Center for Global Development presents a brown bag seminar on
Relationships, Dollars, and Development:
U.S. Aid and State-Building in Egypt, Jordan, South Korea, and Taiwan
University of Virginia
Anne is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Virginia.
Friday, February 20, 2009
Please bring your lunch--drinks provided
Center for Global Development
1800 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Third Floor, Washington, DC
Paper abstract: The very different institutional contributions of large-scale American aid to Egypt, Jordan, South Korea, and Taiwan are best explained by different authoritarian coalitions in each aid recipient. Rulers in Egypt and Jordan have based their rule on highly disparate, distributive coalition strategies and have thus incorporated foreign aid into institutions of patronage, while donor-financed parallel institutions also provide public goods and thereby allow central patronage institutions to remain in place. By contrast, rulers in South Korea and Taiwan relied upon narrow, developmental coalitions and used American financial and technical assistance to create new, more efficient institutions. As a geopolitically-concerned donor, the U.S. was acutely aware of coalition pressures in each recipient and configured aid as such.
Download Relationships, Dollars, and Development (pdf, 386K)
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