. Mnuchin acknowledged a problem, expressed some degree of mystification about federal budget accounting, and pledged to get things in order.
So what’s all of this about?
It’s true that the US government has gotten way behind in meeting its commitments to these institutions, and worse, is the only country in the world that routinely fails to make good on its MDB pledges.
Source: US Treasury
This problem does not exist when it comes to US capital contributions to the MDBs – that is, financial contributions that are tied directly to the purchase of equity shares with direct implications for voting power. When the United States pledges capital to the MDBs, it pays on time and in full with very few exceptions, out of fear of losing voting power. In contrast, the “arrears” problem afflicts the annual US grant contributions to the MDBs’ subsidized lending arms, largest of which is the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA).
So how did we get into such a fix? It’s because, unlike most other countries, the United States does not make pledges from a known pot of money. US Treasury officials make a pledge and then go to Congress the next year with hat in hand, asking that the pledged funds be appropriated. In most other countries, pledges are drawn from a pool of funds already appropriated by their parliaments. Given the very different sequencing, it’s not surprising that the track record for other countries in meeting their pledges is something like 99.9 percent, while for the United States a good outcome is something like 80-90 percent.
The MDBs themselves are complicit in the problem. The US pledge, typically one of the largest, has an inflationary effect on other donors, who tie their pledges automatically to the overall fundraising effort. For example, Belgium might pledge to meet one percent of the overall replenishment. So, the more the US pledges, the more Belgium automatically pays, no matter whether the United States ever fully delivers on its pledge. As a result, the MDBs themselves are aiming for the highest US pledge possible. You might think the other donor countries would be less enthused, but for the most part, they’ve been largely indifferent in recent years. This is likely because their politicians and parliamentarians are not entirely aware of the problem.
Mnuchin’s responses to Rogers were interesting. He was careful not to commit to make good on the past pledges. He simply pledged to fix the accounting. Given the cuts contained in the FY2018 budget, it may finally be time for the United States and the MDBs to end the dysfunctional relationship and simply acknowledge that much of these arrears will never be paid. That may be easier said than done, since any explicit agreement could very well provoke the negative reaction from other donors that has been seemingly dormant.
Whether he can produce a viable plan or not, Secretary Mnuchin’s instincts are right that there is some gimmickry in play here that is problematic. When the dollar amounts are small relative to the pledges themselves, it may not matter much. But with arrears that now equal the entire annual US contributions to the MDBs, it is too big of an issue to politely ignore.
Ambassador Mark Green—President Trump’s pick to lead the US Agency for International Development (USAID)—is slated to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for his nomination hearing on Thursday morning.
Green’s nomination was heralded by many in the international development community, who know his extensive development experience and orientation toward smart reform. While his qualifications are not in dispute, Green is likely to face questions from lawmakers about how he’ll position USAID for success, in light of massive budget cuts proposed by the administration and ongoing discussions of potentially major reorganization.
Drawing on themes of efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, and results, here are a few questions we’d pose to Ambassador Green (and a few of the things we’d love to hear in response).
How can USAID plan for sustainable engagement with partner countries over the medium to long term?
The administration proposed deep funding cuts that, if enacted, would appear to force the near-term closure of several USAID missions. Lessons from previous mission closures suggest hurried deadlines that leave insufficient time to develop a transition strategy in consultation with partner country and US interagency stakeholders can damage bilateral relationships and compromise US interests. Not only that, mission closures are costly in the short-term, so decisions to close that are revisited shortly thereafter (witness the reopening of the closed mission in Tunisia, for example) can be deeply inefficient. That said, USAID can and should do more to plan for what US engagement, in its set of partner countries, should look like over the medium to long-term. In some cases, especially among middle-income partner countries, that planning should consider shifting away from bilateral grant assistance. As part of prioritizing where USAID spends its grant resources and planning for how longer term US engagement should look, Green should reject hasty decision-making in favor of strategic processes that involve deep participation of partner country and interagency stakeholders. For countries under consideration for reduced grant-based assistance, we hope he will encourage missions to explore approaches and tools that help transition countries to a new kind of partnership. Avenues for engagement that move beyond traditional grant-based financing could include trade promotion, loans, and other sources of US development finance.
USAID has made significant progress toward greater accountability through transparency over the last two administrations. What will you do to build on that progress?
When Publish What You Fund first started measuring donors’ progress on transparency in 2011, USAID was in the bottom quartile of the evaluated agencies. By 2016 it ranked better than half of the 46 global donor organizations—a commendable jump in a fairly short time.
Green has an excellent opportunity to build upon recent momentum toward greater transparency by committing to publish USAID’s contracts. The benefits include shortening the chain of accountability, increasing the likelihood that contracts are in the public interest. It can also increase the quality and competition for contracts and has the potential to save the government money and prevent corruption. As our colleague Charles Kenny points out this is totally doable—in fact, other countries are already onboard.
Even short of agreeing to publish USAID contracts, Green could do more to ensure data on USAID contracts and their implementation is made available to the public. Under the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006, prime awardees of USAID contracts are required to report first-tier subawards, but that information isn’t published in any comprehensive way. (This is a big reason our colleagues had such a hard time tracking aid money that went to Haiti after the 2010 earthquake.) Green could take a small but meaningful step toward greater transparency by ensuring data on USAID subcontractors is made publicly available.
How will you work to institutionalize learning and evidence-based programming to maximize the potential for delivering results?
Both of the last two administrations have made concerted efforts to make US foreign assistance a more evidence-based enterprise. Important steps have been taken to increase evidence-based program design and to track and measure the outputs, outcomes, and impacts of US foreign assistance programs. Working with a strong policy foundation, Green could redouble USAID’s commitment to evaluate and learn from its programs and apply that learning (as well as external evidence) to future project design and implementation. The agency, with Green at the helm, also has the opportunity to develop leadership in emerging approaches in evidence-based programming. One interesting opportunity USAID has so far left on the table, is to pilot programs that disburse funds upon the achievement of outcomes. By exploring innovative approaches—such as cash on delivery and development impact bonds—the United States’ largest aid agency can ensure value for money from our aid dollars by paying only when development outcomes are achieved. And, again, the road is not untested. Rather than paying for textbooks, school construction, or teacher training, the UK’s aid agency committed to support education progress in Ethiopia by agreeing to pay a fixed amount for each additional student above a baseline to complete grade 10 and sit for the final exam. The same approach can be applied to sectors beyond education. The agency could agree to pay for each additional household and business with access to reliable electricity, or for decreased travel time and costs across a commercially valuable transit route. Let’s hope Green is willing to give it a shot.
How will you ensure that USAID's emerging "policy voice" doesn't disappear amidst budget cuts and structural changes?
Despite being the largest bilateral aid provider in the world, USAID has long suffered under an inferiority complex in relation to other aid agencies, particularly the UK's Department for International Development. In large part, that reputation came from being known more as a procurement agency than a development policymaker. Fortunately, the agency has made important strides in more recent years toward a robust internal policy function and a strong policy voice within the US government and in multilateral settings. It remains important for US interests around the world to have USAID at the table, helping to shape policy informed by experience on the ground. Policymakers at the State Department or Treasury typically lack an on-the-ground development perspective. And, if confirmed, it will fall to Green to ensure USAID continues to fulfill this important role. A US government foreign policy that lacks USAID’s vital input, whether pertaining to a country relationship or a multilateral set of issues, will be weaker and less effective as a result.
In your view, what is USAID’s comparative advantage vis-à-vis other US departments and agencies working to deliver US foreign assistance?
There are many US institutions involved in foreign assistance. (You can read more about the roles of a few key players here.) Members of the committee are likely to seek assurances from Green that he will provide a strong voice on development and humanitarian issues in any conversations on government reorganization. His approach to this will depend on how he views USAID’s role in the development and humanitarian landscape. Having served two stints on MCC’s board, Green will have a particular advantage in explaining USAID’s role relative to that of the Millennium Challenge Corporation whose model inherently limits its scope. But it will be critical for him to articulate USAID’s strengths and ensure that any reorganization seeks to capitalize on those.
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s appearances before important Congressional Committees this week give us some clues about where the battle lines will be drawn between the Trump Administration’s budget proposals, including an almost 30 percent reduction to the State Department, and the negotiating positions of US lawmakers keen to defend America’s role on the global stage.
Here, CGD experts Amanda Glassman, Scott Morris, and Jeremy Konyndyk weigh in on some of the key points we heard (and live tweeted) during Secretary Tillerson’s testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and, later, when he answered questions from the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs.
Did we miss anything? Please have your say in the comments section below. And thanks to Gailyn Portelance and Jared Kalow, star research assistants with CGD’s US Development Policy Initiative, for being on Twitter duty.